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Fostering Freedom Online: The Role of Internet Intermediaries
Abstract
“Fostering Freedom Online: the Role of Internet Intermediaries” is the title of a new title in the UNESCO
Internet freedom series. With the rise of Internet intermediaries that play a mediating role on the internet
between authors of content and audiences, UNESCO took a joint initiative, with the Open Society
Foundations, the Internet Society, and Center for Global Communication Studies at the University of
Pennsylvania’s Annenberg School for Communication, to examine this recent historical phenomenon and
how it impacts on freedom of expression and associated fundamental rights such as privacy.
The case study research, collaboratively delivered by 16 international researchers led by Ms Rebecca
MacKinnon and Mr Allon Bar, as well as 14 members of International Advisory Committee, covers of three
categories of intermediaries:

• Internet Service Providers (fixed line and mobile) such as Vodafone (UK, Germany, Egypt),
Vivo/Telefônica Brasil (Brazil), Bharti Airtel (India, Kenya), Safaricom (Kenya),
• Search Engines such as Google (USA, EU, India, China, Russia), Baidu (China), Yandex
(Russia) and
• Social Networking Platforms such as Facebook (USA, Germany, India, Brazil, Egypt),
Twitter (USA, Kenya), Weibo (China), iWiW (Hungary).
The research showed that internet intermediaries are heavily influenced by the legal and policy
environments of states, but they do have leeway over many areas of policy and practice affecting online
expression and privacy. The findings also highlighted the challenge where many state policies, laws, and
regulations are – to varying degrees – poorly aligned with the duty to promote and protect intermediaries’
respect for freedom of expression. It is a resource which enables the assessment of Internet
intermediaries’ decisions on freedom of expression, by ensuring that any limitations are consistent with
international standards.
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Foreword
UNESCO, as enshrined in its Constitution, promotes the “free flow of ideas by word and
image”, and is accordingly committed to enabling a free, open and accessible Internet
space as part of promoting comprehensive freedom of expression online and offline.
With the rise of Internet intermediaries that play a mediating role on the internet between
authors of content and audiences, UNESCO is interested in how this recent historical
phenomenon impacts on freedom of expression and associated fundamental rights
such as privacy. This interest is linked to our draft conceptual framework of “Internet
universality” which draws from UNESCO decisions on the Internet, and recognises that
four core principles should inform cyber actors. These principles are that the Internet
should be human rights-based, open, accessible for all and governed by multistakeholder participation.
The full range of intermediaries includes search engines and internet-service providers
(ISPs), hosting providers, cloud computing service through to online social networks, and
media houses which provide for user-generated comment such as comments, blogs or
citizen-journalism posts. These actors can enable freedom of expression in historically
unprecedented ways, but all of them also face challenges when it comes to dealing with
content which may transgress international standards for freedom of expression, be
illegal in terms of national laws, be legal but merit certain restrictions because of ethical
considerations, or be offensive in some eyes but not attracting restriction.
The decisions made by the diverse intermediaries on these pressing issues are partly
shaped by the legal liability regime that applies to the different kinds of service or role
provided. But there are also spaces where these actors make significant decisions within
a given law, where they contest a number of legal measures, and where they seek the
clarity of rule of law and one which is guided by international standards on free expression
and privacy.
Though these issues have been hotly debated in past years, there is still a lack of
empirical study highlighting the global complexity of the subject. This report fills the gap
by collecting and analyzing empirical data around practices with regard to monitoring,
surveillance, blocking, privacy-anonymity and take-down of content, and developing
best practice recommendations from these.
UNESCO has been pleased to work on this research project with the Open Society
Foundations, the Internet Society, and the Center for Global Communication Studies at
the University of Pennsylvania’s Annenberg School for Communication. The result is a
scholarly document that is based on a case study methodology. It is a resource which
enables the assessment of Internet intermediaries decisions on freedom of expression,
by ensuring that any limitations are consistent with international standards.

UNESCO has succeeded in raising awareness and promoting good practice through past
research in the UNESCO Series on Internet Freedom: Freedom of connection, freedom
of expression: the changing legal and regulatory ecology shaping the Internet (2011) and
Global survey on Internet Privacy and Freedom of Expression (2012).
We believe the rich material in this, the third in UNESCO’s Series on Internet Freedom, will
be of great value to all stakeholders. These are industry actors, UNESCO Member States,
technical community, Intergovernmental organizations, private sector, civil society, and
others both national and international.
The research also helps to inform UNESCO’s implementation of a comprehensive and
consultative multi-stakeholder Internet study as mandated by the Organization’s 37th
General Conference Resolution 52. The study, due in 2015, covers UNESCO’s key
competence areas of access to information and knowledge, freedom of expression,
privacy, and ethical dimensions of the information society, and contains possible options
for future actions.
Rich as it is, this report only covers three intermediary types - Internet Service Providers,
Search Engines and Social Media. It will be followed by future studies on other intermediary
types, including data processing, web hosting providers, cloud computing services, and
domain name registries, as well as online media with substantial user-generated content.
UNESCO expresses its thanks to 16 international researchers led by Ms Rebecca
MacKinnon and Mr Allon Bar, as well as 14 members of an International Advisory
Committee, who have jointly delivered this work. UNESCO also thanks Mr Edward
Pittman from the Open Society Foundations, Mr Nicolas Seidler from the Internet Society
and Mr Monroe Price from the Center for Global Communication Studies at the University
of Pennsylvania’s Annenberg School for Communication, for their institutions’ financial
contributions and administrative support to the research.

Getachew Engida
Deputy Director-General of UNESCO
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Executive summary
Freedom of expression is a universal human right that applies equally to the internet as
to the offline world.1
As an international intergovernmental organization with a global remit that promotes
universal values, UNESCO is exploring a conceptual framework of internet ‘universality’
according to which respect for four core principles is a precondition for the Internet to
be universal: human rights, openness, accessibility; and multistakeholder participation.
The four can be summarized by the mnemonic R – O – A – M (Rights-based, Open,
Accessible, Multistakeholder driven).2 This report addresses challenges for realizing the
first principle, human rights. The research also helps to inform UNESCO’s implementation
of a comprehensive and consultative multi-stakeholder Internet study as mandated by
the Organization’s 37th General Conference Resolution 52.3.
The goal of this report is to shed light on how internet intermediaries – services that
mediate online communication and enable various forms of online expression – both
foster and restrict freedom of expression across a range of jurisdictions, circumstances,
technologies, and business models.
All of the intermediaries studied in this report are operated by companies. According to
the UN Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights, states have the primary duty
to protect human rights, businesses have a responsibility to respect human rights, and
both must play a role in providing remedy to those whose rights have been violated.4
The report’s authors have applied this ‘protect, respect, and remedy’ framework to the
policies and practices of companies representing three intermediary types (internet
service providers, search engines, and social networking platforms) across ten countries.
The three case studies highlight challenges and opportunities for different types of
intermediaries in respecting and protecting online freedom of expression.

1
2

3

4

United Nations Human Rights Council. 16 July 2012. The promotion, protection and enjoyment
of human rights on the Internet. United Nations Human Rights Council (A/HRC/RES/20/8). http://
ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?si=A/HRC/RES/20/8
UNESCO. July 2014. Internet Universality: A Means towards Building Knowledge Societies
and the Post-2015 Sustainable Development Agenda. Draft Proposed by the Secretariat.
http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/CI/CI/pdf/news/internet_universality_
summary_240314_en.pdf
UNESCO General Conference. November 2013. 37 C/Resolution 52. Internet related issues:
including access to information and knowledge, freedom of expression, privacy and ethical
dimensions of the information society http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/CI/
CI/pdf/news/37gc_resolution_internet.pdf
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. 2011. Geneva, United Nations, p. 4. www.
ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf
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Findings
Operations of internet intermediaries are heavily influenced by the legal and policy
environments of states. Research findings highlight the extent to which state policies,
laws, and regulations – to varying degrees – are inadequately aligned with their duty to
facilitate and support intermediaries’ respect for freedom of expression. At the same
time, the three case studies also document the extent to which companies are able to
control many aspects of their policies and practices affecting online expression.
There is currently a trend among some internet intermediaries called ‘transparency
reporting’: the disclosure of information about government and other lawful requests
to restrict content, hand over user data or comply with other surveillance-related
requirements. This report uses the term “requests” to cover the broad range of
instructions, injunctions and demands made on intermediaries. There is also a movement
among human rights advocates from a range of countries, some companies, and some
investors calling for greater transparency by governments about requests being made of
companies. Regarding these transparency-related trends this report contains two overarching findings:
1.

To the extent that intermediaries and governments have grown more transparent
about requests made by governments to companies, there is much more transparency
about surveillance and user data requests (directly affecting internet users’ privacy)
than about demands to restrict content and block communications.

2.

For those intermediaries that publish ‘transparency reports’, disclosure has been
largely limited to government or other demands made through legal processes, and
the companies’ handling of such demands. Few efforts have been made thus far by
intermediaries to be more transparent about extra-legal content restrictions, as well
as content removal and account deactivation and other actions taken to enforce
intermediaries’ own self-regulatory terms of service. Corporate transparency around
collective self-regulatory efforts was also found to lag behind transparency related to
direct government requests.

More specific findings of the three case studies can be summarized as follows:
STUDY 1: Internet Service Providers (fixed line and mobile) - Vodafone (UK, Germany,
Egypt), Vivo/Telefônica Brasil (Brazil), Bharti Airtel (India, Kenya), Safaricom (Kenya)
Across jurisdictions, stakeholders interviewed for this report highlighted the importance
of ISPs and their key role in enabling expression. At the same time, ISPs can be a single
point of failure for expression online particularly when content or entire services are
filtered (blocked from being accessed by the user) or networks are shut down locally
or nationally. Because ISPs must be physically present in a country in order to provide
service and operate, the extent to which they facilitate or restrict freedom of expression
is most directly affected by laws, regulations, and government actions compared to the
other intermediaries studied. Findings include:
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•

Levels of transparency on matters related to privacy and surveillance are very low.
Respect and protection of privacy by companies and governments is an enabler of
freedom of expression.5 Yet some companies studied do not have publicly available
privacy policies for their core services in some countries. Data protection practices
varied widely in tandem with whether or not countries had data protection laws. Few
companies make an effort to be transparent about how they respond to government
requests, or speak up for their users, even in relatively open political and media
environments.

•

Governments and companies offer even less transparency about restrictions of
content and user expression made by and through ISPs than about policies and
practices related to privacy and surveillance. This includes filtering and network
shutdowns. “Self-regulatory” filtering processes suffer from questions about public
accountability in their decision making about what content to restrict.

•

With the emergence of an initiative called the Telecommunications Industry Dialogue,
the two member companies included in this report Vodafone and (to a much more
general degree) Telefonica have made public commitments to respect user rights,
advocate for users with governments, and be more transparent. Because these
commitments have just begun to be implemented, it is too early to know the concrete
impact of these commitments on users’ freedom of expression.

STUDY 2: Search Engines - Google (USA, EU, India, China, Russia), Baidu (China),
Yandex (Russia) Search engines are a principal means by which internet users find
and access information. Thus, their policies and practices affecting what content can
or cannot be found online have major implications for freedom of expression. Of the
companies studied, researchers found that search engines’ policies and practices related
to content restriction and manipulation are shaped by their home jurisdictions and to
varying degrees by other jurisdictions in which they operate. Findings include:
•

Differences in ISP filtering regimes have a strong influence on how, and to what
extent, search engines restrict their own search results. For example, due to
substantial difference in the technical and legal characteristics of filtering in Russia
and China, Yandex and Baidu have very different restriction practices, and Google
has taken different approaches to the two markets (remaining in Russia as of August
2014 but removing its operations from China since 2010).

•

The stricter the intermediary liability regime in a given jurisdiction, the more likely
content is to be removed either proactively by the company or upon request
by authorities without challenge. Without government transparency, company
transparency reports (Google was the only one of the three search engines studied)
are the only way for users to ascertain the extent and nature of requests being made.

•

While search engines carry out content restriction on government request, they
also restrict or modify search results for many other commercial and self-regulatory

5

Navi Pillay. 30 June 2014. The right to privacy in the digital age: Report of the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. (A/HRC/27/37), p. 15. www.ohchr.org/EN/
HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session27/Documents/A.HRC.27.37_en.pdf
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reasons, including user personalization and enforcement of companies’ own rules
about what content is acceptable to appear on their services.
STUDY 3: Social Networking Platforms - Facebook (USA, Germany, India, Brazil,
Egypt), Twitter (USA, Kenya), Weibo (China), iWiW (Hungary) Social networking
platforms have significantly lowered the threshold for individuals to publish content that
can reach large audiences. For the two platforms with international user bases (Facebook
and Twitter), researchers identified tensions between the companies’ own policies and
practices and governments’ laws and regulations. The policies and practices of the more
domestically focused platforms more closely mirror home governments’ expectations
and requirements. Findings include:
•

Transparency reports published by Facebook and Twitter reveal the extent to
which intermediary liability regimes affect the volume of government requests that
companies receive to hand over user data and restrict content. The reports also
reveal that companies have legal cause to decline a large percentage of requests
made by many governments.

•

The two companies studied that publish transparency reports define and categorize
data in different ways, and choose to reveal or not reveal different types of information,
making reports difficult to compare. Also, companies are much more transparent
about how they respond to government requests than they are about the nature and
volume of content restricted for violation of their own private rules.

•

There is significant concern amongst some human rights advocates, including for
example those working to stop gender-based violence and online hate speech,
about companies’ lack of communication with users about how terms of service are
developed, interpreted and enforced.

•

Given the significant amount of personal information collected by social networking
platforms, these intermediaries have a special responsibility to take steps to
anticipate harms to user privacy and to take steps to mitigate them.

•

Even in countries with strict intermediary liability laws where companies face strong
pressure from authorities to proactively restrict content and hand over user data,
there are measures companies can take to be more transparent and demonstrate
respect for users’ rights. These include taking maximum possible steps to inform
users when content is restricted, and also under what circumstances their personal
information is collected and how it is shared.

Recommendations:
The report recommends specific ways that intermediaries can improve respect for
internet users’ right to freedom of expression. It also offers recommendations for states
to support and facilitate intermediaries’ respect for users’ rights. Key recommendations
include:
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•

Adequate legal frameworks and policies: Laws and regulations governing
intermediaries should be consistent with international human rights norms, including
the right to freedom of expression;

•

Multistakeholder policy development: Laws, regulations and governmental
policies, as well as corporate policies and rules, should be developed in consultation
with all affected stakeholders;

•

Transparency: Legitimacy and public trust depends on demonstrating that
governance and enforcement actions – whether in accordance with the law or
enforcement of intermediaries’ own terms of service – are in compliance with prespecified principles, rules and conditions. Transparency reporting and other actions
to communicate with the public about company policy and practice should be
comprehensive and sufficiently standardized so that it is possible to compare and
analyze datasets across multiple companies.

•

Privacy: Protecting internet users’ right to privacy via intermediaries is essential for
the flourishing of freedom of expression. Data protection regimes at the national level
are vital, as are legal frameworks and other mechanisms to ensure that government
access to user data and company practices in handling government requests are
based on strict principles of necessity, proportionality, and accountability in terms of
remedial mechanisms.

•

Accountability in self-regulation: Intermediaries’ private rules and accompanying
enforcement processes, as well as government-supported efforts by companies to
collectively self-regulate, should be compatible with human rights norms, including
the right to freedom of expression. They should adhere to core principles of
accountability, transparency and due process.

•

Remedy: It should be possible for people to report grievances and obtain redress
from private intermediaries as well as from state authorities, including from nationallevel human rights institutions.

•

Public information and education: In order for freedom of expression to be
protected and respected online, governments and companies have a responsibility
to consult with stakeholders on their laws and rules and explain them clearly. They
also have an obligation to educate users about their rights so that people can
understand and effectively exercise them; recognize when their rights have been
restricted, violated, or otherwise interfered with; and know where and how to report
grievances and seek redress.

•

Global accountability mechanisms: New structures such as the multistakeholder
Global Network Initiative and the industry-organized Telecommunications Industry
Dialogue have begun to have an impact on concrete commitments by companies
to respect user rights and implement relevant policies and practices. Stakeholders
concerned with protecting online freedom of expression should consider how to
support and broaden global mechanisms that strengthen the incentives and capacity
for intermediaries to respect internet users’ rights, particularly in the area of selfregulation.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Consider three recent developments and their implications for online freedom of
expression around the world:
On 3 April 2014, the Turkish Government lifted a two-week block on the social networking
service Twitter, after the Constitutional Court of Turkey, the country’s highest legal body,
ruled that the ban violated the right to freedom of expression. Although it successfully
contested the block in court, Twitter did agree to restrict an account accusing a former
minister of corruption by making the account inaccessible to internet users with IP
addresses originating from Turkey. The account and its contents remained visible to
everyone else in the world.6
On 13 May 2014, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) ruled that Google
must respect the ‘right to be forgotten’ and enable individuals to request the removal
from its search engine of links that were ‘inadequate, irrelevant or no longer relevant, or
excessive in relation to the purposes for which they were processed and in the light of the
time that has elapsed’.7 While the long-term impact of the CJEU decision has yet to play
out, critics expressed concern that politicians and other powerful public figures would
abuse this right to the detriment of freedom of expression.8
On 6 June 2014, in the period subsequent to Edward Snowden, a former contractor for
the United States National Security Agency (NSA) releasing his first revelations about the
US Government’s surveillance of domestic and global networks, Vodafone, the world’s
second-largest telecommunications company with 434 million customers worldwide,9
released a report analysing ‘law enforcement demands received based on data gathered
from [Vodafone’s] local licensed communications operators’ in the 29 countries in which
it operates.’10 Most relevant from the point of view of international standards for the right
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Ceylan Yeginsu. 4 April 2014. Turkey Lifts Twitter Ban After Court Calls It Illegal. New York Times. www.
nytimes.com/2014/04/04/world/middleeast/turkey-lifts-ban-on-twitter.html
(Accessed 16 July
2014.)
Alan Travis and Charles Arthur. 13 May 2014. EU court backs ‘right to be forgotten’: Google must
amend results on request. The Guardian. www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/may/13/right-tobe-forgotten-eu-court-google-search-results (Accessed 16 July 2014.)
Mark Stephens. 18 May 2014. Only the powerful will benefit from the ‘right to be forgotten’. The
Guardian.
www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/may/18/powerful-benefit-right-to-be-forgotten
(accessed 16 July 2014.)
Vodafone Group Plc. 20 May 2014. Empowering everybody to be confidently connected: Annual
Report 2014. England, Vodafone, p. 1. www.vodafone.com/content/annualreport/annual_report14/
downloads/full_annual_report_2014.pdf
Vodafone Group Plc. 20 May 2014. Law Enforcement Disclosure Report. www.vodafone.
com/content/sustainabilityreport/2014/index/operating_responsibly/privacy_and_security/law_
enforcement.html
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to privacy,Vodafone revealed that in six of those countries, government authorities can
tap directly into the company’s networks.11
Google’s search engine, Twitter’s social network, and Vodafone’s telecommunication
and internet services are called internet intermediaries because they mediate
online communication and enable various forms of online expression. However,
intermediaries can also act as chokepoints, arbiters or ‘gatekeepers’ of expression.12
This powerful role prompted one legal scholar to write that ‘Internet intermediaries govern
online life’.13 A recent book on the internet and human rights by one of this report’s authors
calls them ‘sovereigns of cyberspace’.14
Yet intermediaries’ power can only be fully understood in the context of state power.
The position of internet intermediaries in relation to states and to international human
rights standards is complicated: Internet intermediaries often operate across a variety
of jurisdictions, and states expect them to comply with national laws that in turn align in
varying degrees with international human rights norms. Optimists have regarded these
companies as a source of ‘liberation technology’ that will help unshackle the hands of
the oppressed.15 Others have critiqued them for failing to protect user privacy rights and
facilitating unaccountable surveillance by the private sector as well as governments.16
Intermediaries clearly have a powerful and positive role to play in fostering rights. However
as this report will show, in order to protect freedom of expression, they need to follow
international standards of transparency, necessity, proportionality, legitimate purpose,
and due process in order not to engage in violation of rights.

1.1 Freedom of Expression Online
Freedom of expression is established under Article 19 of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR).17 Article 19 of the UDHR reads:
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Amy Thomson and Danielle Lepido. 6 June 2014. Vodafone Prompts Protests Over Government
Wiretapping. Bloomberg.
www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-06-06/vodafone-says-29-governments-ask-for-access-to-itsuser-data.html (Accessed 16 July 2014); Vodafone Law Enforcement Disclosure Report. op. cit.
Jonathan Zittrain. Spring 2006. A History of Online Gatekeeping. Harvard Journal of Law & Technology,
Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 253–98. http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/articles/pdf/v19/19HarvJLTech253.pdf
Frank A. Pasquale. 2010. Beyond Innovation and Competition: The Need for Qualified Transparency
in Internet Intermediaries. Northwestern University Law Review, Vol. 104, No. 1, p. 105. www.law.
northwestern.edu/lawreview/v104/n1/105/LR104n1Pasquale.pdf
Rebecca MacKinnon. 2012. Consent of the Networked: The Worldwide Struggle for Internet
Freedom, New York, Basic Books, pp. 6, 115–68.
Larry Diamond. July 2010. Liberation technology. Journal of Democracy, Vol. 21, No. 3, pp. 69–83.
www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/gratis/Diamond-21-3.pdf
Bruce Schneier. 20 November 2013. ‘Stalker economy’ here to stay. CNN. http://edition.cnn.
com/2013/11/20/opinion/schneier-stalker-economy/index.html (Accessed 17 July 2014.)
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. 23 March 1976. International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx
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Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes
freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart
information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.18
This right therefore covers the freedom to express and publish content as well as to have
access to such content. As such, it provides for the right to press freedom and the right to
information, and these apply across media platforms and national frontiers. International
standards require that any limitations of these rights should be exceptions to the norm,
and be based on legitimate purposes as set out in the UDHR and ICCPR. Likewise,
limitations of any right need further to made be in terms of law, and be necessary and
proportionate.
In 2012 the United Nations Human Rights Council adopted a landmark resolution
affirming that ‘the same rights that people have offline must also be protected online’.19
It acknowledged the 2011 reports on ‘the right to freedom of opinion and expression
exercised through the Internet’ by UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection
of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression Frank La Rue, which highlighted
how freedom of expression can be fostered as well as violated through the internet.20
La Rue warned of ‘increased restrictions on the Internet through the use of increasingly
sophisticated technologies to block content, monitor and identify activists and critics,
criminalization of legitimate expression, and adoption of restrictive legislation to justify
such measures’.21
In early June 2013, in the period before Snowden began to unveil revelations about the
U.S. Government’s surveillance, La Rue published another privacy-related document
examining the impact of State surveillance on freedom of expression.22 Especially relevant
to this current report is La Rue’s discussion of the private sector’s key role in facilitating
state surveillance, by 1) ‘hav[ing] had to respond to requirements that digital networks
and communications infrastructure be designed to enable intrusion by the State’; (2)
‘developing and deploying new technologies and communications tools in specific ways’;
or even (3) ‘[being] complicit in developing technologies that enable mass or invasive
surveillance in contravention of existing legal standards’.23
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United Nations. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights. www.un.org/en/documents/udhr
Emphasis added.
United Nations Human Rights Council. 16 July 2012. The promotion, protection and enjoyment
of human rights on the Internet. United Nations Human Rights Council (A/HRC/RES/20/8). http://
ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?si=A/HRC/RES/20/8
Frank La Rue. 10 August 2011. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection
of the right to freedom of opinion and expression. (United Nations General Assembly document
A/66/290). www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Opinion/A.66.290.pdf (Accessed 17 July 2014);
Frank La Rue. 16 May 2011. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of
the right to freedom of opinion and expression. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights. (A/HRC/17/27). http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/17session/A.
HRC.17.27_en.pdf
A/HRC/17/27. p. 7.
Frank La Rue. 17 April 2013. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of
the right to freedom of opinion and expression. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights. (A/HRC/23/40). www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/
Session23/A.HRC.23.40_EN.pdf
La Rue, A/HRC/23/40, op. cit., pp. 19–20.
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La Rue also emphasized the importance of ‘private, secure, and anonymous’
communications, describing the ‘chilling effect’ of excluding individuals from vital social
spheres and ‘dissuading the free expression of information and ideas’ when restrictions
are placed on people’s ability to communicate anonymously.24 Later in 2013, La Rue’s
‘surveillance’ report was further reinforced by a UN General Assembly resolution on the
right to privacy in the digital age. It called on states to respect the right to privacy in digital
communications and take measures to prevent violations, including a review of existing
laws and practices and the establishment of oversight mechanisms.25
UNESCO follows the UN’s position on human rights, based on the UDHR, and therefore
the position that human rights are indivisible26, recognizing thereby that particular
actions concerning the right to privacy can impact on other rights, such as the right
to freedom of expression, and vice versa. As stated in UNESCO’s 37 C/Resolution 52,
“privacy is essential to protect journalistic sources, which enable a society to benefit from
investigative journalism, to strengthen good governance and the rule of law, and that
such privacy should not be subject to arbitrary or unlawful interference”.27 At the same
time, privacy may also not be used to shield violations of individual rights or to block
the media from exposing these. Public interest must enter any calculation of reconciling
rights.
This report builds on three UNESCO-commissioned works that have underscored the
internet as an essential component of people’s ability to exercise their right to freedom
of expression, and written over the same time period as the developments described
above. A 2011 UNESCO report called Freedom of Connection – Freedom of Expression:
The Changing Legal and Regulatory Ecology Shaping the Internet provides an overview of
the legal and regulatory contexts in which countries seek to balance the responsibility to
protect freedom of expression with other rights, alongside other goals of the State, such
as economic development, trade and industrial policy.28 UNESCO’s 2012 Global Survey
on Internet Privacy and Freedom of Expression points out that poor privacy protection
has a negative impact on freedom of expression.29 UNESCO’s 2014 report World Trends
in Freedom of Expression and Media Development states that in addition to breaches
of privacy, fear of reprisal also leads to self-censorship – by users as well as internet
intermediaries.30
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Resolution 52 of the 37th General Conference in 2013 mandates UNESCO to conduct
a comprehensive and consultative multi-stakeholder study on Internet-related issues
within the mandate of UNESCO, including access to information and knowledge,
freedom of expression, privacy, and ethical dimensions of the information society, and
containing possible options for future actions. The results of this Study should inform the
Organization’s reporting on the implementation of the World Summit on the Information
Society (WSIS) outcomes to the 38th General Conference in 2015. This research is
conducted as an integral component of this ongoing exploration of Internet related issues
within UNESCO’s mandates.

1.2 Business and Human Rights
International human rights law has traditionally focused on state conduct. Its foundations
are declarations drafted by and voted for by governments, and agreements concluded
between states.31 Over the past several decades, however, there is growing recognition
that businesses also have human rights responsibilities for which they should be held
accountable.
Because most internet intermediaries are operated by private-sector companies, this
report builds on established human rights standards for business and human rights laid
out by the UN’s ‘protect, respect and remedy’ framework. It argues that governments
have the primary duty to protect human rights, but companies also have a responsibility
to respect human rights; both entities must ensure access to effective remedy.32
Building on that framework, in 2011 the Human Rights Council endorsed the Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights, the result of six years of research and
consultation with companies, governments and civil society by Prof. John Ruggie, the
UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Business and Human Rights.
The Guiding Principles begin with the duty of States to protect against human rights
abuses by businesses operating within their territory, and to ‘set out clearly the expectation
that all business enterprises domiciled in their territory and/or jurisdiction respect human
rights throughout their operation.’33
The Guiding Principles outline three concrete steps for companies:34
1.

31
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Make a ‘policy commitment to meet their responsibility to respect human rights’;

Philip Alston. 2005.The ‘Not-a-cat’ Syndrome: Can the International Human Rights Regime
Accommodate Non-State Actors? Philip Alston (ed.), Non-State Actors and Human Rights.
Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 3-4.
Business and Human Rights Resource Centre. September 2010. The UN ‘Protect, Respect and
Remedy’ Framework for Business and Human Rights. www.reports-and-materials.org/sites/default/
files/reports-and-materials/Ruggie-protect-respect-remedy-framework.pdf
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. 2011. Geneva, United Nations, p. 4. www.
ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf
Ibid, pp. 13–28.
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2.

Develop a ‘human rights due diligence process to identify, prevent, mitigate and
account for how they address their impacts on human rights’;

3.

Initiate ‘processes to enable the remediation of any adverse human rights impacts
they cause or to which they contribute’.

These principles apply to all companies – not just internet intermediaries. They also apply
universally. As UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay wrote in her June
2014 report to the General Assembly, ‘The responsibility to respect human rights applies
throughout a company’s global operations regardless of where its users are located, and
exists independently of whether the State meets its own human rights obligations’.35
This report seeks to explain what internet intermediaries can do to maximize freedom of
expression across a range of jurisdictions, circumstances, technologies and business
models.

1.3 Intermediaries
An intermediary is ‘any entity that enables the communication of information from one
party to another.’36 In a 2010 report, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) explains that internet intermediaries ‘bring together or facilitate
transactions between third parties on the Internet. They give access to, host, transmit
and index content, products and services originated by third parties on the Internet or
provide Internet-based services to third parties.’37
It is important to note that most definitions of intermediaries explicitly exclude
content producers, as does this report. More explicitly, the OECD excludes from the
intermediary’s function ‘activities where service providers give access to, host, transmit
or index content or services that they themselves originate.’38 In other words, in this
view, publishers and other media that create and disseminate original content are not
intermediaries. Examples of such entities include news websites that publish articles
written and edited by staff or invited contributors, or a digital-video subscription service
that hires or invites people to produce videos and then disseminates them to subscribers.
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At the same time, many entities offer hybrid services and constitute intermediaries to one
extent or another. (This is particularly the case with traditional media organizations that
also provide social networking or facilitate the sharing of user generated content, a type
of hybrid intermediary not covered in this report.) To what extent social media services,
for instance, are primarily intermediaries or also operate a media function, is important
in terms of expectations. The Council of Europe has adopted a broad definition of media
using six criteria to assess when new actors count as media. These criteria include intent
to act as media, exercise of editorial control (with an editorial policy, process and staff),
and application of professional standards. The effect of this is to recognise that, ‘given
media’s needs and role in society, certain general provisions may need to be interpreted
specifically for the media (for example in respect of defamation, surveillance, stop and
search, state secrets or corporate confidentiality)…’. The Council of Europe’s position
also states that ‘a differentiated and graduated approach requires that each actor whose
services are identified as media or as an intermediary or auxiliary activity benefit from both
the appropriate form (differentiated) and the appropriate level (graduated) of protection
and that responsibility…’.39
Some stakeholders, however, have raised concerns that efforts by some states to define
intermediaries as ‘media’ has resulted in stronger restriction on freedom of expression
in a number of countries. Speaking at the 2014 Internet Governance Forum, one Google
executive argued that in his company’s experience ‘the application of traditional media
laws to this space’ is ‘used primarily as a way of stifling speech’.40
At the same time, all commercially operated Internet intermediaries studied in this report
do require users to agree to ‘terms of service’ before they are allowed to use the service.
Sometimes such terms may restrict users’ speech that is actually protected by the law
in some jurisdictions. (For example: Facebook and Twitter ban adult nudity and various
forms of hate speech on their platforms in the United States even though most such
content is not illegal in the US.) While the enforcement of such terms may resemble an
editorial function, the legal basis for terms of service enforcement in the US and Europe
(where internet intermediaries first emerged) is derived not from media law but from
contract and commercial law, whereby companies have a right to require that users abide
by terms of service in exchange for the provision of an online service operated by a
private or commercial entity.41
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1.3.1 Types of Intermediaries
This report thus focuses on services and platforms that host, give access to, index, or
facilitate the transmission and sharing of content created by others. As intermediaries’
importance has grown not only for freedom of expression but also for the global
knowledge economy, a number of organizations have sought to describe or categorize
intermediary types by their roles and technical function. These include the OECD, the
UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, and civil society organizations such
as Global Partners, Article 19 and the Center for Democracy and Technology. The table
below provides a comparison of the key intermediary types that these organizations have
characterized or singled out for examination.

Table 1: categories and key examples of Internet intermediaries 42 43 44 45 46
OECD42

Special Rapporteur

Article 19344

CDT45

Global Partners46

Internet service
providers (ISPs)

Access providers/ISPs

Physical layer: makes
communications
possible

La Rue43
Internet access and
service providers

Internet service
providers (ISPs)

Data processing and
web hosting providers

Web hosting providers

Network operators
and mobile
telecommunications
providers
Domain registrars and
registries

Connectivity &
code: the language
or protocols of the
communication
Applications: tools to
navigate content

Website hosting
companies
Internet search
engines and portals

Search engines

E-commerce
intermediaries

Blogging services
Online communities
Social media platforms

42
43
44
45
46

Internet search
engines and portals
E-commerce
platforms and online
marketplaces

Internet payment
systems
Participative
networking platforms

Search engines

Social media platforms Online service
providers
In general, any website
that hosts usergenerated content or
allows user-to-user
communications

Perset/OECD, op. cit., p. 9.
“Intermediaries thus range from Internet service providers (ISPs) to search engines, and from
blogging services to online community platforms.” p. 11.
Internet intermediaries: Dilemma of Liability. 2013. London, Article 19, p. 3. www.article19.org/
data/files/Intermediaries_ENGLISH.pdf
Kevin Bankston, David Sohn and Andrew McDiarmid. December 2012. Shielding the Messengers:
Protecting Platforms for Expression and Innovation. Washington DC, Center for Democracy and
Technology. www.cdt.org/files/pdfs/CDT-Intermediary-Liability-2012.pdf
Lisa Horner. 28 May 2008. A layer model for understanding the communications environment. The
Freedom of Expression Project. www.freedomofexpression.org.uk/resources/shaping+a+public+i
nterest+communications+environment (Accessed 17 July 2014.)
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As reflected in by the table above, different types of intermediaries perform different
functions. They also have different technical architectures. For example, internet
service providers (ISPs) connect a user’s device, whether it is a laptop, a mobile
phone or something else, to the network of networks known as the internet. Once a
user is connected to the internet, web hosting providers and domain registrars and
registries, in turn, make it possible for websites to be published and to be accessed
online. Search engines make a portion of the World Wide Web accessible by allowing
individuals to search their database. Search engines are often an essential go-between
between websites and internet users. Social networks connect individual internet users
by allowing them to exchange text, photos, videos, as well as by allowing them to post
content to their network of contacts, or to the public at large.
Different intermediary types further entail different kinds of business models. In
order to provide internet access to people, telecommunications and ISPs must operate
equipment and services within the geographical jurisdictions where those people physically
reside. This type of service requires substantial investment of resources, equipment,
and personnel in physical jurisdictions, requiring state permission and compliance with
local law. Thus the relationship between ISPs and states is highly dependent, with states
maintaining a high degree of leverage over them.
Telecommunications and internet access are not necessarily provided by the same
actors. Internet service provision rides on the technical transmission infrastructure of
telecommunication (wired or wireless or satellite) and which may serve as an underlying
lever to exclude or limit access to certain ISPs or to their customers’ users. In turn,
the ISPs may limit access at a second level independently of their relationship with the
telecommunications infrastructure operators. The reliance of ISPs on telecommunications
makes the network level of intermediaries particularly susceptible to regulation by states.
By contrast, other intermediary types such as web hosting providers, domain name
registrars and registries, search engines, and social networks do not necessarily need
to locate staff, equipment or other physical resources in the same geographical area as
the users they aim to serve. The open, interoperable architecture of the internet makes
it possible for a user in Kenya or Egypt to conduct a search on Google, set up a website
with a web hosting service, or communicate with friends on Facebook without those
companies having staff, offices or equipment in those countries. This has the potential to
remove web-based intermediaries – and their users – from control by states in which they
are not headquartered or otherwise have a physical presence.
This independence is precisely why new media - particularly social media - have been
documented by scholars as enhancing freedom of expression in contexts where offline
expression is subject to strong restriction by the state.47 In practice, however, a growing
number of states are asserting jurisdiction over web-based intermediaries by exercising
greater control over telecommunication and internet service providers as they serve as
47
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chokepoints for users to access the web.48 States can – and increasingly do – threaten
to deny access by all users under their jurisdiction to a particular service if web-based
intermediaries fail to comply with their laws.49
Complementary to the issue of controlling intermediaries, states may also exercise
control over users’ online expression or access to information even outside the national
jurisdiction. By targeting intermediaries, however, states are able to avoid the scale of
directly policing individuals.

1.3.2 Modes of Restriction
Depending on the type of intermediary and the service offered, intermediaries control with
whom and how their users can communicate. They have access to information created by
users – such as posts, tweets, comments, blogs etc. – as well as a range of information
directly related to users – such as registration details, private messages, search and
browsing history, transaction details, location etc. For this reason, intermediaries are key
in facilitating and protecting the rights to free expression and privacy. They also serve as
avenues through which governments can monitor, regulate and control individuals’ online
activities and access to information. While the case studies will explain each mode of
restriction in relationship to each intermediary type in greater depth, the three primary
ways in which freedom of expression can be restricted via ISPs, search engines and
social media can be broadly described as follows:
1.

48
49
50

At the network-level: Telecommunications access providers and Internet service
providers can restrict freedom of expression in three main ways:
a.

Filtering: Access is blocked to either entire websites, specific pages or specific
keywords.50 Filtering is carried out either by the ISP, or by the network operators
that control internet flows into a jurisdiction, or some combination of the two.
Such blocking prevents users from receiving information but can also prevent
users from posting information to a specific location such as in the case of
social networks. The content still exists elsewhere on the internet, but cannot be
accessed by users of the network on which the filter is deployed.

b.

Service shutdown: One or more services offered by one provider or all providers
can be shut down in a given jurisdiction or geographic area, preventing users
in the area from accessing the internet via fixed line or mobile, sending SMS
messages etc.

Chris Tuppen. 2012. Opening the Lines: A Call for Transparency from Governments and
Telecommunications Companies. Global Network Initiative. https://globalnetworkinitiative.org/
sites/default/files/GNI_OpeningtheLines.pdf
Rebecca MacKinnon. 3 February 2014. Playing Favorites. Guernica. www.guernicamag.com/
features/playing-favorites (Accessed 17 July 2014.)
OpenNet Initiative. About Filtering. https://opennet.net/about-filtering (Accessed 17 July 2014.)
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c.

Non-neutral service: Access to certain content or applications is ‘throttled’ or
slowed down, making it more difficult for users to access them. Alternatively,
users might be charged different rates for access to different kinds of content or
services, or might be granted free access to specific services.

The two other intermediary types covered by this report, search engines and social
networks, are directly affected by these restrictions carried out at the network level.
Importantly, filtering or the threat of filtering at the network level is a means by which
pressure can be placed on search engines, social networks and other intermediaries
to carry out restrictions at the platform level.
2.

At the platform level: Intermediaries that operate at the platform level such as search
engines and social networks can act to remove content completely, block it from
view to particular categories of users (usually based on geography), or deactivate
user accounts. These actions are carried out by the company itself or by government
authorities who have been granted direct technical access to the platform’s core
functions.51 The removal, blocking, or deactivation may take place at the request
of a government, at the request of users or other third parties, or according to the
intermediary’s own private rules and system of enforcement. (See Case Studies 2
and 3 for examples and details.)

The restrictions described above are an enforcement tool for different kinds of public
and private governance: They are used to enforce state regulation or to help identify
violations of state regulation. They can be used to enforce companies’ private terms of
service and other rules. They are also used in some countries to enforce standards issued
by private or quasi-governmental bodies.
3.

51

Privacy-related (at both network and platform levels): Internet users who believe
that their communications and online behaviour is being monitored or exposed in a
manner that violates their privacy rights are less likely to express themselves freely
while using the services of internet intermediaries. Privacy can be negatively affected
via all tiers of intermediaries in several ways:
a.

Data collection and monitoring through technologies such as deep packet
inspection, takes place at all layers of the internet and has the ability to restrict
expression through encouraging self-censorship.

a.

Lack of security in how user data is stored or how content data is transmitted
can result in breaches of privacy, unauthorized interception, or interception by
government authorities without the active involvement of the company.

Ethan Zuckerman. April 2010. Intermediary Censorship. Ronald Deibert (ed.), Access Controlled:
The Shaping of Power, Rights, and Rule in Cyberspace. Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, pp. 71–
85. www.access-controlled.net/wp-content/PDFs/chapter-5.pdf; Rebecca MacKinnon. 2 February
2009. China Censorship 2.0: How Companies Censor Bloggers. First Monday, Vol. 14, No. 2.
http://firstmonday.org/article/view/2378/2089
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a.

User control over personal information: Different services and platforms
provide internet users with varying levels of control over if and how their
information is preserved or publicly accessible.

The following table provides a summary of the modes of restriction described above.

Table 2: Modes by which expression can be restricted via internet
intermediaries either on request or on company initiative
ISPs
Network-level Restrictions

Social Media

• Manipulation of search
ranking
• Removal or “de-listing”
of links to specific web
pages or categories of
web pages

• Removal of content from
the platform
• Blocking of content,
and free expression
opportunities, by
restricting access of
particular categories
of users (including
geographical location)
• Account limitation or
deactivation

• Collection and retention
of user data for
commercial purposes
• State requests for user
data
• Catalogue of individuals’
personal individual via
searches on their name

• Collection and retention of
user data for commercial
purposes
• “Real-name” identity
requirements
• State requests for user
data

• Filtering
• Service shutdown
• Non-neutral service

Platform-level restrictions

Privacy-related chilling
effects

Search Engines

• Collection and
retention of user data
for commercial or
government mandated
purposes
• “Real name” account
registration requirements
• State requests for user
data
• Real-time state
surveillance

The role that intermediaries play in protecting or restricting freedom of expression is
further complicated by the global nature of many companies. Multinational companies,
as well as internet services with users in multiple jurisdictions, can be subject to a global
patchwork of legal and regulatory regimes. Some internet companies (including search
engines and social networking platforms) have sought to address this dilemma by creating
country specific filters – i.e. restricting access to content only in the jurisdiction where that
content has been found illegal,52 and by developing clear company policy on handling
government requests for content restriction as well as user data requests.53

52
53

For example, Twitter filters content on a geographic basis. Dave Neal. 27 January 2012. Twitter to
filter content geographically. The Inquirer. www.theinquirer.net/inquirer/news/2141809/twitter-filtercontent-geographically (Accessed 17 July 2014.)
Global Network Initiative. Implementation Guidelines: Freedom of Expression. http://
globalnetworkinitiative.org/implementationguidelines/index.php#29
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When a company does not have any physical offices or personnel in a particular jurisdiction,
it is difficult for a government to compel that company to abide by its laws or respond to its
requests for content restriction. In response, some governments have resorted to filtering
– or threatening to filter – content or entire services when a company -fails to comply
with their requests to remove objectionable content.54 In all this complexity, freedom of
expression standards are often inadequately protected, respected and remedied.

1.3.3 Commitments to Freedom of Expression
In light of this increasingly complex global landscape, a number of efforts have emerged
in recent years at the industry and governmental level to help internet intermediaries
maximize respect for users’ privacy and freedom of expression. For example, in 2013
the European Commission launched a ‘sector guide’ on how ICT companies in the ICT
sector can implement the UN Guiding Principles, which were developed in consultation
with industry, academia, civil society and governments.55
Some intermediaries have begun to make public commitments to respect users’ rights.
Since its launch in 2008, several internet companies have joined the Global Network
Initiative (GNI), a multistakeholder body in which major intermediaries work together with
participants from civil society, responsible investment, and academia to implement a set
of core principles on freedom of expression and privacy.56 Of the intermediaries studied
in this report, Google is a founding member of the GNI and in January 2014 passed
the organization’s assessment process verifying that the company had satisfactorily
implemented the GNI principles in handling government requests for content restriction
and user data.57 Facebook joined the GNI in May 2013 but had not by August 2014
undergone an assessment to verify whether it has implemented the GNI principles.58
In 2012, a group of telecommunications companies, including Vodafone, formed the
Telecommunications Industry Dialogue on Freedom of Expression and Privacy in an effort
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55
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For example, in Brazil, a court threatened to block Facebook from the country for not removing
content related to a dispute between two neighbours. Giancarlo Frosio. 7 October 2013. A Brazilian
Judge Orders Facebook off Air If It Fails to Remove a Defamatory Discussion. Stanford Law School
Center for Internet and Society blog. http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2013/10/brazilian-judgeorders-facebook-air-if-it-fails-remove-defamatory-discussion (Accessed 17 July 2014.)
The Institute for Human Rights and Business and Shift. June 2013. ICT Sector Guide on
Implementing the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. European Commission,
www.shiftproject.org/publication/european-commission-ict-sector-guide
Global Network Initiative. Principles: Freedom of Expression. http://www.globalnetworkinitiative.org/
principles/index.php#18.
Global Network Initiative. January 2014. Public Report on the Independent Assessment Process
for Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo. http://globalnetworkinitiative.org/sites/default/files/GNI%20
Assessments%20Public%20Report.pdf
Evelyn M. Rusli. 22 May 2013. Facebook Joins GNI Online Privacy-and-Freedom Group. Wall
Street Journal Digits blog. http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2013/05/22/facebook-joins-gni-onlineprivacy-and-freedom-group (Accessed 17 July 2014); Alexandra Kulikova. 24 May 2013. Facebook
Joins the Global Network Initiative – What to think of it? The London School of Economics and
Political Science Media Policy Project blog. http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mediapolicyproject/2013/05/24/
facebook-joins-the-global-network-initiative-what-to-think-of-it (Accessed 17 July 2014.)
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to develop principles and best practices most relevant to the business model of one
category of intermediaries.59
A growing number of internet and telecommunications companies are also publishing
regular ‘transparency reports’, thus named for the light they shed on the volume and nature
of requests to remove content – whether by government or other private entities – or to
disclose user data.60 Such transparency helps users and the public at large understand
what kinds of restrictions are being undertaken, and on whose behalf they are carried out.
Among companies studied in this report, Facebook, Google, Twitter and Vodafone have
published transparency reports. It is important to note, however, that significant variations
in their scope, detail, and reporting methodology make it difficult to draw meaningful
conclusions about one company’s respect for free expression and privacy in comparison
to another. Scholars have called on companies to work with academics and advocates
to establish more standardized approaches to transparency reporting. They also propose
that full transparency involves reporting more than just numbers of government requests
received and complied with. Transparency about companies’ policies and practices for
handing government requests as well as private enforcement mechanisms are equally
important.61

1.4 Methodology
This report presents three case studies examining three intermediary types. It covers 11
companies operating in ten countries:
CASE #1, Internet Service Providers and telecommunication services: Vodafone (UK,
Germany, Egypt), Vivo/Telefônica Brasil (Brazil), Bharti Airtel (India, Kenya), Safaricom
(Kenya)
CASE #2, Search Engines: Google (USA, EU, India, China, Russia), Baidu (China),
Yandex (Russia)
CASE #3, Social Networks: Facebook (USA, Germany, India, Brazil, Egypt), Twitter
(USA, Kenya) Weibo (China), iWiW (Hungary)
59
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Peter Micek. 12 March 2013. Telecom Industry Dialogue to collaborate with GNI on freedom of
expression, privacy rights. Access Now blog. https://www.accessnow.org/blog/2013/03/12/telcoindustry-dialogue-to-collaborate-with-gni-on-freedom-of-expression-pr (Accessed 17 July 2014);
Sarah A. Altschuller. 25 March 2013. Telecommunications Companies Release Guiding Principles
on Freedom of Expression and Privacy. Foley Hoag LLP Corporate Social Responsibility and the
Law blog. www.csrandthelaw.com/2013/03/25/telecommunications-companies-release-guidingprinciples-on-freedom-of-expression-and-privacy (Accessed 17 July 2014.)
Danny Yadron. 15 May 2014. A Year After Snowden, Tech Companies Are More Transparent. Wall
Street Journal Digits blog. http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2014/05/15/a-year-after-snowden-techcompanies-are-more-transparent (Accessed 17 July 2014); Kashmir Hill. 14 November 2013.
Thanks, Snowden! Now All The Major Tech Companies Reveal How Often They Give Data To
Government. Forbes. www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2013/11/14/silicon-valley-data-handoverinfographic (Accessed 17 July 2014.) Transparency Reports Database: Government Requests for
User Data, https://transparency-reports.silk.co (Accessed 16 July 2014.)
Ryan Budish. 19 December 2013. What Transparency Reports Don’t Tell Us. The Atlantic. www.
theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/12/what-transparency-reports-dont-tell-us/282529
(Accessed 16 July 2014.)
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The case studies are preceded by a description and analysis of the evolving legal and
regulatory contexts in which internet intermediaries operate globally generally, and in
the case study countries particularly. They are followed by general conclusions, plus
recommendations for all stakeholders.
Africa and gender equality are the two top global priorities UNESCO’s General Conference
(its governing body) has identified for all its programmatic activities. Therefore Chapter 2
contains a special section on intermediary liability in Africa, Chapter 6 addresses gender
issues involving internet intermediaries.62
Selection of the three different intermediary types was informed by the OECD’s five-part
classification of internet intermediaries, plus the three intermediary types singled out as
examples in UN Special Rapporteur Frank La Rue’s 2011 report on the right to freedom
of opinion and expression on the Internet. (See ‘Intermediaries: Definition and Types’ in
the Introduction above for a full discussion.)
Companies and countries of focus for each case were selected because they collectively
represent a range of cultural, regional, political and legal environments from which
powerful internet intermediaries have arisen – and within which these companies operate.
They cover a number of key markets:
•

United States, the UK, and more generally the EU, where many of the world’s largest
internet and telecommunications companies are headquartered;

•

Brazil, Russia, India and China – these so-called ‘BRIC countries’ that represent the
leading emerging-market economies – and are an untapped, lucrative user base for
global companies as well as the home base for successful national companies;

•

Kenya, an African country with a relatively developed internet and telecommunications
sector that has faced issues particularly related to hate speech;

•

Egypt, where internet intermediaries are considered by participants and scholars to
have been significant during the 2011 revolution;

•

Hungary, a smaller market where an indigenous social network struggled to compete
with global competitors.

For every country covered by the case studies, an in-country research team was
commissioned to complete a detailed research questionnaire containing an average of
61 questions about the legal and political context affecting internet regulation, about
the policies and practices of the selected companies in the selected countries, and
also about how the combination of particular company policies and legal context affect
internet users. Researchers were also asked to respond to several specific questions on
gender.

62

UNESCO. 2013. Draft Medium-Term Strategy: 2014–2021 (37 C/4). Paris, UNESCO Publishing,
pp. 16–18. http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0022/002200/220031e.pdf
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Researchers also conducted interviews with representatives from industry, government,
civil society, academia and law. The questionnaires included questions about user
perspectives in each country covered by the case studies. Researchers answered these
questions by canvassing available academic research, media reports and relevant user
forums.
The questionnaires were designed in consultation with the researchers in early 2014.
Research for the questionnaires was then carried out in March and April 2014. The results
of these questionnaires were then analysed and distilled by the report’s authors. Based
on this comparative analysis of the research questionnaires, an introductory chapter on
regulation plus three case studies were drafted. The report’s authors then worked with the
researchers to clarify and update the research through July 2014.
It is important to note that resource and time constraints did not permit statistically
meaningful user polling or in-depth user research through focus groups. Systematic,
in-depth research on user perspectives at the national level on how different internet
intermediaries shape people’s online expression in different legal and regulatory contexts
would be an important next step. Such a further research agenda could add to information
for all stakeholders on how intermediaries can best be governed and operated in a manner
that supports freedom of expression.
It is also important to keep in mind that this report only covers three intermediary types.
The study of internet intermediaries will be further informed by future studies on other
intermediary types, including data processing, web hosting providers, cloud computing
services, and domain name registries, as well as online media with substantial usergenerated content.
The next chapter will provide an overview of the legal and regulatory context shaping
public and private regulation of the case study companies in the particular countries
studied.
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2. LAW AND REGULATION
Just as online platforms and services can be used for legitimate purposes including selfexpression, education, employment, and trade, they can also be used for illegitimate
purposes such as theft or fraud, harassment, copyright infringement, defamatory speech
and so on. The line determining a legitimate and illegitimate purpose is significantly
influenced by political, religious, and cultural context – resulting in multiple understandings
of legitimate and illegitimate purposes throughout the world. Recognizing this tension,
particularly in the context of speech, the UDHR, ICCPR and other international human
rights instruments define limitations on the right to freedom of expression in order to
protect other human rights. Yet as UN Special Rapporteur La Rue underscored in his
2011 report, restrictions are only compatible with international human rights standards
when they meet three conditions:63
•

The restriction must be rule-based, provided by law and carried out in a transparent
and predictable manner;

•

The restriction must be necessary and proportionate, using the least restrictive
means to achieve the objective;

•

The restriction must be consistent with purposes cited in the ICCPR: necessary to
protect the rights or reputation of others, national security or public order, public
health or public morals.

It is also important to note that the UN Human Rights Committee has determined that
‘public morals’ in the human rights context should be compatible with religious and
ideological pluralism.64 Restrictions applied by intermediaries should be evaluated in
terms of these international standards. Evaluation should also be responsive to diverse
legal regimes.
Intermediaries are sometimes held criminally liable for user content that others perceive
as violating privacy or defamation laws [see 2.2 below]. In countries where that is the
case, companies come under pressure to conduct their own monitoring and filtering to
avoid possible repercussions. This contributes to a process of state-sanctioned selfregulation in which some governments may come to rely on private sector companies to
regulate online content without public accountability or due process.65 On the other hand,
self-regulation may sometimes serve to protect freedom of expression and respect for the
normative limitations on restriction as per the UDHR and ICCPR.
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A/HRC/17/27. p. 8.
General Comment 34 on Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Article
19, para. 32. www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/CCPR-C-GC-34.doc; Irina Fedotova v.
Russian Federation, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, para. 10.
www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/CaseLaw/CCPR-C-106-D-1932-2010.doc
UNESCO. 2014. World Trends in Freedom of Expression and Media Development. op. cit. p. 33.

31

2.1 State Commitments and Limitations on Expression
The three case studies at the core of this report examine the operations of specific
internet intermediaries in the context of specific legal jurisdictions: Brazil, China, Egypt,
Germany, Hungary, India, Kenya, Russia the United Kingdom and the United States.
This chapter gives a brief overview of the relevant legal and regulatory contexts of all
jurisdictions and regions covered by the case studies.
While technology, business models and the scope of business carried out by internet
intermediaries have evolved dramatically over the past two decades, the types of
regulatory goals pursued by states remain largely unchanged, even if the methods used to
pursue those goals have evolved along with the technology.66 Below are some examples –
though by no means a comprehensive list – of the types of regulatory objectives pursued
by the states in the three case studies, which in turn have a direct impact on how (and
to what extent) intermediaries are compelled to restrict freedom of expression online.
In many instances, there is debate about the alignment of states’ regulations to ICCPR
standards and the implementations of these standards. While the types of limitations are
often aligned with legitimate purpose, they often fall short in terms of the safeguards of
necessity, proportionality and due legal process for implementation.

2.1.1 Types of Limitations
Defamation: Defamation laws seek to discourage unwarranted attacks on a person’s
reputation. UNESCO,67 the UN Special Rapporteur,68 the Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)69 and the Organization of American States have called for
the decriminalization of defamation.70 Nevertheless, defamation remains criminalized
in all of the countries examined in this report other than the United Kingdom and
the United States.71
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Wolfgang Benedek and Matthias C. Kettemann. December 2013. Freedom of Expression and the
Internet. Strasbourg, Council of Europe Publishing, pp. 45–54. https://book.coe.int/eur/en/humanrights-and-democracy/5810-freedom-of-expression-and-the-internet.html
UNESCO. 2014. World Trends in Freedom of Expression and Media Development. op. cit. pp.
27–30.
A/HRC/17/27. p. 11.
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. Decriminalization of defamation. www.osce.
org/fom/106287
United Nations Human Rights Committee. 26 April 2012. Communication No. 1815/2008 Views
adopted by the Committee at its 103rd session, 17 October–4 November 2011. UN Doc CCPR/
C/103/D/1815/2008/Rev.1, p. 9. www.worldcourts.com/hrc/eng/decisions/2011.10.26_Adonis_v_
Philippines.pdf; Zsolt Bobis. 17 May 2012. Case Watch: When Telling the Truth May Come with
A Prison Sentence. Open Society Justice Initiative Blog. www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/
case-watch-when-telling-truth-may-come-prison-sentence (Accessed 3 August 2014.)
Article 19. Defamation maps (last updated 2012). www.article19.org/defamation/map.html (Accessed
30 July 2014); Yan Mei Ning. Summer 2011. Criminal Defamation in the New Media Environment
– The Case of the People’s Republic of China. International Journal of Communications Law &
Policy, Vol. 14, pp. 6–14. http://ijclp.net/ojs/index.php/ijclp/article/view/15/5; Kayode Oladele. 27
August 2011. Internet Libel and the Law of Defamation: Justice Without Borders? Sahara Reporters.
http://saharareporters.com/2011/08/27/internet-libel-and-law-defamation-justice-without-borderskayode-oladele (Accessed 30 July 2014.)
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National and public security: Different governments apply varying definitions,
approaches and scope to ‘national security’ and ‘public security’. In China, Article 15 of
the ‘Measures on the Administration of Internet Information Services’,72 promulgated by
the State Council in 2000, stipulate what have come to be known as the ‘nine forbidden
content categories’ for Chinese online services. These categories include speech that
‘harms the dignity or interests of the State’, or ‘disseminates rumours, disturbs social
order or disrupts social stability’, or ‘Sabotages State religious policy or propagates
heretical teachings or feudal superstitions’.73 Egypt restricts seditious speech as well
as speech offensive of domestic and foreign governmental authorities.74 The Egyptian
Parliament has been considering an anti-terrorism law that would allow for internet
companies and platforms to be blocked from the country for ‘endangering public order’.75
In Russia, the presidential amendment to the Law on Information (FL 398) allows the
Prosecutor General’s Office to blacklist any website it identifies as ‘extremist propaganda’
with the potential to incite anti-government riots, without a court order.76 Russia also
criminalizes the sharing of ‘extremist’ content on social networks.77 India also allows for
the restriction of online content by the central government or authorized authorities for
national security reasons, including: in the interest of sovereignty and integrity of India,
defence of India, security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order,
or for preventing incitement to the commission of any cognizable offence relating to the
above.78 The United States prohibits incitement to ‘imminent lawless action’,79 disclosing
classified government information80 and ‘knowingly provid[ing] material support or
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People’s Republic of China State Council. 25 September 2000. Measures on the Administration of
Internet Information Service. People’s Republic of China State Council Decree No. 292. www.net.
cn/static/hosting/fa_xinxi.htm
People’s Republic of China State Council. 25 September 2000. Measures. Op. cit.
Arab Republic of Egypt. August 1937. Penal Code No. 58 of 1937, Articles 98F, 102, 161, 179, 181,
185 and 186. http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/research/Egypt/criminal-code.pdf
Alastair Sloan. 3 February 2014. Egypt’s draft anti-terrorism law sparks concern about censorship.
Index on Censorship. www.indexoncensorship.org/2014/02/egypts-draft-anti-terrorism-lawsparks-concern-censorship (Accessed 17 July 2014.)
Russian Duma Passes Bill On ‘Website Blacklist’ In Final Reading. 11 July 2012. Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty. www.rferl.org/content/russia-passes-internet-bill/24642146.html (Accessed
17 July 2014); Russian Federation. 28 December 2013. Federal Law No. 398-FZ ‘On Information,
Information Technology and Information Protection. Rossiiskaya Gazeta. (In Russian.) www.
rg.ru/2013/12/30/extrem-site-dok.html (Accessed 18 July 2014.)
Putin Signs Vaguely Worded Law Criminalizing Online ‘Extremism’. 1 July 2014. Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty. www.rferl.org/content/putin-extremism-internet-law-bill-rights/25441609.
html (Accessed 18 July 2014); Putin Signs Law Giving Prison Terms for Internet Extremism. 30
June 2014. The Moscow Times. www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/putin-signs-law-givingprison-terms-for-internet-extremism/502717.html (Accessed 18 July 2014.)
Department of Electronics and Information Technology, Ministry of Communications and IT,
Government of India. 5 Februay 2009. Indian Information Technology Act 2000 as amended in 2008
– Section 69A. http://deity.gov.in/sites/upload_files/dit/files/downloads/itact2000/it_amendment_
act2008.pdf
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1968/1968_492 The
Supreme Court also characterized some expression as not protectable under the First Amendment
through doctrines as the ‘fighting words’ doctrine.
Legal Information Institute. 18 U.S. Code, Chapter 37 – Espionage and Censorship. Cornell
University Law School. www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/part-I/chapter-37; Georgetown Law
Library. National Security Law Research Guide. www.law.georgetown.edu/library/research/guides/
national_security.cfm#v-statutes-and-legislative-history
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resources to a foreign terrorist organization’.81 The United Kingdom prohibits breaches
of official secrets,82 and expression that encourages terrorism or disseminates terrorist
publications.83 In 2010 the UK established the Counter Terrorism Internet Referral Unit
(CTIRU), which reviews ‘violent extremist or terrorist’ content that the public submits
through an anonymous online reporting tool and ‘proactively scans the web for content
that promotes or glorifies terrorism’.84 It then works with intermediaries to remove
infringing content.85
Hate speech: The 2010 Constitution of Kenya prohibits incitement to violence, hate
speech, advocacy of hatred that constitutes ethnic incitement, vilification of others, or
incitement to cause harm, or is based on any ground of discrimination specified in the
Constitution.86 Article 13 of the National Cohesion and Integration Act 2008 prohibits
‘threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour’ with the intention of ‘stir[ring] up
ethnic hatred’ (or that is likely to happen). Notably, the law only mentions ethnic hatred;
there is no mention of religion, gender, nationality or sexual preference.87 Hungary prohibits
expression that violates another person’s human dignity, the dignity of the Hungarian
nation, or the dignity of any national, ethnic, or religious minority group.88 The United
Kingdom prohibits incitement to racial and religious hatred,89 language that intentionally
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gov/opinions/09pdf/08-1498.pdf ; Adam Liptak. 22 June 2010. Court Affirms Ban on Aiding
Groups Tied to Terror. New York Times. www.nytimes.com/2010/06/22/us/politics/22scotus.
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Gribbon. 2013. The use of the internet in 15 cases of terrorism and extremism. Cambridge, UK, RAND
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Erin Marie Saltman. 23 May 2014. Jihad trending: Analysis of online extremism and how to counter
it. Index on Censorship. www.indexoncensorship.org/2014/05/jihad-trending-comprehensiveanalysis-online-extremism-counter (Accessed 12 August 2014.)
Republic of Kenya. Article 33(2), Constitution of Kenya, www.klrc.go.ke/index.php/constitutionof-kenya/112-chapter-four-the-bill-of-rights/part-2-rights-and-fundamental-freedoms/199-33freedom-of-expression; Section 5B, Kenya Information and Communication Act, op. cit.
Umati Project. February and March 2013. Umati: Monitoring Online Dangerous Speech. iHub
Research and Ushahidi. www.research.ihub.co.ke/uploads/2013/april/1365508815_819_823.pdf
(Accessed 12 August 2014.)
Hungarian Government. 25 April 2011. Hungarian Fundamental Law, Article IX, paragraphs 4–5.
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UK Government. 2006. Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 (RRHA). www.legislation.gov.uk/
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harasses or creates alarm, distress or fear,90 as well as harassment.91 Germany restricts
expression that amounts to Nazi propaganda and Holocaust denial, incitement to hatred
(insulting, maliciously maligning, defaming), material causing others to commit a crime
and depictions of violence.92 China prohibits ethnic hate speech.93 In the United States
hate speech is legal as long as it does not incite ‘imminent lawless action’ (see above). It
is interesting to note that although the EU outlawed Holocaust denial in 2007,94 member
countries have the option of not enforcing the law, which is what the UK did; in contrast
it is illegal in Germany and Hungary.95
Election-related: In Kenya, devastating violence (in which more than 1,000 people
died) was partly fuelled by inflammatory text messages circulated after the 2007 Kenyan
presidential election.96 The Communications Commission of Kenya’s guidelines for the
2013 election required all bulk political messages to be sent in English or Kiswahili,
Kenya’s two official languages, and they had to be submitted for approval 48 hours in
advance.97 But these regulations were limited in scope to SMS messages, and the Kenyan
government had not implemented precautionary measures on hate speech on Facebook
and Twitter, whose Kenyan user bases had skyrocketed since 2007. The National Cohesion
and Integration Commission and civil society groups like Umati stepped in to monitor
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hate speech on social media.98 Brazil, where voting is compulsory,99 prohibits electoral
‘propaganda’ up to three months prior to elections,100 while electoral candidates may
submit requests for the removal of online content that offends ‘dignity or decorum’ or
points out illegal propaganda. Content providers may be held liable if they do not remove
the alleged illegal content once notified.101 Of similar intent are provisions in the United
Kingdom that criminalize making a false statement, during an election, about a person
standing for office.102
Child protection: Child pornography – also known as ‘child sexual abuse images’ – is illegal
in all countries studied.103 Another category of online content related to child protection
involves content that may be legal for adults but is deemed inappropriate for children.104
The United Kingdom bans child sexual abuse images in addition to pornography of
various forms.105 In Germany, service providers are prohibited from distributing content
that is harmful to young persons, including adult content.106 In Russia, Federal Law No.
139 (the ‘blacklist law’) allows the government to add websites to a blacklist in order
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to protect children from information on the internet such as pornography, drugs and
suicide.107
Blasphemy: In India blasphemous speech, though not defined, is prohibited under
the Information Technology Intermediaries Guidelines Rules 2011.108 The Indian Penal
Code does not use the word ‘blasphemy’ but criminalizes ‘deliberate and malicious acts,
intended to outrage religious feelings or any class by insulting its religion or religious
beliefs’.109 In Egypt, blasphemy is a criminal offence, punishable with up to five years in
prison, for anyone who ‘makes use of religion in propagating, either by words, in writing, or
in any other means, extreme ideas for the purpose of inciting strife, ridiculing or insulting
a heavenly religion or a sect following it, or damaging national unity’.110
Intellectual property: In Russia, according to the new Federal Law No. 187 (‘the
anti-piracy law’) passed in 2013, it is illegal to share content in a manner that violates
copyright.111 In Brazil, ‘the transmission and retransmission’ of content infringing on
intellectual property rights can be immediately discontinued or interrupted upon order
from a competent judicial authority.112 In Germany, public distribution or duplication of
copyrighted material without permission from the rights holder is prohibited although
personal and private uses are permitted.113 In the United States copyright is often
cited to impose restrictions on online expression, although trademark violations are
occasionally cited as well.114 Details on the application of intellectual property laws to
internet intermediaries will be covered in the ‘Intermediary Liability’ section.
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2.1.2 Privacy, Data Protection, and Surveillance
Privacy and Data Protection: A 2012 report commissioned by UNESCO which covered
many of the countries covered in this case study concluded that privacy laws or legal
provisions that provide only weak protection can have a negative impact on freedom
of expression.115 A significant number of human rights groups lauded the passage of
European Parliament’s passage in March 2014 of the new General Data Protection
Regulation,116 which places greater privacy requirements on internet intermediaries
operating in Europe.117 Efforts elsewhere around the world vary. The United States lacks
comprehensive consumer data protection legislation, relying instead on a patchwork
of federal and state laws.118 While Brazil does not have a general data protection law
or framework as of September 2014, Marco Civil da Internet includes data protection
provisions.119 The Kenyan parliament at the time of writing was considering a data
protection bill.120 India, at the time of writing, does not have comprehensive privacy
legislation, though data protection standards applicable to corporate and digital
information can be found under section 43A of the Information Technology Act 2000 and
subsequent Rules.121
At the same time, many actors seek to curtail the expression of some citizens to protect
the privacy of others. This is of contemporary significance in the European Union given
the case of Google Spain v AEPD, described in shorthand as establishing a ‘right to be
forgotten’ throughout the EU. It will be discussed in more detail in Study 2, which focuses
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Protection Reform Proposal. Bloomberg BNA Privacy & Security Law Report. www.bna.com/
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117 Marc Rotenberg and David Jacobs. 2013. Updating the Law of Information Privacy: The New
Framework of the European Union. Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, Vol. 36, No. 2, pp.
605–52. www.harvard-jlpp.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/36_2_605_Rotenberg_Jacobs.pdf;
Nina Haase. 11 March 2014. EU Parliament approves privacy package. Deutsche Welle. www.
dw.de/eu-parliament-approves-privacy-package/a-17488815 (Accessed 17 July 2014.)
118 Natasha Singer. An American Quilt of Privacy Laws, Incomplete. The New York Times. 30 March
2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/31/technology/in-privacy-laws-an-incomplete-americanquilt.html (Accessed 17 July 2014.)
119 Knowledge Commons Brasil. Statement on Data Retention Provisions in Marco Civil. http://
www.knowledgecommons.in/brasil/en/marco-civil/statement-on-data-retention-provisions-inmarco-civil/ (Accessed 17 July 2014.) and Chris Riley. Marco Civil – A groundbreaking, although
not perfect, victory for Brazilian Internet Users. Mozilla Open Policy & Advocacy. 25 March 2014
https://blog.mozilla.org/netpolicy/2014/03/26/marco-civil-a-groundbreaking-although-not-perfectvictory-for-brazilian-internet-users/ (Accessed 17 July 2014.)
120 Commission for the Implementation of the Constitution. The Data Protection Bill, 2012. http://www.
cickenya.org/index.php/legislation/item/174-the-data-protection-bill-2012#.VC_6Z-enYbB
121 Section 43A of the Information Technology Act 2000 as amended in 2008, available at: http://
www.dot.gov.in/sites/default/files/itbill2000_0.pdf The Information Technology Reasonable Security
Practices and Procedures and Sensitive Personal Data or Information Rules 2011. Available at:
http://deity.gov.in/sites/upload_files/dit/files/GSR313E_10511(1).pdf

38
on search engines.122 The decision demonstrates that the individual’s desire to eliminate
negative information about him- or herself from the internet can be in direct conflict with
the right of others to receive and impart information.123
Surveillance and government access to user data: The UN High Commissioner for Human
Rights has called for reform of surveillance laws, and referred to the recommendations
by global civil society for the application of the ‘necessary and proportionate’ principles
with strong accountability, transparency, and remedy.124 However, a recent survey of
experts in 18 countries showed that little surveillance reform has taken place around the
world.125 In many places new laws have continued to expand government surveillance
powers: Most recently in July 2014 the United Kingdom enacted a new law, the Data
Retention and Investigatory Powers Act, extending government surveillance powers
beyond the UK’s borders126 by allowing government to issue warrants for the interception
of communications to companies outside of the UK.127 Similarly, Brazil’s Marco Civil da
Internet empowers authorities to access data stored abroad if the intermediary provides
services to or collects data from Brazilian citizens.128 In Russia, it appears that opposition
activists and protest groups may be monitored via domestic intermediaries: Pavel Durov,
founder and former CEO of VKontakte, Russia’s most popular social network with 60
million users,129 claims to have spurned a Russian security agency request for the private
user data of belonging to members of several Ukrainian protest groups.130
Surveillance has been documented to have an impact on freedom of expression in a range
of jurisdictions. For example, in the United States, in the wake of revelations about the
122 Court of Justice of the European Union. Case C-434/09. 13 May 2014. Google Spain SL, Google
Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González. EU:C:2014:317.
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=152065&pageIndex=0&doclang
=EN
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apparent scale of the NSA’s surveillance, the PEN American Center conducted a survey
of over 520 American writers about the effects of surveillance on their work. The report
noted that 16 per cent claimed to ‘have refrained from conducting Internet searches or
visiting Web sites on topics that may be considered controversial or suspicious, and
another 12 per cent have seriously considered it’.131
The European Union faces a growing disconnect between surveillance powers sought
by governments and what courts view as necessary and proportionate. In April 2014
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled that the EU Data Retention Directive was
invalid132 and contained provisions that disproportionally interfered with ‘the private lives
of citizens’.133 The UK Government instructed ISPs to continue to retain data despite the
ECJ ruling.134 It then invoked ‘emergency measures’ to expedite passage of the Data
Retention and Investigatory Powers Act,135 effectively overriding the ECJ decision by
requiring ISPs to continue storing metadata for one year.136 Government officials were
quoted in news reports noting that the legislation was necessary to maintain the ‘tools’
needed to combat terrorism and to ensure public safety. The UK has not been the only
country in Europe to disagree with the ECJ ruling; Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Germany,
Greece, Romania and Sweden have also rejected it.137

2.2 Intermediary liability
What happens when an internet user uses an intermediary service to post, share, or
access content that infringes laws in a given country? To what extent can or should
intermediaries be held legally responsible – or “liable” – for the activities of their users?
This question is answered by a regulatory approach most commonly around the world as
“intermediary liability.”
Intermediary liability provisions formalize government expectations for how an intermediary
must handle ‘third-party’ content or communications. In some intermediary liability
approaches, such legal provisions define circumstances under which intermediaries can
be exempt from liability by setting forth criteria that intermediaries must follow in order to
escape civil or even sometimes criminal penalty for users’ actions.
131 PEN American Center. 12 November 2013. Chilling Effects: NSA Surveillance Drives U.S. Writers to
Self-Censor. www.pen.org/sites/default/files/Chilling%20Effects_PEN%20American.pdf
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133 Court of Justice of the European Union PRESS RELEASE No 54/14 Luxembourg, 8 April 2014.
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135 Parliament passes emergency Data Retention Bill. BBC News. 17 July, 2014.
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136 Dave Lee. What emergency data law means for you. 10 July 2014. http://www.bbc.com/news/
technology-28245589 (Accessed 1 August 2014.)
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2.2.1 Models of Intermediary Liability
Many governments in regions including Europe, North America, parts of South East
Asia and Latin America, have laws specifically addressing intermediary liability. In other
regions, particularly Africa, governments are considering legal provisions on intermediary
liability.138 Broadly speaking, where such regimes exist, there are three models of
intermediary liability:139 which strict liability, conditional liability and broad immunity.140
Exact requirements and nuances of these models vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction,
and are defined by governments and further clarified by courts. Some intermediaries
explicitly comply with legal mandates relating to intermediary liability by undertaking
measures such as self-regulation via enforcement of their terms of service.
‘Blanket’ or strict liability: The intermediary is liable for third-party content even when
it is not aware that the content is illegal (or even exists). The only way to avoid liability
under such circumstances is to monitor, filter, and remove content proactively if it is
likely to be infringing. Even so, monitoring and removing content does not absolve the
intermediary of liability if any infringing content is overlooked. Blanket liability regimes do
not distinguish between intermediaries; all intermediaries, regardless of size or function,
are liable. China and Thailand are governed by strict liability regimes.141 For example the
Chinese government imposes liability for unlawful content on all intermediaries. If they
fail to sufficiently monitor user activity, take down content or report violations, they may
face fines, criminal liability, and revocation of business or media licenses.142 In 2014 the
leading portal, Sina.com, had part of its publishing licenses revoked due to the presence
of pornographic material on its network.143
‘Safe harbour’ or conditional liability: The intermediary is potentially exempt from
liability for third-party content if certain conditions are met – such as removing content
upon receiving notice (‘notice and takedown’), notifying the content creator of infringing
material after receiving notice (‘notice and notice’) or disconnecting repeat infringers

138 Elimar Vushe Gandhi. 19 May 2014. Internet Intermediaries: The dilemma of liability in Africa.
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139 For more information about the different intermediary models, see Article 19, ‘Dilemma’, p. 7; Center
for Democracy and Technology, op. cit., p. 4.
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for Democracy and Technology, op. cit., p. 4.
141 Center for Democracy and Technology, op. cit., pp 14-16.
142 Measures for Managing Internet Information Services, Article 20 [in Chinese], issued by the
State Council on September 25, 2000, effective October 1, 2000. Unofficial English translation
available at http://www.chinaculture.org/gb/en_aboutchina/2003-09/24/content_23369.htm.
See also OpenNet Initiative, Access Contested, MIT Press, 2011, http://access.opennet.net/
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upon notice.144 If an intermediary does not meet these stipulations, they may be liable for
damages.145 Unlike the ‘strict liability’ model, the safe harbour model does not compel
intermediaries to proactively monitor and filter content in order to avoid liability.146 However,
there are a wide variety of safe harbour regimes; for example, the EU E-Commerce
Directive (ECD) establishes criteria under which different categories of intermediaries
can seek exemption from liability,147 whereas South Africa’s Electronic Communications
and Transactions Act148 only recognizes safe harbour for the 169 member companies149
that belong to the Internet Service Providers’ Association, South Africa’s self-regulatory
industry group.150
The ‘notice-and-takedown’ variety of conditional liability – such as the United States’
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) – is criticized because it is easy to abuse;
furthermore, it facilitates self-censorship by placing the intermediary in a quasi-judicial
position responsible for evaluating the legality of content.151 The model is even more
susceptible to abuse when it lacks elements of due process, such as the opportunity to
appeal a takedown request.152 Indeed, ‘notice-and-takedown’ incentivizes intermediaries
to remove content immediately after receiving notice, rather than investing resources to

144 The OECD identified four ways in which intermediaries cooperate with law enforcement: (a) Notice
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oecdbookshop.org/oecd/pdfs/product/9311031e.pdf
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146 Article 19, op. cit., p. 7.
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uri=CELEX:32000L0031:en:HTML
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149 List of members. South Africa, Internet Service Providers’ Association. http://ispa.org.za/
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171–232. http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/articles/pdf/v24/24HarvJLTech171.pdf
152 Carolina Rossini and Maira Sutton. The Impact of Trade Agreements on Innovation, Freedom of
Expression and Privacy: Internet Service Providers’ Safe Harbors and Liability. San Francisco,
Electronic Frontier Foundation. https://www.eff.org/files/filenode/ISPLiability_FNL.pdf
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investigate the validity of the request and risk a lawsuit. Legitimate content can end up
being censored as a consequence.153
A 2011 study on India’s intermediary liability regime by the Centre for Internet and
Society in Bangalore indicated a need for increased safeguards against misuse of the
privately administered takedown regime. Specifically, the study identified a need to:
reduce uncertainty in the criteria for administering takedowns; reduce uncertainty in
the procedure for administering takedowns; include various elements of natural justice
(prevention of bias and emphasis on the right to a fair hearing) in the procedure for
administering takedowns; and replace the requirement for subjective legal determination
by intermediaries with an objective test.154 These issues have been echoed in jurisdictions
such as South Africa, particularly with respect to the lack of due process for users whose
content is removed.155
Broad immunity: In this model the intermediary is exempt from liability for a range of
third-party content without distinguishing between intermediary function and content
type.156 For example, section 230 of the Communications Decency Act in the USA shields
intermediaries from liability for illegal behaviour by users while also protecting them from
liability when they do remove content in compliance with private company policy.157
Exceptions to this model include intellectual property (copyright is governed by the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act, trademark by the Lanham Act), and US federal criminal law.158
Given the key role that intermediaries and the laws that govern them play in online freedom
of expression, discussions at the international level have sought to establish common
principles and best practices. For example, in December 2011, the OECD Council
included ‘limiting intermediary liability’ as one of 14 recommended principles for internet
policy-making to ‘promote and protect the global free flow of information online’. These
principles also emphasized the importance of transparency, due process, accountability

153 For an egregious example of ‘notice and takedown’ as an instrument of taking down legal content,
see Paul Sieminski. 21 November 2013. Striking Back Against Censorship. WordPress Hot Off
the Press Blog. http://en.blog.wordpress.com/2013/11/21/striking-back-against-censorship
(Accessed 17 July 2014); Corynne McSherry. 21 November 2013. WordPress.com Stands Up
For Its Users, Goes to Court to Challenge DMCA Abuse. EFF Deeplinks Blog. https://www.eff.
org/deeplinks/2013/11/wordpresscom-stands-its-users-goes-court-challenge-dmca-abuse
(Accessed July 2014); Mike Masnick. 21 November 2013. Wordpress Goes Legal: Sues Over Two
Egregiously Bogus DMCA Notices That Were Designed To Censor. Techdirt. www.techdirt.com/
articles/20131121/01431725317/wordpress-goes-legal-sues-over-two-egregiously-bogus-dmcanotices-that-were-designed-to-censor.shtml (Accessed 17 July 2014.)
154 Rishabh Dara. 2011. Intermediary Liability in India: Chilling Effects on Free Expression on
the Internet. The Centre for Internet and Society, p. 2. http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/
intermediary-liability-in-india.pdf (Accessed 17 July 2014.)
155 Comninos and Rens, op. cit.
156 Article 19, ‘Dilemma’, op. cit., p. 7.
157 Legal Information Institute. 47 U.S. Code § 230 - Protection for private blocking and screening
of offensive material. Cornell University Law School. www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/47/230
(Accessed 18 July 2014.)
158 Center for Democracy and Technology, op. cit., p. 4.
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and inclusive, multistakeholder policymaking.159 An advisory council comprised of civil
society groups endorsed the recommendation.160

2.2.2 Intermediary Liability in the Case Study Countries
Intermediary liability policy appears to be evolving into a legal mechanism that, in part,
allows governments to transpose their own interpretations of limitations to freedom of
expression onto the internet. Depending on the national, social and historical context,
different governments emphasize the restriction of different types of content as outlined
in section 2.1 above.161
For example, cyber cafes attract particular regulation in India,162 while telecommunication
companies and the potential spread of hate speech via SMS services are a strong
concern in Kenya.163 Depending on the jurisdiction, non-compliant intermediaries may
face criminal prosecution like imprisonment, civil penalties like fines or a revocation of
operating licenses. Below are brief summaries of the intermediary liability regimes of
the case study countries plus the European Union of which three of those countries are
members.164

159 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 13 December 2011. OECD
Council Recommendation on Principles for Internet Policy Making. www.oecd.org/internet/
ieconomy/49258588.pdf
160 Civil Society Information Society Advisory Council. 18 December 2011. ‘CSISAC Welcomes OECD
Recommendation on Principles for Internet Policy Making’. http://csisac.org/2011/12/oecd_
principles_internet_policy.php
161 For more detailed analysis of intermediary liability regimes in these and other countries see the
Center for Internet and Society at Stanford Law School’s World Intermediary Liability Map (WILMap)
project at https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/our-work/projects/world-intermediary-liability-map-wilmap
162 India recognizes Cyber Cafes as intermediaries and has created explicit Rules for Cyber Cafes
under the Information Technology Act 2000. Among other things, the rules require Cyber Cafes
to (a) register all users of the facilities with photo identification, (b) record and store user browser
history for one year, and (c) cooperate with authorities when required. Nikhil Pahwa. 2 May 2011.
India’s CyberCafe Rules Finalized; Foundation For Harassment. MediaNama. www.medianama.
com/2011/05/223-india-cyber-cafe-law (Accessed 17 July 2014); Bhairav Acharya. 31 March
2013. Comments on the Information Technology (Guidelines for Cyber Cafe) Rules, 2011. The
Centre for Internet and Society. http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/comments-on-theit-guidelines-for-cyber-cafe-rules-2011; Department of Electronics and Information Technology,
Ministry of Communications and IT, Government of India. 11 April 2011. Information Technology
(Guidelines for Cyber Cafe) Rules, 2011. GSR 315(E). http://deity.gov.in/sites/upload_files/dit/files/
GSR315E_10511(1).pdf
163 Comninos, An Uncertain Terrain, op. cit., p. 10.
164 Center for Internet and Society at Stanford Law School, World Intermediary Liability Map, op. cit.
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Brazil: On 23 April 2014, Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff signed the Marco Civil da
Internet into law,165 Brazil’s first law addressing intermediary liability.166 Intermediaries
qualify for safe harbor as long as they remove third-party content after receiving a court
order.167 Failure to comply with a court order can result in arrest, as it did in 2012 when
the Brazilian electoral court issued warrants for the arrest of two Google executives
for not removing a film that made negative remarks about a local mayoral candidate in
violation of a 1965 Brazilian electoral law before the 2012 elections.168
The Marco Civil leaves issues related to copyrighted content169 and electoral propaganda170
to specific legislation. Cases related to violations of honour and reputation or personality
rights may be heard by Small Claims Courts, which provides a more expedited process.171
The one exception to the safe harbour provisions is when ‘revenge porn’ is involved;
Article 21 of Marco Civil states that intermediaries may be secondarily liable if they do not
remove content that depicts ‘disclosure, without consent of its participants, of photos,
videos or other materials containing nudity or acts sexual private character, after receipt
of notification by the participant or legal representative’.172 If a service provider has the
contact information of the user who published the content, they must notify the users of
the reasons and other information related to the removal.173
China: In Chinese legal terms, the concept of internet intermediaries is encapsulated by
the concept of ‘Internet Information Service’ as outlined in Article 2 of the Measures on
the Administration of Internet Information Services (Measures).174 According to Article
165 Anthony Boadle. 23 April 2014. Brazilian Congress passes Internet bill of rights. Reuters. www.
reuters.com/article/2014/04/23/us-internet-brazil-idUSBREA3M00Y20140423 (Accessed 17 July
2014); Daniel P. Cooper. 28 April 2014. Brazil Enacts ‘Marco Civil’ Internet Civil Rights Bill. Covington
& Burling LLP. www.natlawreview.com/article/brazil-enacts-marco-civil-internet-civil-rights-bill
(Accessed 17 July 2014.)
166 Anthony Boadle. 23 April 2014. Brazilian Congress passes Internet bill of rights. Reuters. (Accessed
17 July 2014); Daniel P. Cooper. 28 April 2014. Brazil Enacts ‘Marco Civil’ Internet Civil Rights Bill.
Covington & Burling LLP. (Accessed 17 July 2014.); Diego Spinola. Diego Spinola. 30 April 2014.
Brazil Leads the Efforts in Internet Governance with Its Recently Enacted ‘Marco Civil Da Internet’.
What’s In It For Intermediary Liability? Center for Internet and Society at Stanford Law School. http://
cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2014/04/brazil-leads-efforts-internet-governance-its-recently-enactedmarco-civil-da-internet (Accessed 31 July 2014.)
167 Federative Republic of Brazil. 23 April 2014. Marco Civil da Internet, Law No. 12.965 Article 19.
http://sflc.in/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/APPROVED-MARCO-CIVIL-MAY-2014.pdf
168 Sarah Laskow. 29 April 2013. Google vs Brazil. Columbia Journalism Review. www.cjr.org/
cloud_control/brazilian_takedown_requests.php?page=all (Accessed 18 July 2014); Sorcha
Pollack. 27 September 2012. Google Executive Arrested as Brazil Bans Anti-Muslim Film. Time.
http://newsfeed.time.com/2012/09/27/google-executive-arrested-as-brazil-bans-anti-muslim-film
(Accessed 18 May 2014); Larissa G. Alfonso, Felipe Octaviano Delgado Busnello, and Diego C.
Spinola. World Intermediary Liability Map: Brazil. Center for Internet and Society at Stanford Law
School. https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/page/wilmap-brazil (Accessed 30 July 2014.)
169 Marco Civil da Internet, op. cit., Article 31.
170 Federal government of Brazil. 30 September 1997. Presidência da República Casa Civil Subchefia
para Assuntos Jurídicos [Brazilian Electoral Law]. Palácio do Planalto, Article 57-F. (In Portuguese.)
www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/LEIS/L9504.htm (Accessed 1 August 2014.)
171 Marco Civil da Internet, op. cit. Article 19(3).
172 Marco Civil da Internet, op. cit. Articles 19 and 21; Pedro Ekman and Bia Barbosa. 27 March 2014.
Marco Civil Aprovado: Dia Histórico para Liberdade de Expressão. Intervozes. (In Portuguese.)
http://intervozes.org.br/marco-civil-aprovado-dia-historico-para-a-liberdade-de-expressao
(Accessed 17 July 2014.)
173 Marco Civil da Internet, op. cit., Article 20.
174 State Council Information Office. 7 June 2012. Measures. Op. cit.
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13 of the Measures, all ‘information service providers” are required to ‘ensure that the
information that they provide is lawful’. A revised ‘deliberation draft’ of the Measures
was jointly released by the State Information Office and Ministry of Industry and
Information Technology in 2012, proposing a number of updated provisions specifying
the obligations of ISPs.175 The draft which is expected to become law and which has
therefore already begun to influence company behaviour, stipulates that once an internet
information service discovers that the information published falls into the ‘nine forbidden
content categories’, it shall ‘immediately stop the publication and transmission thereof,
save the relevant records and make a report thereon to the relevant authority and the
public security department’ (Articles 18 and 19).176 Article 25 stipulates the creation of a
complaints system enabling any member of the public to report illegal content that they
see on information service providers to the public security bureau and other relevant
government departments.177
Egypt: Although Egypt does not have a specific legal regime for intermediary liability,
there are laws that have been interpreted as affecting intermediaries. For example, Article
147 of Egypt’s 2002 Protection of Intellectual Property Rights Law specifically includes
‘computers, internet, information networks, communication networks’ among the entities
that must respect copyright.178 On the one hand, Article 147’s breadth – which covers
‘any manner of’ copyright exploitation – may hold intermediaries liable, although another
article of the same law, Article 171(9),179 could be interpreted as a statutory safe harbour
indemnifying internet intermediaries in Egypt.180 Scholars saw support for the latter
position in the Egyptian State Council Administrative Court’s November 2010 decision
to overturn the National Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (NTRA)’s decision to
require mobile operators and satellite broadcast companies to monitor their users’ news
feeds.181 The NTRA, which is empowered by the Telecommunications Regulatory Law
to set rules for telecommunications services providers, requires telecommunications
companies (which includes ISPs) to comply with restriction orders182 from the government
or risk imprisonment or revocation of their operating licenses.183 The Egyptian State
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Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Egyptian Gazette. 2 June 2002. Protection of Intellectual Property Rights Law No. 82/2002. World
Intellectual Property Organization, p. 47. www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/eg/eg001en.pdf
(Accessed 18 July 2014.)
‘Without prejudice to the moral rights of the author under this Law, the author may not, after the
publication of the work, prevent third parties from…Ephemeral reproduction of a work where
such reproduction is made in relay, during a digital transmission of the work or in the course of a
process of reception of a digitally stored work, within the normal operation of the device used by an
authorized person.’ Egyptian Gazette, pp. 52–53.
Seng and Fernandez-Diez, op. cit., pp. 24–25.
Yasmine Saleh. 27 November 2010. Egypt’s court overturns telecom news monitoring. Reuters.
www.reuters.com/article/2010/11/27/us-egypt-media-court-idUSTRE6AQ12V20101127
(Accessed 18 July 2014.)
National Telecommunication Regulatory Authority of Egypt. February 2003. Egypt Telecommunication
Regulation Law, Law No. 10 of 2003. University of Minnesota, p. 26 (Article 67). www1.umn.edu/
humanrts/research/Egypt/Egypt%20Telecommunication%20Regulation%20Law.pdf
Egypt Telecommunication Regulation Law, op. cit., p. 31 (Article 82.)

46
Council has the power to issue orders to block or remove content.184 In brief, there is no
consensus on whether the 2002 law ‘explicitly impose[s] liability on intermediaries for
acts of infringement by third parties or absolve[s] them’.185
Germany: In Germany, provisions addressing intermediary liability are defined in the
Telemedia Act 2007.186 The Telemedia Act applies to all electronic information and
communication services, excluding broadcasters and telecommunications service
providers that consist entirely of the transmission of signals. Telecommunications Services
are mainly regulated by the Telecommunications Act.187 The Telemedia Act established a
tiered liability regime that factors in a user’s level of involvement in the infringement on
the internet; individual ‘content providers’ are liable for own content they produce, share,
post etc. on intermediary platforms. ‘Host providers’, like social networking platforms,
are granted limited liability for third-party content, while ‘access providers’, or ISPs,
are assigned only very limited liability for third-party content.188 In Germany, a number
of state and non-governmental actors can issue requests for filtering, and removal of
information.189
Hungary: The concept of internet intermediaries was established via Act CVIII of 2001
(‘on certain issues of electronic commerce services and information society services’),
which implemented the EU E-Commerce Directive (ECD) of 2000.190 According to the ECD,
intermediary service providers are not responsible for the content they transmit, as long
as they do not select or modify the information transmitted/stored, specify the recipient
and initiate the information (art. 8, par. 1). Furthermore, intermediary service providers are
not liable if they have no knowledge of the unlawful nature of the transmitted information
and if, having acquired knowledge about its unlawful nature, they act ‘expeditiously to
remove or to disable access to the information’ (art. 11). As the original formulation of Act
CVIII refers mostly to copyright infringements, it is unclear how newly enacted restrictions
on media content and the modified provisions of the criminal code will impact the legal

184 As an example of an order from a High Administrative Court includes in 2013 a ruling from the High
Administrative Court that ordered YouTube to be blocked for a month in the country after Google
refused to delete the film ‘Innocence of Muslims’. Joel Gulhane. 19 February 2013. Google blocks
YouTube videos in Egypt. Daily News Egypt. www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/02/19/googleblocks-youtube-video (Accessed 17 July 2014.)
185 Seng and Fernandez-Diez, op. cit., pp. 24–25.
186 26 February 2007. Telemediengesetz (TMG) [Telemedia Act (TMA)]. Centre for German Legal
Information (CGerLI). Part 3, Sections 7–10. (Federal Gazette I, p. 179), pp. 6–8. www.cgerli.org/
fileadmin/user_upload/interne_Dokumente/Legislation/Telemedia_Act__TMA_.pdf
187 CGerLI, op. cit., p. 2; Telecommunications Act, §3, www.gesetze-im-internet.de/tkg_2004/
BJNR119000004.html#BJNR119000004BJNG000100000
188 CGerLI, op. cit., pp. 6–8.
189 Government bodies include child protection authorities, Commission for Youth Protection Relating
to Media, the Ministry of Interior and the Federal and Criminal Police Office; non-governmental
organizations include the Association for the Voluntary Self-Monitoring of Multimedia Service
Providers (FSM e.V.), and copyright holders and their representatives.
190 National Media and Infocommunications Authority of Hungary. 24 December 2001. Act CVIII of
2001 on certain issues of electronic commerce services and information society services. http://
english.nmhh.hu/dokumentum/150094/108_2001_el_comm_torv_20070502.pdf
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situation of intermediary services.191 Additionally, according to the revised Criminal Code,
article 77, content of criminal nature ‘disclosed through an electronic communications
network’ can be ordered by courts to be ‘rendered irreversibly inaccessible’.192
India: Section 79 of the Information Technology Act 2000 limits the liability of intermediaries
for third party information on their networks. Intermediaries are granted exemption from
liability for third-party content as long as they do not initiate the transmission, specify
its recipient, select or modify the communication and perform due diligence as defined
by Rules under section 79.193 Among other requirements, according to the Rules, the
intermediary must work to respond to requests for the removal of information that is
in contravention of the Rules within 36 hours of receiving such a request.194 This safe
harbour does not apply if the intermediary has conspired or aided in the commission of
the unlawful act, does not expeditiously remove or disable access to the content after
receiving notice or has obtained actual knowledge of the infringing content.195
Kenya: Kenyan law does not explicitly address the liability of internet intermediaries. The
lack of comprehensive regulations around intermediary liability has caused uncertainty
in the legal definition and recognition of an ‘intermediary’, with the closest definition
being found in the Kenya Information Communications Act under ‘telecommunication
operator’ or ‘licensee’.196 Internet companies such as social networks and search engines
are not defined and therefore do not fall under this definition. Bodies that are authorized
to request content removal include the National Cohesion and Integration Commission,197
the Ministry of Information Communication and Technology,198 Communication Authority
of Kenya199 and the Kenya Copyright Board.200 Because of the lack of specific regulation
addressing intermediary liability in Kenya, intermediaries can potentially be held liable for
illegal content under a number of different laws as mentioned above under ‘restrictions’.

191 Katalin Parti and Luisa Marin. 2013. Ensuring Freedoms and Protecting Rights in the Governance
of the Internet: A Comparative Analysis on Blocking Measures and Internet Providers’ Removal of
Illegal Internet Content. Journal of Contemporary European Research, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 138–59.
www.jcer.net/index.php/jcer/article/view/455/392
192 Act LXXVIII of 2013. (In Hungarian.) www.kozlonyok.hu/nkonline/MKPDF/hiteles/MK13096.pdf
193 Section 79(2) of the Information Technology Act 2000 as amended in 2005 http://deity.gov.in/sites/
upload_files/dit/files/downloads/itact2000/it_amendment_act2008.pdf
194 Rule 3(4) of the Information Technology Intermediaries Guidelines Rules 2011. Rule 3(2) contains
more than thirty-six types of prohibited content. For full list of prohibited content see Department of
Electronics and Information Technology, Ministry of Communications and Information Technology,
Government of India. 11 April 2011. (1330 GI/11-3A) http://deity.gov.in/sites/upload_files/dit/files/
GSR314E_10511(1).pdf
195 Section 79 (3) of the Information Technology Act 2000 as amended in 2008, op. cit.
196 Republic of Kenya. 2012. Kenya Information and Communications Act, Section 2. National
Council for Law Reporting. www.kenyalaw.org:8181/exist/kenyalex/actview.xql?actid=CAP.%20
411A#part_II
197 Republic of Kenya. 2008. National Cohesion and Integration Act, No. 12 of 2008. National Council
for Law Reporting, p. 17 (Section 25(2)). http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/Acts/
NationalCohesionandIntegrationAct_No12of2008.pdf
198 Kenya Information and Communications Act, op. cit., Section 5A.
199 Kenya Information and Communications Act, op. cit., Section 5; Communications Authority of
Kenya. What we Do. www.ca.go.ke/index.php/what-we-do (Accessed 1 July 2014.)
200 Alice Munyua, Grace Githaiga and Victor Kapiyo. 2012. Intermediary Liability in Kenya. Kenya ICT
Action Network, p. 10. www.apc.org/en/system/files/Intermediary_Liability_in_Kenya.pdf (Accessed
1 August 2014.)
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Liability can also arise under common law for breach of privacy, negligence, breach
of contract, copyright infringement, defamation, vicarious liability, etc.201 Pertaining
specifically to ISPs and telecommunications service providers, under the Kenya
Information Communications Act the industry regulator, the Communications Authority of
Kenya has general powers to regulate the operations of licensees through, among others,
the prescription of rules and conditions for licences. This includes the power to revoke
licences for non-compliance with the rules, or the licence terms and conditions.202
Russia: In 2013 the ‘Anti-piracy law’ (Federal Law No. 187-FZ) implemented a number
of legal revisions affecting internet intermediaries, including for the first time in Russia’s
legal code a definition of ‘information intermediaries’.203 The law defines functions
performed by different types of ‘information intermediaries’ – those transferring content
through information communication networks including the internet, those providing
opportunity to place content or information needed to receive the content, and those
providing access to content.204 It also outlines how these actions can avoid liability for
intellectual property right infringement, including by ‘safe harbour actions’ (depending
on the type of intermediary), for example by: 1) not initiating transmission of content nor
determining the receiver of the content; and 2) not modifying the content while providing
services, save for the changes necessary by the technical process of transmission. It also
contained more ambiguous safe harbour requirements such as prompt action to stop
infringement upon notification by rights-holders, and knowledge standards about ‘ought
to know’ that the content in question was unlawful.205 According to recently updated laws
governing online content, intermediaries are required to block or take down content upon
receiving an order from Roskomnadzor, Russia’s communications regulator responsible
for overseeing media and internet content.206 The penalty for failure to delete or block the
requested content is significant. Entire websites can be blocked, including the ones which
have the similar IP addresses.207 A February 2014 amendment requires that intermediaries

201 Republic of Kenya. 2007. Chapter 8: The Judicature Act. National Council for Law Reporting, pp.
3–4 (Section 3). www.kenyalaw.org/Downloads/GreyBook/3.%20Judicature%20Act.pdf
202 Section 25, Kenya Information and Communication Act, op. cit.
203 Government of Russia. Article 1253.1 – On responsibility of Informational intermediaries (Civil code
of Russian Federation Chapter 69). (In Russian.) www.zakonrf.info/gk/1253.1 (Accessed 18 July
2014); Daria Kim. 24 July 2013. Russia Adopts Measures Against Online Video Piracy. Intellectual
Property Watch. www.ip-watch.org/2013/07/24/russia-adopts-measures-against-online-videopiracy (Accessed 16 July 2014.)
204 The full name of the law is ‘On Amending Separate Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation
Concerning the Questions of Protection of Intellectual Rights in Information and Telecommunication
Networks’. See KVG Research. December 2013. TV Market and Video on Demand in the
Russian Federation. Strasbourg, European Audiovisual Observatory, pp. 19–22. www.obs.coe.int/
documents/205595/552774/RU+TV+and+VoD+2013+KVG+Research+EN.pdf/5fbb076c-868e423a-bfed-dca8b66cac43
205 KVG Research, op. cit.
206 Igor Korolev. 17 December 2013. Госдума разрешила блокировать сайты молниеносно и без
суда. [Russian Duma decides to block web sites without court permission]. CNews. (In Russian.)
www.cnews.ru/news/top/index.shtml?2013/12/17/553820 (Accessed 17 July 2014); No. 2925216: Bill Passed Protection of Intellectual Property Rights in the Information and Telecommunications
Networks. www.copyright.ru/ru/library/zakonoproekti/pravovoe_regulirovanie_in/zakon_292521-6
(Accessed 17 July 2014.)
207 VimpelCom (Beeline). 8 August 2012. Как и почему происходит блокировка сайтов. [How and
why websites are blocked/published on the habrahabr website] (in Russian). Beeline telecom blog.
http://habrahabr.ru/company/beeline/blog/149249 (Accessed 18 July 2014.)
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must comply with government demands, even if they are not accompanied by an official
court order, if the content relates to extremism, child pornography, drugs, violence, or the
promotion of riots or anti-government actions.208
United Kingdom: In the UK, there is no formal definition of an internet intermediary,
but ‘information society service provider’ is defined and would include ISPs and
telecommunication companies amongst others, though not as clearly social networks
and search engines.209 Consequently, there is no law in the UK specifically addressing
the liability of internet intermediaries per se, but there are a number of laws that de
facto address the same. For example, internet services are exempted from liability
for defamation if they pass on to a claimant the identity of someone who has posted
defamatory material on their site,210 and under certain situations they may benefit from
exclusions of liability for breaches of copyright too.211 The EU’s E-Commerce Directive
is a significant source of immunity in general,212 and the Information Society Directive
is a source of relief in copyright claims.213 Similarly, blocking powers exist, notably for
breaches of copyright.214 In general, courts can compel restrictions on access to material
that is a breach of contempt of court laws, or defames, or breaches privacy. In relation
to mobile telephony, there are other provisions of particular importance. These derive
from the laws relating to Ofcom, the body that grants mobile telephony licenses to all
mobile phone network providers. Ofcom has the power to revoke service provider’s
licenses to protect national security, public safety and health. Ofcom has a duty to act in
such a way when directed to by the government. The power and duty is contained in the
Communications Act 2003 s 5, and the power to compel Ofcom to act suspend or restrict
a particular network provider is contained in section 132. Other powers also exist that
208 Roskomnadzor, Government of Russia. 31 January 2014. О вступлении в силу изменений
в федеральный закон ‘Об информации, информационных технологиях и о защите
информации’. [Entry into force of amendments of the Federal Law ‘On Information, Information
Technologies, and Protection of Information’]. (In Russian). Roskomnadzor website. http://rkn.gov.
ru/news/rsoc/news23647.htm (Accessed 18 July 2014.)
209 According to Regulation 2 of the ECD Regulations 2002 2013/2002, ‘Any service which is normally
provided for remuneration, and which operates at a distance by electronic [means], … and at the
individual request of a recipient of a service’ (relying on recital 17 of Directive 2000/31/EC, commonly
known as the E-Commerce Directive). ‘It would cover, therefore, most commercial Internet Service
Providers, but would not cover internet cafes, whose services are not provided at a distance.’
Lionel Bently and Brad Sherman. 2009. Intellectual Property Law, 3rd edn. Oxford, Oxford
University Press, p. 158.
210 UK Government. 2013. The Defamation (Operators of Websites) Regulations 2013. The National
Archives. www.legislation.gov.uk/ukdsi/2013/9780111104620 (Accessed 18 July 2014.)
211 A source of liability in copyright for ISPs is section 16 of the Copyright Designs and Patents Act
1988, which provides that liability can be imposed where a person: ‘without the licence of the
copyright owner does, or authorises another to do, any of the acts restricted by the copyright’.
UK Government. Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 – Section 16: The acts restricted
by copyright. The National Archives. www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1988/48/part/I/chapter/II/
crossheading/the-acts-restricted-by-copyright
212 See footnote 154. Under these provisions, liability for damages or criminal sanction is provided for
hosting, mere conduit and caching under certain circumstances.
213 Directive 2001/29/EC, Art 5, recently considered by the Supreme Court in Public Relations
Consultants Association Limited v Newspaper Licensing Agency [2013] UKSC 18. www.bailii.
org/uk/cases/UKSC/2013/18.html
214 Article 8(3) of the Copyright Directive, and s97A of the Copyright Design and Patents Act 1988.
These are enforced to block websites on the basis of (inter alia) copyright breach. A recent case is
Paramount v BSkyB [2013] EWHC 3479 (Ch), which also reviews the law on liability for hyperlinks.
See www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2013/3479.html
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could be used to infringe freedom of expression over mobile communications networks,
including a power the government has to issue directions of a general nature to Ofcom
or network providers.215 Prior parliamentary oversight is not required for these powers to
be exercised.
United States: Broadly speaking there are two models of internet intermediary liability
in the United States. First, Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA)
provides ‘expansive protections against liability’ from a wide array of speech-based torts,
such as defamation, invasion of privacy, misrepresentation and negligence.216 Section
230 means that search engines are not liable for indexing or linking to potentially illegal
third-party content.217 Section 230 also contains a provision that protects intermediaries
such as social networks from liability when they voluntarily block or remove content they
determine could be harmful or objectionable to their users. Since the CDA’s enactment in
1996, lawsuits attempting to impose intermediary liability have generally buckled under
legal scrutiny.218 Note that the CDA does not shield internet companies against intellectual
property claims nor federal criminal laws.
For intellectual property–related claims, Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act (DMCA) provides ‘conditional safe harbor from liability’.219 It defines four types of
intermediaries – (a) ‘transitory digital network communications’ (i.e. ISPs), (b) Caching
service providers, (c) content hosts and (d) ‘information location tools’ (i.e. search
engines).220 The DMCA’s liability model is characterized as a conditional safe harbour
because intermediaries must not have ‘actual knowledge’ of infringement, not directly
benefit from the infringement, and have a notice-and-takedown policy (wherein infringing
links are quickly removed from its index, as well as having a termination policy for repeat
infringers) in order to gain legal immunity.221 This conditional model has expanded
throughout the world via trade agreements the United States has signed with other
countries. It has also served as a template for other countries, including China, India, and
the European Union.222

215 Vodafone, op. cit.; UK Government. Telecommunications Act 1984, s 94 – National Emergency
Plans for the Telecommunications Sector. www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/62282/nep-telecomms-sector-march2010.pdf
216 Adi Kamdar. 6 December 2012. EFF’s Guide to CDA 230: The Most Important Law Protecting Online
Speech. Electronic Frontier Foundation Deeplinks Blog. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/12/
effs-guide-cda-230-most-important-law-protecting-online-speech (Accessed 2 May 2014.)
217 Eric Goldman. 27 August 2013. When Should Search Engines Ignore Court Orders To Remove
Search Results? Forbes. www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2013/08/27/when-should-searchengines-ignore-court-orders-to-remove-search-results (Accessed 12 April 2014.)
218 Electronic Frontier Foundation. CDA 230 Successes. https://www.eff.org/issues/cda230/successes
(Accessed 1 May 2014.)
219 Center for Democracy and Technology, op. cit., pp. 6–13.
220 Legal Information Institute. 17 U.S. Code § 512 – Limitations on liability relating to material online
Cornell University Law School. www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/17/512 (Accessed 27 March
2014.)
221 Legal Information Institute. 17 U.S. Code § 512 – Limitations on liability relating to material online
Cornell University Law School. www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/17/512 (Accessed 27 March
2014.)
222 Daniel Seng and Ignacio Garrote Fernandez-Diez. 2012. Comparative Analysis of National Approaches
of the Liability of the Internet Intermediaries. Geneva, World Intellectual Property Organization, p. 6.
www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/copyright/en/doc/liability_of_internet_intermediaries.pdf
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European Union: Intermediary liability in the European Union is largely based on two
directives – the E-Commerce Directive223 and certain provisions of the Information Society
(InfoSoc) Directive are particular to claims for breach of copyright.224 The E-Commerce
Directive provides a safe harbour, in general terms, for ‘information society services’
against ‘liability’, but not injunctions, for material they carry in certain circumstances.225
An ‘information society service’ is defined as: ‘any service normally provided for
remuneration, at a distance, by means of electronic equipment for the processing
(including digital compression) and storage of data, and at the individual request of a
recipient of a service’.226 The conditions are, in essence, when the information society
service is a mere conduit for information, caches it or is a host for it.227 The Information
Society Directive applies only to claims in copyright. It provides that where there is a
temporary act of reproduction, there is no breach of a copyright holder’s reproduction
right – and hence provides a safe harbour against liability. ‘Temporary’ is further defined
as: ‘transient or incidental, and an integral and essential part of a technological process
and whose sole purpose is to enable (a) a transmission in a network between third parties
and an intermediary, or (b) a lawful use of a work or other subject-matter to be made, and
which have no independent economic significance’.228
Both Directives have been challenged in court due to what critics consider ambiguity of
the defences and safe harbours. For example, the application of the Information Society
Directive defence contained in Article 5 has been the subject of eight years of litigation,
with a Danish case being referred twice to the Court of Justice of the European Union
(CJEU),229 and a UK case reaching the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom and also
being referred to the CJEU.230 The question in this latter case – the ‘Meltwater’ litigation
– included the rather basic issue of whether browsing breached copyright; and the Danish
litigation – the ‘Infopaq’ cases – included the equally fundamental question of the extent
to which additional profit made by a defendant vitiates an Article 5 defense.

223 European Parliament and the Council of the European Union. 8 June 2000. Directive 2000/31/EC of
the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information
society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (‘Directive on electronic
commerce’). EUR-Lex. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32000L003
1:en:HTML
224 European Parliament and the Council of the European Union. 22 May 2001. Directive 2001/29/
EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain
aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society. EUR-Lex. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32001L0029
225 Directive 2000/31/EC, op. cit., Articles 12, 13 and 14, Recital 45.
226 Directive 2000/31/EC, Recital 17, Articles 2 (a) and (b), and Article 1(2) of Directive 98/34/EC as
amended by Directive 98/48/EC
227 Directive 2000/31/EC, op. cit., Articles 12, 13 and 14.
228 Directive 2000/31/EC, op. cit., Article 5.
229 Infopaq International A/S v Danske Dagblades Forening, (‘Infopaq I’) Case C-5/08; Infopaq
International A/S v Danske Dagblades Forening, (‘Infopaq II’) Case C-302/10. Maria Fredenslund.
17 May 2013. Denmark: Infopaq-case finally decided after eight years. Kluwer Copyright Blog.
http://kluwercopyrightblog.com/2013/05/17/denmark-infopaq-case-finally-decided-after-eightyears (Accessed 17 July 2014.)
230 Public Relations Consultants Association Ltd v Newspaper Licensing Agency [2013] UKSC 18.
www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKSC/2013/18.html (Accessed 18 July 2014); Newspaper Licensing
Agency Ltd and others v Public Relations Consultants Association Ltd (Case C-360/13)
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Ambiguities also exist in the E-Commerce Directive.231 So, for example, the protection of
the Directive for hosts is lost when a defendant has ‘actual knowledge’ of illegal activity or
of facts from which illegality becomes apparent, but it is not clear what constitutes ‘actual
knowledge’.232 Indeed, the regulation does not specify what information is required in a
notice that purports to provide a defendant with such knowledge, and hence remove
the defense. This, conceivably, may be different when a defendant is being sued in
copyright or defamation. Further, and also in relation to liability for hosts and caching,
the law says that a defendant needs to act ‘expeditiously to remove or disable access
to the information’, but does not indicate how long ‘expeditiously’ should be.233 These
ambiguities can create a chilling effect on expression, and an interference with freedom
of expression, as companies will be automatically tempted to take down content about
which they have been served a notice. This is because evaluating the merits of the case
will take time and money, and it may be more efficient, cheaper and without the risk
of liability, as noted earlier in the explanation on the safe harbour model, to react and
remove, rather than pause and think.234

2.2.3 Special Note: Intermediary Liability in Sub-Saharan Africa
While internet usage is growing fastest in the developing world, legal provisions related to
intermediary liability have yet to catch up in many parts of Sub-Saharan Africa.235 Absence
of intermediary liability provisions creates regulatory and procedural uncertainty.236 A 2014
report by an international NGO with consultative status to the UN’s Economic and Social
Council, the Association for Progressive Communications (APC), argues that the lack
of protection for intermediaries in African countries causes intermediaries to proactively
restrict content on their networks and platforms, resulting in the undue restriction of
users’ freedom of expression.237
Many African countries are in the process of crafting intermediary liability regimes, partly
in response to approaches by international bodies and major trade and aid partners to
protect intellectual property rights and ensure that intermediaries take action against
copyright-infringing material on their networks and platforms.238
Some countries, such as South Africa and Uganda, have adopted safe harbours
modeled on those of the United States and the European Union, although they have

231 Ashley Hurst, Partner at Olswang LLP. Interview with Richard Danbury. Personal interview.
Cambridge/London, UK, 14 April 2014. This paragraph gratefully draws on Mr Hurst’s critique, but
errors remain our own.
232 Art 14 (a)
233 Art 13 (e), Art 14 (b), recital 46
234 Ashley Hurst. 25 January 2013. ISPs and defamation law: hold fire, Robert Jay. The Guardian.
www.theguardian.com/law/2013/jan/25/defamation-law-robert-jay (Accessed 17 July 2014.)
235 For example, it has been found that South Africa and Uganda have legal provisions explicitly
addressing intermediary liability, but in countries such as Kenya and Nigeria, intermediary liability is
an emerging debate and issue. Comninos, An Uncertain Terrain, op. cit., p. 4.
236 Ibid. p. 12.
237 Gandhi, op. cit.
238 Ibid.
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been implemented quite recently and thus so far there is little ‘clarifying jurisprudence’.239
In South Africa, Chapter XI of the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act
‘provides for the limitation of liability for service providers, if these providers are members
of an industry representative body that has been recognized by the minister, and they
have adopted that body’s code of conduct’ (emphasis added).240
Regulatory uncertainty can stem from new laws that muddy the intent of previous
laws. For example, Uganda’s Electronic Transactions Act of 2011 limits the liability of
service providers for user content and, furthermore, it does ‘not require them to monitor
stored or transmitted data including for unlawful activity’.241 However, since then, ISPs
have been compelled to ‘install electronic surveillance and interception equipment that
“identifies the origin, destination, termination, duration and equipment identification of
each communication”’.242
On the other hand, Kenya and Nigeria – countries with high internet penetration rates and
vibrant tech communities – lack intermediary liability regimes.243 Nigeria has proposed
provisions addressing liability of telecommunication providers for subscribers’ activity.
Such provisions are coupled with provisions addressing data retention.244 In Kenya,
companies have begun to create policies restricting user activity and content in an effort
to pre-empt legal action over defamatory content.245
For countries putting in place intermediary liability regimes, civil society groups concerned
with freedom of expression such as Association for Progressive Communications have
voiced concern that countries will ‘cherry pick’ from other countries’ regimes.246 This can

239 Alex Comninos. October 2012. Intermediary liability in South Africa. South Africa, Association for
Progressive Communications, p. 9. (Intermediary Liability in Africa Research Papers, No. 3).
www.apc.org/en/system/files/Intermediary_Liability_in_South_Africa-Comninos_06.12.12.pdf
240 Republic of South Africa. 31 July 2002. Electronic Communications and Transactions Act,
2002 (No. 25 of 2002.) www.itu.int/ITU-D/projects/ITU_EC_ACP/hipssa/Activities/SA/docs/
SA-1_Legislations/South%20Africa/ElecComm.PDF (Accessed 31 July 2014.); Guy Berger and
Zikhona Masala. 22 March 2012. Mapping Digital Media: South Africa. New York, Open Society
Foundations, p. 98. www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/mapping-digital-mediasouth-africa-20120416.pdf
241 Ashnah Kalemera. 20 June 2014. Uganda: When National Security Trumps Citizens’ Internet
Freedoms. OpenNet Africa.
http://opennetafrica.org/internet-freedom-in-uganda-personal-information-and-the-state
(Accessed 11 July 2014.)
242 Ashnah Kalemera, Lillian Nalwoga and Wairagala Wakabi. Intermediary Liability in Uganda. CIPESA.
(Intermediary Liability in Africa Research Papers, No. 5.) www.apc.org/en/system/files/Intermediary_
Liability_in_Uganda.pdf (Accessed 29 July 2014.)
243 Kenya and Nigeria have a 36.70 per cent and 37.5 per cent penetration rate, respectively, where
an internet user is defined as an ‘individual, of any age, who can access the Internet at home, via
any device type (computer or mobile) and connection’. Internet users in both countries have grown
at the high annual rate 16 per cent. Interestingly, because Nigeria has such a large population
(at 178 million people, it has the eighth-largest population of internet users worldwide – behind
Germany and ahead of the UK. See Internet Users by Country. 2014. Internet Live Stats. www.
internetlivestats.com/internet-users-by-country (Accessed 15 July 2014.)
244 Gbenga Sesan. 16 May 2014. New Laws Affecting Intermediary Liability in Nigeria. APCNews.
www.apc.org/en/node/19200 (Accessed 17 July 2014.)
245 Grace Githaiga. 19 May 2014. Intermediary Liability: Preventing hate speech online in Kenya.
APCNews. www.apc.org/en/node/19202 (Accessed 17 July 2014.)
246 Ibid.
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lead to unintended consequences, they fear, because the importation of provisions is not
always complete, and can translate into more stringent, broad or vague regulations.247
Another concern is that countries may establish restrictive and selective regimes. Because
monitoring by intermediaries for potential illegal content could compromise internet
users’ right to privacy and freedom of expression, strong data protection and privacy
laws have been identified as an important safeguard to ensure that intermediary liability
regimes are not abused for surveillance or monitoring purposes.248 Indeed, while the lack
of intermediary liability regimes weakens freedom of expression, the simple existence
of an intermediary liability regime does not guarantee stronger protection either for
intermediaries or for online freedom of expression in general. In addition, intermediaries’
own terms of service may be inadequately aligned to freedom of expression standards.
Competence of the courts and the presence of entities able to advocate for online human
rights are key to ensuring protection of intermediaries and online freedom of expression.249

2.3 Self-regulation and Co-Regulation
Laws are not the only source of online content restriction; a company’s private rules like
its ‘terms of service’ also circumscribe freedom of expression. For example, Facebook250
and YouTube251 do not allow pornography, but Google’s Blogger does – as long as that
content is not accompanied by advertisements.252 Blogger also does not allow gratuitously
bloody content such as ‘close-up images of gunshot wounds or accident scenes without
additional context or commentary’.253 Pornography and photos of gunshot wounds are
not illegal in the United States, where Facebook and Google are headquartered, but the
companies has made the decision to exclude such content on the rationale this would as
they ‘serve to enhance the service as a whole’.254
Additionally, while US law protects hate speech as long as it would not incite imminent
violence, most US-based companies proscribe much broader categories of hate speech
in their terms of service.255
247 Nicolo Zingales. November 2013. Internet intermediary liability: Identifying best practices for
Africa. South Africa, Association for Progressive Communications, p. 25. www.apc.org/en/system/
files/APCInternetIntermediaryLiability_BestPracticesAfrica_20131125.pdf
248 Githaiga, op. cit.
249 Comninos and Rens, op. cit.
250 Facebook Community Standards. https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards
251 YouTube. YouTube Community Guidelines. https://www.youtube.com/t/community_guidelines
252 Violet Blue. 28 June 2013. Google’s Blogger to delete all ‘adult’ blogs with ads in three days. ZDNet.
www.zdnet.com/googles-blogger-to-delete-all-adult-blogs-with-ads-in-three-days-7000017451
(Accessed 31 July 2014.)
253 Google. Blogger Content Policy. www.blogger.com/content.g?hl=en
254 Ibid.
255 For example, Blogger: ‘content that promotes or condones violence against individuals or groups
based on race or ethnic origin, religion, disability, gender, age, nationality, veteran status, or sexual
orientation/gender identity, or whose primary purpose is inciting hatred on the basis of these core
characteristics’; Facebook: ‘Content that attacks people based on their actual or perceived race,
ethnicity, national origin, religion, sex, gender, sexual orientation, disability or disease is not allowed.
We do, however, allow clear attempts at humor or satire’; YouTube: ‘speech which attacks or
demeans a group based on race or ethnic origin, religion, disability, gender, age, veteran status, and
sexual orientation/gender identity’.
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In some jurisdictions, systems to set and enforce rules for online expression combine
elements of public and private authority, resulting in self-regulation and co-regulatory
enforcement mechanisms. The scope and power of these mechanisms are in turn
heavily shaped by states’ legal and regulatory contexts. Thus there is a great deal of
fluidity and inter-linkage between public and private regulation. All of the internet
intermediaries covered in this report engage in some degree of self-regulation and private
enforcement. The extent and nature of self- regulation and co-regulation taking place in
a given jurisdiction is in turn shaped by the specific constitutional, legal and regulatory
frameworks of that jurisdiction, particularly its intermediary liability regime.
The four international rapporteurs on freedom of expression – UN Special Rapporteur on
Freedom of Opinion and Expression; OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media;
Organization of American States (OAS) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression;
and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) Special Rapporteur
on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information – have pronounced self-regulation
to be an ‘effective tool in redressing harmful speech’ which ‘should be promoted’.256 In
fact, as early as 2003 self- and co-regulation was viewed favourably; a Council of Europe
declaration encouraged ‘self-regulation or co-regulation regarding content disseminated
on the Internet’ by member states.257 If such systems are not to serve as censorship, they
should operate in terms of criteria and processes aligned to international stand ards on
freedom of expression.
Company self-regulation: At the level of the individual company this ranges from
measures taken by the company to block or remove spam and viruses, to the setting
and enforcement of ‘terms of service’, which are rules that users must agree to abide by
in order to use the service. The case studies demonstrate that the terms of service for
one company may be very similar to legal and regulatory requirements, whereas other
companies prohibit content that is legal but deemed by the company to be undesirable
or incompatible with the purpose or character of its service.
Private companies are legally allowed to draft their own terms for what constitutes
undesirable content (for example, companies targeting children may prohibit cursing).
However, because large internet intermediaries effectively serve as quasi-public spheres,
some advocates have argued that these companies have a responsibility to assess the
human rights implications of their private rules in order to minimize negative impact on
users’ rights.258
Collective self-regulation: A group of private entities may jointly create industry codes
of conduct or set common technical standards by which all participants agree to abide.

256 Adeline Hulin (ed). 2013. Joint Declarations of the representatives of intergovernmental bodies to
protect free media and expression. Vienna, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe,
p. 67. www.osce.org/fom/99558?download=true
257 Council of Europe Committee of Ministers. 28 May 2003. Declaration on freedom of communication
on the Internet. (Decl-28.05.2003E.) https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=37031 (Accessed 30
October 2014.)
258 Jillian C. York. September 2010. Policing Content in the Quasi Public Sphere. OpenNet Initiative.
https://opennet.net/policing-content-quasi-public-sphere (Accessed 17 July 2014.)
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As internet scholar Christopher Marsden defines it: ‘a group of firms or individuals
exert control over their own membership and behavior. Membership is voluntary and
participants draw up their own rules using tools such as codes of conduct as well as
technological solutions and standards. Members take full responsibility for monitoring
and compliance without reference to a statutory regulatory authority’.259
One example of such an arrangement is the ‘six strikes’ Copyright Alert System adopted
by major US internet service providers, in which the companies have agreed to adhere to
common practices to monitor their networks for copyright infringement and to target and
alert users alleged to have infringed.260 Executed by the non-profit Center for Copyright
Information261 the scheme allows service providers to adapt its basic underlying principles
as they see fit. As a result, the implementation of the scheme reportedly varies from
service provider to service provider: some warn users and reduce their internet speeds,
while others block access to specific websites until the user takes courses in copyright
and piracy awareness.262
Co-regulation: A growing amount of self-regulation, particularly in the European Union,
is implemented as an alternative to traditional regulatory action. Some governments
actively encourage or even place pressure on private business to self-regulate as an
alternative to formal legislation or regulation which is inherently less flexible and usually
more blunt than private arrangements.263 A regulatory regime involving private regulation
that is actively encouraged or even supported by the state through legislation, funding,
or other means of state support or institutional participation, has come to be known as
‘co-regulation’.264
A global example of co-regulation is a notice-and-takedown system to combat child
sexual abuse images established between the International Association of Internet
Hotlines (INHOPE) and ISPs.265 Of the countries addressed in this report, Brazil, Germany,
Hungary, Russia, the UK and the United States operate INHOPE-associated hotlines.266
Specifically in the UK, the Internet Watch Foundation (IWF), a self-regulatory body set
up by the internet industry in 1996 in response to the threat of more direct regulation, is
empowered to make decisions about what content should be blacklisted, while working

259 Christopher T. Marsden. 2011. Internet Co-Regulation: European Law, Regulatory Governance,
and Legitimacy in Cyberspace. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 54.
260 Mitch Stoltz. To Safeguard the Public Domain (and the Public Interest), Fix Copyright’s Crazy
Penalties. EFF Deeplinks blog. 18 January 2014. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/01/safeguardpublic-domain-and-public-interest-fix-copyrights-crazy-penalties (Accessed April 15, 2014.)
261 Copyright System FAQs. Center for Copyright Information. http://www.copyrightinformation.org/
resources-faq/copyright-alert-system-faqs/ (Accessed 15 April 2014.)
262 Matthew Ingram. Should You Fear the ‘Six Strikes’ Anti-Piracy Rule? 27 February 2013.
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-02-27/should-you-fear-the-six-strikes-anti-piracyrule (Accessed 15 April 2014.)
263 Marsden, op. cit., p. 48.
264 Marsden, op. cit., p. 46.
265 In Germany three such hotlines are operated by the self-regulatory Association for the Voluntary
Self-Monitoring of Multimedia Service Providers (FSM e.V.), the Association of the German Internet
Industry eco e.V. and the joint state-regulatory body Jugendschutz. INHOPE Member Details.
https://old.inhope.org/en/hotlines/facts.html (Accessed 18 July 2014.)
266 Ibid.
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closely with government departments. In 2014 the IWF was tasked by the UK Government
to actively investigate child sex abuse images on the internet.267 In Germany, in addition
to complying with warrants and court orders, service providers have developed Codes of
Conduct in conjunction with a non-governmental self-regulatory body, the Voluntary SelfMonitoring of Multimedia Service Providers (FSM). These codes include commitments to
ensure that content on their networks complies with statutory requirements regarding the
protection of youth, including child sexual abuse images.268 In Brazil, the nongovernmental
organization Safernet accepts anonymous complaints of human rights violations on
the internet relating to child sexual abuse images (online paedophilia), in addition to
racism, xenophobia, religious intolerance, neo-Nazism, incitement to crimes against life,
homophobia, and incitement to cruel treatment of animals.269 Safernet investigates the
complaint, and collaborates with the federal police and prosecutors’ office, which may
start a criminal investigation. If there is enough evidence that a site has hosted content that
was found to be illegal, the site will be asked to remove the illegal content and is required
to preserve evidence of the alleged crime. The content of the users’ communications
may only be shared if there is a court order, however, demonstrating possible privacy
implications of such cooperations.270
Proponents of the co-regulatory model are seeking to expand it. For example in 2013
the UK government established an Extremism Taskforce, which among other things,
committed to working with service providers to restrict access to online extremist
material hosted overseas, but illegal in the UK. The task force also sought to strengthen
mechanisms for public reporting of online extremist content, and work with the internet
industry – in a co-regulatory capacity to identify and include extremist content in ‘family
friendly’ filters.271 According to media reports in 2013, the government was considering
establishing a system similar to the Internet Watch Foundation, in which a government
funded body would identify and work with service providers to block or otherwise disable
extremist content.272
All three of the case studies in this report examine various models of self- and coregulation. Proponents of industry self-regulation argue that it is preferable to government
regulation because such coordination is more flexible and more effective than government
regulation, deters legal yet undesirable conduct in the context of a particular service’s

267 Internet Watch Foundation. 2013. Internet Watch Foundation Annual & Charity Report 2013.
Cambridge, IWF, p. 5. www.iwf.org.uk/assets/media/annual-reports/annual_report_2013.pdf.pdf
(Accessed 29 July 2014.)
268 Jugendmedienschutz im Mobilfunk.Selbstverpflichtung der Mobilfunkanbieter [Youth Protection in
Mobile Networks. Code of Conduct of Mobile Providers],. October 2007. http://www.izmf.de/sites/
default/files/download/Studien/jugendschutz_mobilfunk.pdf (Accessed 12 April 2014.)
269 O Que Denunciar. Safernet Brasil. http://www.safernet.org.br/site/institucional/projetos/cnd/o-quedenunciar.
270 Term of Cooperation, article 5, paragraph 1. Available at: http://www.safernet.org.br/site/sites/
default/files/Teles.pdf
271 Tackling extremism in the UK: Report from the Prime Minister’s Task Force on Tackling Radicalisation
and Extremism. HM Government. December 2013. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/
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purpose, helps consumers evaluate products and services, and can lead to more efficient
product standards in addition to lowering the cost of production. On the other hand, critics
warn that self-regulation’s frequent shortfalls in regard to public accountability and due
process may fail to protect democratic values and neglect basic standards of justice.273
For example, the European Digital Rights Initiative warned that ‘very basic questions
need to be asked about whether we should entrust enforcement of law in a core element
of modern democracy – electronic communications – to private companies’.274 The
European Commission has argued that co-regulation is ill-suited for situations in which
‘fundamental rights or major political choices’ are at stake.275

2.4 Introducing the Case Studies
With the legal and regulatory context clearly established, the next three chapters examine
ISPs, search engines and social networks in turn – examining the extent to which
individuals’ rights are respected when their freedom of expression depends on private
sector internet intermediaries.
The three case studies illustrate how an internet user’s freedom of expression hinges
on the interplay between a company’s policies and practices, government policy, and
geopolitics. Key questions include: To what extent do companies make concerted efforts
to respect users’ rights in the face of government requests and legal frameworks that
are not always consistent with international human rights norms? What is the impact of
private terms of service on freedom of expression?276 In addition to limitations on content,
to what extent do company data protection practices and privacy policies, combined
with government surveillance requirements, affect whether people can freely express
themselves?277
Clearer understanding of such outcomes by all stakeholders should in turn help foster
freedom of expression online: helping governments formulate laws that protect online
rights but also facilitate intermediaries’ respect for users’ rights; helping companies
improve their policies and practices to foster freedom of expression via their services;
and helping civil society hold governments as well as companies accountable.

273 Konstantinos Komaitis. 29 July 2013. Voluntary Initiatives as a source of policy-making on the
Internet. Internet Society Public Policy blog. www.internetsociety.org/blog/2013/07/voluntaryinitiatives-source-policy-making-internet (Accessed 28 July 2014.)
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European Digital Rights Initiative, p. 5. www.edri.org/files/EDRI_selfreg_final_20110124.pdf
275 European Commission. 12 October 2001. European Governance: A White Paper. Official Journal
of the European Communities. (2001/C 287/01.) p. 17. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52001DC0428&rid=2
276 Article 19, ‘Dilemma’, op. cit., p. 7.
277 La Rue, A/HRC/23/40, op. cit., pp. 19–20.
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3. STUDY 1: INTERNET
SERVICE PROVIDERS
Vodafone (UK, Germany, Egypt), Vivo/Telefônica Brasil (Brazil), Bharti Airtel (India,
Kenya), Safaricom (Kenya)

3.1 Introduction
Internet service providers (ISPs) allow users to access and use the Internet via fixed
line or wireless connections.278 They enable the transmission of data to and from other
intermediaries (such as search engines, social networking platforms, web hosting
services, cloud computing services, etc.) over their networks.
ISPs can be state-owned, partially privatized or fully privatized.279 Many are operated
by companies whose original business focused on traditional and mobile telephone
services prior to expanding into internet services. Companies that act as ISPs may also
provide other services like voice calling, web hosting, cloud computing, domain name
registration, email, and other services. This case study focuses on the core functions of
an ISP as a provider of internet access via wireless and fixed-line services.
As the Guiding Principles of the Telecommunications Industry Dialogue on Freedom of
Expression and Privacy point out, telecommunications can both enhance openness and
transparency, and are pertinent to governments in protecting public safety and security.280
ISPs play a critical role in facilitating the right to freedom of expression given that internet
access is not only a prerequisite for online expression, but for enabling the free flow of
information globally.281 They act as internet ‘gatekeepers’282 given their direct access to,
and the technical ability to restrict, voice or data communication on their networks.

278 The Economic and Social Role of Internet Intermediries. OECD. DSTI/ICCP(2009)9/FINAL, p.9.
http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DSTI/ICCP(2009)9/
FINAL&doclanguage=en
279 Tuppen, op. cit. p. 10.
280 Telecommunications Industry Dialogue on Freedom of Expression and Privacy. Guiding Principles.
Version 1 6 March 2013. http://www.vodafone.com/content/dam/sustainability/pdfs/telecom_
industry_dialogue_principles.pdf
281 Comments of The New America Foundation, Free Press, Electronic Frontier Foundation, Public
Knowledge, Reporter Without Borders, American Civil Liberties Union. Before the National
Telecommunications and Information Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce. In the Matter
of Global Free Flow of Information on the Internet. Docket No. 100921457–0457–01. 6 December
2010. p.3.
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/comments/100921457-0457-01/attachments/NAFetal_
FreeFlowofInfoComments.pdf
282 Shielding the Messengers: Protecting Platforms for Expression and Innovation. Version 2. Center
for Democracy and Technology. December 2012. p.20. https://www.cdt.org/files/pdfs/CDTIntermediary-Liability-2012.pdf
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ISPs also have the ability to collect, store, and gain access to user’s personal data and the
content of their communications as well as metadata such as IP addresses, call record
details, and location.283 They can face legal mandates, and even extra-legal interference
through informal pressures, to provide access to this information, and can also face legal
requirements to facilitate real time monitoring and surveillance.284 For these reasons ISPs’
roles at the network level can affect users’ freedom of expression on other intermediaries’
services such as search engines and social networking platforms.
The business models of ISPs – provision of internet access to fixed line or mobile subscribers
– generally requires the investment of substantial physical infrastructure, equipment, and
personnel in the jurisdictions where they themselves or the telecommunications providers
operate.285 Thus, their policies and practices affecting freedom of expression map more
closely to a jurisdiction’s political and legal context than that of other intermediary types
such as search engines or social networking platforms outside of their home jurisdiction.
Nonetheless, this case study demonstrates that ISPs do have control over a range of
company business decisions, policies and practices that affect freedom of expression
online.
Publicly available terms of service, Privacy Policies, and other relevant policy documents
of the companies were analysed in the context of news items, stakeholder interviews, and
applicable legislation of the relevant jurisdictions in order to understand the challenges
ISPs face in respecting the right to freedom of expression.

3.1.1 The Companies
This case study examines the following ISPs operating in Brazil, India, the United
Kingdom, Germany, Egypt, and Kenya:
Vivo Telecommunications:286 Vivo Telecommunications, also known as Telefônica Brasil,
was launched in 1993. With 79 million cell phone subscribers as of May 2014, Vivo is the
largest telecommunications company in Brazil,287 and offers mobile, broadband, and cable
services.288 For the purposes of this research, Vivo operations were studied in Brazil, with
particular attention to the terms of service for internet services of mobile ‘post pay’ monthly
subscribers.289

283 Dunstan Alliston Hope. Protecting Human Rights in the Digital Age. BSR. February 2011. https://
globalnetworkinitiative.org/sites/default/files/files/BSR_ICT_Human_Rights_Report.pdf
284 Ibid.
285 Telecommunication Industry Dialogue. Guiding Principles. op. cit.
286 Vivo’s website. http://www.vivo.com.br/portalweb/appmanager/env/web.
287 Market Share das Operadoras de Celular no Brasil. Teleco. 17 June 2013. http://www.teleco.com.
br/mshare.asp (Accessed 24 June 2014.)
288 www.vivo.com.br
289 CONTRATO DE ADESÃO AO SERVIÇO VIVO INTERNET MÓVEL PÓS PAGO (Contract for
membership to the service Vivo Mobile Internet Postpaid).
http://www.vivo.com.br/consumo/groups/public/documents/documentopw/ucm_009621.pdf
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Bharti Airtel:290 Bharti Airtel is an Indian multinational telecommunications business
founded in 1995. Airtel offers 2G, 3G and 4G wireless services, mobile commerce,
fixed-line services, high speed DSL broadband, IPTV, DTH, enterprise services including
national and international long-distance services to carriers in twenty countries. Airtel is
ranked as the world’s fourth largest mobile operator with a subscriber base of over 200
million.291 For the purposes of this research, Airtel operations were studied in India and
Kenya.292 Airtel India’s ‘Terms and Conditions for Providing Services’293 and the ‘Online
Privacy Policy’294 and Airtel Kenya’s ‘Terms and Conditions for the Use of Airtel Data’295
were reviewed.
Vodafone:296 Vodafone is a UK-based multinational telecommunications business
founded in 1991. Vodafone is the world’s second-largest telecommunication provider
with a subscriber base of over 411 million customers and operating businesses in 29
countries in addition to joint ventures like Kenya’s Safaricom, which Vodafone calls its
‘local associate operator’ (see below).297 For the purposes of this research, Vodafone
was studied in the UK, Germany and Egypt. For Vodafone UK and Vodafone Germany,
the ‘Terms and Conditions: General Terms’ were reviewed. Additional policy documents
from the Vodafone Group such as the 2014 ‘Disclosure to Law Enforcement Report’ were
reviewed.298
Safaricom:299 Safaricom is Kenya’s largest mobile operator with 21 million subscribers.300
According to Bloomberg Industries, Safaricom claims 67 per cent of Kenya’s mobilephone market, as well as 79 per cent of voice traffic and 96 per cent of text messages as
of March 2014.301 Safaricom is 40 per cent owned by Vodafone; the Kenyan Government
owns 35 per cent and the remaining shares were publicly floated on the Nairobi Stock

290 www.airtel.in
291 About Bharti Airtel. Airtel India. http://www.airtel.in/about-bharti/about-bharti-airtel Airtel crosses
200 million mobile customer mark in India. 19 February 2014. http://www.airtel.in/about-bharti/
media-centre/bharti-airtel-news/corporate/airtel-crosses-200-million-mobile-customer-mark-inindia;
292 For more information about Airtel Kenya, see: http://africa.airtel.com/wps/wcm/connect/
africarevamp/Kenya//.
293 Airtel India. Terms and Conditions for Providing Services. https://cloud.airtel.in/ap4saasWeb/termsconditionsForUserReg.html
294 Online Privacy Policy. Airtel. http://www.airtel.in/forme/privacy-policy
295 Airtel Kenya. Terms & Conditions for the use of Airtel Data. http://africa.airtel.com/wps/wcm/
connect/africarevamp/kenya/3g/home/terms-and-conditions
296 www.vodafone.com
297 Factsheet. Vodafone Group Plc. http://www.vodafone.com/content/dam/vodafone/investors/
factsheet/group_factsheet.pdf
298 Vodafone UK. Terms and conditions: General terms. http://www.vodafone.co.uk/about-this-site/
terms-and-conditions/general-terms/
299 www.safaricom.co.ke
300 For more information see: http://www.safaricom.co.ke/about-us/investors-relations/investordashboard/corporate-information.
301 Eric Ombok. 26 March 2014. Vodafone’s Safaricom May Withdraw Its Offer for Essar Kenya.
Bloomberg. www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-03-25/safaricom-may-drop-bid-for-essar-kenyaunit-over-regulator-delay.html (Accessed 14 August 2014.)
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Exchange in June 2008.302 The ‘Safaricom Post Pay Customer Terms and Conditions’ and
‘Conditions of Use for the Safaricom Prepaid Services’ were reviewed.303

3.2 Direct Restrictions on Freedom of Expression
In this report’s introduction (Chapter 1), the section on ‘Modes of Restriction’ lists three
primary ways that internet intermediaries can restrict expression. Restrictions carried
out by ISPs are ‘network-level’ restrictions because they either prevent or restrict an
individual’s access to the internet itself or prevent or restrict access to online content,
expression opportunities, and services that are offered by other types of intermediaries.
As case studies 2 and 3 will demonstrate, network-level restrictions made by ISPs affect
the nature and extent of restrictions carried out by other intermediaries such as search
engines and social networking platforms.

3.2.1 Network-Level Filtering
Filters are specialized software programs that can restrict access to entire websites, types
of online services, specific pages or content within websites, or web pages containing
specified keywords.304 State-mandated filtering is usually carried out by ISPs and can be
required as one of the conditions of a company’s operating license in a jurisdiction. The
state may also install centralized filtering mechanisms through internet exchange points
that serve as gateways for internet traffic between different jurisdictions and to - and from
- the networks operated by different ISPs. Private or local institutions such as schools
and libraries can deploy filters on their own local networks to block access to certain
content. Filters can also be installed at the household level – most commonly by parents
seeking to control what content their children can access.305 This report focuses primarily
on state-mandated filtering by ISPs as well as other filtering that ISPs might deploy to

302 John Maina. 3 October 2007. Scramble for Safaricom: Who is Fooling Who? The African Executive.
www.africanexecutive.com/modules/magazine/articles.php?article=2590&magazine=143
(Accessed 14 August 2014); Kurt Eilhardt. 2010. Safaricom: Managing Risks in a Frontier
Capital Market. The Fletcher School at Tufts University. http://fletcher.tufts.edu/IBGC/Lab/
StudentResearch/~/media/Fletcher/Microsites/CEME/newpdfs/SafaricomFinal112010.ashx
(Accessed 14 August 2014.)
303 Though both of these Terms and Conditions refer to mobile services, they are the core Terms and
Conditions for services such as data bundles powered by 3G. These Terms and Conditions include
information about subscription and allocation, but note that they are extensions of the Post Pay and
Pre Paid Terms and Conditions. For access to Safaricom post pay Terms and Conditions see: http://
www.safaricom.co.ke/images/Downloads/Terms_and_Conditions/standard_terms_conditions_
safaricom_postpay_service_v1_feb_2010_tracked.pdf. For access to Sarfaricom Pre Pay Terms
and Conditions see: http://www.safaricom.co.ke/images/Downloads/Terms_and_Conditions/
conditions_of_use_for_the_safaricom_prepaid_services.pdf
304 R. S. Rosenberg. 2011. Controlling access to the Internet: The role of filtering. Ethics and Information
Technology, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 35–54. www.copacommission.org/papers/rosenberg.pdf
305 Jonathan Zittrain and John Palfrey. Internet Filtering: The Politics and Mechanisms of Control. In
Ronald Deibert, John Palfrey, Rafal Rohozinski, Jonathan Zittrain, eds. Access Denied: The Practice
and Policy of Global Internet Filtering. (Cambridge: MIT Press) 2008. pp 6-8. Online at:
http://access.opennet.net/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/accessdenied-chapter-2.pdf
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enforce their own rules, or to participate in collective industry self- and co-regulation (see
Chapter 2 for a discussion of private regulatory mechanisms).
Through deployment of specialized filtering technology, ISPs can filter specific keywords
or URLs belonging to specific web pages. With very basic techniques they can also filter
entire websites at the network level, as in the example depicted below.

Figure 1: screenshot of browser attempting to visit a filtered file-sharing
website in India in 2011.306

When content or a URL within a website is filtered at the network level, users can only
reach the unfiltered part of the website. When an entire website is filtered at the network
level, the user cannot reach any part of that website. Under the latter it is possible that
even legal content is also rendered inaccessible.
Depending on the legal context, ISPs can receive requests, recommendations, and orders
for filtering from the government, private third parties, and/or regulatory organizations.
Such orders can be communicated on a case-by-case basis directly to the ISP, or in the
form of a general ‘blacklist’. Examples from this research demonstrate that some ISPs in
some jurisdictions take self-regulatory or co-regulatory steps - including vetting content
on their networks by standards developed by the company, as well as collaborating with
hotlines, regulatory, and industry bodies to identify infringing content. ISPs can also offer

306 Online at: http://www.medianama.com/wp-content/uploads/Screen-Shot-2011-07-21-at10.55.41-AM.png
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individual users the option of applying filters to their home and office networks. Freedom
of expression can be affected by the reasons for filtering, the practical implementation
of the filtering, and the transparency by government and companies about how and why
the filtering occurs.

Company Policy
Case study research focused on company policies on complying with government and
other parties’ requests and how they enforce their private terms of service. Because the
researchers were unable to secure interviews with company representatives, the following
relies on publicly available sources.
Compliance with government requests: Airtel India blocks websites, content, and
specific user accounts as directed by statutory authorities or security agencies.307
The Vodafone Group broadly clarifies in a document titled ‘An Overview of Vodafone’s
policy on privacy, human rights, and law enforcement assistance’ that the company will
assist law enforcement where legally required.308 Vodafone also explains in its ‘Law
Enforcement Disclosure Report’ that the company may apply filters as mandated by
authorized authorities and according to ‘block lists’ maintained by relevant authorities.309
Airtel Kenya, and Safaricom do not address how they comply with government filtering
requests in publicly available materials, although Vodafone included Safaricom, of which
it owns a 40 per cent stake, in the ‘Law Enforcement Disclosure Report’ as ‘Vodafone’s
local associate operator’.310 It is unclear to what extent Vodafone’s policy on privacy,
human rights, and law enforcement assistance extends to cover Safaricom in absence
of clarification by Safaricom. Vivo does not mention the issue of government filtering
requests in its public materials but that has become moot since the Marco Civil da
Internet prohibits filtering of content.311
Enforcement of private rules: As a co-regulatory step, Vodafone UK clarifies that it
collaborates with the Internet Watch Foundation (IWF) to filter content specifically related
to child sexual abuse which is identified and communicated by the IWF in the form of a
block list.312 (See Chapter 2 for in-depth discussion of co-regulation generally and the
IWF specifically.) Vodafone has a license to use the IWF blacklist in territories outside of

307 Airtel India. Terms and Conditions for Providing Services. Section 15.5.8. op. cit.
308 Vodafone. Human Rights and Law Enforcement. 17 July 2012. http://www.vodafone.com/content/
index/about/about-us/privacy/human_rights.html.
309 Vodafone Law Enforcement Disclosure Report. op. cit. p. 68.
310 Ibid. p. 78.
311 Isabel Costa Carvalho, Claudette M. Christian, Timothy P. Tobin and Arthur Rodrigues do Amaral.
Marco Civil da Internet: Brazil’s new Internet Law could broadly impact online companies’ privacy
and data handling practices. Lexology: Association of Corporate Counsel. 7 May 2014.
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=2b5808f2-a0a6-469f-ba05-4b2335dfb36f
(Accessed 14 August 2014.)
312 Human Rights – Our approach. Vodafone. http://www.vodafone.com/content/sustainability/
operating_responsibly/human_rights.html

65
the UK.313 As a self-regulatory step, Vodafone UK and Vodafone Germany also provide
customers with the option to activate parental controls and filter content.314
All companies include in their Terms prohibited types of content and activities on
their networks. Specificity varies, but most use broad terms to capture many forms
of disallowed content. For example, Airtel India prohibits what it calls objectionable,
obscene and pornographic messages or communications, and maintains that content
and communications on the network must be consistent with Indian law.315 Airtel
Kenya requires users to comply with all relevant laws and regulations and notes that
users cannot encourage, allow or engage in the transmission of what it terms obscene
or offensive communications, the spread of viruses, copyright infringing material, or
defamatory material.316 Safaricom’s pre-paid terms of service hold users responsible
for any transmitted material/communication, which is classified as illegal, defamatory,
misleading or in breach of any persons rights.317 (These conditions do not apply to
Safaricom’s ‘post pay’ or monthly subscriber service terms.)
In contrast, Vodafone UK filters access to web or Wireless Application Protocol (WAP)
sites that are known or suspected to be illegal, and places mandatory restriction and
verification controls on content that is restricted to individuals 18 years and older.318
Among other prohibited uses, Vodafone Germany obliges the customer to avoid violating
third-party rights, in particular copyright and trademark rights.319 Vivo says that it prohibits
acts that are contrary to law, moral, good customs, and customs and habits understood
to be reasonable and acceptable online. This includes dissemination of messages that
are racist, pornographic, paedophilic, intellectual property–infringing, or that violate the
law.320 Vivo also prohibits customers from invading the privacy or harming other users.321

313 Vodafone Group Statement of Commitments to CEO Coalition to ‘Make the Internet a Better Place
for Children’. January 2013. p. 8. http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/newsroom/cf/document.
cfm?doc_id=1655
314 Vodafone Group Statement of Commitments to CEO Coalition to ‘Make the Internet a Better Place
for Children’. op cit. p. 6. and Customer Protection: Keeping children safe. Vodafone UK. http://
www.vodafone.co.uk/our-responsibilities/protecting-our-customers/customer-protection/
315 Airtel India. Terms and Conditions for Providing Services. Section 15.5.2. op. cit.
316 Airtel Kenya. Terms & Conditions for the use of Airtel Data. Section 5 (a) op. cit.
317 Safaricom. Conditions of Use for the Safaricom Prepaid Services. Section 6. http://www.safaricom.
co.ke/images/Downloads/Terms_and_Conditions/conditions_of_use_for_the_safaricom_prepaid_
services.pdf
318 Terms and Conditions: Content control. Vodafone. http://www.vodafone.co.uk/about-this-site/
terms-and-conditions/content-control/ (Accessed 25 June 2014.) “Vodafone Group Statement of
Commitments to CEO Coalition to ‘Make the Internet a Better Place for Children,” op. cit.
319 Allgemeine Geschäftsbedingungen für Vodafone-Dienstleistungen (AGB). Section 6.5. Vodafone
Germany. http://www.vodafone.de/infofaxe/203.pdf
320 CONTRATO DE ADESÃO AO SERVIÇO VIVO INTERNET MÓVEL PÓS PAGO, op. cit. section 5.1,
(g) and (h)
321 Ibid. Section 5.1a
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Implementation in national context:
ISPs filter a broad range of content types in response to government requests or in
compliance with the law. In the countries covered by this case study, typical types of content
filtered by ISPs based on government order or legal mandate include what are deemed
to be copyright-infringing materials, pornography, child-abuse images, defamation, hate
speech, election-related speech and materials sensitive to national security. (See Chapter
2 for a discussion of how different states take different regulatory approaches to different
content types.) Self- and co-regulatory efforts involving ISPs varied widely depending on
national context. Case study researchers identified the following points of vulnerability for
freedom of expression that ISPs and individuals face:

Obstacles to challenging government filtering requests
For ISPs, loss of operating license can result in unacceptably high costs to a business,
especially where they invest in physical facilities, install equipment and hire large
numbers of local staff in order to provide service in a given jurisdiction. In general,
license agreements and the law vastly limit the choices available to ISPs when it comes
to challenging government filtering requests. This includes decisions about: 1) whether
or not to comply with a requests; 2) the type of public notice and explanation of the
restriction provided by the service provider; and 3) whether and when to remove filters
on particular content.
However, Vodafone’s Disclosure to Law Enforcement Report underscores that Vodafone
did challenge requests that were clearly not legal despite the risk of criminal liability and
losing operating licenses.322 None of the other companies studied for this research have
made a similar public revelation.

Technical capacity and clarity of laws
In Brazil, research has shown that the most common type of restriction is carried out
against defamatory content.323 However most restrictions are targeted at the platform
level (search engines, social networks, web-hosting services, etc.) instead of at the ISP
network level. In fact, with the passage of the Marco Civil da Internet in 2014, ISPs are
now forbidden from blocking, monitoring, filtering or analyzing online content.324 Prior to
2014, Brazilian ISPs were rarely ordered to implement filtering by the government and
regulations did not compel them to install software enabling the targeted restriction of
specific content or pages. Because the ISPs lacked the technical means to carry out
targeted filtering, filtering orders meant to restrict specific defamatory material on YouTube
and the blog-hosting platform WordPress resulted in the entire services being blocked for

322 Vodafone Law Enforcement Disclosure Report. op. cit.
323 “Ameaças na Rede. Relatóriio de violações contra blogueiros, donos ou editores de site e usuários
na internet em 2012. Article 19, 2013. p. 13. http://artigo19.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/
RELAT%C3%93RIO-BLOGS-_Vers%C3%A3o-internet.pdf
324 Isabel Costa Carvalho, et. al. op cit.
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short periods of time in 2007 and 2008 respectively.325 Now with the prohibition of ISP
filtering, legal liability and enforcement in Brazil targets only the platform level, which
will be the subject of further discussion in the case study examining social networking
services.
In Kenya, no nationwide filtering has been reported, although in January 2013 researchers
from the Citizen Lab at the University of Toronto in Canada identified the existence of a
technology called PacketShaper, manufactured by a US company called BlueCoat, on
Kenyan networks. Thus, while Kenyan ISPs have not apparently used PacketShaper’s
filtering capabilities, it appears that Kenyan authorities if not ISPs themselves possess the
technical capability to carry out targeted filtering of content and web pages.326
Sometimes laws are only partially or unevenly enforced – or complied with to different
degrees by different ISPs. In 2009, an Egyptian administrative court ordered the blocking
of access to online pornography.327 Initially, the order was not complied with, and in 2012
the Prosecutor General of Egypt ordered government ministries to enforce the ban.328 As
of 2013, news items reported that the National Telecom Regulatory Authority of Egypt
announced the development of filtering software to prevent pornography from being
shared, while as of January 2013 it has been reported that ISPs had installed filtering
software on their networks.329 In August 2013 the Administrative Court had ruled against
the pornography ban, but meanwhile as per the media reports, the filtering software was
already installed.330

Extension of “family friendly” filtering to adults by default
In 2014 the UK Government reached an agreement with four major British ISPs in
which the companies will, as a self-regulatory scheme, offer customers ‘family friendly
network filtering services’ that are automatically switched ‘on’ at the time of purchasing
a broadband connection. In July 2014, Ofcom, the British telecommunications regulator
published a report explaining that it is an ‘unavoidable’ choice for users to have filters

325 Brazil court orders ISPs to block access to Wordpress blog. OpenNet Initiative. 10 April 2008.
https://opennet.net/blog/2008/04/brazil-court-orders-isps-block-access-wordpress-blog and YouTube
Does Brazil. OpenNet Initiative. 10 January 2007. https://opennet.net/blog/2007/01/youtube-doesbrazil (Accessed 9 April 2014.)
326 Appendix A: Summary Analysis of ‘Countries of Interest.’ In Morgan Marquis Boire, Jakum Dalek,
and Sarah McCune, et. al. Planet Blue Coat: Mapping Global Censorship and Surveillance Tools.
Research Brief Number 13, January 2013. The CitizenLab. p. 25. https://citizenlab.org/2013/01/
appendix-a-summary-analysis-of-blue-coat-countries-of-interest/ (Accessed 9 April 2014.) and The
Right To Privacy in Kenya. Universal Periodic Review Stakeholder Report: 21st Session, Kenya.
https://www.privacyinternational.org/sites/privacyinternational.org/files/file-downloads/upr_kenya.
pdf
327 Egypt. Country report. OpenNet Initiative. 6 August 2009. https://opennet.net/research/profiles/
egypt
328 Eva Galperin. Egyptian Prosecutor Orders Ban on Internet Porn. Electronic Frontier Foundation. 7
November 2012. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/11/egyptian-prosecutor-orders-ban-internetporn (Accessed 10 April 2014.)
329 Egypt ready to block porn websites: Official. The Siasat Daily. 1 April 2013. http://www.siasat.com/
english/news/egypt-ready-block-porn-websites-official (Accessed 10 October 2014.)
330 Al-Sayed Gamaleddine. Egypt court rules against banning porn websites. 24 August 2013. http://
english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/79783/Egypt/Politics-/Egypt-court-rules-againstbanning-porn-websites--.aspx (Accessed 10 April 2014.)
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turned on at the time of purchase – while existing customers can ‘opt in’ to the scheme.
Common categories of content to be filtered include suicide, self-harm, pornography
and file sharing. Some ISPs also include content related to: alcohol, tobacco, dating,
games, gambling, hacking, nudity, sexual education, social networking, media streaming,
fashion, and search engines and portals.331 In the media, the scheme has been justified
as a means of protecting children from the harmful effects of pornography, but it has also
been criticized in the media for having been implemented without public consultation and
as a means for the UK Government to filter content that it does not want the public to
access, including file sharing and extremist sites.332

‘Collateral’ Filtering
Overbroad or inconsistently applied laws can result in the inconsistent application of
filtering within a country as well as the filtering of entire websites instead of specific
infringing content within those websites, contradicting the ‘necessary and proportionate’
principle. Overbroad filtering is also known as ‘collateral filtering’ because of the collateral
damage it can potentially inflict upon freedom of expression.333
In mid-2014, the NGO Open Rights Group tested the impact of Internet filters in the
UK on nine different UK mobile and fixed line ISPs, and found that approximately one
in five sites out of 100,000 tested are blocked by at least one of the ISPs.334 The group
encouraged users to send in personal reports about blocked websites: A young mother,
for example, reported that an article to information about postpartum care was blocked.
The political blog of a Syrian commentator was reported blocked by four services
including Vodafone.335
In a recent ruling, the European Court of Justice held that ISPs could be required to
filter access to websites that contribute to the infringement copyright, but that orders for
filtering must be targeted. Specifically, the ruling stated, ‘In this respect, the measures
adopted by the internet service provider must be strictly targeted, in the sense that they
must serve to bring an end to a third party’s infringement of copyright or of a related right
but without thereby affecting internet users who are using the provider’s services in order

331 Ofcom Report on Internet safety measures - Internet Service Providers: Network level filtering
measures. Ofcom. 22 July 2014. http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/internet/internet-safety-2?utm_
source=updates&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=filtering-report
332 At the time of writing, there was a campaign to introduce filtering to restrict access by children
to pornography. For more information see: Laurie Penny. David Cameron’s internet porn filter
is the start of censorship creep. The Guardian. 2 January 2014. http://www.theguardian.com/
commentisfree/2014/jan/03/david-cameron-internet-porn-filter-censorship-creep (Accessed 10
July 2014.); Also see Warwick Ashford. UK internet porn filters a failure, says Open Rights Group.
Computer Weekly. 3 July 2014. http://www.computerweekly.com/news/2240223883/UK-internetporn-filters-a-failure-says-Open-Rights-Group (Accessed 10 July 2014.)
333 Nart Villeneuve. January 2006. The Filtering Matrix: Integrated mechanisms of information control
and the demarcation of borders in cyberspace. First Monday. Vol. 11. No. 1-2. http://firstmonday.
org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/1307/1227
334 Pam Cowburn. ORG’s Blocked project finds almost 1 in 5 sites are blocked by filters. Open Rights
Group. 2 July 2014 https://www.openrightsgroup.org/blog/2014/blockedproject%20 (Accessed 10
July 2014.)
335 Blocked! The personal cost of filters. Open Rights Group. July 2014. https://www.blocked.org.uk/
personal-stories
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to lawfully access information. Failing that, the provider’s interference in the freedom of
information of those users would be unjustified in the light of the objective pursued’.336
In India, civil society, the media, and government authorities have engaged in lively debates
about the collateral impact of filtering, which ISPs are required to carry out upon receipt
of a court order or instructions from an authorized government body. In 2013, the Indian
Computer Emergency Response Team – the government branch broadly responsible for
cybercrime located in the Department of Electronics and Information Technology – and
the Department of Telecommunications (DoT), in response to a court order issued by the
Gwalior district court, ordered the filtering of 78 URLs containing content related to the
Indian Institute of Planning and Management.337 Other authorities in the government’s
Department of Electronics and the government have publicly stated that they will contest
the court order. According to journalists the petitioner argued that unblocking any of
the links would constitute contempt of court.338 The filters were criticized in the media
as being overly broad and restricting legitimate speech; even a public notice issued by
the University Grants Commission was filtered.339 Also in 2013, the DoT, in response to
a court order from the Supreme Court of India, issued an order to ISPs for the filtering of
39 websites that allowed users to share content - including pornographic content.340 In
addition to file sharing and image hosting websites, the URL shortening and ad hosting
website Ad.fly was also filtered.341 The potential for overly broad filtering in response
to copyright laws has also been raised as a concern. For example, in 2011 Indian ISPs
were found to filter entire file-sharing websites rather than specific URLs when acting on
a court order to prevent piracy of a film called Singham. a 2011 film whose disparaging
comments about Karnataka residents was exploited for violent protests.342

336 European Court of Justice. Judgment of the Court in Case C-314/12. 27 March 2014. para 56,.
Mackinnon v Barr. Case C-123/12. 6 June 2014. http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.
jsf?text=&docid=149924&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&c
id=163325.
337 The Financial Express. After Court Order, DoT blocks web links critical of IIPM. 16 February 2013.
http://www.financialexpress.com/news/after-court-order-dot-blocks-78-web-links-critical-ofiipm/1075073 (Accessed: 9 September 2014.)
338 Liat Clark. ISPs must block defamatory sites in India, including government’s own pages. 19
Febuary 2013. http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2013-02/19/india-government-sites-blocked
(Accessed 26 June 2014.)
339 Shubhra Rishi. All Indian Enterprises should be Very Worried: Centre for Internet and Society. 25
February 2013. http://www.computerworld.in/feature/%E2%80%9Call-indian-enterprises-shouldbe-very-worried%E2%80%9D-centre-internet-and-society-75742013 (Accessed 26 June 2014.)
340 DNA. Govt orders Internet service providers to block 39 websites hosting obscene content. 26
June 2013. http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-govt-orders-internet-service-providers-to-block39-websites-hosting-obscene-content-1853550 (Accessed 26 June 2014.)
341 Softpedia. India Blocks 29 Adult Content and File Sharing Sites, Including Adf.ly. 1 July 2013. http://
news.softpedia.com/news/India-Blocks-39-Adult-Content-and-File-Sharing-Sites-Including-Adfly-364750.shtml/ (Accessed: 26 June 2014.)
342 Apar Gupta. The Great Singham Filesharing Block. India Law and Technology Blog. 24 August
2011.
http://www.iltb.net/2011/08/the-great-singham-filesharing-block/ (Accessed 26 June
2014.); NDTV. Singham effect: File sharing sites blocked. 22 July 2011 http://www.ndtv.com/article/
india/singham-effect-file-sharing-sites-blocked-121249 (Accessed 26 June 2014.); ‘Singham’
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Transparency and Accountability of enforcement
Self-regulatory measures in the form of ‘family friendly’ filters made available by ISPs
to users on their personal connection can risk placing the service provider (as well as
the companies that sell filtering software to the ISPs) in the combined role of judge, jury
and police: the ISP is responsible for determining the criteria to be included in the filter,
implementing the filter, and addressing complaints about mis-categorized websites. The
ISPs may in cases do this as part of their right to set private terms of reference, or in
other cases, be acting in terms of a co-regulatory agreement made with the government.
According to a representative from an NGO in the UK on the topic of the filters ‘The
government is encouraging companies to put in filters. But it is not clear how real the
choice will be to opt out and avoid these filters, nor is it clear how filtering takes place. The
government should not be allowed to promote such wide-ranging filtering without proper
democratic scrutiny’.343 Given the availability of software filters that parents can control
on their own home networks, international experts such as the UN Special Rapporteur on
freedom of expression Frank La Rue have questioned why ISPs should be legally required
to filter content, calling government-mandated filtering ‘difficult to justify’.344
The UK Government has also been criticized for seeking to expand the scope of selfregulatory efforts to other forms of content. As required by the Terrorism Act 2006, ISPs
must, on request, filter or otherwise make unavailable websites and content that promotes
terrorism.345 In 2011, the UK Government sought the creation and implementation of a
‘national block list’ of extremist content and promoted the filtering of internet in libraries,
schools etc.346 According to news reports, between 2008 and 2011 the government
implemented a pilot project in which illegal sites related to terrorism were blocked in
schools and libraries. Critics have raised concern about lack of transparency and
accountability throughout the process.Allegedly, sites were identified by the government’s
Counter Terrorism Internet Referral Unit (CTIRU), sent to the Crown Prosecution Services
for vetting for compliance with the UK Terrorism Act 2006, and then shared with filtering
software companies who then shared the filters with the libraries and schools.347
On the other hand, for certain types of content, such as hate speech, self-policing
and self-regulation are sometimes viewed as more conducive to upholding freedom of
expression compared to direct regulation and legal enforcement. A 2010 consultation by
the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights concluded that it is more
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Phone interview conducted with Gabrielle Guillemin of Article 19 on 15 April 2014.
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S2 and S3 of the UK Terrorism Act 2006. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/11/contents
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effective for ISPs to restrict hate speech as measures to enforce their terms of service,
instead of relying on the criminal justice system.348
Nonetheless there are concerns about delegating too much enforcement to private
intermediaries. In an interview, Markus Löning of the research institute Stiftung Neue
Verantwortung noted that these deliberations were ‘more difficult’ for ‘certain types
of pornography or hate speech’. Acknowledging that all ISPs may take down content
according to their terms and conditions, he maintained that ISPs should delete illegal
content under the aegis of and in cooperation with law enforcement. To illustrate, ‘in
the case of Nazi propaganda…it is the service provider’s responsibility to work with
prosecutors and law enforcement agencies, which means making a decision via a third
instance’.349

Relationship between self-regulation, state regulation and law
Sometimes measures that begin as self-regulatory schemes can later be turned into
regulation, or legislators can seek to formalize them in the law. In Kenya, in reaction
to the post-election violence in 2007, Safaricom developed a number of self-regulatory
guidelines to ensure that during election periods, content on the network is ‘peaceful’.
In 2012, Safaricom developed ‘Guidelines for Political Mobile Advertising on Safaricom’s
Premium Rate Messaging Service’, under which anyone intending to send bulk SMS of a
political nature would first have to submit an application to Safaricom, and the company
would vet the content to ensure that hate speech was not included.350 These measures
ultimately resulted in the development of regulatory guidelines by the Communications
Authority of Kenya for the prevention of transmission of undesirable bulk political content
via SMS.351
In June 2014, members of the UK parliament presented an ‘Online Safety Bill’352 requiring
ISPs to withhold ‘adult content’,353 and requiring users to prove that they are 18 years
of age to opt in to access content.354 This would change what are now self-regulatory
measures by ISPs into formal legal requirements to filter ‘adult content’.However, it is

348 Joe McNamee. The Slide From ‘Self Regulation’ to Corporate Censorship. European Digital Rights.
January 2011. p. 29 http://www.edri.org/files/EDRI_selfreg_final_20110124.pdf
349 Markus Löning, Director of the Privacy Project at Stiftung Neue Verantwortung Berlin and former
German Federal Commissioner for Human Rights Policy and Humanitarian Aid. Interview with
Kirsten Gollatz. Personal interview. Berlin, Germany, 7 April 2014.
350 Lucy Purdon. Corporate Responses to Hate Speech in the 2013 Kenyan Presidential Elections.
Case Study: Safaricom. Institute for Human Rights and Business, in Digital Dangers: Identifying and
Mitigating Threats in the Digital Realm (November 2013) p. 24. www.ihrb.org/pdf/DD-SafaricomCase-Study.pdf.
351 Guidelines for the Prevention of Transmission of Undesirable Bulk Political Content/Messages via
Electronic Communications Networks. CCK. September 2012. http://216.154.209.114/regulations/
downloads/Guidelines_for_the_prevention_of_transmission_of_undesirable_bulk_political_content_
via_sms.pdf
352 Online Safety Bill. HL Bill 19 55/3. 14 May 2013. http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/
lbill/2013-2014/0019/14019.pdf
353 Defined in the Bill as: ‘harmful and offensive materials from which persons under the age of eighteen
are protected.’
354 Online Safety Bill (amended). HL 16 55/4. 10 June 2014. http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/
bills/lbill/2014-2015/0016/15016.pdf
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important to note that this is a Private Members’ Bill, meaning that there is very little
chance of actually becoming law.355 356 357

BOX: Emerging Issue: ‘Upstream Filtering’
Internet service providers and the practice of ‘upstream filtering’ can hinder freedom of expression. As
companies begin to practice filtering in one jurisdiction, other jurisdictions served by the provider can be
affected by these practices. This is a result of the ‘passing on’ of any filter (or other technical component)
in place on the ISP’s network. This is known as upstream filtering, and the result is that content considered
illegal in one jurisdiction and subsequently restricted, is continued to be restricted in another jurisdiction,
where it might not be illegal.356 For example, highlighting the importance of agreements and arrangements
between ISPs – foreign and domestic – Citizen Lab of the University of Toronto reported in 2012 that the
traffic peering arrangement Airtel India and Omantel led to a situation where Airtel India’s content filters
were also effective on the Omantel network in Oman.357

3.2.2 Service Shutdowns and restriction
Governments can order network shutdowns or restrict internet services at a regional or
national level. The restriction can affect the entire network or a specific service. Network
shutdowns and service restrictions can be carried out for reasons related to the prevention
of terrorism, the maintenance of public order and the prevention of public unrest. In many
jurisdictions, ISPs must legally comply with such orders or risk legal penalty. They can
also restrict or shut down the network or a service for the reasons of maintenance or
technical failure.
The shutdown of an entire network or restriction of a service in a large area is a broad
stroke that impacts all content, and is a restriction on freedom of expression that strongly
risks not meeting internationally recognized principles such as proportionality and
necessity.358 Other more narrowly-targeted measures can also be taken. For example,
a user’s service can be terminated or suspended and the user will be unable to access
the internet or use mobile services. Governments may issue orders for such termination
or suspension of services. ISPs may also terminate or suspend a user’s service or curtail
access as a measure to enforce their own private policies.
Mobile telecommunications companies also receive orders from governments requiring
them to send messages via their networks. This can affect freedom of expression,
especially if the messages are not sent out in the government’s name, because such
measures ‘push’ certain information to users even if they do not restrict information.

355 Chris Davies. 16 May 2013. Private members’ bills: Which ones made it from 2012? BBC News.
www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-22365004 (Accessed 14 August 2014.)
356 Chris Davies. 16 May 2013. Private members’ bills: Which ones made it from 2012? BBC News.
www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-22365004 (Accessed 14 August 2014.)
357 The Citizen Lab. Routing Gone Wild: Documenting upstream filtering in Oman via India. 12 July
2012. https://citizenlab.org/2012/07/routing-gone-wild (Accessed 25 June 2014.)
358 A/HRC/17/27. pg.8
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Company Policies
Internet service providers generally only restrict the entire network for maintenance or
reasons out of their control. Companies do suspend or terminate user accounts. Such
measures appear to be in compliance with broader legal mandates, court orders, or as
self or co-regulatory steps taken to address specific types of content or behaviour – such
as copyright infringement.
Compliance with government requests: ISPs examined for this case study inform
users that their individual account or the network can be restricted in compliance
with governmental orders. Some, such as Airtel India, state that the service can be
disrupted and/or discontinued, suspended, etc. in response to directions, regulations,
and notifications from the Regulator, or in compliance with any regulation or policy or
other statutory authority.359 Safaricom will terminate access to users’ post paid services if
required to do so by any licensing, law enforcement, or regulatory authority. 360
In its 2014 Law Enforcement Disclosure Report, Vodafone recognized that orders for
network shutdown are received by the company, and that this is a power that governments
typically exercise in times of emergency.361 The report also noted that there were other
possible types of actions, including prioritizing SIMs (designating certain ‘VIP’ phone
numbers for priority service when the network is congested), shutting down particular
services and ceding direct network control to governments.362 Vodafone UK does not
explicitly mention restricting the service or network based on orders from authorized
authorities in their general terms and conditions, though Vodafone Germany notes that
disruption of the services could be due to orders by authorized officials.363 None of the
companies studied in this research clarify in their terms whether they could be legally
required to send out messages of a political nature.
Enforcement of private rules: The circumstances and the detail regarding when the
service or the network could be affected as per company policy differed. Airtel India,364
Vodafone UK,365 Vodafone Germany366 and Safaricom367 note that this can take place due
to technical error, maintenance or geographical conditions. Airtel India lists a number of
additional instances including: combating fraud and sabotage, in times of civil disorder,
military operation, or local emergency, if services are used in contravention of laws in
force, and any other reason/cause found to be reasonable by the company.368 Airtel
359 Airtel India. Terms and Conditions for Providing Services. sections 2.1.2.6, 2.1.2.7, 2.1.2.9. op. cit.
360 Safaricom. Post Paid Terms for Use. section 16(a). http://www.safaricom.co.ke/images/Downloads/
Terms_and_Conditions/standard_terms_conditions_safaricom_postpay_service_v1_feb_2010_
tracked.pdf
361 Vodafone Law Enforcement Disclosure Report. p.68.
362 Ibid.
363 Vodafone Germany. Allgemeine Geschäftsbedingungen für Vodafone-Dienstleistungen (AGB).
section
2.2.
http://www.vodafone.de/infofaxe/203.pdfhttp://www.vodafone.de/infofaxe/203.
pdfhttp://www.vodafone.de/infofaxe/203.pdf
364 Airtel India. Terms and Conditions. op. cit. section 2.1.2.6, 2.1.2.7, and 2.1.2.9.
365 Vodafone UK. Terms and Conditions: General Terms. section 2.2. http://www.vodafone.co.uk/
about-this-site/terms-and-conditions/general-terms/
366 Vodafone Germany., op.cit.
367 Safaricom. Safaricom Post Pay Customer Terms and Conditions. section 5. op. cit.
368 Airtel India. Terms and Conditions. op.cit. section 2.1.2.
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Kenya broadly states that services might be terminated if Airtel is unable to continue to
supply the services due to contractual, economical, or operational reasons.369 Vodafone
UK notes that the service might be affected to preserve network security, when there
is Artificially Inflated Traffic, and during Emergency Planning Measures.370 Vivo broadly
states that the services can be affected if the authorization for the company to operate is
withdrawn by the Government.371
All ISPs reserve the right to terminate, suspend, or moderate the service for abuse of the
service or breach of the company Terms and Conditions. Beyond this, Airtel India reserves
the right to terminate or suspend accounts for the same reasons as noted above, while
Airtel Kenya specifies that any violation of the provisions for ‘User Conduct’ will result in
account termination.372 Safaricom, for post-pay services, reserves the right to terminate
services if the company believes that the Service is being used in an unauthorised or illegal
way or for criminal activities.373 Safaricom may suspend or disconnect those who use its
services ‘in an unauthorised, unlawful, or fraudulent manner’ or if the communications are
‘illegal, a nuisance, abusive, a hoax, menacing or indecent’. The conditions of use clearly
state that the ‘SIM Card will at all times remain our property.374 Vodafone UK reserves
the right to terminate services if the company reasonably believes that the equipment or
services are being used for purposes that are abusive, a nuisance, illegal, or fraudulent.375

Implementation in national context
ISPs are faced with difficult decisions about how to comply, and how to communicate
with the public about their compliance. Below are some specific examples.

Nationwide shutdowns
Government orders to shut down all internet services for an entire nation are rare. During
the 2011 Egyptian Revolution, the government shut down mobile and Internet networks
for the entire country from 28 January to 2 February 2011.376 According to some experts,
the shutdown that occurred in Egypt was unprecedented in its scope.377 Journalists
further explain that the shutdown was possible, in part, because of the structure of Egypt’s

369 Airtel Kenya. Terms & Conditions for the use of Airtel Data. op. cit. section 10.
370 Vodafone UK. Terms and Conditions: General Terms. section 2.2 http://www.vodafone.co.uk/
about-this-site/terms-and-conditions/general-terms/
371 Vivo. Contrato De Adesao Ao Servico Vivo Internet Movel Pos Pago. section 9(e). http://www.vivo.
com.br/consumo/groups/public/documents/documentopw/ucm_009621.pdf
372 Airtel Kenya. Terms & Conditions. op. cit. section 5.
373 Safaricom. Safaricom Post Pay Customer Terms and Conditions. op. cit. section 16(a).
374 Ibid. section 5.
375 Vodafone UK. Terms and Conditions. op. cit. section 3.3(a).
376 Christopher Roads and Geoffrey Fowler. Egypt Shuts Down Internet, Cellphone Services. 29
January 2011. http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405274870395660457611045337
1369740 (Accessed 20 July 2014.)
377 According to a news interview with the network security firm Renesys Corp, other countries like Iran,
Tunisia, and China exert control over the internet – but this is via methods such as blocking particular
websites and slowing down the internet. Egypt’s case is unique as within 20 minutes all of the
largest service providers in Egypt were shut down. Larry Greenemeirer. How Was Egypt’s Internet
Access Shut Off?. Scientific American. 28 January 2011 http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/
egypt-internet-mubarak/ (Accessed 7 July 2014.)
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telecom sector: most ISPs are licensees of the state telecom – making them legally bound
to the Orders and Rules of the Telecommunication Regulatory Authority.378 Vodafone,
one of the many ISPs that received the order, shut down its network.379 Following the
shutdown, the Vodafone Group published a statement explaining why the company
complied with the requests.380
Service providers are not always clear in their terms of service that they will shut down
the entire network, a particular service, or accounts if required to do so by legal mandate,
though as of June 2014 Vodafone has clarified this possibility in their Law Enforcement
Disclosure Report.381 Prior to publication of that report, Vodafone was criticized for
complying with the 2011 governmental orders related to network and service restrictions
in Egypt.382 In this context, human rights organizations questioned Vodafone’s compliance
with Egyptian authorities and asked that the company develop clear standards applicable
to all its operations for responding and addressing such requests.383

Targeted and localized shutdowns
In 2012 the Government of Jammu and Kashmir, India, was reported in the media to have
ordered a regional shutdown of mobile and internet service to prevent riots in response to
the YouTube film ‘Innocence of Muslims’ for approximately a day.384 Government officials
in Jammu and Kashmir were cited in the news as stating that all Internet services were not
shut down in the region, and Airtel India was cited as having carried the following message:
‘Mobile Internet access is not available on your Airtel mobile today in compliance with an
advisory from the Jammu and Kashmir Police.’385 Note that the steps by the authorities
to shut down service in Jammu and Kashmir came alongside an order to ISPs to block

378 Babu Kurra. Egypt Shut Down Its Net With a Series of Phone Calls. Wired. 28 January 2011. http://
www.wired.com/2011/01/egypt-isp-shutdown/ (Accessed 7 June 2014.)
379 John Oates. Vodafone confirms Egypt lock-down. The Register. 28 January 2011. http://www.
theregister.co.uk/2011/01/28/egypt_vodafone_shuts/ (Accessed 7 June 2014.)
380 Vodafone Group Plc – Response on Issues Relating to Mobile Network Operations in Egypt. 22
February 2011.
http://www.business-humanrights.org/media/documents/vodafone-statement-re-egypt-22feb-2011.pdf (Accessed 7 June 2014.)
381 Vodafone Law Enforcement Disclosure Report. p.68.
382 Telco Hall of Shame: Vodafone. Access Blog. 29 January 2013. https://www.accessnow.org/
blog/2013/01/29/hall-of-shame-vodafone (Accessed 10 June 2014.)
383 Juliette Garside. Vodafone under fire for bowing to Egyptian pressure. The Guardian. 26 July 2011.
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2011/jul/26/vodafone-access-egypt-shutdown (Accessed:
7 July 2014.)
384 Note: Jammu and Kashmir is not the only region that has ordered the blocking of the film ‘Innocence
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385 Pamposh Raina and Betwa Sharma. Telecom Services Blocked to Curb Protests in Kashmir.
The New York Times. 21 September 2012. http://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/21/telecomservices-blocked-to-curb-protests-in-kashmir/ (Accessed 26 June 2014.)
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access to YouTube and Facebook in the region.386 This is, in an example of how shutdown
orders are sometimes accompanied by orders for filtering.387 388 389 390 391

BOX: Bypassed legal procedure in 2005 O2 localized network shutdown
In 2005, the City of London Police implemented a localized service restriction by ‘switching off’ parts of O2’s
network 1km around the Aldgate Station after the terrorist bombings in London.388 The shutdown lasted
from 12.00 pm to 4.45 pm. The request to O2 to give privileged access to its network to emergency services,
and restrict it to others – known as ‘Access Overload Control’ (ACCOLC) – was issued by the London Police
because they were having difficulty communicating in the Aldgate area. This was done despite the fact that
the Gold Co-ordinating Group, which is administratively responsible for authorizing network shutdowns,
decided not to shut down the networks and activate ACCOLC.389 According to London Assembly’s 7 July
Review Committee report of the bombings, during the shutdown it was estimated that possibly over a million
individuals’ communications were impacted.390 The 7 July Review Committee also found that there was
a need to review and restructure the protocol to be followed during emergency circumstances to ensure
authorities are provided with adequate and effective procedures to follow.391 Note that the order for restriction
was only for O2’s network.

Government requirements for specific messaging, or restriction of messaging, in
times of crisis. During the 2011 protests, the Egyptian Government not only shut down
mobile and internet networks, but required ISPs including Vodafone to send political
messages from the authorities.392 Later in a public statement Vodafone clarified that
Vodafone had declined to send the messages in the company’s name and insisted that
the messages clearly and accurately attribute the governmental department sending the
message.393
In India, in 2012, in response to sectarian threats circulating in several cities in the wake of
riots in the North Eastern state of Assam, in addition to other actions including orders for
the blocking of content and suspension of accounts,394 the government of India placed
a temporary nationwide restriction on SMS and data, not allowing more than five SMSs
or MMSs and no attachments over 25 KB of data to be sent per day for a period of
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fifteen 15 days.395 Information about the restriction was initially reported in news items
that cited confirmation of the restriction by the press office of Ministry of Home Affairs,396
but a public statement from government could not be located during this research. News
portals reported that Airtel India did not appear to have implemented the restriction, while
users sending the 6th message via Chennai, India-based company Aircel, were met with
the following message ‘Due to Govt. directives, more than 5 SMS per day are blocked.
Please retry tomorrow. Anticipate your co-operation’.397 Earlier, in 2010, the Government
of India also issued a temporary ban on all bulk SMS and MMS services. This restriction
was announced via a government press release that noted the duration of the restriction
and the governmental departments responsible for the restriction.398
In 2008 the Kenyan government initially considered shutting down SMS services during
the election period, in response to the 2007 post-election violence that occurred in the
region. As an alternative, Safaricom arranged with the Kenyan Government to have
service providers send messages of ‘peace and calm’ to users on their own initiative and
in the name of the company.399

Suspension, termination or curtailment of specific user accounts.
In Kenya, in compliance with the 2013 law requiring individuals to register SIMs with
government identification, service providers including Safaricom400 and Airtel Kenya401,
suspended services to unregistered subscribers. In countries across the European
Union, courts have ordered service providers to disconnect users engaging in file sharing
of copyright infringing material.402 In the UK, as of mid-2014, the Digital Economy Act
2010 (DEA) required ISPs to temporarily suspend the accounts of users persistently
downloading copyrighted material, though the lack of enabling legislation meant that
these provisions had not been put into effect.403 In 2012, some UK ISPs challenged the

395 Shreya Shah. India Bans Mass SMS to Counter Panic Wall Street Journal. 17 August 2012. http://
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DEA’s legality in the UK Court of Appeal, which upheld the Act.404 However, in 2012 the
codes that were intended to combat copyright infringement, drafted by Ofcom pursuant
to the DEA, were withdrawn.405 In July 2014, as a self-regulatory step, major ISPs in the
UK, the government, and the music industry established the ‘Voluntary Copyright Alert
Programme’, which sends warnings to infringing users pointing out their illegal behaviour
and providing them with legal alternatives to access content. Notably, the programme
does not impose sanctions such as disconnection. Furthermore, the government
indicated that the relevant DEA provisions would be shelved.406

3.2.3 Network Neutrality
‘Network neutrality’ is the principle that ISPs should treat all data equally and not prioritize
data or services for any reason – including commercial and political ones.407 Net neutrality
is important for freedom of expression because it preserves individual’s choice and right
to access internet content, applications, services and hardware.408 ISPs have access
to technologies that allow them to analyse, block or slow down content and services.
These practices can threaten network neutrality. According to Barbara van Schewick of
Stanford Law School’s Center for Internet and Society and David Farber of Carnegie
Mellon University, ISPs are motivated to discriminate against selected applications for
economic reasons, bandwidth regulation and restriction of content. They recommend
greater transparency by companies as to how their broadband services work, what types
of network management activities they engage in, and how such activities might affect
consumers.409
Across the jurisdictions studied in this research, governments and regulators are
struggling to understand how and if network neutrality should be protected by law, and
what responsibility companies should have in ensuring network neutrality. Brazil is the
only country studied in this research that guarantees network neutrality by law. With the
passage of the Marco Civil da Internet, ISPs are responsible for the transmission of data
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nuances. Communications of the ACM. Vol. 52 No. 2.
http://www.thei3p.org/docs/events/WESIINetNeutrality2.pdf
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regardless of content, ensuring that any traffic discrimination or degradation must be in
accordance with law, providing to consumers clear notice of network traffic management
and security practices, refraining from anti-competitive practices, and refraining from
blocking, monitoring, filtering or analysing the content of data packets except as
established by law.410
In the UK, Ofcom has published a statement on net neutrality that broadly exhorts
companies to be transparent as and when internet traffic is managed, and recommending
market-based solutions to problems that arise.411 In 2013, UK broadband providers
developed a voluntary industry code on traffic management transparency for broadband
services, in which they have committed to treat all traffic equally while also providing
users with accessible information about their respective traffic management practices. 412
In April 2014, the European Commission proposed changes to a number of regulations
through the ‘Connected Continent Legislative Package’. Among other things, the
proposed regulation mandates net neutrality by prohibiting discriminatory blocking
and throttling practices, defining clear rules and principles for traffic management, and
requiring that specialized services must provide adequate and standard quality of internet
service.413 Though the proposed regulation originally allowed for the filtering of content
for the purpose of implementing legal provisions, on a court order, or to prevent or
impede serious crimes, it was later amended to permit filtering only on receipt of a court
order.414 In reaction to the proposal, some members of industry issued a joint statement
criticizing the proposal as being ‘restrictive, anti-innovation, and anti-consumer choice’,
the statement also critiqued the legislative process as being rushed and not based on
adequate technical analysis.415
Concerns have also been raised by politicians in the UK that provisions relating to filtering
in the regulation will have a negative impact and allow for content such as child abuse
images to be shared.416 In 2013, the German Government also proposed a law mandating
network neutrality in reaction to a German ISP throttling services of customers who

410 Marco Civil da Internet. op. cit. Article 9, section (1),(2), (3).
411 Ofcom’s approach to net neutrality. Ofcom. 24 November 2011. http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/
consultations/net-neutrality/statement/
412 Voluntary industry code of practice on traffic management transparency for broadband services.
Broadband Stakeholder Group (UK). http://www.broadbanduk.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/
Voluntary-industry-code-of-practice-on-traffic-management-transparency-on-broadband-servicesupdated-version-May-2013.pdf
413 Connected continent legislative package. Digital Agenda for Europe. https://ec.europa.eu/digitalagenda/en/connected-continent-legislative-package
414 Draft European Parliament Legislative Resolution on the proposal for a regulation of the European
Parliament and of the Council laying down measures concerning the European single market
for electronic communications and to achieve a Connected Continent, and amending Directives
2002/20/EC, 2002/22/EC, and Regulations (EC) No 1211/2009 and (EU) No 531/2012. Article 23
paragraph 5.
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+REPORT+A7-20140190+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN
415 Frances Robinson. Battle Lines Drawn Over Net Neutrality in Europe. Wall Street Journal Digits
blog. 1 April 2014. http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2014/04/01/battle-lines-drawn-over-net-neutralityin-europe/ (Accessed 25 June 2014.)
416 Net neutrality law adopted by European Parliament. BBC News. 3 April 2014.
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-26865869 (Accessed 25 June 2014.)
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exceed their monthly quotas. While the principle of net neutrality has been legally codified
(§ 41a TKG) in Germany, it is still not entirely safeguarded through concrete provisions.417
Despite a number of jurisdictions proposing legislation, there still exist a number of
regulatory gaps around net neutrality. Thus, practices vary from company to company.
For example, even though India lacks formal legal provisions, it is believed that ISPs
generally adhere to net neutrality.418 However, in 2013 Airtel India and Google have
received criticism for a joint venture known as ‘free zone’ that would allow Airtel India
customers to access initial searches and email for free.419 Similar options are offered to
users in Kenya through services like Facebook Zero, which allow subscribers to access
text versions of the service for free through collaborations between Facebook and
ISPs.420 In response to critics of ‘free zones’ there is a strong counter argument that these
measures increase user choice and provide access to the internet to users who otherwise
would not have access.421

3.3 Privacy
Service providers have access to a broad range of information about their subscribers
including metadata, communications content, location, etc. According to the UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights’ report on the Right to Privacy in the Digital Age:
‘Enterprises that provide content or Internet services, or supply the technology and
equipment that make digital communications possible, for example, should adopt an
explicit policy statement outlining their commitment to respect human rights throughout
the company’s activities. They should also have in place appropriate due diligence
policies to identify, assess, prevent and mitigate any adverse impact. Companies should
assess whether and how their terms of service, or their policies for gathering and sharing
customer data, may result in an adverse impact on the human rights of their users’.422
Further the report holds that ‘even the mere possibility of communications information
being captured creates an interference with privacy, with a potential chilling effect on
rights, including those to free expression and association’.423

417 Iain Morris. German minister proposes net neutrality rules to rein in Deutsche Telekom: report. 17
June 2013. http://www.telecomengine.com/node/79864 (Accessed 25 June 2014.)
418 The Times of India. What is net neutrality and why is it important. The Times of India. 20 January
2014.
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/tech/tech-news/What-is-net-neutrality-and-why-it-is-important/
articleshow/29083935.cms (Accessed 16 April 2014).
419 Sudipto Sircar. Airtel Partners With Google: Latest Network Neutrality Violation. India Law and
Technology Blog. 3 July 2013.
http://www.iltb.net/2013/07/airtel-partners-with-google-latest-network-neutrality-violation/
(Accessed: 6 June 2014.)
420 David Talbot. 21 March 2013. Facebook and Google Create Walled Gardens for Web Newcomers
Overseas. MIT Technology Review. www.technologyreview.com/news/512316/facebook-andgoogle-create-walled-gardens-for-web-newcomers-overseas (Accessed 13 August 2014.)
421 Tasneem Akolawala. Airtel and Google join hands to provide free internet for mobile users in India.
DNA. 26 June 2013.
http://www.dnaindia.com/scitech/report-airtel-and-google-join-hands-to-provide-free-internet-formobile-users-in-india-1853383 (Accessed 9 September 2014.)
422 A/HRC/27/37. p.15.
423 A/HRC/27/37. p.7.
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3.3.1 Company Policies
This section provides a breakdown of how companies covered in this case study
articulate their policies affecting users’ privacy. It will be followed by a section analyzing
the outcomes produced when those particular company policies interact with the policies,
laws, and actions of specific governments.
General privacy practices: Vodafone Group has a comprehensive privacy policy that is
applicable to its subsidiaries in different countries,424 and has a number of supplementary
policies that address user privacy including: the ‘Global Policy Standard on Law
Enforcement Assistance’ and the 2014 Sustainability Report.425 Vodafone UK and Airtel
India have comprehensive privacy policies governing their data practices and refer to
privacy in their Terms. Vodafone UK’s privacy policy broadly addresses the collection, use,
sharing and disclosure, security, and users rights with respect to personal information.426
Vodafone UK’s General Terms also clarify that the company is a data controller under the
Data Protection Act 1998 and each party to the contract is bound to comply with the legal
duties laid out in the Act.427 Similarly, Vodafone Germany notes in its General Terms that
the company handles users’ personal data in compliance with the statutory provisions for
data protection including the Telecommunications Act (TKG), the German Federal Data
Protection Act (BDSG) as well as for the application of Internet services, the Telemedia
Act (TMG).428
Airtel India’s ‘Online Privacy Policy’ addresses what personal information is, when
personal information will be collected, how it will be used, when it can be disclosed
and transferred, security procedures and practices around personal information, how
individuals can update their personal information, and how users can submit complaints
or feedback to the company.429 The Airtel India terms further note that the privacy of
users’ communications are subject to relevant laws and regulations.430 On the other hand,
Airtel Kenya does not appear to have a dedicated privacy policy, nor does Safaricom.
This is reflective of the legal environment, as Kenya does not have a Data Protection Act.
Despite this, Airtel Kenya touches upon privacy in its Terms for Airtel data, noting the
circumstances under which the company will monitor, vet, edit or knowingly disclose the
contents of emails. 431 Safaricom in its Terms of post- pay mobile services touches upon

424 Additionally, the parent company Vodafone Group has a thorough privacy policy applying to its
subsidiaries. See: Vodafone privacy commitments. http://www.vodafone.com/content/index/about/
about-us/privacy.html, and also: Privacy at the heart of Vodafone. http://www.vodafone.com/
content/dam/vodafone/about/privacy/vodafone-privacy-programme.pdf
425 Sustainability Report 2013/14. Vodafone Group Plc. http://www.vodafone.com/content/dam/
sustainability/2014/pdf/vodafone_full_report_2014.pdf
426 Vodafone UK. Understanding our privacy policy. http://www.vodafone.co.uk/about-this-site/ourprivacy-policy/
427 Vodafone UK. Terms and Conditions: General Terms.section 17.2. http://www.vodafone.co.uk/
about-this-site/terms-and-conditions/general-terms/
428 Vodafone Germany. Allgemeine Geschäftsbedingungen für Vodafone-Dienstleistungen (AGB).
section 9.1. http://www.vodafone.de/infofaxe/203.pdf
429 Airtel India. Online Privacy Policy. op. cit.
430 Airtel India, Terms and Conditions for Providing Services. Section 2.1.4. op. cit.
431 Airtel Kenya. Terms & Conditions for the use of Airtel Data. Section 7. op. cit.
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the potential uses and circumstances for disclosure and sharing of users’ personal and
banking information.432
Vivo does not have a privacy policy that was publicly accessible at the time of this
research and company representatives did not respond to requests for interviews. In
June 2014, however, Vivo’s parent Telefonica released a Sustainability Report announcing
that ‘the Group has a Privacy Policy approved by the Board in March 2013 which has
to be complied with in all the countries in which we operate, and that the company had
appointed a Chief Privacy Officer.433 The report also states that the group has established
‘common standards of behaviour for all our companies’. This includes a commitment
to ‘protect the confidentiality of personal information entrusted to us, whether that of
customers, shareholders, employees or suppliers’, and ‘Inform users on how to access
and correct the data we handle’.434 Making privacy policies of specific services publicly
available would be consistent with that commitment, and advocacy group Access has
called on Telefonica to release specific details of the company’s privacy policy, which its
report implies adheres to globally consistent standards.435
Data Retention: Vodafone UK436 and Airtel India,437 which both have dedicated privacy
policies for their services, maintain that the company retains subscriber information
as legally required or for as long as necessary to provide customers with the service
requested. Policies for the other companies studied were not publicly available. In
Telefonica’s sustainability report which also applies to Vivo, the company commits to
‘provide our stakeholders with relevant information about how we use and store their
personal data’ although there are no publicly available details on how subsidiary brands
such as Vivo carry out this commitment.438
Real-time surveillance and responding to government user data requests: ISPs
can be analysed in terms of how they respond to governmental mandates for real time
surveillance and access to user data with differing levels of clarity. For example, for its
post-pay services, Safaricom reserves the right to hold and use information provided by
the user for carrying out legal, governmental, or regulatory requirement in connection with
a legal proceeding or in respect of crime or fraud prevention, detection or prosecution. The
company can also monitor or record voice or data services in order to prevent or detect
crime.439 In the terms for Safaricom’s pre-paid services, the company reserves the right to
disclose, receive and record any details of the use of the services including, though not
432 Safaricom. Post Paid Terms for Use. section 11. op. cit.
433 Telefonica 2013 Sustainability Report. http://www.rcysostenibilidad.telefonica.com/wp-content/
uploads/2014/07/Informe_Sostenibilidad2013_ENG3jul.pdf p. 126.
434 Ibid. p. 120.
435 Peter Micek and Ana Monteiro. Telefónica reports progress on privacy and free expression principles.
26 June 2014. Access blog. https://www.accessnow.org/blog/2014/06/26/telefonica-reportsprogress-on-privacy-and-free-expression-principles (Accessed 18 July, 2014.)
436 Vodafone UK. Understanding our privacy policy. http://www.vodafone.co.uk/about-this-site/ourprivacy-policy/
437 Airtel India. Privacy Policy: Security Practices and Procedures. http://www.airtel.in/forme/privacypolicy/security+practices+and+procedures?contentIDR=9346516c-c1a1-4bd7-bce0-6945236dc
eaa&useDefaultText=0&useDefaultDesc=0
438 Telefonica 2013 Corporate Sustainability Report. op. cit. p. 120.
439 Safaricom. Post Pay Terms and Conditions. Section 11.3 (a) and (b), op.cit.
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limited to calls, emails, SMSs, data, personal information or documents obtained from the
user for the purposes of fraud prevention and law enforcement, reasonable commercial or
business purposes, in compliance with legal, governmental or regulatory requirement and
for use by lawyers in connection with any legal proceedings.440 This standard does not
clarify to the user if and how the company complies with real time surveillance requests or
if the company provides access to historical data collected and stored by the company.
On the other hand, as noted above, Airtel India broadly references that the privacy of
communications is subject to compliance with relevant laws and licenses, which would
include legal provisions pertaining to surveillance,441 while noting specific instances that
they will share information with law enforcement or government agencies in their Online
Privacy Policy.442 Airtel Kenya discloses email content if it is legally required.443
Of all the companies studied, the Vodafone Group was the only ISP that published a
comprehensive policy on responding to demands from authorized authorities. Vodafone’s
policy is known as the ‘Global Policy Standard on Law Enforcement Assistance’ and
includes information about its process for evaluating and responding to requests for user
data from law enforcement. The policy specifies that Vodafone is bound to the laws of
the jurisdiction in which it operates, and that the company engages with governments
to protect user rights to the extent possible.444 Furthermore, Vodafone’s 2014 Law
Enforcement Disclosure Report sheds light on the complex situation that ISPs face
when complying with requests from authorized authorities – pointing to the challenges of
evolving technology, opaque law, and secrecy requirements. Vodafone also clarifies in the
report that the company collaborates with authorized authorities in three ways: response
to legal requests, voluntarily in clear emergency situations (such as a kidnapping) and
proactively to protect the Vodafone network.445
Telefonica’s Sustainability Report, which by extension is applicable to its subsidiary
company Vivo, states, ‘Telefonica has formal processes for handling data requests
from local or governmental authorities. These processes are the responsibility of the
departments of the General Secretary and Security in each Group company’.446 The
company also reports that in 2012 it carried out a human rights impact assessment with
the assistance of the non-profit consultancy Business for Social Responsibility (bsr.org).
Its report further states that ‘the exercise carried out allowed us to identify privacy and
freedom of expression as high-risk aspects for the sector; in search of a global solution

440 Ibid.
441 Airtel India. Terms and Conditions for Providing Services. op. cit. Section 2.1.4.
442 Airtel India. Privacy Policy. http://www.airtel.in/forme/privacy-policy/disclosure+and+transfer?conte
ntIDR=745792ad-d6af-4684-85d4-d85773e77356&useDefaultText=0&useDefaultDesc=0
443 Airtel Kenya. Terms & Conditions for the use of Airtel Data. Section 7. op. cit.
444 Note: The policy states that Vodafone may be bound to follow laws that are overly restrictive, and
thus Vodafone’s actions may consequently be overly-restrictive. However, Vodafone does indicate
that it engages in advocacy with governments to bring about changes in restrictive laws. See:
Vodafone. Human Rights and Law Enforcement. op. cit.
445 Vodafone. Law Enforcement Disclosure Report. op. cit.
446 Telefonica 2013 Sustainability Report. op. cit. p. 126
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we helped to create the [Telecommunications Industry] Dialogue Group on Freedom of
Expression and Privacy’.447
Identification practices: The ISPs studied in this research comply with legal requirements
for the registration of subscribers via government-issued identification. For example,
Airtel India,448 Airtel Kenya449 and Safaricom450 require users to submit government-issued
identification. Even when ISPs are not legally required to collect government identification
from subscribers, many do verify provided information at the time of signing service
contracts. In Brazil, users are required to register with their real names before purchasing
a mobile phone or subscribing to a private internet connection.451 In Germany, although
paragraph 111 of the Telecommunications Act requires suppliers of SIM cards to verify
a customer’s identity from customers, this is not rigorously enforced in practice and
suppliers do not check on the accuracy of the information provided upon activation so it
remains possible for people to obtain SIM cards anonymously.452

3.3.2 Implementation in national context
Below is an examination of how the company policies described above play out in specific
national contexts.

Compliance with government requests and legal mandates
Vodafone’s Disclosure to Law Enforcement Report does more than any other ISP to shed
light on the challenges companies face in respecting users’ privacy. The report describes
the range of legal requirements that the company faces around the world – including
requirements that directly violate user privacy – such as the requirement to provide
authorities in a number of jurisdictions with a direct line of access into the company
network. In a strong move towards protecting user privacy, Vodafone has called on
governments to amend legislation that allows government agencies and authorities to
gain direct access to an ISP’s infrastructure, and to take steps to discourage agencies
from seeking direct access without legal authorization.453

447 Telefonica 2013 Sustainability Report. op. cit. p. 126
448 According to the Department of Telecommunications Revised Guidelines on Verification of New
Mobile Subscriber for post paid and pre paid, users must submit a passport sized photograph,
proof of identity, and proof of address. This information must be verified by Airtel. Airtel notes that it
will carry out verification of subscriber information in Section 1.4 of Airtel India. Terms and Conditions
for Providing Services. op. cit.
449 Airtel Kenya. Customer Registration page. http://africa.airtel.com/wps/wcm/connect/africarevamp/
Kenya/home/customer-care/Customer-registration/
450 Safaricom. Subscriber SIM Registration Form. http://www.safaricom.co.ke/about-us/subscriberregistration/subscriber-registration.html
451 Freedom House. Freedom on the Net - Brazil – 2013. http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/
freedom-net/2013/brazil
452 L. Sobiraj. Datenschutz: Die Crux mit den anonymen Prepaid-Karten [Data Protection: the crux with
anonymous prepaid cards]. 18 August 2013. teltarif.de. http://www.teltarif.de/anonyme-sim-karteprepaid-discounter/news/52201.html (Accessed 8 August 2014.)
453 Vodafone. Law Enforcement Disclosure Report. op.cit. p. 65.
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Government monitoring and centralization
At the time of writing India was considering implementing a Centralized Monitoring
System, a surveillance scheme that would automate and centralize the process of
interception and allow authorized security agencies to bypass ISPs to access and
intercept communications directly.454 Company privacy policies in context
Only some of the companies investigated in this case study publish privacy policies
applicable to dedicated services offered locally (as opposed to website privacy policies,
or general group-level policies published by the group headquarters as opposed to by the
local subsidiary), or clearly and comprehensively explain what data they collect of users,
how long they use it for, and what they do with it.
In Kenya, where there is no data protection legislation, ISPs were not found to have
published comprehensive privacy policies for access by local users of their local services,
and only briefly mentioned the possible instances of disclosure of user data in terms
of service. Brazil also lacks a data protection or data retention law. According to the
National Council of Justice,455 in 2011 more than 18,000 telephone lines were monitored
with judicial authorization. Besides telephone lines, 204 e-mail accounts and 673 lines
using voice over IP were also monitored.
Also, despite legal mandates in many jurisdictions defining the time periods for which
data must be retained, the companies studied do not specify in their terms of service
or privacy policies (or at least those accessible to researchers) the exact time period for
which they retain data.

Limitations on anonymous Internet use via both broadband and mobile data
In most of the countries investigated, legal requirements oblige users to sign up for
services by presenting government-issued identification. This requirement typically
applies to both post-pay and pre-paid services. These identification requirements are
distinct from ISPs requiring personal information from the user for the carrying out of
commercial transactions such as billing. Some jurisdictions legally obligate ISPs to verify
this information before providing services to the user. This heavily reduces the space
for anonymous online participation, as users’ online behaviour may not only be tracked
but also linked to their actual identity without the protections to privacy of international
standards covering legitimate limitations of rights.

454 Human Rights Watch. India: New Monitoring System Threatens Rights. 7 June 2013. http://www.
hrw.org/news/2013/06/07/india-new-monitoring-system-threatens-rights (Accessed 26 June
2014.)
455 The National Council of Justice is a body composed by members of the Judiciary, the Public
Prosecutor’s Office, lawyers and members of civil society tasked with overseeing judicial malpractices
and improving the management of the Judiciary.
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3.4 Transparency
In a 2012 report “Opening the Lines: A call for transparency from Governments and
Telecommunications companies” the Global Network Initiative recommends that ISPs
and governments be transparent about the following: applicable laws and operating
licenses, government requests for user metadata and content, government requests for
filtering and government requests for text messages sent via the ISP’s network without
attribution.456
Transparency of laws, policies, practices, decisions, rationales, and outcomes related to
privacy and restrictions on freedom of expression allow users to make informed choices
about their own actions and speech online. Transparency is therefore important to internet
users’ ability to exercise their rights to privacy and freedom of expression.

3.4.1 Company Practices
The practice and scope of company and government transparency about surveillance
practices, filtering and service restrictions vary across jurisdictions. In none of the countries
studied are ISPs legally required to be transparent about their policy or practice regarding
filtering, service restrictions, or surveillance measures. Below are some examples of ISPs’
varying levels of transparency around specific types of restriction:
Commitment to notify users of restrictions based on government orders: None of
the companies commit to provide individual or public notice of filtering based on orders
from authorized authorities. Vodafone’s 2014 Law Enforcement Disclosure Report does
note that the company complies with filtering requests from authorized authorities.457
Commitment to notify users of restrictions based on self-regulatory steps: Almost all
of the companies commit to notify the public of restrictions resulting from self-regulation.
The exception is Vodafone UK, which notes in its Disclosure to Law Enforcement Report
that the company filters child sexual abuse images on a wide and voluntary basis,458 and
notes in its terms of service that it will notify the customer of intention to suspend the
service when reasonable. The Vodafone Group is also transparent about its collaboration
with the IWF.459 This could indicate that, beyond cooperation with self-regulatory
bodies and internet hotlines, ISPs carry out few restrictions at their own initiative. In the
Conditions of Use for PrePaid Services, Safaricom broadly states that the company will
try to communicate with users through advertisement, newspaper, SMS, website or other
suitable means.460
456 Tuppen. op. cit. p. 20
457 Vodafone. Law Enforcement Disclosure Report. op. cit. p. 68.
458 Vodafone. Child safety online – our approach.
http://www.vodafone.com/content/sustainabilityreport/2014/index/operating_responsibly/child_
safety_online.html
459 Vodafone. How to… report online child sexual abuse content to the IWF.
http://www.vodafone.com/content/parents/howto-guides/internet_watch_foundation_helpline.html
460 Safaricom. Terms and Conditions PrePaid Mobile. section 8. http://www.safaricom.co.ke/images/
Downloads/Terms_and_Conditions/conditions_of_use_for_the_safaricom_prepaid_services.pdf
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Transparency about surveillance and user data requests: Other than Vodafone, none
of the companies studied in this research publish information regarding the surveillance
and user data requests that they receive and comply with. In January 2014, Vodafone
challenged the UK government to permit it to disclose some information regarding
governmental requests for wiretaps and user data.461
Neither Vivo nor its parent Telefonica, a Telecommunications Industry Dialogue member
alongside Vodafone, has published data or general information about the nature and
volume of government data requests or surveillance requirements. ‘Transparency’ is stated
as an important value throughout Telefonica’s 2013 Sustainability Report, but specifics
are given only in relation to supply chain management and environmental sustainability.462

3.4.2 Implementation in national context
For ISPs and telecommunications services, the ability to be transparent with customers
and users about practices affecting freedom of expression is heavily dependent on
whether the government itself is transparent, and also whether legal frameworks allow
meaningful levels of transparency on the part of companies.

Government transparency about restriction requests
In the jurisdictions covered by this case study, there is little government transparency
about the nature and volume of official requests made to ISPs for filtering or service
restrictions. Governments do not offer ‘blacklist’ overviews or official statistics about the
number and type of restriction orders they issue. Sometimes governments acknowledge
restrictions or respond to allegations of restriction in the media, or to queries from other
branches of the government, although such instances are not standard or consistent.
For example Egypt’s National Telecommunication Regulatory Authority (NTRA) issued
a press release in response to accusations in the media that it had ordered telecom
companies to block or bar political words in their SMS services. In the press release the
NTRA claimed this was untrue.463 In India, news media reported in 2012 that in response
to a question raised in Parliament, the Minister for Communication and IT noted that the
Indian Government had asked social networking sites to block 1,299 URLs for various
reasons including maintenance of public order.464

461 Juliette Garside. Vodafone takes a stand on privacy with plan to disclose wiretapping demands. The
Guardian. http://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/jan/15/vodafone-aims-to-disclose-wiretapdemands (Accessed 13 July 2014.)
462 Telefonica 2013 Sustainability Report. op. cit.
463 NTRA Has Not & Will Never Interfere in the SMS Content. National Telecommunication Regulatory
Authority. www.tra.gov.eg/english/News_NewsDetails.asp?ID=216
464 Government asks social networking sites to block 1,299 URLs. The Economic Times. 12 February
2014. http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-02-12/news/47270235_1_362-urls-62urls-312-urls (Accessed 13 July 2014.)
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Corporate transparency about restrictions in context
Some other intermediary types (such as Google, Facebook and Twitter examined in the
next two case studies) offer ‘transparency reports’ with the number of content restriction
requests received from governments and courts, the percentage complied with, and
other data related to the company’s handling of restrictions requested by authorized
authorities. In general, ISPs covered by this case research are not transparent about
the extent to which they carry out filtering, their policies on filtering, or explanations
about the legal requirements for filtering.
Legal obstacles: One obstacle to greater transparency about filtering by ISPs is that
in some jurisdictions ISPs are legally prohibited from publicizing filtering orders that
they receive, as well as other information relating to content or service restrictions. For
example, in India, ISPs are prohibited from disclosing details of governmental blocking
orders by law,465 while in the UK, ISPs are prohibited from publishing blocking orders
relating to surveillance and terrorism, though not to copyright.466
General transparency: While Vodafone’s Law Enforcement Disclosure Report recognized
content and service restriction practices, it does not offer comprehensive information
about scope of requests nor about the rate of compliance. Airtel India and Vodafone
recognize in their terms of service that they comply with legal mandates for filtering, but
few disclose all the actors – including government, law enforcement, commercial filtering
companies and self-regulatory organizations – that are involved in filtering schemes and
decisions. This makes it difficult to verify the legitimacy and justification of filtering actions.
Specific transparency: When a user tries to access a filtered website, some companies
do display some form of explanation. For example, Airtel India and Vodafone UK display a
notification screen when filtering takes place based on orders from authorized authorities
or (in Vodafone’s case) in accordance with co-regulatory mechanisms.467 An example
of a notice from Airtel India reads: ‘This website/URL has been blocked until further
notice either pursuant to Court orders or on the Directions issued by the Department of
Telecommunications.’468 Vodafone offers the following message for age-restricted mobile
content:

465 According to Rule 16 of the Information Technology (Procedures and Safeguards for Blocking for
Access of Information by Public) Rules, 2009, blocking requests and complaints must be kept
confidential. For more information see: http://dispur.nic.in/itact/it-procedure-safeguards-blockingaccess-rules-2009.pdf.
466 See, inter alia, Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. s 97A Copyright Designs and Patents
Act 1988, s3, Terrorism Act 2006, and s 21D Terrorism Act 2000.
467 See screenshot below.
468 For example, according to news items “Airtel users are shown a message ”This website/URL
has been blocked until further notice either pursuant to Court orders or on the Directions issued
by the Department of Telecommunications”. For more information see: http://www.medianama.
com/2014/02/223-uploaded-net-blocked-again/.
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Figure 2: Vodafone mobile ‘restricted access’ notice469

Government transparency about surveillance and user data requests
As noted in the Vodafone Disclosure to Law Enforcement Report, the German and UK
governments provide official annual statistics about the number of interception and
user data requests they issue. For example, in 2012, Germany requested Internet traffic
data in 18,026 cases470 and intercepted 23,687 telecommunications.471 Similarly, the UK
government authorized 2,760 interception warrants and 514,608 notices for communication
data in 2013, according to the annual report of the Interception of Communications
Commissioner.472 Additionally, the audit conducted by the UK Commissioner found
errors in the implementation of interception orders including: interception of incorrect
communications addresses; interception and requests for stored communications made
without lawful authority; inadequate discharge of legislative powers; failure to take steps
to cancel erroneous interception; and telephone numbers attributed to the wrong target.473

469 Screentshot published by the Tor Project: https://blog.torproject.org/files/www.torproject.orgvodafone.png
470 Bundesamt für Justiz [Federal Office of Justice]. Übersicht Verkehrsdatenerhebung (Maßnahmen
nach § 100g StPO) für 2012 [Summary of traffic data collection for 2012, first and extended orders]
1 August 2013.
https://www.bundesjustizamt.de/DE/SharedDocs/Publikationen/Justizstatistik/Uebersicht_
Verkehrsdaten_2012.pdf
471 Bundesamt für Justiz [Federal Office of Justice]. Übersicht Telekommunikationsüberwachung
(Maßnahmen nach §100a StPO) für 2012 [Summary of telecommunication surveillance for 2012,
first and extended orders]. 24 October 2013. https://www.bundesjustizamt.de/DE/SharedDocs/
Publikationen/Justizstatistik/Uebersicht_TKUE_2012.pdf
472 Rt. Hon. Sir Anthony May. 2013 Annual Report of the Interception Communications Commisioner. p. 9.
http://www.iocco-uk.info/docs/2013%20Annual%20Report%20of%20the%20IOCC%20
Accessible%20Version.pdf
473 Ibid. p. 16.
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The other jurisdictions studied in this report have not published official information about
surveillance and user data requests made to ISPs.

Corporate transparency about surveillance and user data in context
Legal constraints on what can be disclosed: Though the German government publishes
statistics regarding interception and access to communications data, Vodafone stated
confirmed in its Disclosure to Law Enforcement Report that it was not allowed to publish
statistics about the lawful interception or user data requests received from German
authorities. The report also explains that, given legal constraints, it would be difficult to
explain a number of factors necessary to understand the meaning of these numbers. For
example, such statistics would present only a partial view of law enforcement demands
as they would not include automated access systems that allow rapid and large-scale
interrogation of a central database of customer records.474
The revelations by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden pointed to apparent
widespread data harvesting taking place by US and UK governments from a number
of ISPs, including Vodafone UK. News reports in late 2013 claimed that some ISPs had
gone well beyond what was required by law to assist intelligence agencies in their mass
collection of communication.475 Other reports associated Vodafone with this cooperation
– codenamed ‘Tempora’ according to leaked documents.476 Reports also asserted that
Vodafone, among other companies, had given GCHQ unlimited access to its network of
undersea cables.477 Similar allegations have been made in the Egyptian media against
Vodafone Egypt – accusing the company, along with other multinational ISPs operating
in Egypt, of colluding with the Egyptian Government and allowing access to private
communication data.478 With regards to Egypt, Vodafone has denied these claims, and
in its June 2014 Disclosure to Law Enforcement Report notes that the company may not
disclose whether or not there are lawful intercept capabilities employed in Egypt.479 With
regards to the UK allegations, Vodafone also put out a statement in which it said that it
did not recognize any of the UK intelligence agency programmes identified in the media,
and that it never went beyond its legal obligations to collaborate with any security or
intelligence agency by opening up its networks to any form of mass observation.480 At
its 2014 Annual General Meeting Vodafone also stated that the company would submit
474 Vodafone. Country-by-country disclosure of law enforcement assistance demands. Germany. June
2014.
http://www.vodafone.com/content/sustainabilityreport/2014/index/operating_responsibly/privacy_
and_security/law_enforcement/country_by_country.html
475 James Ball. Leaked memos reveal GCHQ efforts to keep mass surveillance secret. The Guardian.
25 October 2013. http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/oct/25/leaked-memos-gchq-masssurveillance-secret-snowden (Accessed 28 June 2014.)
476 James Ball, Luke Harding, and Juliette Garside. BT and Vodafone among telecoms companies
passing details to GCHQ. 2 August 2013. http://www.theguardian.com/business/2013/aug/02/
telecoms-bt-vodafone-cables-gchq (Accessed 28 June 2014.)
477 Ibid.
478 Juliette Garside. Vodafone under fire for bowing to Egyptian pressure. 26 July 2011.
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2011/jul/26/vodafone-access-egypt-shutdown (Accessed
28 June 2014.)
479 Vodafone. Country-by-country disclosure of law enforcement assistance demands. Egypt. op. cit.
480 Vodafone statement regarding GCHQ allegations. http://www.vodafone.com/content/index/media/
faqs_statements/vodafone_statement.html
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comments to a UK Government review of surveillance laws, and that its comments would
be consistent with the principles outlined in its Law Enforcement Disclosure report.481
Lack of clarity about what is legal to disclose: At times, laws do not explicitly prohibit
ISPs from disclosing information about surveillance and filtering, but when asked to
clarify, authorities have made statements that conflict with existing practices. For
example, although German law neither clearly prohibits nor allows ISPs to disclose
such information, when Vodafone asked to confirm, authorities told it that publication
would be against the law.482 Yet a month before Vodafone published its report, German
telecommunications provider Deutsche Telekom483 and smaller email provider Posteo484
had published transparency reports after having received permission from the government
to publish ‘anonymous statistical information’.485 According to Vodafone, information
published by other German telecommunication companies is incomplete and at risk of
future prohibition.486

3.5 Remedy
For ISPs in jurisdictions covered by this research, potential remedy can potentially be
provided for an individual user or an entire group of users whose right to freedom of
expression has been infringed. Remedy can include an investigation, a public report/
explanation, the reinstatement of content or connection, or can include the provisioning of
an alternate means through which users are able to express themselves. These examples
demonstrate that it is possible for courts or tribunals, companies, and regulatory bodies
to grant remedy. The form of remedy available to users depends on the jurisdiction of the
company and the user.

481 Peter Micek. Vodafone hears Access calls to go beyond transparency. 29 July 2014.
https://www.accessnow.org/blog/2014/07/29/vodafone-hears-access-calls-to-go-beyondtransparency (Accessed 13 August, 2014.)
482 Vodafone. Country-by-country disclosure of law enforcement assistance demands. Germany. op.
cit.
483 Deutsche Telekom. Jahresbericht – Auskunft an Sicherheitsbehörden. [Annual report – Information to
security agencies]. (In German.) 5 May 2014. www.telekom.com/sicherheitsbehoerden (Accessed
13 August 2014) and Kirsten Gollatz. 20 May 2014. Deutsche Telekom’s ‘surveillance report’ builds
on a trend. Internet Policy Review.
http://policyreview.info/articles/news/deutsche-telekoms-surveillance-report-builds-trend/284
(Accessed 13 August 2014.)
484 Posteo. 5 May 2014. Transparenzbericht. [Transparency report]. (In German.) https://posteo.de/
site/transparenzbericht_2013 (Accessed 13 August 2014.)
485 Transparenzbericht. Posteo. 5 May 2014,
https://posteo.de/site/transparenzbericht_2013
(Accessed 28 June 2014); Deutsche Telekom. Provision of information to security authorities. 12
June 2014.
http://www.telekom.com/corporate-responsibility/data-protection/More+Articles/239498;
and
Posteo. Ihre schriftliche Frage Nr. 4/175 vom 17. April 2014. 29 April 2014, https://posteo.de/
Antwort_Bundesregierung.pdf
486 Vodafone. Country-by-country disclosure of law enforcement assistance demands. Germany. op.
cit.
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3.5.1 Company Dispute Resolution Mechanisms
Mechanisms for complaints and dispute resolution can potentially complement, or serve
as an alternative to, systems for redress and remedy provided by government. Some
governments require that companies institute private grievance and remedy mechanisms.

Options limited to consumer complaints
Airtel India provides a mechanism for the resolution of differences arising between
subscribers and the company. The arbitrator of these disputes will be appointed by
Airtel India and the resolution of the dispute will be subject to the jurisdiction of the city
where installation is opted for.487 As required by the law488, Airtel India additionally lists the
contact information of a grievance officer in their online privacy policy,489 as well as the
contact information of regional Appellate Authorities that individuals can contact if their
complaints are not resolved at the nodal officer level.490
Vodafone UK has a number of potential paths that users can follow to lodge complaints.
For example, it is suggested that users initially submit complaints to the ‘account
manager’ via the ‘customer complaint code,’ which offers a live helpline. Complaints
are handled by customer care, but if not resolved within eight weeks, can be escalated
to an independent ombudsman.491 Vodafone UK also outlines an ‘escalation route’
that customers are expected to exhaust before bringing legal action. Additionally, it is
clarified that both parties are subject to the UK Data Protection Act 1998, under which
Vodafone is a data controller. This is potentially a strong mechanism through which users
can seek redress for breaches regarding their data.492 The General Terms and Conditions
also specify an address for the sending of notices, and note that in the situation where
Vodafone will suspend end users from use of the service, Vodafone will first inform the
customer to allow for potential remedy of the alleged breach.493 Lastly, Vodafone UK
clarifies that if there is a misrepresentation or untrue statement, the only remedy available
to customers is through a claim for damages for breach of contract.494
The UK also has a co-regulatory mechanism for remedy: In a 2014 Ofcom Report on the
family friendly network level filtering services that the major fixed-line ISPs are offering the
487 Airtel India. Terms and Conditions. section 18. op. cit.
488 According to Rule 5(9) of the Information Technology (Reasonable security practices and procedures
and sensitive personal data or information) Rules, 2011, all body corporate handling sensitive
personal information in the digital format must list the contact information of a grievance officer on
their website. http://deity.gov.in/sites/upload_files/dit/files/GSR313E_10511(1).pdf
489 Airtel India. Privacy Policy: Feedback and Concerns. http://www.airtel.in/forme/privacy-policy/
feedbak?contentIDR=c9d0f414-8cb9-4381-b122-3f3148a01b80&useDefaultText=0&useDefaultD
esc=0
490 Airtel India. Broadband Internet Appellate Authorities.
http://www.airtel.in/applications/xm/
BroadbandInternet_AppellateAuth.jsp
491 Vodafone UK. Contact Us. http://www.vodafone.co.uk/contact-us/
492 Vodafone. General Terms. provision 17.2 http://www.vodafone.co.uk/about-this-site/terms-andconditions/general-terms/
493 Vodafone. General Terms. provision 3 and 17.3. http://www.vodafone.co.uk/about-this-site/termsand-conditions/general-terms/
494 Vodafone. General Terms. provision 17.8. http://www.vodafone.co.uk/about-this-site/terms-andconditions/general-terms/

93
UK, it is noted that customers and site owners can follow a process to report websites or
content that have been incorrectly filtered – leading to a review of the categorization of
identified content for filtering.495
Safaricom does not provide as much detail as Vodafone UK, but does note in the Term
and Conditions for prepaid mobile services, that all disputes must be settled by a single
arbitrator that is agreed and appointed by both parties. Any award must be made under
the Arbitration Act 1995 and all disputes are subject to the jurisdiction of Kenya. All
determinations by the Arbitrator will be final and binding.496 Airtel Kenya does not mention
a dispute resolution mechanism in their terms of service and does not appear to have a
complaint mechanism on their website.
While filtering is not relevant for Vivo in Brazil, it is possible that users may have grievances
related to privacy violations. While there is no publicly available information about remedy
or grievance mechanisms offered by Vivo, Telefonica’s 2013 Sustainability Report states
that the Group has committed to ‘examine, as a group, options for implementing relevant
grievance mechanisms, as outlined in Principle 31 of the UN Guiding Principles for
Business and Human Rights’, and that Telefonica is exploring ‘this aspect’ as a member
of the Telecommunications Industry Dialogue.497

Complaint mechanisms offered by industry organizations and regulators
The UK Internet Service Providers’ Association (ISPA) offers a complaints mechanism
through which users can issue complaints against companies that are members of ISPA
for violation of the ISPA code of conduct.498 Additionally, the UK telecommunications
regulator Ofcom offers a complaint mechanism for users which includes avenues for
issuing complaints related to the safety of the user’s personal information, the recording
of phone calls, and content that is believed to be illegal – in which users are directed to
report content that is thought to be illegal to the Internet Watch Foundation.499 Types
of content that are listed as examples of illegal content include: images of child sexual
abuse, criminally obscene adult material that is hosted in the UK, and incitement to racial
hatred that is hosted in the UK.500
Similarly, the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) has developed the ‘Telecom
Consumer Complaint Redressal Regulations, 2012’ that governs how ISPs must structure
consumer complaint mechanisms at the organizational level and how complaints should
be responded to (time frames etc). Complaints, including those ‘alleging that a practice
495 Ofcom Report on Internet safety measures. Internet Service Providers: Network level filtering
measures. 22 July 2014.
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/internet/internet_safety_measures_2.pdf
496 Safaricom. Conditions of Use for the Safaricom Prepaid Services. http://www.safaricom.co.ke/
images/Downloads/Terms_and_Conditions/conditions_of_use_for_the_safaricom_prepaid_
services.pdf
497 Telefonica 2013 Sustainability Report, op. cit p. 129
498 The Internet Service Providers Association. Complaints Form. http://www.ispa.org.uk/consumers/
complaints-form/
499 Other issues: Scams and frauds. Ofcom. http://consumers.ofcom.org.uk/complain/phone-andbroadband-complaints/other-issues/
500 Ibid.
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adopted by the service provider adversely affects the interest of the consumers’ can
also be issued to TRAI and referred by TRAI to the relevant ISP.501 TRAI also accepts
responses from companies to present and proposed policies impacting their services. In
a move towards protecting user privacy and freedom of expression, Airtel India in 2012
submitted a response to regulations meant to govern and control unsolicited commercial
communications. In the response, Airtel stressed the need for privacy legislation in India
and argued against using any ‘artificial intelligence criterion’ for blocking text messages
(such as imposing a numeric limit per user per hour) because it ‘would amount to
interfering with the cherished right of freedom of speech and expression.’502

3.5.2 Role of the Legal System and Consumer Protection Bodies
Obtaining remedy through the courts can be time-consuming and expensive in many
countries. Little international research has been done in relation to best practices
for consumer protection bodies in handling cases related to telecommunications.
Nonetheless, researchers found two particularly notable examples of remedy: one
through the courts and the other through consumer protection bodies.
Accountability through courts: In May 2011 an Egyptian Court issued a fine of $90
million to the former President Hosni Mubarak and Vodafone, Mobinil and Etisalat. The
ruling held that the president, the prime minister and interior minister were responsible
for damages to the economy while the ISPs had violated the Egyptian Constitution for
complying with a request that was not accompanied with a legally issued warrant.503
Consumer protection mechanisms: In 2012 Airtel India was ordered by a consumer
forum to pay a user rs.15,000 (approximately USD 300) for ‘harassing’ a customer and
for disconnecting the call services to the user’s phone for 24 days.504 Also in 2012, Airtel
India was fined by a Karnataka consumer forum Rs.20,000 (approximately USD 400) for
‘deficiency in Internet service’ and causing mental agony to the complainant by incorrectly
blocking websites and subsequently being unable to download an application.505

501 Telecom Consumers Complaint Redressal Regulations, 2012. Telecom Regulatory Authority of
India. 5 January 2012. http://www.dot.gov.in/sites/default/files/TCCRR0012012.pdf
502 Bharti Airtel’s response to TRAI Consultation paper (No. 13/2012) on Review of The Telecom
Commercial Communications Customer Preference Regulation, 2010 and The draft Telecom
Commercial Communications Customer Preference (Tenth Amendment) Regulation, 2012. http://
www.trai.gov.in/WriteReadData/ConsultationPaper/Document/2012090505255533740236.%20
Airtel%20response.pdf
503 Egypt: Court fines Mubarak and Vodafone for communications blackouts. Association for Progressive
Communications. 30 May 2011. http://www.apc.org/en/press/egypt-court-fines-mubarak-andvodafone-communicati (Accessed 18 July 2014.)
504 Airtel fined Rs. 15,000 for ‘harassing’ customer. Times of India. 31 August 2012. http://
timesofindia.indiatimes.com/tech/tech-news/Airtel-fined-Rs-15000-for-harassing-customer/
articleshow/16060415.cms (Accessed 14 July 2014.)
505 Anuj Srivas. Airtel penalised for ‘torrent site’ block, legality questioned. 7 August 2012. http://www.
thehindu.com/sci-tech/technology/internet/article3738269.ece (Accessed 14 July 2014.)
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3.6 Conclusions
Across jurisdictions, stakeholders interviewed for this research highlighted the
importance of ISPs and the fundamental role that they play in connecting users to a
wealth of knowledge, opportunities, and possibilities for expression. Yet some users feel
that companies need to do more to protect freedom of expression.
For example, users in Egypt, particularly with respect to Vodafone’s cooperation with
the Egyptian Government, have expressed the view that ISPs need to do more to resist
governmental demands for user data.506 Safaricom in 2014 was the target of public and
media criticism for violating users’ privacy by sending out SMS messages on behalf of
the National Council of Churches of Kenya.507 Civil society groups such as the US-based
Access have also criticized the company for sharing user data without consent. Access
has called on the company to conduct a thorough human rights impact assessment and
reform its policies affecting privacy and freedom of expression.508 Companies such as
Vodafone have pointed out that defying government requests can pose high risk for ISPs
– business risks as well as risks to the safety of their local employees. On the other hand,
through compliance in some cases, companies may also risk damaging the trust of their
users.
A number of general observations can be drawn from this case study’s findings:
Governments and companies offer even less transparency about restrictions of
expression made by and through ISPs than about policies and practices related
to privacy and surveillance. The findings of this case study highlight a severe lack of
transparency by governments and companies across a range of jurisdictions about basic
aspects of filtering practices. In the wake of the revelations from Edward Snowden,
public dialogues and research initiatives have been heavily focused on the obligation
of ISPs and governments to be transparent about privacy and surveillance requests,
with much less emphasis on transparency of practices that directly affect internet users’
freedom of expresison.509

506 Political activists attack Vodafone Egypt on Twitter. The Cairo Post. 4 January 2014. http://
thecairopost.com/news/66987/quirk_of_the_day/political-activists-attack-vodafone-egypt-ontwitter (Accessed 10 August 2014.)
507 Njeri Wangari. CCK approved SMS Message from NCCK causes a storm with Kenyans Online.
Afromum. 4 July 2014. http://www.afromum.com/cck-approved-sms-message-from-ncck-causesa-storm-with-kenyans-online/ (Accessed 10 August 2014.)
508 Ephraim Percy Kenyanito. Surveillance in a legal vacuum: Kenya considers massive new spying
system. Access blog. 13 June 2014. https://www.accessnow.org/blog/2014/06/13/surveillancein-a-legal-vacuum-kenya-considers-massive-new-spying-system (Accessed 10 August 2014.)
509 For example, Some projects testing ISP transparency, such as IXmaps, have developed criteria
broadly related to the public commitment to applicable data protection law, public commitment to
inform users about third party requests for information, transparency about frequency of third party
requests, inclusive definitions of personal information, retention periods for personal information,
transparency about where personal information is stored, transparency about where personal
information is routed, visible steps to avoid U.S routing of data, and open advocacy of user privacy
rights. For more information see: http://ixmaps.ca/transparency.php
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On surveillance, government transparency is limited and few companies speak
up for their users. The German and UK governments publish annual reports reviewing
the scope of government surveillance. Vodafone publishes clear policy guidelines on
how it deals with government requests for user data. Though this is a positive, it leaves
subscribers of the other services in the dark about how their privacy will be protected in
the face of government or other pressures. This uncertainty is compounded by the lack
of information on government user data requests. As of this report’s writing, Vodafone
was the only company to report on the number of user data requests it receives from
government agencies. The numbers of users whose information is requested is significant,
even though no numbers about compliance are provided. Although Safaricom was
included in the Law Enforcement Disclosure Report, Vodafone was unable to disclose the
number of government requests because it was unable to determine whether disclosure
would be lawful.510
It is notable that Vodafone is also the only company covered in this research calling
openly for greater government transparency, and for legal reforms that would enable the
company itself to report more detail about surveillance and user data requests.

Data protection and privacy practices of companies vary widely, in tandem with
the existence or lack of data protection laws. As described in section 2.1.2, with
the exception of the EU’s data protection framework, data protection regimes in other
countries studied are in a state of flux: Kenya and Brazil have data protection bills under
varying stages of parliamentary consideration and India at the time of writing has no
comprehensive data protection law. Research for this study showed a clear connection
between weaker privacy laws and weaker privacy policies by ISPs. ISPs in countries with
weaker or nascent legislation also disclosed much less information about their privacyrelated practices. Such findings underscore the need for comprehensive data protection
laws at the national level.
It is difficult for individuals, as users and citizens, to hold companies and
governments accountable for actions taken via ISPs that restrict users’ freedom
of expression in a manner incompatible with international human rights standards.
In some jurisdictions, industry regulators can offer means by which users can report
infringing content or report ISP practices that violate their rights. In some jurisdictions,
such as India, it appears that users can hold ISPs accountable through consumer
tribunals. However examples from this research of redress for violations by ISPs and
or government agencies of users’ online freedom of expression have been limited to
monetary fines. This shows that recognition and consequence for violations is limited.
Public commitments by some companies to international human rights principles
are an important first step but there is a long way to go. In March 2013, a group of
telecommunications operators and vendors including internet service providers launched
the Telecommunications Industry Dialogue on Freedom of Expression and Privacy

510 Vodafone Law Enforcement Disclosure Report, op. cit. p. 78.
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(hereafter ‘Industry Dialogue’) with a set of ‘Guiding Principles’ influenced by the UN
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.511 Vodafone and Telefonica at the time
of writing were among the 9 Industry Dialogue members, and their 2014 reports cited in
this case study are billed on the ID website as a product of the companies’ commitment
to report annually on ‘progress in implementing the principles and, as appropriate, on
major events occurring in this regard.’512
As discussed earlier in this case study, the Vodafone and Telefonica reports vary greatly
in the extent to which they offer specifics about company policies and practices. For
example, the privacy-related practices of Telefonica’s subsidiary, Vivo, remain particularly
opaque. Nonetheless, it is notable that these two Industry Dialogue members have made
clear public commitments to respect user rights and to examine group-wide policies and
practices in light of those commitments. The two non-Industry Dialogue members studied
in this research, Bharti Airtel and Safaricom, have made no similar public commitments.513
The Industry Dialogue is engaging in collective study of best practices in corporate
transparency for their sector, as well as ‘how to implement operational-level grievance
mechanisms’. Members have also acted collectively to engage with governments. As their
first annual report states, the Industry Dialogue’s intention to ‘continue to advocate for
greater government transparency on the use and scope of surveillance of communications
and on actions that have the effect of restricting the content of communications, in
keeping with our Principles.’514
The concrete impact of such company activities and commitments on internet users
has yet to be studied systematically, let alone measured. Nonetheless, activities of the
Industry Dialogue member companies thus far indicate that collective action, combined
with broader stakeholder engagement, has empowered ISPs to take steps that they had
previously not been willing to take on their own. Thus it seems that users in countries
where Bharti Airtel and Safaricom operate would only stand to benefit in the long run if
those two companies should ever join the Industry Dialogue as active and committed
members. The Industry Dialogue would benefit further in terms of credibility by adding
an assurance process to verify whether companies are implementing their commitments,
overseen by a multistakeholder board, such as the third-party assessments carried out
by the Global Network Initiative.

511 Telecommunications Industry Dialogue ‘About’ page. http://www.telecomindustrydialogue.org/
about
512 Telecommunications Industry Dialogue. Guiding Principles. http://www.telecomindustrydialogue.
org/content/guiding-principles
513 Although Vodafone implies with its inclusion of Safaricom in its ‘Disclosure to Law Enforcement’
report that even with only 40% ownership it asserts some level of influence on Safaricom’s policies
and practices.
514 Telecommunications Industry Dialogue. Annual Report 2014.
http://www.telecomindustrydialogue.org/sites/default/files/ID%20Annual%20Report%202014.pdf
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4. STUDY 2: SEARCH ENGINES
Google (USA, EU, India, China, Russia), Baidu (China), Yandex (Russia)

4.1 Introduction
Search engines are a principal means by which Internet users find and access information.
They are important for freedom of expression because they act as an intermediary
between people who seek information and people who publish information on the Web in
hopes of reaching larger audiences. As one journalist has described: they are a “shaper
of online reality, helping determine what we see and how.”515
Most web pages on the internet are not indexed by search engines and therefore cannot
be found in search engine results.516 Even Google, the world’s largest and most popular
search engine, has only indexed a small percentage of the world’s web pages (estimates
range from 0.4 to 12 per cent).517 There are three main reasons for this: a) the web pages
have not yet been found or cannot be found by the spiders because no other websites
link to them; b) they are “invisible” to spiders because the owners of web pages and
online databases have chosen to block them; c) the database structure of most websites
“hides” pages from discovery by an external spider.518
Every search engine uses its own search algorithm, a complex mathematical formula that
decides what results to display, and in what order, in response to a user’s specific query.519
The algorithm’s decisions about what is most relevant to the searcher are triggered in part
by elements in a web page’s URL, headlines on the page, and other content in the page
itself. Those who want their content to be viewed by large audiences of search engine
users can “optimize” their Web sites, pages and content not only so that it will be found
and indexed, but also to maximize the probability that it will appear near the top of the
first page of a search engine’s displayed results.520

515 Craig Timberg. 12 May 2014. Research in India Suggests Google Search Results Can Influence
an Election. Washington Post. The Switch blog. www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/
wp/2014/05/12/research-in-india-suggests-google-search-results-can-influence-an-election.
(Accessed 19 April 2014.)
516 Michael K. Bergman. August, 2001. White Paper: The Deep Web: Surfacing Hidden Value. Taking
License. Vol 7 Issue 1. http://quod.lib.umich.edu/j/jep/3336451.0007.104 (Accessed 19 April
2014.)
517 Brian Proffitt. 17 June 2013. Google Is Starting War On Child Pornography, Not Ending.
ReadWriteWeb. http://readwrite.com/2013/06/17/google-is-beginning-war-on-child-pornographynot-ending#awesm=~oBTRHlVjKDVc11 (Accessed 14 July 2014.)
518 UC Berkeley Library. Invisible or Deep Web: What it is, How to find it, and Its inherent ambiguity.
http://www.lib.berkeley.edu/TeachingLib/Guides/Internet/InvisibleWeb.html (Accessed 19 April
2014.)
519 See Google. Inside Search: How Search Works: Algorithms. https://www.google.com/insidesearch/
howsearchworks/algorithms.html
520 Search Engine Optimization. Microsoft Developer Network. http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/
library/ff724016(v=expression.40).aspx
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No two search engines will produce the same results—or the same number of results—
for the same query, unless their algorithms, spiders, and indexes are identical. This is
why, for example, if one searches for the same term on Google.com and Microsoft’s Bing.
com, on the same computer in the same location at the same time, the results will not
be the same even if no deliberate effort has been made to restrict or manipulate results.
Freedom of expression in relation to search engines involves three potential parties: 1)
individual internet users seeking information; 2) creators and operators of websites that
are or potentially may be indexed by search engines; 3) the search engines themselves
whose algorithms have been viewed by scholars and emerging jurisprudence as a kind of
editorial process – albeit not as direct and deliberate as a media organization’s editorial
process.521 This study examines how search engine policies and practices related to
content restriction and content manipulation are shaped by their home jurisdictions, and
to varying degrees by the laws and regulations of other jurisdictions. It also analyzes how
three different companies headquartered in three very different national contexts have
chosen to handle challenges related to online freedom of expression.

The companies
This case study focuses on three search engines, all run by companies that provide many
other services beyond search:
Baidu dominates in China with 63.1 per cent market share of the world’s largest Internet
user base of over 600 million.522
Yandex dominates in Russia with 62 per cent market share in a country of 84.4 million
Internet users.523
Google is the world’s dominant search engine. Its market share in the United States (with
279.8 million Internet users524) is 67.5 per cent.525 Google’s market share is much higher in
countries where there is no major local competitor. For example Google’s market shares

521 Joris van Hoboken. Search Engine Freedom: On the implications of the right to freedom of
expression for the legal governance of Web search engines. PhD thesis, University of Amsterdam
Faculty of Law, 2012. http://dare.uva.nl/document/357527 p.322
522 As of December 2013. Steven Millward. Baidu down, Qihoo up, Google dead: 2013 was a year of
drama for China’s search engines. Tech In Asia. 7 January 2014. www.techinasia.com/how-baiduqihoo-google-performed-in-china-in-2013. (Accessed 21 May 2014.) However, Baidu itself claims a
70% market share. Baidu Introduction. http://is.baidu.com
523 As of April 2014, according to LiveInternet. See Smita Nair. Yandex sees a market share increase
powered by its search service. Yahoo Finance. 31 March 2014. http://finance.yahoo.com/news/
yandex-sees-market-share-increase-130033283.html (Accessed 21 May 2014).
524 Internet Live Stats http://www.internetlivestats.com/internet-users-by-country/ (Accessed 7 August
2014.)
525 Craig Smith. By The Numbers: 40 Amazing Google Stats and Facts. Digital Marketing Ramblings.
http://expandedramblings.com/index.php/by-the-numbers-a-gigantic-list-of-google-stats-andfacts. (Accessed 21 May 2014.)
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in India and European markets are 97 per cent and 90 per cent respectively.526 Google’s
market share in Russia is 27.6 per cent527 and a mere 1.6 per cent in China.528
China, Russia, the United States and India were chosen as focus countries where
our researchers examined outcomes resulting from the interplay of company policy
and practice with national legal contexts. The first three were chosen because they are
the home markets of the three search engines. While China, Russia, and the US were
chosen as they are the home markets of the three search engines, India was selected as
it is a large developing nation and important market for global Internet companies, the
common thread running through all three case studies. Where useful for the purposes of
comparative analysis, outcomes in the European Union are also discussed.

4.2 Impact of Network Filtering on Search Engines
The freedom of expression of search engine users can be affected when a search engine
is filtered by ISPs. If the search engine’s front page is filtered, then the service is wholly
inaccessible to users accessing the Internet via that particular ISP or national network. It
is also possible for the ISP to filter only specific pages of search engine results containing
specific URLs or keywords, making the service partially usable – as long as the user is not
searching for content that is filtered by the ISP.
The search engine operator has no control over—and plays no role in—filtering by ISPs.
However, the nature and extent of ISP filtering in a given jurisdiction affects how search
engines in turn carry out their own restrictions. Thus, prior to a discussion of the policies,
practices, and implementation of restrictions by the three search engines themselves, it
is necessary to describe the extent and nature of ISP filtering of search engines in each
country covered in this case study. In the four jurisdictions covered by this case study,
four different approaches to search engine filtering were identified:

No filtering of search engines:
In the United States, ISPs do not filter search engines at any level, although targeted
filtering based on keywords or URLs occurs at the level of the home or institution level
(schools, libraries, hotels, corporations, specific government agencies, etc.).529 Any
broader restriction of search engine results is implemented by the search engine itself (as
will be described in section 4.3).

526 Paul Geitner. Google Moves Toward Settlement of European Antitrust Investigation. New York
Times. 25 July 2012, www.nytimes.com/2012/07/25/technology/eu-nears-settlement-of-googleantitrust-investigation.html and Rohin Dharmakumar. Is Google Gobbling Up the Indian Internet
Space? Forbes India. 22 July 2013. http://forbesindia.com/article/real-issue/is-google-gobblingup-the-indian-internet-space/35641/0 (Accessed 21 May 2014.)
527 As of April 2014. LiveInternet. www.liveinternet.ru/stat/ru/searches.html?slice=ru;period=month.
528 As of December 2013. Steven Millward, op. cit.
529 John G. Palfrey, Jr. Local Nets on a Global Network: Filtering and the Internet Governance Problem.
THE GLOBAL FLOW OF INFORMATION, Jack Balkin, ed. Harvard Public Law Working Paper No 1041. p.8. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1655006.
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Filtering of websites but not the search engines:
In Russia, since 2012 ISP’s are required to filter blacklisted websites.530 Thus if a user
of Google or Yandex conducts a search whose results include a link to a blacklisted
website, and if he or she clicks on that link, an error message will be displayed in place
of the website. The message, generated by the ISP, explains that the page has been
filtered in compliance with law. Below is an example of such a page in Russian. In English
translation it reads:
Dear users!
We beg your pardon, but access to the requested services is now limited.
Possible reasons for it:
1.

The network address identifying the web site on the internet is included in the ‘General
list of domain names that include prohibited information.’

2.

The access is limited in accordance with a court decision or other Russian legal
norms.

Figure 3: Error message displayed for filtered website in Russia

Limited filtering of search engines:
In India, Google (or other search engines) are generally not filtered through governmental
orders. An exception to this is the temporary ‘internet blackout’ ordered by the

530 J.Y. Lurk no more: Internet censorship in Russia. The Economist Eastern approaches blog.
http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2012/11/internet-censorship-russia
(Accessed 21 May 2014.)
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Government of Jammu and Kashmir in 2012 in response to violent outbreaks after the
release of the ‘innocence of Muslims’ YouTube film,531 during which all search engines
and other websites were rendered inaccessible. Additionally, in 2012 the Delhi High
Court threatened to block Google and other internet services if they did not take steps to
monitor and remove objectionable content from their platforms.532

Extensive filtering of overseas search engines accompanied by temporary
disconnection from the internet:
The phenomenon of internet filtering in China has been the subject of extensive research
and scholarly publication over the past decade.533 While it is beyond the scope of this
case study to provide an in-depth summary of that research, it is nonetheless important to
understand some basic characteristics of Internet filtering in China in order to understand
how filtering affects freedom of expression for Chinese search engine users – and for
websites aiming to reach audiences in China.
In China blacklisted websites are filtered, as are web pages containing politically
sensitive words or banned URLs, including pages displaying search queries and search
results containing sensitive words. When a user tries to access a filtered URL, or a page
containing filtered keywords or links, an error message stating “the webpage cannot be
found” appears in his or her browser. Below is how the message appears in an Internet
Explorer browser:

531 J&K govt orders blackout of anti-Islam film, blocks internet. Indiatoday. 21 September 2012.
http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/jammu-and-kashmir-govt-orders-blackout-of-anti-islam-filmblocks-internet/1/221569.html (Accessed: 16 April 2014.)
532 Filter content or face blackout, Delhi HC warns Facebook, Google. Reddiff.com. 13 January 2012.
http://www.rediff.com/money/slide-show/slide-show-1-tech-delhi-hc-warns-facebookgoogle/20120113.htm (Accessed: 16 April 2014.)
533 See for example Jonathan Zittrain and Ben Edelman. Internet Filtering in China. IEEE Internet
Computing March/April 2003. http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/apcity/
unpan011043.pdf; OpenNet Initiative. Internet Filtering in China in 2004-2005: A Country Study.
https://opennet.net/studies/china; and Xueyang Xu, Z. Morley Mao, and J. Alex Halderman. Internet
Censorship in China:
Where Does the Filtering Occur? In Proceedings of PAM . 2011. http://web.eecs.umich.edu/~zmao/
Papers/china-censorship-pam11.pdf.
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Figure 4: “This website cannot be found” browser error in China.

No notification or explanation of the restriction is provided to the user from the ISP or
other authorities. However – assuming that the user indeed made no errors in typing
the URL and the link is not out of date as the error message implies – technical testing
confirms that the appearance of this error message indicates that the webpage has in
fact been filtered. At the same time that the browser displays this error message the
user’s internet connection is disconnected for anywhere between several seconds to a
few minutes. 534
All web content and services including search engines operating from outside China’s
jurisdiction are filtered when their content passes through internet exchange points via
which all internet traffic is routed in and out of the country – with the exception of Hong

534 Xu, Mao, and Halderman. op. cit. p. 137 and James Fallows. ‘The Connection Has Been Reset’. The
Atlantic. 1 March 2008. http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2008/03/-the-connectionhas-been-reset/306650/ (Accessed 22 May 2014.)

104
Kong.535 If the entire search engine is blacklisted, then the entire service is inaccessible.
If only specific keywords and URLs are programmed into the filtering blacklist, then the
front page of the search engine is accessible but searches on certain terms will trigger
the filters, resulting in the error page pictured above as well as a temporary disconnection
of internet service. Such disruption makes search engines operating from outside very
inconvenient to use in China even when their main search page is accessible.
Within China, ISP level filters are not as extensive as the filters deployed at the exchange
points controlling international traffic.536 Websites operating from within the jurisdiction
of China are not subject to the same degree of filtering because they carry out their own
content restrictions in response to government requests and requirements (see section
4.3 of this study and Study 3 for more detail).

4.3 Measures Taken by Search Engines
In any given jurisdiction, search engine operators may restrict or manipulate content
through any or all of the following actions:
1.

remove specific pages or even entire websites from the search engine’s index;

2.

program the spider not to add certain pages, entire websites, or sites containing
certain content;

3.

program the search engine’s algorithm not to deliver results for certain queries;

4.

program the algorithm to favour or “weight” certain types of web pages over others;

5.

influence the user’s understanding of certain search results by adding explanatory
statements, warnings, or statements in accompanying advertising.

As with the service providers discussed in the previous case study, search engines may
restrict content at the request of a government authority or other external party, or may
restrict content to enforce their own terms of service and other private rules or procedures.
Personalization: In 2005 Google started tailoring search results for all logged-in users to
their apparent preferences and interests based on search history. In 2009 personalization
was extended to all Google searches even if the user is logged out, based on browser
cookie records.537 Critics have expressed concern about the effect of personalization on
freedom of expression because it renders the same website more or less visible to different
535 Xu, Mao, and Halderman, op. cit. pp. 133-142; also see James T. Areddy. Birds Above, Data Below:
Where the U.S. Internet Meets China’s. The Wall Street Journal China Realtime blog. 8 July 2014.
http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2014/07/08/birds-above-data-below-where-the-u-s-internetmeets-chinas/ and James T. Areddy, Paul Mozur, and Danny Yadron. From Mountains, Island,
Secret Town, China’s Electronic Spy Shop Watches. The Wall Street Journal. 7 July 2014. http://
online.wsj.com/articles/chinas-spy-agency-has-broad-reach-1404781324. (Accessed 10 August
2014.)
536 Xu, Mao , and Halderman, op. cit.
537 Personalized Search for Everyone. Google Official Blog. 4 December 2009. http://googleblog.
blogspot.com/2009/12/personalized-search-for-everyone.html (Accessed 14 September, 2014.)
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users depending on their prior browsing habits.538 The full impact of personalization on
freedom of expression globally remains unclear. Some have argued that the issue is less
about the degree of personalization and more about the extent to which the user is able to
understand and control the factors affecting their own searches.539 One recent academic
study of Google searches found that personalization varies widely depending on the
query, and that personalization was much less measurable for queries made on Google
when logged out.540 Personalization also occurs on Baidu and Yandex.541

4.3.1 Company policies on government requests and legal requirements
The legal environments of the companies’ home jurisdictions heavily shape their policies
and practices related to content restriction.
Baidu: Content forbidden by the terms of service overlaps directly with content designated
as illegal in China. Specifically, as mentioned in Chapter 2, Article 15 of Measures on
the Administration of Internet Information Services, (hereafter referred to as “Measures”)
stipulates what have come to be known as the “nine forbidden content categories” for
Chinese online services.542
Under China’s strict liability regime described in Chapter 2, all online services including
search engines are held liable for failing to prevent content that falls into these “forbidden
nine categories” from appearing on their platforms. Industry representatives interviewed
for this report confirm that companies including Baidu receive regular instructions as well

538 Jessica Thompson. Search Personalization: Good or Bad? Advance Digital Search & Social Group.
http://www.advancessg.com/search-personalization-good-or-bad/ (Accessed 14 September
2014.)
539 Van Hoboken, op. cit. p. 205
540 Aniko Hannak, Balachander Krishnamurthy, David Lazer, Christo Wilson, Arash Molavi Kakhki
and Alan Mislove. Measuring Personalization of Web Search. WWW ‘13 Proceedings of the 22nd
international conference on World Wide Web. pp. 527-538. http://www.ccs.neu.edu/home/cbw/
pdf/fp039-hannak.pdf
541 Matt McGee. Yandex Turns Up The Dial On Personalized Search. Search Engine Land. 13 May
2013.
http://searchengineland.com/yandex-turns-up-the-dial-on-personalized-search-161695 (Accessed
15 September, 2014) and Min Jiang. The Business and Politics of Search Engines: A Comparative
Study of Baidu and Google’s Search Results of Internet Events in China. http://www.researchgate.
net/publication/256016569_The_Business_and_Politics_of_Search_Engines_A_Comparative_
Study_of_Baidu_and_Googles_Search_Results_of_Internet_Events_in_China. New Media &
Society. 16(2). pp. 212-233.
542 Measures on the Administration of Internet Information Services, http://www.net.cn/static/hosting/
fa_xinxi.htm. The “nine forbidden categories” apply to content that: 1. Opposes the fundamental
principles determined in the Constitution; 2. Compromises State security, discloses State secrets,
subverts State power or damages national unity; 3.Harms the dignity or interests of the State;
4.Incites ethnic hatred or racial discrimination or damages inter-ethnic unity; 5. Sabotages State
religious policy or propagates heretical teachings or feudal superstitions; 6.Disseminates rumors,
disturbs social order or disrupts social stability; 7. Propagates obscenity, pornography, gambling,
violence, murder or fear or incites the commission of crimes; 8.Insults or slanders a third party or
infringes upon the lawful rights and interests of a third party; 9.Includes other content prohibited
by laws or administrative regulations. For further analysis of Chinese online content regulation see:
Anne S.Y. Cheung. The Business of Governance: China’s Legislation on Content Regulation in
Cyberspace. New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, 2006, v. 38, p. 1-37
http://nyujilp.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/38.1_2-Cheung.pdf
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as “blacklists” from authorities specifying what content needs to be either removed or
blocked by the service itself.543
Baidu does not limit content restrictions to its home jurisdiction: the same search results
that it restricts in China are also restricted for users anywhere in the world.544
Yandex: As discussed in Chapter 2, several Russian laws passed between 2012 and 2014
empower the government’s executive branch to blacklist “extremist” content, content
deemed harmful to minors, and copyright infringing content among other content without
requiring a court order.545 However in an interview for this report, Yandex executives
insisted that the company does not filter or remove search results. Our researchers found
no evidence to the contrary. In response to an e-mailed query, Yandex public relations
manager Katerina Karnaukhova responded:
“It is a fact and we are sad to confess that today in the Internet there are also
materials that violate the law or ethical norms, but we still conduct our search
all over the Internet and it is not our goal to edit or filter it. We do not block any
information in our search results. If material is deleted from a website, it will also
disappear from the search results.”546
It is important to note that for content on other services beyond its search platform
Yandex executives told our researchers in an interview that the company does receive
and comply with content removal requests for other services such as video and photo
hosting.
Google: The company’s global reach has led it to adopt policies and practices that are
both global but also sufficiently flexible so that the company can reach Internet users
living in a vast array of different policy and legal contexts.
As a member of the Global Network Initiative, Google has made a commitment to interpret
content removal demands from authorized authorities as narrowly as possible, and to
challenge demands that appear incongruous with relevant law.547 Google publishes
information about its process for evaluating and responding to government and private

543 Interviewee wished to remain anonymous, date and location not disclosed for that purpose.
544 See Baidu is charged in U.S. for its online censorship. The Wall Street Journal. 19 May 2011.
http://cn.wsj.com/gb/20110519/tec143847.asp (Accessed 16 June 2014) and Baidu and Chinese
government are sued in New York for online censorship. 19 May 2011. http://www.bbc.co.uk/
zhongwen/simp/chinese_news/2011/05/110519_baidu_lawsuit.shtml (Accessed 16 June 2014.)
545 Decree #1101 of the Government of the Russian Federation dated October 26, 2012. ‘On the
Uniform Automated Information System of the Russian Internet Blacklist.’ English translation
at: http://eais.rkn.gov.ru/docs.eng/1101.pdf; also see Courtney Weaver and Charles Clover,
Russia’s ‘internet blacklist’ sparks fears. FT.com. 11 July 2012. (Accessed 16 June, 2014) and
Russian federal law 292521-6. Russian text at: http://www.copyright.ru/ru/library/zakonoproekti/
pravovoe_regulirovanie_in/zakon_292521-6/; also see Monika Emert and Frederic Dubois. Russia:
controversial anti-piracy law comes into force. Internet Policy Review. 1 August 2013. http://
policyreview.info/articles/news/russia-controversial-anti-piracy-law-comes-force/185 (Accessed 16
June 2014.)
546 E-mail exchange with researcher Tatiana Indina, April 2014.
547 Global Network Initiative Implementation Guidelines.
https://globalnetworkinitiative.org/implementationguidelines/index.php
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demands to remove or filter content.548 The company’s “Transparency Report” (discussed
in greater detail below and in the “Transparency” section 4.5 of this case study) indicates
that it challenges or refuses to comply with a significant percentage of government
requests around the world.549 When it complies with a government request to restrict
a piece of content in one jurisdiction, the content is restricted from view only in the
jurisdiction where the request was made, unless the content also happens to violate the
company’s terms of service.550 (In the case of European court decisions meant to apply to
the entire European Union such as the ‘right to be forgotten’ case discussed later in this
study, Google has interpreted this commitment to apply to its online properties across
the EU but not beyond.) Child pornography, illegal in all jurisdictions, is one category of
content that Google voluntarily and proactively removes from its search results without
waiting for government requests.551

4.3.2 Self-regulation
Of the three search engines studied in this report, only Google uses its terms of service
and internal policies to restrict a significant amount of content not prohibited by law.
This is particularly true in the United States where the law restricts relatively little speech
compared in comparison with the rest of the world. While some Google services such
as YouTube and Google+ do not allow pornography, “graphic or gratuitous violence,”
and “hate speech,” (though Blogger allows certain “adult content”),552 Google considers
its search engine to be its “least restrictive” of expression “because search results are
a reflection of the content of the web.”553 Still, it does restrict and manipulate content
globally in accordance with its terms of service and other internal policies. Examples
include:
Sensitive personal information: Google excludes sensitive personal information such as
‘sensitive government ID numbers, bank account and credit card numbers, and images
548 Controversial content and free expression on the web: a refresher. Official Google Blog. 19 April
2010. http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/04/controversial-content-and-free.html (Accessed 16
June 2014.)
549 Google Transparency Report. Requests to Remove Content. From Government. Summary of All
Requests. https://www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/government/
550 Google Transparency Report. Turkey. http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/
government/TR/ For example in the January-June 2013 reporting period: “We received 1,126
requests from government agencies to remove a total of 1,345 items from Blogger, Google+,
and Web Search that the agencies claimed were in violation of law 5651. We removed 188 items
that violated our product policies.” Also see: Jeff Landale. Google transparency report sheds light
on internet threats. 6 December 2012. https://www.accessnow.org/blog/2012/12/06/googletransparency-report-sheds-light-on-internet-threats (Accessed 15 April 2014.)
551 Ben Rooney. Microsoft, Google Join To Battle Child Porn. Wall Street Journal. 18 November 2013.
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB40001424052702304439804579205874211710440
(Accessed 15 April, 2014.)
552 “We do allow adult content on Blogger, including images or videos that contain nudity or sexual
activity. But, please mark your blog as ‘adult’ in your Blogger settings. Otherwise, we may put it
behind a ‘mature content’ interstitial.” Google. Blogger Content Policy. https://www.blogger.com/
content.g?hl=en (Accessed 4 May 2014.)
553 Rachel Whetstone. Controversial Content and Free Expression on the Web: A Refresher. Official
Google blog. 19 April 2010. http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/04/controversial-content-andfree.html. (Accessed 4 May 2014.)
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of signatures’554 when users file removal requests.555 However, Google refuses such
requests when it ‘believe[s] someone is attempting to abuse these policies to remove
other information from our results’.556
Penalties for prohibited search engine optimization techniques: Google penalizes
websites that attempt to appear higher in search results by manipulating their website
code or paying for links in a way that violates Google’s search engine optimization
policies. Several websites of reputable brands have been punished for this,557 including
WordPress,558 the Washington Post,559 the BBC560 and Rap Genius.561
Spam and malware: Google search automatically, through algorithms and manual
“demotion” of spam pages, penalizes pages that contain irrelevant content just to
appear higher in ranking.562 Google proactively shields users from spam and malware
by displaying prominent warnings (‘The Website Ahead Contains Malware!’) when users
click on bad links.563 Yandex also protects its users by placing a warning message in
search results next to websites that contain harmful code.564
Security of websites: As part of an effort to encourage website owners to strengthen
their security practices, in August 2014 Google announced that its search algorithms
would favor websites that use HTTPS encryption by default, thus shielding the user’s

554 Google. Inside Search – Policies. https://www.google.com/insidesearch/howsearchworks/policies.
html
555 Google. Search Help – Removal Policies.
https://support.google.com/websearch/answer/2744324?hl=en (Accessed 1 July 2014); and
Sheily Chhabria. ‘Protecting Consumers From Identity Theft and Scams’. Google Public Policy
Blog. 5 March 2014. http://googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.com/2014/03/protecting-consumers-fromidentity.html (Accessed 1 July 2014.)
556 Google. Search Help – Removal Policies.
https://support.google.com/websearch/answer/2744324?hl=en
557 Danny Sullivan. 10 Big Brands That Were Penalized By Google, From Rap Genius To The BBC.
Marketing Land. 12 February 2014. http://marketingland.com/10-big-brands-that-were-penalizedby-google-69646 (Accessed 2 May 2014.)
558 Andy Baio. Wordpress Website’s Search Engine Spam. Waxy blog. 30 March 2005. http://waxy.
org/2005/03/wordpress_websi (Accessed 1 July 2014.); and Matt Mullenweg. A Response. 1 April
2005. http://ma.tt/2005/04/a-response (Accessed 1 July 2014.)
559 Shawn Smith. Google takes Washington Post, news sites and popular blogs down a notch. New
Media Bytes. 24 October 2007. www.newmediabytes.com/2007/10/24/google-takes-washingtonpost-news-sites-and-popular-blogs-down-a-notch (Accessed 1 July 2014.)
560 Barry Schwartz. Google Penalized One Article On BBC’s Web Site. Search Engine Land. 18 March
2013.
http://searchengineland.com/google-penalized-one-article-on-bbcs-web-site-151954 (Accessed
29 April 2014.)
561 Lydia Laurenson. Google, Censorship, and Salesmanship: The Epic Smackdown of RapGenius.
Medium: Futures Exchange. 22 January 2014. https://medium.com/futures-exchange/
b0c49f6853ca (Accessed 3 May 2014.); Leslie Kaufman. Google Penalizes Rap Genius for Gaming
Search Rank. New York Times. 26 December 2013. www.nytimes.com/2013/12/26/business/
media/google-penalizes-rap-genius-for-gaming-search-rank.html (Accessed 3 May 2014.)
562 Google. Inside Search – Fighting Spam. https://www.google.com/insidesearch/howsearchworks/
fighting-spam.html (Accessed 3 May 2014.)
563 Sheily Chhabria. Protecting Consumers From Identity Theft and Scams. Google Public Policy Blog.
5 March 2014. http://googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.com/2014/03/protecting-consumers-fromidentity.html (Accessed 1 July 2014.)
564 Yandex. Identifying potentially harmful sites. http://help.yandex.com/search/beware/harmful-sites.
xml
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activity on the website from interception (although a web browser as well as tracking
cookies may still record and transmit information about websites visited).565

4.3.3 Features particular to search engines
In addition to the main search results, all three search engines studied include other
features unique to search engines that can be subject to manipulation or restriction in
distinct ways:
Search query prediction: Google, Baidu, and Yandex all offer a feature known as
“autocomplete” or “word completion” which automatically generates suggested word
combinations after the user types in the first letters or words of a search. All three services
exclude certain words and phrases from this function. Baidu and Yandex exclude
predictions that would lead the users to content that is illegal under Chinese or Russian
law, respectively.566 Google excludes the same categories of content that it restricts on
its social media platforms as well as “predictions about activities that could result in realworld physical harm”, such as human trafficking; sale of drugs, weapons or other illegal
goods and services; and “illegal and dangerous activities, like assault and suicide.”567
Search-word related advertising: All three search engines studied display advertising
alongside relevant search terms. Baidu and Yandex apply domestic legal standards.568
Google restricts a broader range of content than U.S. law requires for its AdWords service
that displays advertisements alongside search results linked to particular words. For
example, speech that constitutes “attempts to revise history against the interests of a
protected group” is constitutionally protected in the United States but is prohibited in
Google Adwords because it is illegal elsewhere. Google cites legal regulations alongside
its goal “to ensure a positive user experience, and to protect Google’s brand” as reasons
for its global restrictions on hate speech in AdWords.569
Parental controls: Google’s SafeSearch feature allows users to voluntarily choose settings
that filter adult content (regardless whether it is legal or illegal in their home jurisdiction)
from search results. Google maintains a manually curated “whitelist” for misidentified
websites (such as essex.edu, for example) to prevent them from being classified as

565 Google to prioritise secure sites. 7 August 2014. http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-28687513;
and HTTPS as a ranking signal. Google Webmaster Central Blog. 6 August 2014. http://
googlewebmastercentral.blogspot.com/2014/08/https-as-ranking-signal.html (14 August 2014.)
566 The application of autocomplete in a Baidu search box. Baidu Alliance User Experience Center.
http://ueo.baidu.com/?p=2325 (Accessed 16 June 2014.) This guidance specifies that ‘Baidu
Suggest will filter politics and pornography’. Also see Yandex corporate principles. http://company.
yandex.ru/rules
567 Yandex corporate principles, op. cit.. And Yandex code of corporate ethics. http://company.yandex.
ru/rules/code/
568 For example, search ‘free vpn’ on Baidu, there will be little advertising along the right side of search
results. Above the results, there is a warning: ‘According to relevant laws and policies, part of the
search results is not shown.’ Experiment conducted by the report’s China researcher. 30 June 2014.
Also see Yandex corporate principles and Yandex code of corporate ethics, op. cit.
569 Google Advertising Policies support. Offensive or inappropriate content. https://support.google.
com/adwordspolicy/answer/175902?hl=en&ref_topic=1626336

110
pornography.570 In some jurisdictions Google turns on SafeSearch by default.571 Yandex
offers a similar optional service called ‘family search’. By default Yandex filters adult
content that is not specifically sought (no adult content will appear when simply entering
general terms like ‘videos’), though this ‘moderate’ filter setting can also be disabled.572

4.3.4 Implementation in national context
China
Baidu displays a mix of compromise and pragmatism in the face of strict liability combined
with broad laws and regulations. Baidu’s algorithm is programmed to block results
containing words and phrases that appear on the government blacklists, along with entire
websites that the company is instructed to remove from its search database. The volume
and nature of government requests is not officially disclosed. However, some overseasbased websites573 and news media574 have obtained and published lists of sensitive
words and topics that companies have received. In 2009 the U.S.-based website China
Digital Times published a set of documents leaked by a Baidu employee.575 Based on an
analysis of these leaked materials combined with stakeholder interviews, the restricted
words, phrases, and Web addresses can be divided into the following categories:
•

Names of the Chinese high leadership

•

Protests and dissident movements

•

Events, places and people deemed politically sensitive

•

Foreign websites and organizations blocked at the network level

•

Other (pornography, etc.)

Researchers have found that most of the instructions to remove or block specific content
from search results are communicated on a “just in time” basis: as warranted by breaking

570 Google. Inside Search – Policies. op. cit.
571 Testing conducted by the report’s China researcher confirmed that SafeSearch feature could not be
deactivated on Google.com.hk. 30 June 2014.
572 Yandex. Filtering adult content. http://help.yandex.com/search/beware/adult-filter.xml More
elaborate Russian explanation at http://company.yandex.ru/rules/filtration.
573 Censorship of keywords in China. Greatfire.org. https://en.greatfire.org/search/keywords. Berkeleybased China Digital Times operates an Open-Sourced Research on Blacklisted Search Keywords
on Sina Weibo, http://chinadigitaltimes.net/chinese/category/%E7%BD%91%E6%83%85%E9%8
0%8F%E8%A7%86/%E6%95%8F%E6%84%9F%E8%AF%8D%E5%BA%93/.
574 Keywords Used to Filter Web Content. Washington Post, 18 February 2006, http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/02/18/AR2006021800554html/ (Accessed 25
June 2014.)
575 Baidu’s Internal Monitoring and Censorship Document Leaked (1) (Updated). China Digital Times.
30 April 2009. http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2009/04/baidus-internal-monitoring-and-censorshipdocument-leaked/; Baidu’s Internal Monitoring and Censorship Document Leaked (2). China Digital
Times. 29 April 2009.
https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2009/04/baidus-internal-monitoring-and-censorship-documentleaked-2/ ; Baidu’s Internal Monitoring and Censorship Document Leaked (3). China Digital Times.
28 April 2009. http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2009/04/baidus-internal-monitoring-and-censorshipdocument-leaked-3/ (Accessed 25 June 2014.)
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news and other “sudden incidents”- accidents, natural disasters, corruption scandals,
etc. - that may trigger strong responses from Chinese “netizens.” Such restrictions are
often limited to a specific period of time rather than permanent.576 One lawyer interviewed
for this report who has been involved with cases involving online content observed that
authorities increasingly communicate instructions by phone instead of in writing.577
According to one industry executive, Baidu would seem sometimes to ignore requests
from local government authorities whose concerns and priorities are not shared by central
authorities. While it reportedly pro-actively restricts content known to be a concern to
central authorities, Baidu seems likely to wait for a government demand rather than proactively remove “relatively obscure” politically sensitive information, particularly around
emerging incidents in remote locations far from Beijing.
Despite the frequent and often extensive demands placed on companies to restrict
content, even a domestic critic of the government’s approach to regulating the Internet
described search engines like Baidu as a “positive force” for freedom of expression.
“There is some space for information to be spread before the supervising departments
catch up and tag it as sensitive,” one entrepreneur and industry veteran said in an
interview. “After all, the Internet companies are private businesses. So in order to attract
clicks, they do their best to provide fast and objective information.” 578
Since 2010, Google no longer operates a search service within Chinese jurisdiction and
no longer complies with Chinese government requests to restrict search results.579 As of
early August 2014 the front page of Google search, including google.com and its Hong
Kong-based search engine google.com.hk, was filtered in China.580

576 Internet censorship listed: how does each country compare? The Guardian. 16 April 2014.
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/datablog/2012/apr/16/internet-censorship-country-list
(Accessed 26 June 2014.)
577 Interviewee wished to remain anonymous, date and location not disclosed for that purpose.
578 Interviewee wished to remain anonymous, date and location not disclosed for that purpose.
579 After short revival, Google service disruptions in China return. Reuters. 11 July 2012.
http://in.reuters.com/article/2014/07/11/google-china-idINKBN0FF1DO20140711 (Accessed 10
July.)
580 Abby Liu. Just Google It? Not In China, Where Google Remains Blocked. 18 June 2014.
http://globalvoicesonline.org/2014/06/18/china-google-censorship-tiannamen-block/ (Accessed
10 July.)
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BOX: Google Search in China, 2006-2010
In January 2006 Google launched a search engine operated from within China, Google.cn. Between 2006 and
2010 Google.cn was not subject to network-level filtering because it complied with government requirements
to restrict its search results. This enabled Google to compete more effectively for Chinese users with Baidu,
whose search results are rarely subject to ISP-level filtering because the company restricts its search results
in accordance with government instructions. Then in early 2010, in the wake of a large-scale cyber-attack,
Google’s U.S.-based management decided to re-locate Google.cn to Hong Kong, whose legal system is
separate from the rest of China. After the relocation, China-based users of Google.cn experienced frequent
outages triggered by the network-level filtering of search results containing sensitive words. This resulted in
a sharp drop in Google’s market share, and corresponding boost to Baidu’s market share. Then in June 2014,
Google search became almost completely inaccessible to Chinese users with the exception of Hong Kong and
remained so at the time of this report’s writing.

India
Google receives and responds to numerous requests for the removal of search results
in response to governmental and law enforcement requests as well as court orders. At
times, Google restricts access to content based on these requests. For example, in 2012
Google restricted access to the film “Innocence of Muslims” in India as well as a number
of other countries.584 Also in 2012, Google received a court order for the removal of 247
search results linking to websites that allegedly violated individuals’ privacy. Google did
not remove the search results as the relationship between the results and the court order
were unclear.585 Between January and June 2012, based on court orders Google removed
360 search results linking to webpages containing adult content that allegedly violated
individuals’ privacy.586 According to Google’s Transparency Report, the types of content
that have been requested for removal since July 2010 in India include: defamation,
religious offense, privacy and security, impersonation, adult content, hate speech,
bullying/harassment, copyright, government criticism, national security, geographical
dispute, and information that falls in the category of ‘other’.
In the January to June 2013 transparency reporting period, requests for removal of
defamatory content from the Google search platform were at their highest, with requests
for removal of content that constituted impersonation, adult content, and religious offense
following. For the same reporting period, requests for removal of content on Google’s
581 Google to censor China Web searches. 24 January 2006. CNet.com. http://news.cnet.com/
Google-to-censor-China-Web-searches/2100-1028_3-6030784.html (Accessed 16 June 2014.)
582 Google angers China by shifting service to Hong Kong. 23 March 2010. The Guardian.
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2010/mar/23/google-china-censorship-hong-kong
(Accessed 16 July 2014.)
583 Google Losing Ground in China. 31 March 2011. The Wall Street Journal. http://online.wsj.com/
news/articles/SB10001424052748704530204576234693138486996 (Accessed 16 July 2014.)
584 Google Transparency Report. India- Requests to remove content. Government Requests. July –
December 2012.
http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/government/IN/?p=2012-12
585 Google Transparency Report. India- Requests to remove content. Government Requests. July –
December 2012.
http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/government/IN/?p=2012-12
586 Google Transparency Report. India- Requests to remove content. Government Requests. January
– June 2012. http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/government/IN/?p=2012-06
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image search included adult content, defamatory content, and content impacting
individual privacy and security. On the Google web search autocomplete, defamatory
content was affected the most.587 This is in contrast to the July - December 2012 reporting
period, where Google web search received the highest number of removal requests for
content infringing on privacy and security.588

Russia
As noted in the previous section, Yandex executives claim that the search engine does
not restrict search results because illegal websites are already filtered by the ISPs. In
April 2014, the Duma passed the so-called “blogger law,” requiring bloggers with more
than 3,000 visitors per day to register with the government as media. Such “popular
bloggers” would also be required to use their real names and adhere to mass media
regulations. In response, Yandex shut down a feature of its blog search that displayed
ratings and readership figures, claiming that the numbers were not entirely accurate.589
This step served to shield popular bloggers who did not register.
Google reports that it removes some search results at the request of the Russian
government, documenting what requests it has received and complied with through its
Transparency Report. (which will be discussed in greater detail in the “Transparency”
section of this case study). For the January to June 2013 reporting period, Google
received one court order and three other orders categorized as “executive, police etc”
to remove four results. The company complied with all four orders, three of which were
related to “suicide promotion,” a content category prohibited under Russian law, while
the fourth request was unspecified. In 2012 Google received and complied with one
request described as being related to “national security” and two requests described
also as “suicide promotion.” 590
In Russia, both Yandex and Google lobbied against the Antipiracy law (Bill No 292521),
passed in 2013, that makes it illegal to spread content in a way that violates copyright.591
Both companies oppose the law in its current form because it maximizes opportunities
for accidental over-blocking which affects websites that are not infringing copyright or
otherwise illegal. Google advocates that Russia should adopt a DMCA-style “notice and
takedown” approach (despite its noted flaws in the United States, as discussed below),
whereby the party whose copyright is infringed directly notifies the company hosting the
content of the infringement. Industry interviewees told our researchers that Google is
587 Google Transparency Report. India - Requests to Remove Content. Summary of All Requests.
Government Requests. January – June 2013.
http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/government/IN/
588 Google Transparency Report. India - Requests to Remove Content. Government Requests.
Product Breakdown. January – June 2012. https://www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/
government/IN/?metric=compliance&by=product&p=2012-12
589 «Яндекс» закрыл рейтинг популярности блогеров [Yandex has closed popularity blogger
ratings] Lenta.ru, April 18, 2014, http://rt.com/politics/155580-russia-internet-blogger-bill/http://
lenta.ru/news/2014/04/18/blogi1/
590 Google Transparency Report. Russia. Requests to Remove Content. Government Requests. By
Product. January-June 2013. https://www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/government/
RU/?by=product (Accesssed 28 June 2014.)
591 Russian federal law 292521-6. op. cit.
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appealing to copyright owners in Russia to take their complaints directly to the company
hosting the content in order to avoid government involvement that could lead to broader
filtering. Yandex representatives, on the other hand, stated in interviews that the company
chooses not to act as a mediator for online content issues, including copyright issues.
In July 2014 the Russian parliament enacted a new law requiring foreign internet companies
to store personal data of Russian users within the country. The law originally set an
implementation deadline of January 1, 2016 but in September the parliament moved the
deadline to January 1, 2015.592 The law has been interpreted in the international media to
mean that foreign intermediaries might be filtered by Russian ISPs if they fail to comply.
Since it is possible to provide search service without collecting any user data, it remains
unclear how Google search will be affected by this law. (Other Google services such as
GMail and YouTube which do store large quantities of user data and content as part of
their core services, seemed more likely as of this writing to be affected, although those
services are not within the scope of this study.)593

The United States
Most of the instances in which Google restricts search results globally are to comply with
copyright law. In fact, copyright takedown notices are responsible for 95 per cent of the
takedown requests Google receives for search results, and it complies with 97 per cent of
them.594 However, critics point out that the DMCA copyright takedown system in the U.S.
(discussed in the “Intermediary liability” section of Chapter 2) incentivizes search engines
to promptly remove content rather than question requests, because the penalties for the
search engine can be astronomical: up to $150,000 per infringement.595 This can have a
negative impact on freedom of expression because the DMCA system makes it easy for
those who want content to be removed from the Internet to abuse the system by claiming
copyright infringement.596

592 Sergei Blagov. Russia Seeks New ‘Impossible’ Deadline For Server Localization of Jan. 1, 2015.
Bloomberg. 8 September 2014.
http://www.bna.com/russia-seeks-new-n17179894570/ (Accessed 2 October 2014.)
593 Paul Sonne and Olga Razumovskaya. Russia Steps Up New Law to Control Foreign Internet
Companies. The Wall Street Journal. 24 September 2014. http://online.wsj.com/articles/
russia-steps-up-new-law-to-control-foreign-internet-companies-1411574920?cb=logg
ed0.07114209281280637 (Accessed 2 October 2014.)
594 How Google Fights Piracy. September 2013. p. 16. https://docs.google.com/a/google.com/file/
d/0BwxyRPFduTN2dVFqYml5UENUeUE/edit
595 Mitch Stoltz. To Safeguard the Public Domain (and the Public Interest), Fix Copyright’s Crazy
Penalties. EFF Deeplinks blog. 18 January 2014. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/01/safeguardpublic-domain-and-public-interest-fix-copyrights-crazy-penalties (Accessed 15 April 2014.)
596 Daniel Seng. The State of the Discordant Union: An Empirical Analysis of DMCA Takedown Notices.
20 March 2014. Virginia Journal of Law and Technology, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: http://
ssrn.com/abstract=2411915 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2411915; Also see Takedown Hall
of Shame. Electronic Frontier Foundation. https://www.eff.org/takedowns (Accessed 9 August
2014.)
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sGoogle says that it receives “inaccurate or unjustified copyright removal requests
for search results that clearly do not link to infringing content,” noting that it does not
comply with such requests. In 2012 Google’s Fred von Lohmann wrote: “We’ve also
seen baseless copyright removal requests being used for anticompetitive purposes,
or to remove content unfavorable to a particular person or company from our search
results.”597 Google sometimes takes a stand against the requests. For example in 2013,
Google refused to remove from its search results “The Pirate Bay” home page - the Pirate
Bay website’s individual pages may infringe copyright, but the home page itself does not
host any copyright-infringing content.598
In 2012, Google’s algorithms were reprogrammed to support the DMCA system: The
company announced websites that receive high numbers of “valid copyright removal
notices…may appear lower in our results.” The purpose, according to an official Google
blog post, is to “help users find legitimate, quality sources of content more easily.”599600601

BOX: Impact of domestic website restrictions on global search
In 2012, the software engineer and writer David Auerbach wrote of problems caused by algorithms that “do
not arise from malicious intent, but from expediency and happenstance.”600 Companies that operate search
engines are learning that applying an inherently apolitical mathematical algorithm to a heavily manipulated
and filtered corpus of websites can be harmful to freedom of expression.
In early 2014 the activist group GreatFire accused Microsoft Bing of extending its Chinese-language content
restriction practices required for its operation inside China to users located in other jurisdictions where
the same laws and requirements do not apply. The activists pointed to a comparison of Google’s Chinese
language search results for terms considered politically sensitive in China, versus Bing’s Chinese-language
search results – in both instances when the search is conducted from jurisdictions such as the United States
and the UK. While Google’s results contained content from many web pages that are filtered or otherwise
inaccessible in China, Bing’s results contained mainly content from websites created and operated from
within China – and which are therefore subject to Chinese laws and regulations. Microsoft responded that it
“does not apply China’s legal requirements to searches conducted outside of China.”601

597 Fred von Lohmann. Transparency for Copyright Removals in Search. Official Google Blog. 24
May 2012. http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2012/05/transparency-for-copyright-removals-in.html
(Accessed 9 August 2014.)
598 Ernesto Van Der Sar. Google Refuses to Move the Pirate Bay Homepage. TorrentFreak blog. 9
September 2013.
http://torrentfreak.com/google-refuses-to-remove-the-pirate-bay-homepage-130909 (Accessed 2
April 2014.)
599 An update to our search algorithms. Google Inside Search blog. 8 October 2012. http://insidesearch.
blogspot.com/2012/08/an-update-to-our-search-algorithms.html (Accessed 2 April 2014.)
600 David Auerbach. The Stupidity of Computers. Issue 13: Machine Politics. Winter 2012.
http://nplusonemag.com/issue-13/essays/stupidity-of-computers/ (Accessed 2 April 2014.)
601 Microsoft, Bing Censor Chinese Search Results System Error. The Guardian. 12 February 2014.
www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/feb/12/microsoft-bing-censor-chinese-search-resultssystem-error (Accessed 9 April 2014.)
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In the opinion of one member of this report’s research team who has studied the issue of search engines and
freedom of expression over the past decade, the problem is more likely due to the fact that search ranking
relies on calculating inbound links as well as user “click through” rates to a website. Due to the massive
size of the Chinese internet (618 million users as of December 2013),602 incoming links and click-throughs
for the websites that rank highly on Chinese search engines are orders of magnitude greater than clickthroughs for websites popular with the West. The number of people clicking through to simplified Chinese
language websites based outside of China - particularly if they are filtered within the country - is inevitably,
and substantially, lower.
It appears that Google’s search algorithm was adjusted to compensate for this imbalance created by
jurisdiction-specific filtering, but as of early 2014, Bing’s had not.603 This incident speaks to an emerging
challenge to freedom of expression and access to information on search engines—content restriction within
a large country has the potential to affect speakers of that country’s primary language regardless of where
they live. This can apparently be prevented only if the search engine operator identifies and compensates
for lower click-through rates and inbound links that are intrinsically a feature of websites that are filtered.

4.3.5 Europe and the “Right to Be Forgotten”
As many of the examples in this case study have illustrated, search engines—even when
operating in legal environments where freedom of expression receives strong protection
— are not entirely neutral arbiters of information. Adjustments are made globally to the
search algorithm in order to protect users from spam and malware or identity theft, to
protect children from sexual exploitation, and to comply with intellectual property law.
Many more adjustments are made in response to private and government requests in
specific jurisdictions around the world. The role of search engines now faces a further
set of challenges in Europe – and potentially around the world – with the European Court
of Justice’s May 13, 2014 ruling, establishing the “right to be forgotten” throughout the
European Union.
A previous UNESCO report, published in 2012, highlighted the inherent tensions between
privacy and freedom of expression.604 One of many potential tensions is between the
individual’s desire to eliminate negative information about him or herself from the Internet
and the right of others to receive and impart information.605 On 13 May 2014, the Court
of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) ruled in the case Google Spain v AEPD, brought
against Google by a Spanish man who argued that an auction notice of his repossessed
602 According to a January 2014 report by the China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC). www.
cnnic.net.cn/hlwfzyj/hlwxzbg/hlwtjbg/201401/P020140116395418429515.pdf; Steven Millward.
16 January 2001. China Now Has Half a Billion Mobile Web Users, 618 Million Total Internet Users.
Tech in Asia.
www.techinasia.com/cnnic-china-500-million-mobile-web-users-and-618-internet-users-2013
(Accessed 9 April 2014.)
603 Rebecca MacKinnon. 14 February 2014. Where is Microsoft Bing’s Transparency Report? The
Guardian.
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/feb/14/micorsoft-bing-china-censorshiptransparency (Accessed 9 April 2014.)
604 Mendel et. al., op. cit. p. 97-104.
605 Global Network Initiative. 15 May 2014. EU Court ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ Ruling Threatens
Freedom of Expression. http://www.globalnetworkinitiative.org/news/eu-court-%E2%80%98rightbe-forgotten%E2%80%99-ruling-threatens-freedom-expression
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home appearing in Google’s search results constituted a violation of his right to privacy.
606 According to the court’s ruling, Internet users in Europe now have the right to
demand that search engines remove links to web pages about them that are ‘inadequate,
irrelevant or excessive in relation to the purposes of the processing’.607 Furthermore, the
individual’s right to privacy overrides ‘as a general rule’ the public’s interest in finding
information. At the same time, the public interest may be preponderant, for example in
the cases of public figures.608
The ruling came under heavy criticism from free expression groups such as Article 19, the
Committee to Protect Journalists and Index on Censorship, who warned that excessive
enforcement of privacy rights can impinge on press freedom.609 This position aligns with
one that recognises that press freedom represents the right to use free expression to
communicate with the wider public, and that while removing links to content does not
per se violate the original expression, it eliminates much of the significance of publishing
in the digital age.
Other digital rights advocates argued that media coverage and the free expression
community overreacted. For example, Joe McNamee, director of the European Digital
Rights Initiative, pointed out that contrary to some press reports Google had ‘not been
asked to delete data’, merely block the link from appearing in search results for searches
on the name of the person in question.’610 Some also pointed out that the search engine
operator is given a great deal of discretion in responding to individual requests, and is not
compelled to remove any results prior to a court ruling. Jef Ausloos of the University of
Leuven said that upon closer inspection ‘much of the wording seems to be very nuanced
and limited in scope’.611
606 Europe’s top court: people have right to be forgotten on Internet. Reuters. 13 May 2014. http://
www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/13/eu-google-dataprotection-idUSL6N0NZ23Q20140513
(Accessed 14 July 2014.)
607 Read original CJEU ruling at Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v Agencia Española
de Protección de Datos, Mario Costeja González [2014] http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
TXT/?uri=CELEX:62012CJ0131; For additional commentary see David Streitfeld. ‘European Court
Lets Users Erase Records on Web’. New York Times. 14 May 2014. www.nytimes.com/2014/05/14/
technology/google-should-erase-web-links-to-some-personal-data-europes-highest-court-says.
html (Accessed 24 June 2014.)
608 CJEU ruling, op. cit.
609 Geoffrey King. EU ‘right to be forgotten’ ruling will corrupt history. Committee to Protect Journalists.
4 June 2014. http://cpj.org/blog/2014/06/eu-right-to-be-forgotten-ruling-will-corrupt-histo.php;
Index urges court to rethink ruling on “right to be forgotten”. Index on Censorship. 30 May 2014.
http://www.indexoncensorship.org/2014/05/index-urges-court-rethink-ruling-right-forgotten/;
Gabrielle Guillemin A right to be forgotten? EU Court sets worrying precedent for free speech. 14
May 2014. http://www.article19.org/join-the-debate.php/146/view/ (Accessed 24 June 2014.)
610 Joe McNamee. Google’s right to be forgotten – industrial scale misinformation? European Digital
Rights Initiative. 9 June 2014. http://edri.org/forgotten (Accessed 24 June 2014.) McNamee
links to the following two articles; Victoria Espinel. ‘Coming Together to Combat Online Piracy
and Counterfeiting’. White House Office of Management and Budget’s ‘OMBlog’. 15 July 2013.
www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2013/07/15/coming-together-combat-online-piracy-and-counterfeiting
(Accessed 24 June 2014.); and Bad Google DMCA Takedown Is Hurting Us, Hosting Site Says.
TorrentFreak. 30 March 2014. https://torrentfreak.com/bad-google-dmca-takedown-is-hurting-ushosting-site-says-140330 (Accessed 24 June 2014.)
611 Jef Ausloos. 13 May 2014. European Court Rules against Google, in Favour of Right to be
Forgotten. London School of Economics and Political Science. Media Policy Blog. http://blogs.lse.
ac.uk/mediapolicyproject/2014/05/13/european-court-rules-against-google-in-favour-of-right-tobe-forgotten (Accessed 24 June 2014.)
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By the end of May 2014, Google came up with a ‘rudimentary framework’ for compliance
with the ruling and to cover itself from subsequent cases based on the ruling. It created
a public web page612 through which users based in Europe could request that their
names be decoupled from certain search results.613 The removals would only take place
on Google search websites specific to the European Union (google.co.uk or google.
co.de, for example) and would remain visible on the global search engine, Google.com.
A notification that such removals had taken place would appear on the search results
page.614
As a member of the Global Network Initiative, Google faced the need to reconcile
compliance with the ruling with its GNI commitments to be transparent about how content
is restricted, as well as to interpret official requests around content restriction as narrowly
as possible.615 On 11 July 2014 Google reported that it had received 70,000 restriction
requests covering 250,000 websites since mid-May. The requests were being reviewed
manually, and the company had also instituted a policy of notifying websites when
one of their pages was removed.616 The Guardian newspaper was one of the first news
organizations to receive notifications that links to some of its stories had been removed
from its search results in the EU.617 Wikipedia’s founder Jimmy Wales condemned the
process as “censorship” after his organization received notice that several links to
Wikipedia content had been removed in compliance with requests from people who were
the subject of that content.618
Google also set up an advisory council to investigate how it should balance privacy and
freedom of expression. Senior Vice President and Chief Legal Officer David Drummond
wrote that while some requests were clearly illegitimate, like politicians seeking to cover
up prior misdeeds, one could sympathize with many others:
…from the man who asked that we not show a news article saying he had been
questioned in connection with a crime (he’s able to demonstrate that he was
never charged) to the mother who requested that we remove news articles for
612 Google. Search removal request under European Data Protection law. https://support.google.com/
legal/contact/lr_eudpa?product=websearch (Accessed 24 June 2014.)
613 Mark Scott. 18 June 2014. Google Ready to Comply With “Right to Be Forgotten” Rules in Europe.
New York Times. http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/06/18/google-ready-to-comply-with-right-tobe-forgotten-rules-in-europe (Accessed 24 June 2014.)
614 Danny Sullivan. 30 May 2014. How Google’s New “Right To Be Forgotten” Form Works: An Explainer.
Search Engine Land. http://searchengineland.com/google-right-to-be-forgotten-form-192837
(Accessed 24 June 2014.)
615 Global Network Initiative Implementation Guidelines. Freedom of Expression.
http://globalnetworkinitiative.org/implementationguidelines/index.php#29 and Global Network
Initiative Principles. Freedom of Expression. http://globalnetworkinitiative.org/principles/index.
php#18
616 Searching for the right balance. Google Official Blog. 11 July 2014. http://googleblog.blogspot.
com/2014/07/searching-for-right-balance.html
617 James Ball. 10 July 2014. Google admits to errors over Guardian ‘right to be forgotten’ link
deletions. The Guardian. http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/jul/10/google-admitserrors-guardian-right-to-be-forgotten-deletions (Accessed 14 August 2014.)
618 Alex Hern. 6 August 2014. Wikipedia swears to fight ‘censorship’ of ‘right to be forgotten’ ruling.
The Guardian.
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/aug/06/wikipedia-censorship-right-to-be-forgottenruling (Accessed 14 August 2014.)
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her daughter’s name as she had been the victim of abuse. It’s a complex issue,
with no easy answers.619
In the third quarter of 2014, the company was scheduled to hold public consultation
sessions across Europe, and had also published an online questionnaire seeking public
comment.620 Questions included: “What is the nature and delineation of a public figure’s
right to privacy?” and “How should we differentiate content in the public interest from
content that is not?” and “Does the public have a right to information about the nature,
volume, and outcome of removal requests made to search engines?”621
Meanwhile, as of June 2014, it appeared that the CJEU ruling might effect similar changes
around the world. For example, privacy regulators attending the Asia Pacific Privacy
Authorities (APPA) forum on 17–18 June 2014 in Seoul, Korea, discussed the possibility of
‘engaging with Google and other search engines’ and said that they would be publishing
a report with recommendations on this topic by the next APPA meeting in December.622
The implications of implementing similar rules in other jurisdictions began to come under
debate. For example, in an editorial in a local newspaper, Prof. Park Kyung-Sin of Korea
University Law School expressed concern that legislation of the right to be forgotten this
could grant broad license to national authorities to censor online content.623

4.4

Data retention, collection, and surveillance

The retention of user data by search engines combined with heightened knowledge
about government surveillance practices appears to have affected the public’s trust in
search engines. An analysis of publicly available Google (Search) Trends data before and
after June 2013 (when former NSA contractor Edward Snowden began to release his
revelations about U.S. government surveillance via Internet intermediaries) sought to find
“empirical evidence of a chilling effect on users’ willingness to enter [sensitive] search
terms.”624 They examined search traffic data for 282 terms in 11 countries that included
China and Russia (but not India).625 Nine out of eleven countries exhibited a decrease
in search traffic for terms that were rated as “likely to get you in trouble with the U.S.

619 Searching for the right balance. op cit.
620 Lance Whitney. 30 July 2014. Google seeks public opinion on ‘right to be forgotten’. CNet.
http://www.cnet.com/news/google-seeks-public-opinion-on-right-to-be-forgotten/ (Accessed 14
August 2014.)
621 Google. Formal request for public comment and evidence. https://services.google.com/fb/forms/
advisorycouncilcomments/
622 Asia Pacific Privacy Authorities. 41st APPA Forum – Communiqué. www.appaforum.org/resources/
communiques/41stforum.html (Accessed 24 June 2014.)
623 Park Kyung-Sin. 8 August 2014. A ‘surveillance’ right to be forgotten. Hangyerye
http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/opinion/column/650266.html (Accessed 10 August 2014.) With thanks
to Jae Yeon Kim for bringing this article’s to the authors’ attention.
624 Alex Marthews and Catherine Tucker. 24 March 2014. Government Surveillance and Search
Behavior. SSRN. http://ssrn.com/abstract=2412564.
625 According to the United States and its top ten international trading partners according to the
U.S. Census for the 2012–13 trading year. These were, in order, Canada, China, Mexico, Japan,
Germany, South Korea, the UK, France, Brazil, and Saudi Arabia. Tucker and Marthews op. cit. p.3.
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government,” but an increase for terms “not likely to get you in trouble.” In the United
States, the magnitude of this drop was 2.2 per cent.626
As noted earlier, in the United States, the PEN American Center survey of 520 American
writers found a chilling effect.627 Even before the surveillance revelations, a February
2012 Pew Internet & American Life survey found that Americans were not only “anxious
about the collection of personal information by search engines,” but 62 per cent of them
also did “not know how to limit the information that is collected about them.”628
Similar surveys have not been conducted in Russia and China that would provide
parallel data about levels of public understanding of data retention and collection by
search engines, or levels of public awareness about the nature and extent of government
surveillance. Nonetheless the studies cited above do indicate that at least in some
societies, awareness of the lack of privacy and existence of some level of pervasive
surveillance can have a chilling impact on search engine users’ freedom of expression.
Concerns about data collection by search engines (and other online services) have
prompted the rise of alternatives that claim not to track or store users’ digital data.

4.4.1 Company policies and practices
General Privacy Policies
All three companies have privacy policies with varying degrees of specificity. Of the three,
only Google is subject to regular third-party privacy audits, in accordance with a 2011
ruling by the U.S. Federal Trade Commission.629
Google’s Privacy Policy (unified for all of the company’s services) states that it collects
“log information,” including “details of how you used our service, such as your search
queries.”630 This information also includes user IP addresses, hardware information of
the mobile device they may be searching from (if applicable) and “cookies that may
uniquely identify your browser or your Google Account.” This is done, the company
says, to provide, maintain, protect and improve its services, to develop new services, “to
protect Google and our users,” and “to offer you tailored content - like giving you more
relevant search results and ads.”631 The Yandex privacy policy is called a ‘Confidentiality
Policy,’ and describes what kinds of data the company collects and for what purpose.
626 Excepting Saudi Arabia and South Korea. See Tucker and Marthews, op. cit. p.14.
627 PEN American Center. Chilling Effects: NSA Surveillance Drives Writers to Self-Censor. November
2013.
www.pen-international.org/read-pen-american-centres-report-chilling-effects-nsa-surveillancedrives-writers-to-self-censor (Accessed 2 May 2014.)
628 Kristen Purcell, Joanna Brenner, and Lee Rainie. 9 March 2012. Search Engine Use 2012. Pew
Internet & American Life Project. www.pewinternet.org/2012/03/09/search-engine-use-2012.
629 Federal Trade Commission. 30 March 2011. FTC Charges Deceptive Privacy Practices in Googles
Rollout of Its Buzz Social Network. http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2011/03/ftccharges-deceptive-privacy-practices-googles-rollout-its-buzz
630 Google. Privacy Policy. Privacy & Terms. https://www.google.com/policies/privacy/
631 Google. Key Terms. Privacy & Terms. https://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/privacy/key-terms/
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Yandex says it gathers such information necessary for reasons including development
of new services, to improve quality of service and for targeted advertisements.632 In its
Privacy Policy Baidu states that it collects users’ personal information, log information,
equipment information, cookies and anonymous identifiers. It explains the purpose of
gathering information and promises to store and process the information anonymously.633

Data Retention
Google does not disclose how long it retains user data or what data is “anonymized”
(de-linked from data that would enable re-identification of the user).634 While Google logs
search history by default, users can delete their history manually by accessing Google
Dashboard. Users can also disable logging of their Web browsing history when logged
in.635 Like Google, Yandex also provides users with the option to delete their Web history
or opt out of the storage of their Web history.636 Company executives at Yandex have
stated publicly that user data will be stored for at least three months, although that
information was not found on the company’s own website.637 Baidu does not offer a
similar feature to delete search history, and makes no commitment about a time limit for
storing such information.638

Security and encryption
In March 2014 Google announced that it was implementing encryption by default for
all web searches worldwide.639 Such encryption limits the ability for third parties to
inconspicuously intercept search terms entered by the user. However, Google notes
that “when you visit another website from the Google search results page, that website
may be able to identify what site you came from or the search terms that you used.”640
Yandex offers encrypted search on Yandex.com but not Yandex.ru. Baidu does not offer
encrypted search.

Disclosure of User Data to Government Authorities
Yandex company representatives have stated that the company does not share user
information with third parties with the exception of government security services, who
are required to produce a court order.641 At the same time, however, Internet companies
632
633
634
635
636
637
638
639

640
641

Yandex. Privacy Policy. Art. 2.2. https://legal.yandex.ru/confidential.
Baidu Statement of Privacy Protection. http://www.baidu.com/duty/yinsiquan.html.
Google Privacy Policy. op. cit.
Google. About Google Search History.
https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/54068?hl=en&ref_topic=14148
Yandex. How long are the files stored? FAQ. http://help.yandex.ru/disk/faq.xml#time
http://searchengines.guru/showthread.php?t=856569
Baidu Statement of Privacy Protection. http://www.baidu.com/duty/yinsiquan.html.
Craig Timberg and Jia Lynn Yang. 12 March 2014. Google is encrypting search globally. That’s bad
for the NSA and China’s censors. Washington Post The Switch blog. www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/03/12/google-is-encrypting-search-worldwide-thats-bad-for-the-nsaand-china (Accessed 5 May 2014.)
Google. Search Help – SSL Search. https://support.google.com/websearch/answer/173733?hl=en
Internet companies will be obliged to keep almost all user data. Forbes (Russian) 3 June 2014.
http://www.forbes.ru/news/259055-internet-kompanii-obyazhut-khranit-pochti-vse-dannye-opolzovatelyakh (Accessed 10 July 2014.)
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operating in Russia are required to participate in the Law Enforcement Support System,
known by its Russian acronym, SORM. Data interception equipment is installed within
company facilities. According to Privacy International, the most recently upgraded
version of SORM “gathers information from all communication media, and offers longterm storage (three years), providing access to all user data.”642 Thus it is unnecessary for
security services to request the information because they may already have direct access
to it. If this is not through Yandex directly then it may be via Russian ISPs. At the time of
writing, user activity on Yandex.ru was not encrypted.
Among the list of circumstances under which user information might be disclosed Baidu
includes when “the disclosure is required by laws, regulations, legal proceedings, and
government authorities.”643
Google publishes a transparency report, (to be discussed in more detail in the next
section of this case study) that includes global data about “User Data Requests” from
governments around the world. From December 31, 2010 to December 31, 2013, the
number of requests Google received from governments for user data pertaining to all
Google services doubled. The percentage of requests that the company complied with
during that same three-year period has steadily declined from 76 per cent to 64 per
cent.644

4.4.2 Implementation in national context
In the 2014 “Who Has Your Back” report by the US-based Electronic Frontier Foundation
(EFF) evaluating U.S. companies on policies and practices related to US government
user data requests and surveillance,645 Google was awarded full points in all six possible
categories: 1) The company requires a warrant before providing content to U.S. law
enforcement; 2) It informs users in the US whenever legally possible before information
is disclosed to requesting authorities; 3) It publishes a Transparency Report (see below);
4) It publishes ‘law enforcement guides’ explaining how the company evaluates and
responds to US law enforcement requests; 5) It “fights for user privacy” in the US courts;
6) and it opposes mass surveillance as a member of the Reform Government Surveillance
Coalition, which advocates that “governments should limit surveillance to specific, known
users for lawful purposes, and should not undertake bulk data collection of Internet
communications.”646

642 Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan. 4 March 2013. Lawful interception: the Russian approach.
https://www.privacyinternational.org/blog/lawful-interception-the-russian-approach (Accessed 15
July 2014.)
643 Baidu Statement of Privacy Protection, http://www.baidu.com/duty/yinsiquan.html.
644 Requests for User Information. Google Transparency Report.
http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/userdatarequests/
645 Who Has Your Back? 2014. Protecting Your Data From Government Requests. Electronic Frontier
Foundation. https://www.eff.org/who-has-your-back-2014
646 Reform Government Surveillance. Global Government Surveillance Reform.
https://www.reformgovernmentsurveillance.com/
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Similar scorecards on Baidu or Yandex have not been produced by civil society or research
organizations in their respective home countries. According to the EFF six-point criteria,
Yandex would receive one point out of six as the company: it requires a warrant before
handing over user data to law enforcement. Yandex has publicly advocated against laws
such as the Antipiracy Law that it believes harm freedom of expression online,647 but there
is no publicly available information about the company lobbying in regard to government
surveillance practices. Based on information available to this report’s researchers, Baidu
would score zero out of six. Note that this conclusion does not necessarily reflect the
intent of the companies themselves, given that they operate in legal and regulatory
environments where a full score is not possible.

4.5

Transparency

Members of the Global Network Initiative, specifically commit to “respect and protect the
freedom of expression of their users” in the course of responding to government requests
to remove content or hand over user data.648 They also commit to be held accountable to
this commitment. There are two components of public accountability for GNI members:
“independent assessment and evaluation” of whether the companies are upholding their
commitment to the GNI principles, and also “transparency with the public.”649 Two years
after the GNI’s official launch with three company members (Google, Microsoft, and
Yahoo), the practice of what has come to be called “transparency reporting” began to
emerge.

4.5.1 Company practices
In 2010 Google was the first Internet company in the world to publish a semi-annual
“Transparency Report” including data about the number of government requests that
it receives for content restriction as well as the hand-over of user data.650 Since 2010
the company has also included the percentage of requests it has complied with in each
country. In the “Requests to remove content” section, data includes court orders related
to cases of defamation brought by individuals.651 It also includes data about removal or
filtering requests received from copyright holders.652

647 Halia Pavliva. 11 July 2014. Internet Censorship Law Triggers Yandex Tumble. Bloomberg.
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-11/internet-censorship-law-triggers-yandex-tumblerussia-overnight.html (Accessed 10 August 2014.)
648 Global Network Initiative Principles. Freedom of Expression. http://globalnetworkinitiative.org/
principles/index.php#18
649 Global Network Initiative Principles. Governance, Accountability, and Transparency. http://
globalnetworkinitiative.org/principles/index.php#22
650 Greater transparency around government requests. Google Official Blog. 20 April 2010. http://
googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/04/greater-transparency-around-government.html
651 Requests to Remove Content. From Governments. Google Transparency Report. https://www.
google.com/transparencyreport/removals/government/
652 Requests to Remove Content. Due to Copyright. Google Transparency Report. https://www.google.
com/transparencyreport/removals/copyright/?hl=en
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When search results are removed in response to government or copyright holder demands,
a notice describing the number of results removed and the reasons for their removal is
displayed to users (see figure 5 below) and a copy of the request to the independent nonprofit organization ChillingEffects.org, which archives and publishes the request (see box
below for more about the Chilling Effects database).653 When possible the company also
contacts the website’s owners.654

Figure 5: Google notification that content has been removed from search
results.

655656

BOX: ChillingEffects.org, a third party clearing house for take-down
notices
Founded in 2001, the Chilling Effects database hosted by Harvard’s Berkman Center for Internet and Society
collects and analyzes legal complaints and requests for removal of online materials. The purpose, according
to the project’s website, is to help scholars study ‘the prevalence of legal threats and let Internet users
see the source of content removals.’655 In 2002, Google started submitting cease-and-desist letters that it
received to Chilling Effects. Since then, several other companies including Twittter (see Chapter 5) have
chosen to use the project as a neutral third-party host for take-down requests received around the world. The
database now includes millions of notices and the project publishes regular analyses of trends in the volume
and types of notices received.656 Below is a screenshot of one copyright notice recently received by Google.

653 DtecNet DMCA (Copyright) Complaint to Google. Chilling Effects Clearinghouse. 12 March 2013.
www.chillingeffects.org/notice.cgi?sID=841442.
654 Google. How Google Fights Piracy. September 2013. p.16.
https://docs.google.com/a/google.com/file/d/0BwxyRPFduTN2dVFqYml5UENUeUE/edit
655 Chilling Effects. https://www.chillingeffects.org
656 About. Chilling Effects. https://www.chillingeffects.org/pages/about; and for example Huge Volume
Increases and Updates to Google Transparency Report. Chilling Effects Blog. 13 December 2012.
https://www.chillingeffects.org/blog_entries/585
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Figure 6: Example of a take-down notice received by Google and
published at Chillingeffects.org657

Baidu does notify users about its process for copyright holders to request removal of
infringing content.658 Also, in the case of specific searches containing results that have
been removed, Baidu displays a notice at the top of the page announcing: “In accordance
with relevant laws and regulations, some search results do not appear.”
The company does not publish information about its process for evaluating and
responding to government demands. It does not publish data about government requests
for content removal or restriction, or about the number of copyright takedown requests
received or complied with. The law makes it difficult for Baidu to be more transparent,
as Google’s experience in China demonstrates. When Google operated its local Google.
cn search engine within the jurisdiction of China until early 2010, its transparency report
omitted government request data for China. Google explained that data about censorship
657 DMCA (Copyright) Complaint to Google. Digimarc on behalf of Pearson Education, Inc. Chilling
Effects. 25 September 2014. https://www.chillingeffects.org/notices/2050759#
658 Baidu. Rights Protection Statement. http://www.baidu.com/duty/right.html
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demands are considered state secrets in China and therefore reporting them would be
illegal.659 It would be similarly illegal for Baidu to report data on Chinese government
requests. However, it is worth noting that as Baidu expands into other markets outside
of China, particularly in Asia,660 it does not face the same legal barrier to publishing data
about requests made by other governments in other jurisdictions.
Yandex does not publish any information about its process for evaluating and responding
to government or private demands to remove content. (As mentioned previously, Yandex
claims that it does not remove search engine results although it does remove content from
other services not covered by this study.) Unlike in China where it would be a violation
of law to provide the type of detail found in Google-style “Transparency reports,” our
researchers were unable to identify any specific Russian law that would prevent Yandex or
other Russian Internet companies from publishing statistics about what is being removed,
or what volume of requests they receive and what percentage they are complying with.
Nor did company representatives explain to our researchers why they do not produce
such information, beyond stating that there is no such tradition in Russia.

4.5.2 Transparency in context
India provides an example of how civil society in some countries has begun to use data
from Google’s transparency report to hold governments accountable for their practices.
In 2011, researchers from the Bangalore-based Centre for Internet and Society sent a
“right to information” request to the Department of Information Technology (DIT), now
the Department of Electronics and Information Technology (DEITY), asking for more
information about the number of orders issued by the government for website blocking
in India.661 They then compared the government’s responses to the data published in
Google’s transparency report data on Indian government requests made between January
and June 2011, and found that the government had disclosed making substantially fewer
requests to Google than Google reported having received from the government. CIS
researchers concluded: “Either the DIT is not providing us all the relevant information on
blocking, or it is not following the law.”662
It also appears that lack of transparency can affect public trust in search engines in some
countries. In China, a lack of transparency about the nature and volume of government
restriction requests makes it easier for Chinese users to suspect corruption and foul
play. In 2008 Baidu faced widespread accusations in the media and online that it had
manipulated search results about the company Sanlu, which had been implicated in a

659 Requests to Remove Content. From Governments. China. Google Transparency Report. https://
www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/government/CN/
660 Asina Pornwasin. Baidu poised for big push into Thailand. 15 October 2013. http://www.
nationmultimedia.com/technology/Baidu-poised-for-big-push-into-Thailand-30217048.html
(Accessed 25 July 2014.)
661 Text of DIT’s Response to Second RTI on Website Blocking. The Centre for Internet & Society.
27 October 2011. http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/dit-response-2nd-rti-blocking
662 Ibid.

127
scandal over tainted milk powder.663 Bloggers and members of several online fora accused
the company Baidu of burying negative stories about Sanlu at the company’s request.664
Eventually Baidu acknowledged that it had been approached by representatives of the
dairy industry offering to pay if the company downplayed certain types of search results,
but insisted that it had “flat out refused” to do so.665
In 2012 Baidu fired four employees for allegedly taking bribes to remove content from
one of its websites after three of the four were arrested.666 In March 2014, the statesponsored Beijing News reported that Beijing police had detained “at least 10 people”
including Baidu employees for allegedly “abusing their positions to delete online posts
in return for money.” The article cited “several cases since 2012” in which Beijing police
“exposed a profit chain connected to a web censor at the Beijing Municipal Public
Security Bureau.”667 One industry source interviewed for this report said, “There are a lot
of companies focusing on deleting specific search results,” adding, “it’s a business now.”
According to legal experts interviewed for this report, China’s courts have dismissed
efforts by plaintiffs seeking redress or reinstatement when content that they believed was
actually legal was removed for unknown reasons. One interviewee expressed concern
that China’s online information environment is shaped not only by government officials
but also by private sector elites.668

4.6 Remedy
There are two potential parties whose freedom of expression rights might be affected by
search engines: internet users broadly, and also the creators and operators of websites
including individuals with personal blogs and websites, civil society organizations, and
news organizations. Other parties can and do have grievances related to other rights –
such as content creators concerned about links to file-sharing sites. This section focuses
on remedy and grievance mechanisms related only to freedom of expression and not on
mechanisms addressing other rights.

663 Baidu announcement: Never agreed to block Sanlu negative news. Sina Tech. 13 Sep 2008.
http://tech.sina.com.cn/i/2008-09-13/15472456026.shtml.
664 Liu Hongbo: Baidu’s brainwash, Southern Metropolitan News, 3 May 2010,
http://tech.163.com/10/0503/09/65OIDEBF000915BF.html (Accessed 15 April 2014.)
665 Kidney Stone Gate: Baidu Denies Censoring Search Results. ChinaSMACK. 17 September 2008.
http://www.chinasmack.com/2008/stories/kidney-stone-gate-baidu-denies-censoring-searchresults.html (Accessed 15 April 2014.)
666 Cao Yin. Baidu fires four for deleting posts. China Daily. 8 August 2012. http://usa.chinadaily.
com.cn/business/2012-08/08/content_15650874.htm and Baidu Employees Fired and Arrested for
Taking Bribes to Delete Content. PCWorld. 6 August 2012. http://www.pcworld.com/article/260498/
baidu_employees_fired_and_arrested_for_taking_bribes_to_delete_content.html (Accessed 15
April 2014.)
667 Baidu staff, web censor profited by deleting unfavorable posts. Beijing News. 26 March 2014.
http://www.bjd.com.cn/10beijingnews/metro/201403/26/t20140326_6474269.html (Accessed 15
April 2014.)
668 Interviews conducted with sources who wish to remain anonymous; thus date of interviews and
identities of interviewees are not disclosed.
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None of the search engines studied have complaints, grievance or remedy mechanisms
that can be used by internet users who believe that their freedom of expression has been
violated due to the way in which a search engine governs its content.
Google does have a mechanism for website owners to challenge removal under the
DMCA of links to their websites.669 Since the company began to implement the European
“right to be forgotten” ruling, Google has reinstated links to some news articles that were
originally restricted.670 However the process for handling appeals for reinstatement is not
clear. Prior to the roll-out of Google’s new “right to be forgotten” web form in the wake of
the EU court ruling, none of the search engines studied have provided mechanisms for
users to seek remedy if they believe that their privacy rights have been harmed by search
results.
While Europeans have successfully used the courts to seek remedy for alleged privacy
violations by a search engine, plaintiffs in the countries studied have not been successful
in using courts to obtain remedy for search engines’ restriction of their websites. Most
recently, in 2013 some U.S.-based users of Baidu filed a lawsuit against the company,
claiming that Baidu’s restriction of content that is not illegal outside of China constituted
a violation of their freedom of expression. A United States District Judge dismissed the
case against Baidu on the grounds that a search engine’s algorithms are protected by the
First Amendment.671

4.8 Conclusions
This case study has highlighted how search engine policies and practices related to
content restriction and content manipulation are shaped by their home jurisdictions, and
to varying degrees by the laws and regulations of other jurisdictions. It has also illustrated
how three different companies headquartered in three very different national contexts
have chosen to handle challenges related to freedom of expression of their users. Key
findings include:
Differences in ISP filtering regimes have a strong influence on how, and to what
extent, search engines restrict their own search results. For example, due to
substantial differences in the technical and legal characteristics of filtering in Russia and
China, Yandex and Baidu have very different restriction practices, and Google has taken
different approaches to the two markets (remaining in Russia as of August 2014 but
removing its operations from China since 2010).

669 Removing Content from Google. https://support.google.com/legal/troubleshooter/1114905?hl=en
#ts=1115655,1614942,1727155,1115847
670 Dave Lee. 4 July 2014. Google reinstates ‘forgotten’ links after pressure. BBC News.
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-28157607 (Accessed 18 July 2014.)
671 U.S. Judge Dismisses Lawsuit Against Chinese Search Engine. Reuters. 28 March 2014.
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/29/business/us-judge-dismisses-lawsuit-against-chinesesearch-engine.html (Accessed 18 July 2014.)
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The stricter the liability regime in a given jurisdiction, the more likely the content will
be removed either proactively by the company or upon request without challenge.
China falls on one end of the spectrum of strict liability and proactive content restriction.
But one can also see how the “notice and takedown” system for protecting copyright in
the United States can lead to restrictions of legitimate content that a court would likely
find it within the search engine’s right to display, if the company does not take a strong
position in favor of users’ rights.
While content restriction takes place on search engines at the request of authorities,
it also happens for other reasons in all jurisdictions, including for reasons that the
search engines deem to be in the users’ or the public’s interest. This contradicts
a widespread public perception that search engines are neutral arbiters of information.
Some consensus among companies and freedom of expression advocates has emerged
on best practice by search engines in handling government demands and take down
requests from a freedom of expression standpoint, as evidenced by the Global Network
Initiative’s principles and implementation guidelines. However there is no clear consensus
across stakeholders about how search engines should respect freedom of expression in
the course of algorithmic design and other content restrictions unrelated to government
requests.
Transparency by companies as well as governments plays a crucial role in fostering
public trust in a search engine’s practices and in ensuring that freedom of expression
is not restricted for illegitimate or accidental reasons. The situations discussed in this
case study highlight a variety of examples of why it is important that governments be
transparent to their citizens about restriction demands being made on search engines
as well as the network-level filtering measures that have a direct impact upon them. It is
equally important that companies be transparent to users about what is being removed
at government or others’ request and why.
Privacy concerns are growing but only one of the three companies studied – Google
– has addressed these concerns in a public and forthright way. Google has vocally
criticized the U.S. government’s mass surveillance practices and has been openly
lobbying to change them. Neither Baidu nor Yandex have taken similar stands in the
face of their governments’ surveillance practices. However, many users expect that the
companies they rely upon to find information and have their own content found, should be
more forthcoming in regard to rights-linked information. This covers as much information
about data collection, storage and sharing practices as the law allows, and protecting
data to the greatest extent possible within the realities of their legal and political contexts.
Stakeholder engagement, commitment to principles, and remedy frameworks
are important for global intermediaries in addressing tensions between freedom
of expression and other rights, as well as difficult regulatory situations. Google’s
commitment to the Global Network Initiative since the organization’s launch in 2008, and
contribution to the development of the GNI’s principles since 2006, has strengthened the
company’s ability to respect freedom of expression and contest government requests
that it and many human rights advocates believe its terms of service are not consistent
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with human rights norms. However on other freedom of expression and privacy-related
issues not related to government demands, there is no principled framework and no
global stakeholder consensus upon which such a framework might eventually be built.
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5. STUDY 3: SOCIAL
NETWORKING PLATFORMS
Facebook (USA, Germany, India, Brazil, Egypt), Twitter (USA, Kenya) Weibo (China), iWiW.
hu (Hungary)

5.1 Introduction
Online social networks play a vital role in social interactions and expression, providing
a platform that allows for the democratization of publishing content and information.672
By enabling the sharing and aggregation of user-generated content, social networks
are seen by some to transform ‘traditionally passive audiences into active information
producers,’673 providing new tools with the potential for citizens to hold governments
accountable.674
Social networking companies, like most Internet companies that offer services free
of payment, make their profit by targeting advertising to their customers. Third party
companies buy advertisements to appear on social networks because they expect these
services to be able to identify potential buyers from within their user pool through data
collection and processing. Therefore, users ‘pay’ for the free services they use with their
personal information and their privacy. The platforms evolve as their companies develop
new ways for users to create and share data.
Social networks have also increased the visibility and reach of some traditional news
media, for example, through the ‘retweeting’ or relaying a microblog to one’s connections
or the public, thereby disseminating information vastly quicker than conventional means.
In China, as one Weibo user pointed out, ‘Weibo acts as a source of information and an
amplifier. So much has been amplified; so many problems are brought to the public’.675 A
Chinese news service has cited a poll in which 70 per cent of the Chinese public thinks

672 Grabowicz PA, Ramasco JJ, Moro E, Pujol JM, Eguiluz VM. 2012. Social Features of Online
Networks: The Strength of Intermediary Ties in Online Social Media. PLoS ONE, Vol. 7, No. 1.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0029358 (Accessed 10 July 2014.)
673 Yik Chan Chin. August 2013. Regulating social media. Regulating life (and lives). RJR 33 Online,
p. 4. http://journalism.hkbu.edu.hk/doc/Regulating_social-Media.pdf (Accessed 4 August 2014.)
674 The 2012 Sina Weibo Media Report released on January 2013 by People’s Daily Online explained
that ‘the relatively free atmosphere and the tremendous expression space of Weibo have greatly
promoted the openness and transparency of information. Its fission-like communication effect
increases the supervision by public opinion . . . Netizens have gained a consciousness of rights,
got encouraged to protect their rights by open and legal means.’ 2012 Sina Weibo Media Report,
January 2013, (Accessed 11 August 2014.)
http://www.wenming.cn/xwcb_pd/cmcy/201301/P020130123314840012552.pdf.
675 Weibo Opinion Leaders’ Observation of China. 25 November 2010. Time Weekly.
www.time-weekly.com/story/2010-11-25/421.html. (Accessed 11 August 2014.)
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that online expression ‘will become a new avenue for China’s democratic development’.676
A representative from an Egyptian NGO has noted that, as people use social media ‘to
call for marches or protests, and other political events . . . they [become] an outlet for the
people to express their impressions and what is on their minds’.677
Many legal systems consider social networks as ‘content hosts’, because users create
content on their platforms, and third parties are allowed to post and share information.678
Because they allow private content to be publicly shared, social networks blur the
line separating the public and private spheres, raising questions about appropriate
expectations for expression on such platforms – i.e. should expression on Facebook be
treated the same as expression in a news article or a blog?679
Due to the scope and impact of user-generated expression and activity on social
networks it is not easy for a company to balance a commitment to free expression, legal
compliance, and user expectations as well as the fiduciary duty as companies to make
profits.680 This study examines the policies and practices of several social networking
platforms in a range of national contexts. It finds that the ability of social networking
platforms to respect users’ freedom of expression is heavily influenced by national legal
and regulatory contexts, particularly by the context of a company’s home country. At the
same time, the cases analyzed clearly show that companies have many options available
to them in terms of how they manage and design their platforms. These choices have a
critical impact on users’ freedom of expression.

The Companies Studied:
Facebook (www.facebook.com). Facebook is a US-based social network founded in
2004. As of March 2014, the company had 1.28 billion monthly active users– of which 81.2
per cent were located outside of North America.681 It allows registered users to maintain
a personal profile through which users can share personal and contact information,
photos, articles and location statuses; to communicate with other users via private or
public messages; to search and ‘friend’ other users, whom they may ‘tag’ in photos
or location updates; and to join groups and interact with other members. Facebook is
available on the world wide web as well as through dedicated applications on a number

676 China’s Sina Weibo microblog nears identity deadline. 12 March 2012. BBC News.
www.bbc.com/news/technology-17337252 (Accessed 11 August 2014.)
677 Emad Mubarak, Executive Director, Association for Freedom of Thought and Expression. Interview
with Sara Alsherif. Cairo, Egypt, 22 April, 2014.
678 Internet intermediaries: Dilemma of Liability. Article 19. 2013. p. 6.
http://www.article19.org/data/files/Intermediaries_ENGLISH.pdf
679 Tarleton Gillespie. 2010. The Politics of ‘Platforms’. New Media & Society, Vol. 12, No. 3, pp.
347–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1461444809342738 (Accessed 4 August 2014.) The legislative
strategy of platforms (here: YouTube) as a middle way of being ‘rewarded for facilitating expression
but not liable for its excesses’ (p. 356); on the one hand highlighting the crucial role of their services
for ‘unfettered circulation of information’, for some other reasons downplaying their role as ‘merely
in intermediary, to limit its liability for the users’ activity’ (p. 356).
680 Sean Rintel. 5 January 2014. A thin blue line: how Facebook deals with controversial content.
http://theconversation.com/a-thin-blue-line-how-facebook-deals-with-controversialcontent-19966 (Accessed 24 June 2014.)
681 Facebook. Newsroom – Statistics. http://newsroom.fb.com/company-info
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of mobile operating systems.682 For this study, Facebook’s operations were examined in
Brazil, Egypt, Germany, India and the United States.
Twitter (www.twitter.com) Twitter is a US-based micro-blogging platform founded in
2006. As of June 2014, it had 271million monthly active users who send 500 million
messages (called ‘Tweets’) a day. Seventy-seven per cent of Twitter’s users live outside
of the United States.683 Twitter allows registered users to exchange messages of 140 (or
fewer) characters through the Twitter website, mobile application(s) or SMS. Users can
forward such messages by ‘retweeting’ them. Users can also search for and ‘follow’ other
users, and even unregistered people can read users’ Tweets, as long as the users have
kept their profile public (the default setting).684 Twitter is accessible on the world wide web
and via multiple mobile applications. Tweets can be organized via hashtags (the hash
sign # followed by a word or phrase), allowing users to group related posts together. If a
hashtag receives high volumes of ‘retweets’ it is termed to be ‘trending’.685 Twitter does
not ‘require real name use, email verification, or identity authentication’.686 Twitter was
studied primarily in the United States and Kenya.
Weibo (www.weibo.com) Weibo, is a Chinese micro-blogging platform founded in 2009
that was spun off from Sina, its original parent company, prior to its public listing of
shares in the United States in April 2014.687 As of June 2014 it boasted 156 million
monthly active users.688 Users have personal profiles, post 140-character messages
(called weibo, which literally means ‘microblog’ in Chinese) and comment under other
weibo, a key feature that provides a ‘simple way for Chinese people and organizations to
publicly express themselves in real time’.689 For this report, Weibo was studied in China.
iWiW (formerly www.iwiw.hu) iWiW (‘international who is who’) is a now-defunct Hungarian
social network that closed operations in July 2014 due to its diminishing user base.690 It
was founded in April 2002 as wiw.hu (‘who is who’),691 and became iWiW in October
2005, when it unsuccessfully tried to expand and began offering its platform in multiple

682 For more information about Facebook products, see Facebook. Newsroom – Products. http://
newsroom.fb.com/products
683 Twitter. About Twitter. https://about.twitter.com/company
684 Twitter. Help Center. About public and protected Tweets. https://support.twitter.com/articles/14016about-public-and-protected-tweets (Accessed 28 July 2014.)
685 About Twitter op. cit.
686 Twitter. Guidelines for Law Enforcement. https://support.twitter.com/articles/41949-guidelines-forlaw-enforcement#5
687 Sina Corporation. About Sina. http://corp.sina.com.cn/eng/sina_intr_eng.htm. Kaylene Hong. 28
March 2014. China’s Twitter’ Sina Weibo drops ‘Sina’ from its name as it prepares to list in the
US. The Next Web. http://thenextweb.com/asia/2014/03/28/chinas-twitter-sina-weibo-drops-sinafrom-its-name-as-it-prepares-to-list-in-the-us (Accessed 10 August 2014.)
688 Xinhua08.com. 15 August 2014. Weibo Monthly Active Users Exceed 156 million [in Chinese].
http://news.xinhua08.com/a/20140815/1371610.shtml (Accessed 10 August 2014.)
689 Weibo Corporation. November 2014. Form 6-K to the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission. Posted at http://ir.weibo.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=253076&p=irol-sec
690 iWiW, The Hungarian Social Network Closes After 12 Years of Success. 19 May 2014. Daily News
Hungary. http://dailynewshungary.com/iwiw-the-hungarian-social-network-closes-after-12-yearsof-success (Accessed 25 June 2014.)
691 Anikó Imre. May 2009. National intimacy and post-socialist networking. European Journal of Cultural
Studies, Vol. 12, No. 2, pp. 219–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1367549409102428 (Accessed 25
June 2014.)
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languages.692 In April 2006 it was acquired by T-Online, Magyar Telekom’s business unit,693
and in 2008 iWiW merged with Origo.hu.694 Until 2011 it was invitation-only.695 In January
2013 it had 4.7 million registered users.696 For this report, iWiW was studied in Hungary.
Social networks are popular around the world but they are used differently in different
cultural and political contexts.697 Facebook and Twitter are two of the most popular social
networks with broad international user bases, and thus a study of these services can shed
light on freedom of expression issues in a transnational environment. iWiW and Weibo are
primarily domestic operations. Weibo is especially interesting because the Chinse socialmedia market is highly competitive yet insulated from foreign competition.698 iWiW was
chosen for this study (prior to being closed down) because it represents a domestic social
networking service trying to compete in a local linguistic and cultural context against
global competitors.

5.2 Impact of ISP filtering on social networking platforms
As discussed in Chapter 3, governments can require ISPs to filter social networking
platforms by blocking access either to the entire website, or to specific content, groups
or pages. Such filtering can also take place at national internet exchange points as
described in the previous case studies.
Facebook, Twitter and YouTube (owned by Google) are reported by local internet
users to have been consistently filtered in China for a long period of time, rendering
them completely inaccessible to Chinese internet users unless special circumvention
technology is used.699 (For a full discussion and definition of network-level filtering, please
see Study 1.) Other countries, including Iran, Pakistan and Turkey, have also filtered these
social networking platforms for varying periods of time.700
692 Adam Straub. 14 April 2012. Miért nem az iWiW lett a Facebook? [Why not have a Facebook
iWiW?]. Origo. (In Hungarian.) www.origo.hu/techbazis/20120412-tizeves-az-iwiw-interju-varadyzsolttal-a-kozossegi-szajt.html (Accessed 8 August 2014.)
693 Magyar Telekom. 28 April 2006. T-Online gains control of iWiW.
www.telekom.hu/static/sw/download/WIW28April_eng.pdf (Accessed 5 August 2014.)
694 Borbála Tóth. 5 January 2012. Mapping Digital Media: Hungary. Open Society Foundations. p. 42.
www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/mapping-digital-media-hungary-20120216.pdf
695 Blase Ur and Yang Wang. Online social networks in a Post-Soviet state: How Hungarians protect
and share on Facebook. Paper presented at iConference ‘12, February 7–10, Toronto (Canada).
2012. http://www.blaseur.com/papers/ur_wang_iconference12_hungary.pdf.
696 Unsocial network: the rise and fall of iWiW. Budapest Business Journal. 7 January 2013. www.
bbj.hu/business/unsocial-network-the-rise-and-fall-of-iwiw_64418 (Accessed 6 April 2014); Átlépte
a 4 milliót az iWiW felhasználók száma! [iWiW crosses the 4 million number!]. PenzCentrum.
hu. (In Hungarian.) www.penzcentrum.hu/vasarlas/atlepte_a_4_milliot_az_iwiw_felhasznalok_
szama.1015273.html
697 Pew Global. Social Networking popular across globe. Pew Research Global Attitutes Project. 12
December 2012. http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/12/12/social-networking-popular-across-globe/
(Accessed 28 July 2014.)
698 Loretta Chao and Josh Chin. China Eases Crackdown on Internet. op.cit.
699 Freedom House. Freedom on the Net 2013. China
www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2013/china
700 Dana Liebelson. 28 March 2014. MAP: Here Are the Countries That Block Facebook, Twitter,
and YouTube. Mother Jones. www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/03/turkey-facebook-youtubetwitter-blocked (Accessed 7 August 2014.)
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Companies that operate social networking platforms have no control over actions by
governments and ISPs to filter them. Some have spoken out against network-level
filtering in general, as Facebook, Twitter, and Google have done.701 However, companies
do exercise control over their terms of service and also respond to government requests
to remove content or deactivate accounts on their own platforms. Companies’ decisions
about such platform-level restrictions may in turn affect whether or not governments
choose to filter at the network level.
Governments restrict social networks via network-level filtering under several circumstances:
Differences in norms of the jurisdictions: Unlike ISPs, social networks – as well as search
engines discussed in the previous case study - do not require a physical presence in a
country in order to reach users in it. However some governments use the threat of network
level filtering in an effort to compel companies to comply with their laws.
For example, in 2011 the Delhi High Court asked Facebook (along with Google) to ‘develop
a mechanism to monitor and remove offensive and objectionable material’ and threatened
to filter them ‘like China’ if they did not comply.702 As previously mentioned in Study 1, in
2013, a Brazilian judge ordered Facebook to remove content about a fight between two
neighbours and threatened to block Facebook if it refused. The judge reportedly viewed the
company’s intransigence as an insult to Brazil’s sovereignty. Facebook did not comply and
the threat was not carried out.703
To prevent political unrest and preserve national unity: From July 2009-May 2010,
the Chinese government implemented a network shutdown in the northwestern province
of Xinjiang in response to unrest.704 Since then, Facebook and Twitter have been filtered
nationwide and cannot be accessed without the use of special circumvention technology.
In 2011, the Egyptian government filtered Facebook and Twitter, prior to shutting down
internet access across the country for approximately one week. In this instance, filtering of
Facebook and Twitter was not permanent and inconsistently implemented as access was
intermittently available when internet service itself was available.705

701 For example, Facebook and Twitter spoke out against the internet ban that took place in Egypt
in 2011. For more information see: Google, Facebook and Twitter speak out against Egypt’s
Internet ban. AFP via France24. 2 February 2011. http://www.france24.com/en/20110202-googlefacebook-twitter-egypt-internet-ban-mubarak/ (Accessed 5 August 2014.)
702 Facebook and Google remove ‘offensive’ India content. 6 February 2012. BBC.
www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-16903765 (Accessed 5 August 2014.)
703 Rafael Sabarai. 3 October 2013. Briga de Vizinho pode tirar Facebook do ar no Brasil. [Neighbor
fights can take air in Brazil Facebook]. Veja. http://veja.abril.com.br/noticia/vida-digital/acao-judicialpode-deixar-facebook-fora-do-ar-no-brasil (Accessed 8 April 2014.)
704 Edward Wong. 15 May 2010. After Long Ban, Western China Is Back Online. New York Times.
www.nytimes.com/2010/05/15/world/asia/15china.html (Accessed 5 August 2014.)
705 Confusion over Egyptian blocks on web protest tools. 26 January 2011. BBC News. accessed
13 July 2014, www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-12291982; At a glance. Twitter. 1 January 2011
– 28 February 2011. Herdict. http://www.herdict.org/explore/indepth;jsessionid=92376A04145A8
1FEAED45F53F0858298#!fs=2633&fc=EG&fed=02/28/2011&fsd=01/01/2011 (Accessed 13 July
2014); At a glance. Facebook. 1 January 2011 – 28 February 2011. Herdict.
http://www.herdict.org/explore/indepth;jsessionid=92376A04145A81FEAED45F53F0858298#!fs=
2633&fc=EG&fed=02/28/2011&fl=&fs=2245&fsd=01/01/2011 (Accessed 13 July 2014.)
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Real-time need to control to and maintain public order: Governments issue orders for
the network-level filtering of social networking platforms when there is a perceived need
to maintain public order. One example cited in Study 1 occurred in India in 2012 when
the government, responding to threats of ethnic and sectarian violence following unrest
in the northeast, ordered ISPs to filter pages on YouTube, Facebook and Twitter that
featured inflammatory content and requested that the companies remove content and block
accounts).706

5.3 Content removal and account deactivation
While social networking platforms can be the target of ISP-level filtering over which they
have no direct control as described above, social networks do have their own mechanisms
to block or otherwise restrict user content. This section discusses such mechanisms and
the different contexts in which they are deployed.
Social networking platforms generally require users to create an account – i.e. a username
and password – in order to share content. Operators of the platforms can restrict content
that users share on the platform in several ways: deleting content; blocking it from view for
users in specific jurisdictions; or shutting down – deactivating - the accounts of users who
post certain content. These actions may be taken as a self-regulatory measure to enforce
private rules, or in compliance with government requests and other legal requirements such
as responding to court orders in civil cases. The table below provides an overview of the
different modes through which these actions occur, reasons, and affected parties.

Table 3: Key factors affecting content restriction by social networking
platforms:
Reason for restriction:

Content violates
terms of
service?

• government requests

• possibly

• law-based requests (e.g.
copyright takedown
notices, court orders in
civil cases)

• possibly

• self-regulation on
own initiative (terms
of service and other
enforcement of private
rules)

• Usually

• user reporting (on other
users’ violations of
terms of service)

• Usually

Modes of
implementation:
• complete removal of specific
content
• blocking of specific content
for a specific user group or
jurisdiction (content remains
accessible to others)

Who is affected:
• all users
• only users in a particular
jurisdiction
• only specific user groups
(for example by age)

• automated (pro-active)
filtering of pre-identified types
of content

706 Vikas SN. 22 August 2012. #IndiaBlocks: Airtel Blocks Youtu.be Short URL, Proxy & Domain
Marketplace Sites. MediaNama. www.medianama.com/2012/08/223-indiablocks-airtel-blocksyoutu-be-short-url-proxy-domain-marketplace-sites (Accessed 4 August 2014.)
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The next two sub-sections will examine company policies related to these different modes
of restriction, as well as their implementation in the context of jurisdictions covered by
this case study.

5.3.1 Government requests and legal requirements
Company Policies
Facebook and Twitter, with large user bases outside their home jurisdictions, may act to
restrict content in response to lawful requests from governments.
Child sexual abuse images are the only type of illegal content that Facebook and Twitter
pro-actively monitor and remove without first having received a government request,
court order, or copyright takedown notice. In 2011, Facebook was the first company to
employ Microsoft’s PhotoDNA, which can identify known child sexual abuse photos 99.7
per cent of the time.707 Twitter has used it since 2013.708
Both companies publicly explain their policies for responding to all other restriction
requests from authorized authorities in their home jurisdiction and around the world.709 In
cases where the content in question does not violate the companies’ terms of service and
is not illegal in the United States, Facebook and Twitter may use a jurisdiction-specific
restriction mechanism: content is restricted only to users in jurisdictions where it found
to be infringing according to local law and where governments have made specific lawful
requests.710 This way, content remains accessible to users outside the jurisdiction where
the law compels its restriction.
Weibo does not have a public policy dedicated to content restriction requests from
authorized authorities, but a leaked Sina internal document appeared to highlight a direct
‘backdoor’ access to Weibo’s servers, which reportedly allows officials to filter keywords

707 Riva Richmond. 19 May 2011. Facebook’s New Way to Combat Child Pornography. New York
Times. http://gadgetwise.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/05/19/facebook-to-combat-child-porn-usingmicrosofts-technology (Accessed 5 August 2014); Nick Eaton. 19 May 2011. Facebook deploys
Microsoft tool to fight child pornography. Seattle Post-Intelligencer. http://blog.seattlepi.com/
microsoft/2011/05/19/facebook-deploys-microsoft-tool-to-fight-child-pornography (Accessed 5
August 2014); Bill Harmon. 19 May 2011. 500 million friends against child exploitation. The Official
Microsoft Blog. http://blogs.microsoft.com/blog/2011/05/19/500-million-friends-against-childexploitation (Accessed 5 August 2014.)
708 Charles Arthur. 22 July 2013. Twitter to introduce PhotoDNA system to block child abuse images.
The
Guardian.
www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/jul/22/twitter-photodna-child-abuse
(Accessed 5 August 2014.)
709 Twitter. Guidelines for law enforcement. https://support.twitter.com/groups/56-policies-violations/
topics/238-report-a-violation/articles/41949-guidelines-for-law-enforcement#11 Facebook. Safety
Center. Information for Law Enforcement Authorities. https://www.facebook.com/safety/groups/
law/guidelines
710 Facebook restricts content on a reactive basis and on receipt of requests from governments, law
enforcement and nongovernmental organizations. Facebook. Government requests report. FAQs.
https://govtrequests.facebook.com/faq/ and Facebook. Government requests report. About the
report. https://govtrequests.facebook.com/about Twitter restricts content on a reactive basis and
on receipt of ‘a valid and properly scoped request from an authorized entity’. Twitter. Help Center.
Country Withheld Content. https://support.twitter.com/articles/20169222-country-withheld-content
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and delete content without having to go through the company.711 iWiW did not have
publicly available guidelines on dealing with governmental requests to restrict content,
and was not available for comment.

Implementation in national context
All of the social networking platforms studied in this research are affected by law in their
home jurisdiction as well as by law in other countries where they actively market their
service to users. It is important to note however that governments have less leverage
over social networking services that do not have offices or employees physically located
in their jurisdiction. Laws related to intermediary liability (see Chapter 2) in the home
jurisdiction, as well as in other jurisdictions where the platforms have high commercial
interest, appear to have particularly strong influence on how companies shape their
content restriction policies and practices.
In cases where a social networking platform is completely filtered at the network level
for a long period of time in a given jurisdiction, the company must decide whether or
not to concede to that country’s legal requirements in order to possibly get the filter
removed and thus restoring restore access to that market.712 In the case of China, neither
Facebook nor Twitter has made that concession.713
China’s ‘blanket liability’ regime for intermediaries means that social networking platforms
are responsible for all content – even that which is user-generated and which the company
is not aware of. SinaWeibo seems the only company studied in this research that is known
to proactively monitor user content (other than child abuse images), because it needs
to comply with Chinese law and the demands of regulators. In China’s strict regulatory
environment, there is no public evidence of Weibo contesting government requests
for content restriction. Details of Weibo’s implementation will be discussed later in this
section.
There is no evidence of iWiW having challenged government requests in Hungary, but this
may be because the government had not issued takedown requests; there is insufficient
public information available to know for sure.
The US-based Facebook and Twitter are broadly exempt from liability for third-party
content under US law – Section 230 of the CDA (see Chapter 2) – which specifically

711 Sophie Beach. 11 March 2013. Beyond censors’ reach, free expression thrives, to a point.
Challenged in China: The shifting dynamics of censorship and control. Committee to Protect
Journalists.
https://www.cpj.org/reports/2013/03/challenged-china-media-censorship-weibo-expression.php
(Accessed 10 August 2014.)
712 Gibran Ashraf. Two years on, no light at the end of the tunnel for YouTube. 18 September 2014.
The Express Tribune. http://tribune.com.pk/story/763869/two-years-on-no-light-at-the-end-of-thetunnel-for-youtube/ (Accessed 3 October 2014.)
713 Censors in China keep mainlanders in dark about Hong Kong protests. 29 September 2014. The
Los Angeles Times. http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-censors-in-china-keep-mainlandersin-dark-about-hong-kong-protests-20140929-story.html (Accessed 3 October 2014.)
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maintains that intermediaries do not have to monitor user content.714 This serves as the
baseline for the companies’ policies related to government requests and other legal
compliance requirements at home and around the world.
Intermediaries do receive many copyright-related takedown requests in accordance with
copyright laws. Because Facebook and Twitter are headquartered in the United States
they delete content globally in compliance with DMCA takedown requests. (see Chapter
2 for a discussion of the DMCA). Facebook and Twitter have different mechanisms to
receive these requests.715 (The Transparency and Remedy sections of this case study
will describe how users are notified of requests and takedowns, as well mechanisms for
appeal.)

Practices of Facebook and Twitter in context:
As will be discussed in greater detail later in the ‘Transparency’ section of this case study,
of the social networking platforms studied, only Facebook and Twitter publish information
about the volume and type of requests received by governments as part of what the
industry has come to call ‘transparency reports’. Their data show that requests and
companies’ compliance rates vary widely from country to country – and also between
companies – thus shedding light not only on different legal regimes but also illuminating
some basic characteristics of these companies’ policies and practices in relation to
government requests.
The following table lists the number of items restricted by Facebook in response to
government requests (but not court orders in civil cases or copyright takedowns) between
July-December 2013 in all jurisdictions covered by all three case studies in this report. It
also includes some basic information about the reason for restriction as disclosed by the
company. (Countries where no requests were made are omitted.)

714 Roxanne E. Christ, Jeanne S. Berges and Shannon C. Trevino. July 2007. Social Networking Sites:
To Monitor or Not to Monitor Users and Their Content? Intellectual Property and Technology Law
Journal, Vol. 19, No. 7, p. 2.
www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/social-networking-monitoring-content-texas-case
715 See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (i)(1)(A). Legal Information Institute. www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/17/512
(Accessed 11 August 2014); James Gibson. 12 July 2011. The DMCA and Repeat Infringers. The
Media Institute. www.mediainstitute.org/IPI/2011/071211.php (Accessed 11 August 2014.)
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Table 4: Facebook content restricted at government request,
July-December 2013716
Brazil

0*

“We restricted content in Brazil in response to requests related to defamation and
orders in civil cases. We have not reported defamation or civil claims in this report.
We may include these sorts of requests in future reports.”

Germany

84

“We restricted access in Germany to a number of pieces of content reported under
local laws prohibiting Holocaust denial.”

India

4,765

“…reported primarily by law enforcement officials and the India Computer
Emergency Response Team under local laws prohibiting criticism of a religion or
the state.”

Russia

4

“We restricted access in Russia to a number of pieces of content reported by the
Federal Service for Supervision in the Sphere of Telecom, Information Technologies
and Mass Communications under local laws prohibiting access to certain forms of
drug-use and self-harm.”

UK

3

“We restricted access to content in the UK in response to a small number of court
injunctions.”

The next table contains Twitter’s similar but more detailed breakdown of restrictions made
in response to government requests and court orders during the same time period, in
jurisdictions covered by this report. (Countries where no requests were made are omitted.)

Table 5: Twitter content restricted at government request July-December
2013717
Country

Removal
requests Court Orders

Removal
requests Gov’t agency,
police, other

Percentage
where some
content
withheld

Accounts
specified

Accounts
withheld

Tweets
withheld

Brazil

11

1

33%

50

2

26

Germany

1

1

0%

<10

0

0

India

2

6

13%

54

0

13

Russia

0

14

64%

14

1

9

UK

1

8

0%

<10

0

0

USA

2

6

0%

11

0

0

Because Facebook does not publish data about the number of requests versus the
number honored, it is not clear how Facebook’s compliance rate may or may not differ
from Twitter’s. Twitter for its part does not shed light on the reasons for requests or what
type of subject matter they relate to. The nature of the services is also sufficiently different
that a direct comparison may have limited meaning. Nonetheless these numbers help to
shed some light (even if still murky) on how companies respond to government requests

716 Facebook. Government Requests Report. https://govtrequests.facebook.com/
717 Twitter Transparency Report. Removal Requests. July 1 – December 31, 2013. https://transparency.
twitter.com/removal-requests/2013/jul-dec
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differently in different jurisdictions – and which governments tend to make the most
requests.
Twitter’s data shows that, in the countries covered by this report, the company chose
not to comply with a large percentage of government restriction requests it received in
the second half of 2013. This indicates that, in a substantial number of cases, Twitter
apparently determined that either a) the request itself was not in full compliance with
the law where the request was made; b) its lawyers determined that the content was not
infringing in that jurisdiction, or c) that the company otherwise had a legal right in that
particular context to decline.
During the same reporting period, Twitter received the highest number of requests from
Brazil and Russia. Facebook also restricted some content in Russia for the same period
in compliance with “local laws prohibiting access to certain forms of drug-use and
self-harm.” Twitter specifies that most of its requests from Brazil came as court orders.
Facebook clarifies that while it received no government agency requests in Brazil for that
period, it did restrict content in Brazil due to defamation and orders in civil cases, even
though the company did not provide data on those restrictions.
Another significant data point is the high number of restrictions Facebook carried out
at the request of the Indian government - 4,765. This is by far the highest number of
restrictions Facebook carried out in any jurisdiction. The high number reflects the legal
and regulatory environment of India, discussed in Chapter 2, in which intermediaries have
considerable liability for user content and government has the legal authority to require
removal of broad categories of content. The company nonetheless makes an effort to
limit such restrictions so that the content remains visible in other jurisdictions where it
is not illegal. For example, in 2012 Facebook complied with a court order and restricted
‘objectionable’ material cited as causing communal unrest in India, but maintained public
visibility for the content when viewed from IP addresses not located in India.718
Both Twitter and Facebook restrict content in Germany. In its first implementations of
its ‘Country Withheld Content policy’ in 2012, Twitter blocked access to the account
of a white supremacist organization to users in Germany, upon request from German
law enforcement.719 In that case, because the user’s entire account was targeted for
restriction by authorized authorities in a single country, Twitter did not delete the account,
but instead restricted access to the account for German users only.720 Twitter is the only

718 Note: this order was from the Delhi High Court that targeted Facebook, Yahoo, Orkut and 21 other
internet companies for hosting ‘objectionable’ content. For more information see: BBC, Facebook
and Google remove ‘offensive’ India content. 6 February 2012. BBC. www.bbc.com/news/worldasia-india-16903765 (Accessed 5 August 2014.)
719 Twitter Transparency Report. Removal requests. July 1 – December 31, 2012. https://transparency.
twitter.com/removal-requests/2012/jul-dec
720 Freedom House Foundation (ed.). Freedom on the Net Report - Germany 2013. http://www.
freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2013/germany; Kate Connolly. 18 October 2012. Twitter
blocks neo-Nazi account in Germany. The Guardian. www.theguardian.com/technology/2012/
oct/18/twitter-block-neo-nazi-account (Accessed 4 August 2014.)
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company in this study that reports account restrictions (as opposed to content restriction)
due to government requests.721

Figure 7: Screenshot of the blocked account of a German far-right group
when accessed from a German IP address.722

Figure 8: Screenshot of the same account accessed from a US IP address.
The account holders stopped using it after it was blocked in Germany.723

Even with jurisdictional blocking, companies do not accept all requests. In March 2014, a
Brazilian court ordered Facebook to delete the Page of Eduardo Campos, a presidential
candidate in the 2014 elections. As of this writing the page is still accessible in Brazil.724

721 Twitter Transparency Report. Information requests. July 1 – December 31, 2013. https://transparency.
twitter.com/information-requests/2013/jul-dec; Twitter Transparency Report. Information requests.
January 1 – June 30, 2013. https://transparency.twitter.com/removal-requests/2013/jan-jun
722 Screenshot 22 July 2014. https://twitter.com/hannoverticker
723 Screenshot 22 July 2014. https://twitter.com/hannoverticker
724 Correio Popular. 5 March 2014. TSE manda retirar site ‘Eduardo Campos Presidente’. http://correio.
rac.com.br/_conteudo/2014/03/capa/nacional/158198-tse-manda-retirar-site-eduardo-campospresidente.html (Accessed 8 April 2014). Yet as of date the page is still accessible on Facebook
- See page on facebook https://www.facebook.com/groups/eduardocampospresidente/?ref=br_tf.
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BOX: jurisdictional blocking in other countries
There are a few other prominent examples from outside of the case study countries worth mentioning, as
they help highlight other key dimensions to jurisdictional blocking. In France, Twitter blocked specific Tweets
containing the hashtags #UnBonJuif (‘a good Jew’) and #UnJuifMort (‘a dead Jew’), upon request of a French
Jewish student group. Twitter explained, ‘Based on local law, we withheld access to some, but not all, of
the reported Tweets in France’.725 In Turkey, Twitter acknowledged problematic aspects of having to comply
with local law to block content locally when it complied with a request to block an account that accused a
former Turkish government minister of corruption.726 This move happened at the same time that Twitter was
temporarily blocked in Turkey after Twitter users had posted information accusing government figures of
corruption.727 Civil society advocacy groups have criticized Twitter for too easily using jurisdictional blocking.
It temporarily blocked ‘blasphemous’ content in Pakistan and a right-wing Ukrainian group’s Twitter account
in Russia.728 Twitter denied Russian assertions that it had blocked further accounts alleged to be extremist.729

As will be discussed further in section 5.3.2, Facebook and Twitter also remove content
and deactivate accounts to enforce their own terms of service, separate from what the
law requires. Both companies have mechanisms through which any individual can flag
a piece of content or user account for violating Facebook’s Community Standards and
Twitter’s equivalent, called ‘The Twitter rules’.
Industry sources confirmed to this report’s researchers that authorities of some
governments sometimes also seek to have content restricted via the companies’ own
self-regulatory mechanisms, rather than make formal requests through official channels
following legally specified process. As of this writing, neither company has included in its
transparency reports any data about the extent to which governments in various countries
use the companies’ own self-regulatory mechanisms designed for individuals to report
content that violates the terms of service. (Notably, Google’s transparency report does
include information about content that governments have sought to have removed from

725 Twitter removes French anti-Semitic Tweets. BBC News. 19 October 2012. http://www.bbc.com/
news/technology-20004671 (Accessed 16 July 2014.); François Delerue. The French Twitter Case:
A Difficult Equilibrium between Freedom of Expression. Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature
Law Review. vol. 10 (November 2013) pp. 193-197.
http://sas-space.sas.ac.uk/5444/1/2042-2947-1-SM.pdf.
726 Vijaya Gadde. 26 March 2014. Challenging the access ban in Turkey Wednesday. Twitter Blog.
https://blog.twitter.com/2014/challenging-the-access-ban-in-turkey (Accessed 8 August 2014);
Sam Schechner and Ayla Albayrak. 26 March 2014. Twitter Keeps Up Turkey Fight but Blocks
an Account. Wall Street Journal. Digits. http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2014/03/26/twitter-keeps-upturkey-fight-but-blocks-an-account (Accessed 8 August 2014.)
727 Officials in Turkey ‘lift Twitter ban. BBC News. 3 April 2014. http://www.bbc.com/news/worldeurope-26873603 (Accessed 16 July 2014.)
728 Robert Mackey. 18 June 2014. Twitter Restores Access to ‘Blasphemous’ Tweets in Pakistan. New
York Times.
http://news.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/06/18/twitter-restores-access-to-blasphemous-tweets-inpakistan (Accessed 4 July 2014); Activists fight Twitter censorship in Pakistan with #TwitterTheocracy.
11 June 2014. Al Jazeera. http://stream.aljazeera.com/story/201406111324-0023825 (Accessed
28 July 2014.)
729 Robert Mackey. 18 June 2014. Twitter Restores Access to ‘Blasphemous’ Tweets in Pakistan. New
York Times. http://news.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/06/18/twitter-restores-access-to-blasphemoustweets-in-pakistan (Accessed 4 July 2014); Ilya Khrennikov and Sarah Frier. 24 June 2014. Twitter
Denies Blocking Extremist Accounts in Russia. Bloomberg. www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-0623/russia-says-twitter-to-block-extremists-such-as-ukraine-group.html (Accessed 16 July 2014.)
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its video sharing service, YouTube, and which the company agreed to remove because it
violated the platform’s terms. However YouTube was not covered in this study.)

Practices of Weibo in context:
China is the only country in this case study that requires intermediaries to proactively
monitor user content. In China, if too much of the information users share on social
media platforms falls into the ‘nine forbidden content categories’ (see Chapter 2), the
company can have its operating licenses revoked.730 Failure to comply satisfactorily with
government requirements can have serious consequences: during an anti-pornography
crackdown in April 2014 the government revoked Sina’s publishing and media distribution
licenses.731 As such Weibo’s terms of service – as with all internet intermediaries in China
– closely mirror the legal requirements imposed by the Chinese government and Weibo
proactively monitors and deletes content in order to retain its operating licenses.732
According to a Carnegie Mellon study of Weibo, about 16 per cent of all messages are
deleted.733 Reuters has reported that within an average 24 hour period Weibo’s staff
must process and make decisions about three million Weibo posts.734 The China Digital
Times, a project housed at the University of California Berkeley, has a long-term project
to track Weibo’s list of sensitive words. Researchers have found that the addition of new
words and terms into the company’s list of sensitive words appeared to be correlated
with political and social events. Researchers also found that the list apparently also
contained a large number of homophones and similar expressions in order to limit access
to information about particular controversies. For instance, in January 2014, ‘Xi’, Chinese

730 Article 35, Measures on the Administration of Internet Information Services (Deliberation Draft). 7
June 2012. sina.com.
http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2012-06-07/135924552816.shtml (Accessed 16 July 2014.)
731 Michael Martina. 25 April 2014. Sina shares fall after China strips its licence in web porn crackdown.
Reuters.
www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/24/china-internet-sina-idUSL3N0NG4EG20140424 (Accessed
4 August 2014.) –are there no other sources for this but Western?
732 Since the second half of year 2011, China Digital Times has been running an independent test
aiming at the keywords that are blocked in Sina Weibo search and publish the test results from
time to time. On October 17 of the same year, the project started to collect clues from the public
and named itself as the open-source project of sensitive words in Sina Weibo’s search. This project
now publishes a open list of banned words in Sina Weibo’s search, which records more than one
thousand words and expressions that were or are blocked. See http://chinadigitaltimes.net/chinese
/%E6%96%B0%E6%B5%AA%E5%BE%AE%E5%8D%9A%E6%90%9C%E7%B4%A2%E6%95
%8F%E6%84%9F%E8%AF%8D%E5%88%97%E8%A1%A8/.
733 David Bamman, Brendan O’Connor and Noah Smith. March 2012. Censorship and deletion practices
in Chinese social media. First Monday, Vol. 17, No. 3. http://dx.doi.org/10.5210/fm.v17i3.3943
(Accessed 5 August 2014); Allen Yu. 23 March 2012. Carnegie Mellon Study on Censorship and
Deletion Practices in Chinese Social Media. Stanford Law School Center for Internet and Society
Blog. http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2012/03/carnegie-mellon-study-censorship-and-deletionpractices-chinese-social-media (Accessed 5 August 2014.)
734 Li Hui and Megha Rajagopalan. 11 September 2013. At Sina Weibo’s censorship hub, China’s Little
Brothers cleanse online chatter. Reuters. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/12/us-chinainternet-idUSBRE98A18Z20130912 (Accessed 12 September 2014.)
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President Xi Jinping’s surname, Xi, appeared to have been filtered when it was combined
with expressions such as ‘publicity stunt’, ‘sensationalism’ and ‘playacting’.735
Chinese social networking platforms use a variety of other methods to comply with
government censorship requirements. Keyword blocking is the most popular. Weibo
maintains a blacklist of keywords that users are unable to use in their posts. For example
the screenshot below illustrates a case in which the user attempted to post an item
mentioning the “New Citizen Movement.” A message appeared stating: ‘Sorry, this post
is not suitable for public display’.
In other instances, terms might trigger a program that flags the post it for editorial review
before it can be published. In some cases, censors can leave the post visible to the
author but block its visibility to others, thus not alerting users to the fact that a post is
being restricted.736
Terms or user names can also be blocked from appearing in the platform’s search function,
for instance, a search for a the name of the artist Ai Weiwei, is met with a message that
says: ‘In accordance with relevant laws and regulations, the search results for “Ai Weiwei”
do not appear’.
Sometimes specific features can be temporarily disabled: In March 2012 authorities
reportedly instructed Sina Weibo to disable commenting – its liveliest and most popular
feature – for three days.737 Chinese authorities and social networking platform operators
can be extremely specific about the granularity of some restrictions. This granularity
can be geographic; for example, after the July 2012 Beijing floods, Beijing-based Weibo
users searching for ‘Beijing’ reported to see only users whose handles included the word
‘Beijing’ – but no posts about the floods.738
Despite the heavy restrictions, some argue that Weibo remains an outlet for controversial
expression even if for short periods of time. One employee pointed out that news does
often get out in the several minutes before something is deleted.739

735 This project now publishes an open list of banned words in Weibo’s search, which records more
than one thousand words and expressions that were or are blocked. For test results, refer to this
continuously updated document “新浪微博搜索敏感词列表（更新中）Sensitive Sina Weibo
Search Terms (Updating)”, Google Docs, accessed 16 July 2014,
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheet/ccc?key=0Aqe87wrWj9w_dFpJWjZoM19BNkFfV2JrWS1p
MEtYcEE#gid=0.
736 Li Hui and Megha Rajagopalan. At Sina Weibo’s censorship hub, China’s Little Brothers cleanse
online chatter. op. cit.; Sina Weibo Community Management Regulations (Trial). Sina Weibo. 8
May 2012. http://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2012/05/08/sina-weibo-communitymanagement-regulations-trial (Accessed 7 August 2014.)
737 Loretta Chao and Josh Chin. 2 April 2012. China Eases Crackdown on Internet. op. cit.
738 Coincidence? Sina Weibo’s Curious Breakdown. 27 July 2012. Wall Street Journal China Real
Time Blog. http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2012/07/27/coincidence-sina-weibos-curiousbreakdown (Accessed 11 August 2014.)
739 Interviewee agreed to be held on condition of anonymity. Threfore name, time and location of
interview have been withheld.
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5.3.2 Company Self-regulation
Companies reserve the right to restrict content from the platform that violates their terms of
service.740 All social networking platforms prohibit some content in their terms of service741
or easier-to-understand guidelines like the ‘Facebook Community Standards’742 or ‘The
Twitter Rules’.743 In addition to prohibiting content that is illegal in their home jurisdictions,
many restrict access to content that may be legally protected speech (especially in the
US) but which the company has chosen to disallow: Such content generally includes
categories such as adult pornography, nudity, hate speech, harassment, impersonation,
and private information like someone’s credit card or government ID number.744 Facebook
users with ‘Pages’ (as opposed to personal profiles) have the option to filter common
profanity or self-selected words.745 iWiW, for example, prohibits usernames that contain
a public figure’s name.746

Account restrictions
All companies reserve the right to revoke certain privileges, suspend or terminate user
accounts at their discretion without prior notice.747 This can happen in response to any
of the reporting mechanisms described below. However, some Facebook and Twitter
policies hint that summary account terminations are rare; Twitter explains it ‘will make
reasonable efforts to notify you’ by email or the next time users log in.748 Weibo may warn
the user or summarily suspend or terminate the account.749
In countries where laws restrict broad categories of speech, companies’ terms of service
reflect the legal regime. Weibo’s ‘Community Convention Administrative Regulations’
prohibits content that criticizes the government.750

740 https://twitter.com/tos, Sina Weibo – http://service.account.weibo.com/roles/guiding. , iWiW http://iwiw.hu/i/felhasznalasi-feltetele
741 Facebook Terms https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms; Twitter terms of service. https://twitter.
com/tos; Sina Weibo Community Management Regulations. http://service.account.weibo.com/
roles/guiding (for translation see http://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2012/05/08/
sina-weibo-community-management-regulations-trial/) ; iWiW Tems of Service. http://iwiw.hu/i/
felhasznalasi-feltetele
742 Facebook. Community Standards. https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards
743 Facebook’s Statement of Rights and Responsibilities: ‘You will not use Facebook to do anything
unlawful, misleading, malicious, or discriminatory.’ Twitter. The Twitter Rules. https://support.twitter.
com/articles/18311-the-twitter-rules
744 The Twitter Rules: ‘You may not use our service for any unlawful purposes or in furtherance of
illegal activities. International users agree to comply with all local laws regarding online conduct and
acceptable content.’
745 Facebook. Desktop Help. How can I proactively moderate content posted on my Page?
https://www.facebook.com/help/131671940241729.
746 iWiW terms of service, Felhasználási Feltételek. http://iwiw.hu/i/felhasznalasi-feltetelek
747 iWiW reserves the right to, at the company’s discretion, terminate and remove content for a number
of additional reasons. For more information see: terms of service. Felhasználási Feltételek.
http://iwiw.hu/i/felhasznalasi-feltetelek; https://support.twitter.com/articles/18311-the-twitter-rules;
Facebook Terms, op. cit.
748 Twitter terms of service op. cit.
749 Sina Weibo Community Management Regulations (trial). http://service.account.weibo.com/roles/
guiding; Li Hui and Megha Rajagopalan. op. cit.
750 Sina Weibo Community Regulations. op. cit.
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Most social networking platforms including those covered by this research have
automated mechanisms to detect spam.751 However, sometimes these computer
programs unsupervised by humans can make mistakes when the user’s actions or the
content of their postings display patterns common to spam. For example in 2012, a
journalist’s comment on Facebook was mistakenly flagged as spam.752 On Twitter, spam
can must be reported by a user clicking on a Tweet from the alleged spammer’s profile.

Reporting mechanisms
Companies allow people to report either content or individual users that are abusive, or
that otherwise violates terms of service. The companies evaluate these reports and have
an internal process for deciding whether and how to take action if warranted.
Facebook offers forms to users, as well as to those who do not have an account, to
report different types of violations including abuse, nudity, and the potential spreading
of private information.753 Facebook specifies that reported content is reviewed manually,
and if the content in question violates the company’s ‘Community Standards’, it will
remove it from the platform for all jurisdictions.754 Facebook has outsourced much of
the process of manually reviewing reported content,755 although sources knowledgeable
about Facebook’s operations have said that the outsourced company sends difficult
cases back to Facebook staff for further review.756 Users who report a violation can track
how their report is being handled through a Support Dashboard.757 Facebook also uses a
‘social reporting’ mechanism that allows users to reach out to trusted friends to help them
resolve issues. For example, when one user posts unflattering or false information or
pictures about another, the subject can make a direct removal request to the person who

751 Facebook. Desktop Help. Spam.https://www.facebook.com/help/287137088110949; Twitter.
Help Center . Reporting spam on Twitter. https://support.twitter.com/articles/64986-reportingspam-on-twitter.
752 Christina DesMarais. 6 May 2012. Facebook Spam Filter Catches Some By Surprise. TechHive.
www.techhive.com/article/255101/facebook_and_spam_not_everything_is_relevant.html
(Accessed 29 July 2014); Emil Protalinski. 5 May 2012. Facebook blames Scoble snafu on spam
false positive. ZDNet. www.zdnet.com/blog/facebook/facebook-blames-scoble-snafu-on-spamfalse-positive/12589.
753 Facebook. Desktop Help. Report a Violation. https://www.facebook.com/help/263149623790594.
754 Sean Rintel. A thin blue line: how Facebook deals with controversial content. 5 January 2014.
http://theconversation.com/a-thin-blue-line-how-facebook-deals-with-controversialcontent-19966 (Accessed 16 July 2014); Facebook. What Happens After You Click ‘Report’. 19
June 2012. https://www.facebook.com/notes/facebook-safety/what-happens-after-you-clickreport/432670926753695.
755 Note: in the past this role was outsourced to a company called oDesk as reported in the source in
this footnote. According to an industry source speaking on condition of non-attribution, Facebook
no longer works with oDesk although it is known to work with another other company performing
the same function. Details about any new outsourcing arrangements are not publicly available.
Adrian Chen. Inside Facebook’s Outsourced Anti-Porn and Gore Brigade, Where ‘Camel Toes’ are
More Offensive Than ‘Crushed Heads. Gawker. 16 February 2012, http://gawker.com/5885836/
facebook-releases-new-content-guidelines-now-allows-bodily-fluids.
756 Details of interview omitted on the requests of the interviewees.
757 Facebook. More Transparency in Reporting. 26 April 2012, https://www.facebook.com/notes/
facebook-safety/more-transparency-in-reporting/397890383565083.
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posted the content. Or one user can use a special form to reach out to a friend requesting
help in countering harassment by a third user:758

Figure 9: Example of a Facebook form seeking a friend’s help in
countering harassment, as provided by the company to users

Reporting mechanisms can be useful in addressing abusive behaviour and content, but
oftentimes people misuse the reporting mechanism merely to report content that they
do not like. Facebook has been accused of removing activists’ pages for reasons that
were not clear to the creators of the page.759 Facebook claims that ‘number of times
something is reported doesn’t determine whether or not it’s removed’,760 but some activist
groups have alleged that mass abuse reporting by apparent government agents in some
countries has led to content removal.761

758 Facebook. Details on Social Reporting. 10 March 2011. https://www.facebook.com/notes/
facebook-safety/details-on-social-reporting/196124227075034
759 Shiv Malik. 29 April 2011. Facebook accused of removing activists’ pages. The Guardian. http://
www.theguardian.com/technology/2011/apr/29/facebook-accused-removing-activists-pages
(Accessed 10 August 2014.)
760 Facebook. About Facebook’s Security & Warnings Systems. https://www.facebook.com/
help/408181689281891 (Accessed 10 August 2014.)
761 Vietnam Blocks Dissident Facebook Pages Through Fake Abuse Reports. 21 July 2014. Radio Free
Asia. www.rfa.org/english/news/vietnam/facebook-07212014182948.html (Accessed 4 August
2014)
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Twitter has also has mechanisms allowing users to report content via web forms.762 It details
how to report the various violations on one web page titled “how to report violations’.763
One may report Tweets and Twitter account holders for impersonation, trademarks,
harassment, and self-harm. Users can also ‘report an ad’: Twitter advertisements are not
allowed to promote ‘illegal products, services, or content’.764 Some advertisements are
restricted by geography: In Brazil the company prohibits any advertising related to political
campaigning.765 Below is an image of the reporting mechanism for advertisements:

Figure 11: Twitter’s form to report advertisements that violate the
company’s rules

Similarly, Weibo has a reporting mechanism through which users can report posts,
comments and private messages that they believe are abusive or infringing of company
policy. Weibo users are encouraged to use the ‘report abuse’ function for ‘false
information’, especially if it concerns natural disasters, and information that may have
been exaggerated to gain attention.766
Prior to its closure, iWiW also had online forms for reporting abuse.767

Company enforcement
Companies explain how they enforce their rules for user behavior and acceptable content
to varying degrees. Some companies provide very specific examples, whereas others use
imprecise language that allows companies to exercise discretion.
762 Twitter Help Center. How to report violations. https://support.twitter.com/articles/15789
763 Twitter. How to report violations. https://support.twitter.com/groups/56-policies-violations/
topics/238-report-a-violation/articles/15789-how-to-report-violations
764 Twitter. Help Center. Twitter Ads Policies. https://support.twitter.com/articles/20169693-twitter-adspolicies
765 Twitter. Advertiser policies: Political campaigning. https://support.twitter.com/articles/20170492
766 Sina Corp. Help Center: Report Abuse. http://help.sina.com.cn/comquestiondetail/view/1045
767 Deutsche Telekom AG. Implementation Questionnaire. Principles for the Safer Use of Connected
Devices and Online Services by Children and Young People in the EU. ICT Coalition. 11 October
2013. p. 11-12.
http://www.ictcoalition.eu/gallery/ICT%20Principles_Compliance%20Report%20Deutsche%20
Telekom%20Group%20080114-08012014021423.pdf.
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Facebook can mete out tiered punishments; e.g. if someone sends repeatedly sends
spam, Facebook may block just the messaging features for that user.768 It does commit
to notifying users the next time they log in.769 Twitter posts a clear notification that
an account has been suspended – even for users who are merely trying to view the
suspended account. The below screenshot taken in August 2014 is an example:

When an account is found to violate the company’s terms, it is removed globally from
the platform. For example, in the wake of the 2013 Westgate Mall terror attack in Kenya,
Twitter suspended a number of accounts belonging to a Somali militant group for
spreading content that was abusive and violent in nature.770 In this case, the decision
to suspend the accounts was based on a determination that they violated Twitter’s own
rules. Such cases do not appear in Twitter’s transparency reports because the company
only publishes data about content removals that are made in response to formal
government requests or court orders. In other words, the company does not publish data
about content removed for violating its ‘Twitter rules’ – presumably, even if that content
was brought to the company’s attention by a government authority using the company’s
self-regulatory mechanism for reporting ‘Twitter rules’ violations.
In 2007, iWiW deleted the profile of Magyar Gárda, a Hungarian right-wing paramilitary
group, because it violated iWiW’s rule that only allows natural persons – i.e. no
organizations – to create accounts. It also received hundreds of user complaints about
the profile’s ‘propagandistic nature’, which also violated its terms.771 Gárda supporters
alleged cried ‘double standards’, pointing to the ‘many political organisations’ on iWiW,
including ‘the openly communist Munkáspárt [Hungarian Workers’ Party]’.772

768 Facebook Desktop Help. Why does Facebook limit the use of certain features and what are the
limits?
https://www.facebook.com/help/177066345680802
769 Facebook. Statement of Rights and Responsibilities. https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms
770 Bernard Oginga. 22 September 2013. Al Shabaab twitter acount shut down after Kenyan attack.
Standard Digital. www.standardmedia.co.ke/?articleID=2000094048&story_title=al-shabaabtwitter-account-shut (Accessed 7 April 2014); Hamza Mohamed. Al-Shabab in long-running battle
with Twitter. Aljazeera. 18 Dec 2013, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/12/alshabab-long-running-battle-with-twitter-2013121711271555968.html (Accessed 7 April 2014.)
771 See Magyar Gárda profile deleted by iWiW. Népszabadság Online 28 august 2007 (Törölte
az iWiW a Magyar Gárda adatlapját). [translation]. (In Hungarian.) http://nol.hu/archivum/
archiv-462071-265440; Magyar Gárda deleted from iWiW. Index. 28 August 2007 (Törölték a
Magyar Gárdát az iWiW-ről), available at: http://index.hu/bulvar/iwiwgarda372/; Magyar Gárda
kicked off, Fodor Gábor allowed to stay on iWiW Heti Válasz. 28 August 2007. http://hetivalasz.
hu/migr_lt_cikk_gy_ujtu/a-magyar-garda-ropult-fodor-gabor-viszont-maradhatott-az-iwiw-en16827/?cikk_ertekel=1&ertekeles=3 (Accessed 10 August 2014.)
772 The Hungarian Guard (Magyar Gárda) has been object of cenzorship on iwiw.hu. Ex-homár Blog. 28
August 2007. http://ex-homar.blogspot.com/2007/08/hungarian-guard-magyar-grda-has-been.
html (Accessed 10 August 2014.)
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In 2012 Weibo enacted ‘Community Management Regulations’ announcing that users
would be recruited to form a committee773 that votes on how to deal with reported
content.774 Weibo deletes accounts belonging to the worst violators of its content
rules, which aligns closely with laws and government requirements.775 Weibo’s account
deletions have spawned ‘reincarnation parties’ where participants create hundreds of new
accounts.776 However reincarnation can be thwarted: Journalist Yang Haipeng’s Weibo
account appeared to have been closed in April 2012, and while he reported repeated
attempts to reopen it under a variety of coded user names, in each of the 65 attempts,
accounts were ultimately closed.777 The artist Ai Weiwei also resported that he was
repeatedly unable to register, possibly due to blocks associated with his IP addresses or
ID numbers now required for registration.778
Violations of company terms of service are unevenly enforced. Furthermore, Facebook
and Twitter have been known to reverse their decisions after receiving negative publicity
for their handling of specific cases. For example, a German TV host received a notification
stating that his post criticizing the Catholic Church’s stance on same-sex marriage
violated community guidelines.779 As a public figure, he was able to draw attention to
Facebook’s arbitrariness. Facebook apologized for the ‘mistake’.780
Conversely, content is sometimes found to violate the company’s rules and deleted only
after activists or the media call attention to it. For example, Facebook deleted the biggame hunting photos of 19-year-old Kendall Jones after environmental activist groups
expressed outrage. Facebook said that they violated its terms of service as ‘graphic

773 Sina Weibo Community Management Regulations (Trial). Unofficial translation published at China
Copyright and Media. 8 May 2012. http://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2012/05/08/
sina-weibo-community-management-regulations-trial (Accessed 5 August 2014.)
774 Sina Weibo Community Convention (trial). http://service.account.weibo.com/roles/gongyue;
Sina Weibo Community Management Regulations (trial). http://service.account.weibo.com/roles/
guiding; and Sina Weibo Community Committee System (trial). http://service.account.weibo.com/
roles/zhidu.
775 Li Hui and Megha Rajagopalan. At Sina Weibo’s censorship hub, China’s Little Brothers cleanse
online chatter. op. cit.
776 Bei Feng. 26 November 2012. Microblogs Have Become the Focus of Internet Censorship in China.
Human Rights in China. www.hrichina.org/en/crf/article/6406 (Accessed 1 August 2014.)
777 Sophie Beach. 11 March 2013. Beyond censors’ reach, free expression thrives, to a point.
Challenged in China: The shifting dynamics of censorship and control. Committee to Protect
Journalists.
https://www.cpj.org/reports/2013/03/challenged-china-media-censorship-weibo-expression.php
(Accessed 10 August 2014.)
778 Sui-lee Wee. 19 March 2012. Ai Weiwei says censors removed his microblog. Reuters. www.
reuters.com/article/2012/03/19/us-china-artist-microblog-idUSBRE82I09U20120319 (Accessed
10 August 2014.)
779 Jürgen Domian. No title. Facebook, 18 March 2013. www.facebook.com/Domian.Juergen/
posts/466265690110405 (Accessed 19 June 2014.)
780 Tina Kulow. 19 March 2013. Was ist mit dem Post von Domian passiert? [What has happened
to the post of Jürgen Domian?]. Public Official Facebook Statement. (In German.) https://de-de.
facebook.com/notes/tina-kulow/was-ist-mit-dem-post-von-domian-passiert/625428644149658.
(Accessed 19 June 2014.)
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images shared for sadistic effect or to celebrate or glorify violence’.781 In May 2013,
Facebook temporarily banned certain violent videos, and then quietly reversed its
decision in July. A video of a woman being beheaded by members of an organized crime
cartel in Mexico only entered public consciousness when BBC wrote about it in October.
Facebook first declined to remove the video, but later reversed its position due to public
and political pressure.782
Both Facebook and Twitter have in recent years grown more transparent about how
they repond to government requests for content restriction made through formal legal
channels or other official, legally binding processes. However as several examples in
this section and the previous section show, both companies are much more opaque
about their internal decision-making processes around how and when their own rules are
enforced.

5.4

Privacy

Social networks are veritable treasure troves of private information, revealing everything
from political preferences to sexual orientation. Users implicitly entrust social networks
with personal data. Governments for their part make requests for private user information
in the pursuit of civil, criminal, and even national security investigations.

5.4.1 Company policies
All companies examined in this case study have privacy policies of some form that explain
how user information is used, but the policies are rarely straightforward or comprehensive.
Weibo does not have a privacy policy per se but several provisions of its Community
Regulations address privacy;783 its parent, Sina, also has a privacy statement. The
statement discusses the personally identifiable information that the company collects and
provides individuals the option to opt out of receiving information from the company.784

781 Chris Taylor. 7 July 2014. Facebook: Here’s Why We Deleted Cheerleader’s Hunting Pics. Mashable.
http://mashable.com/2014/07/07/facebook-kendall-jones (Accessed 11 August 2014); Charlotte
Allen. In defense of Texas huntress and conservationist Kendall Jones. Los Angeles Times. 16 July
2014.
www.latimes.com/opinion/opinion-la/la-ol-kendall-jones-texas-hunter-cheerleader-20140716story.html (Accessed 11 August 2014); Molly Wharton. 9 July 2014. Hunting Photos Glorify
Violence, but ‘Kill Kendall Jones’ Facebook Page Apparently Doesn’t. National Review Online. www.
nationalreview.com/corner/382355/hunting-photos-glorify-violence-kill-kendall-jones-facebookpage-apparently-doesnt (Accessed 11 August 2014.)
782 Will Grant. 3 November 2013. Facebook beheading video: Who was Mexico’s Jane Doe? BBC
News Magazine. www.bbc.com/news/magazine-24772724 (Accessed 11 August 2014.)
783 Sina Weibo terms of service http://service.account.weibo.com/roles/guiding (Accessible only after
login.)
784 Sina Corp. About Sina: Privacy. http://corp.sina.com.cn/chn/sina_priv.html
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Facebook decided to call its privacy policy a ‘Data Use Policy’ (DUP) in a September
2011 update.785 Facebook is unique in this study in promising users a seven-day period to
comment on proposed changes to its DUP on the dedicated ‘Site Governance Page’.786
Twitter’s Privacy Policy explains that when ‘material’ changes to the policy are made,
users will receive a @Twitter update or email.787
iWiW’s privacy policy provided notice to users of changes to the policy. Users accept the
modifications of the privacy policies by logging into the service after the modifications
had entered entry into force.788

Data Retention
Companies studied do not offer much information about data retention. Weibo does not
provide any information. Facebook is vague: it stores data ‘for as long as it is necessary
to provide products and services to you and others’ – typically ‘until your account is
deleted’.789 Twitter explains that ‘log data’ – i.e. metadata – is deleted or anonymized
after 18 months at the latest.790 iWiW stated that data was retained for as long as the
user is a member, with user content like status updates and photos ‘displayed’ to the
user’s contacts for 14 days and stored at most for 21 days, while metadata is stored for
six days.791

Disclosure of User Data
Facebook and Twitter have policies that describe how they respond to government
requests for user data. Facebook and Twitter, unless legally restricted, notify the user if
an authorized authority requested user account information.792
Weibo’s parent Sina states that it may be required by law to disclose personal information
under several circumstances: (1) compliance with legal notices or applicable legal
785 Laurie Segall. 23 March 2012. Facebook strips ‘privacy’ from new ‘data use’ policy explainer. CNN
Money. http://money.cnn.com/2012/03/22/technology/facebook-privacy-changes (Accessed
9 August 2014); Facebook. Data Use Policy. Last updated 15 November 2013. https://www.
facebook.com/full_data_use_policy (Accessed 9 August 2014.)
786 Facebook. Data Use Policy: Some other things you need to know. https://www.facebook.com/
about/privacy/other
787 Twitter Privacy Policy. https://twitter.com/privacy
788
789 Facebook. Information we receive and how it is used. https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/
your-info.
790 ‘We receive Log Data when you interact with our Services, for example, when you visit our websites,
sign into our Services, interact with our email notifications, use your Twitter account to authenticate
to a third-party website or application, or visit a third-party website that includes a Twitter button
or widget. Twitter uses Log Data to provide our Services and to measure, customize, and improve
them. If not already done earlier, for example, as provided below for Widget Data, we will either
delete Log Data or remove any common account identifiers, such as your username, full IP address,
or email address, after 18 months.’ Twitter Privacy Policy. last updated 21 October 2013. https://
twitter.com/privacy (Accessed 4 August 2014.)
791 iWiW Privacy Policy. Adatkezelési szabályzat. http://iwiw.hu/i/adatkezelesi-szabalyzat , art. 9A, 9E,
9F.
792 Twitter. Help Center. Guidelines for Law Enforcement. https://support.twitter.com/entries/41949;
Facebook. Safety Center. Information for Law Enforcement Authorities. https://www.facebook.com/
safety/groups/law/guidelines
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procedures; (2) protection of the rights or property of users; (3) In an emergency situation,
in order to protect personal or public safety.793
iWiW did not describe in any detail how it responded to government and other lawful
requests for user data. The company did mention in its privacy policy that it did not need
user consent in instances of data transfer mandated by law, and gave no mention of any
procedure for notifying users after the transfer had taken place.794

Real-name requirements
The UN Special Rapportueur for Freedom of Expression and the UN High Commissioner
for Human Rights have both flagged the importance of anonymity, as linked to the right to
privacy, for the exercise and protection of human rights in the internet age. Many social
networking platforms, but not all, require that users sign up with their real names and
inforce such policies to varying degrees and in a variety of ways.
Twitter is the only company examined without a real-name policy; it only asks for an
email at registration. Facebook, iWiW and Weibo require real names for various reasons.
Chinese law compels Weibo to verify identities.795 iWiW required that users register with
their genuine first and last names and reserved the right to ask users to verify personal
information.
Facebook states that a real name policy ‘leads to greater accountability and a safer and
more trusted environment’.796 It has enforced this policy with varying degrees of effort and
consistency over time. The deactivation of prominent pseudonymous accounts has made
media waves, especially when the accounts of celebrities including the author Salman
Rushdie were deleted. As of August 2014, Facebook stated that it allows persistent
pseudonyms (e.g. Snoop Dogg) but uses an algorithm to verify what it deems patently
false names.797 Furthermore, people who want to change their names are required to
submit proof of identification.798

793 Sina Corp. About Sina: Privacy. http://corp.sina.com.cn/chn/sina_priv.html
794 iWiW Privacy Policy. Adatkezelési szabályzat. http://iwiw.hu/i/adatkezelesi-szabalyzat , art. 8H.
795 XinhuaNet. February 10, 2012. ‘Four questions’ about Weibo real name policy (original source:
People’s Daily Overseas Edition) [in Chinese].
http://news.xinhuanet.com/society/2012-02/10/c_111507519.htm (Accessed 9 August 2014.)
796 Somini Sengupta. 15 November 2011. Rushdie Wins Facebook Fight Over Identity. New York Times.
www.nytimes.com/2011/11/15/technology/hiding-or-using-your-name-online-and-who-decides.
html?pagewanted=all (Accessed 9 August 2014.)
797 Facebook. Desktop Help – Get Started on Facebook – Signing Up. My name was rejected during
signup. https://www.facebook.com/help/212848065405122
798 Facebook. Desktop Help: Changing Your Name.
www.facebook.com/help/contact/245617802141709

155

Although Facebook promises to ‘permanently delete your ID from [its] servers’ after
confirming that you are indeed using your real name,799 there is no way for the user to
verify this. One mitigating factor is that users may submit two IDs of lesser value – e.g.
bus cards, magazine subscription stubs, yearbook photos – instead of driver’s licenses
or passports.800

Account settings
Default settings have significant privacy ramifications because human beings are subject
to ‘default bias’.801 As regulatory scholar Cass Sunstein put it, ‘defaults are powerful
influences of choice, even when the stakes are high’.802
Although it is primarily a public-facing network, Twitter does allow users to tweet privately
to a select group of followers (protected Tweets cannot be retweeted, nor can they show
up in searches).803 Accounts on Twitter and Weibo are set to public by default.
Facebook has experimented with default settings. At the time of writing, users had the
option to choose whether to share content publicly, to their ‘networks’ or only to friends.
799 Facebook. Desktop Help: What happens to my ID after I upload it? https://www.facebook.com/
help/155050237914643
800 Facebook. Desktop Help: What types of ID do you accept? https://www.facebook.com/
help/159096464162185
801 Cass Sunstein. December 2013. Deciding by Default. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 162,
No. 1. p. 14. http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=penn_
law_review
802 Eric J. Johnson, Steven Bellman and Gerald L. Lohse. 2002. Defaults, Framing, and Privacy: Why
Opting In–Opting Out. Marketing Letters, Vol. 13, No. 1. pp. 13–14. https://www0.gsb.columbia.
edu/mygsb/faculty/research/pubfiles/1173/defaults_framing_and_privacy.pdf
803 Twitter Help Center. About Public And Protected Tweets. https://support.twitter.com/articles/14016about-public-and-protected-tweets
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In December 2009, Facebook changed the default setting to ‘public’, while announcing in
a press release that granular privacy options heralded a ‘new standard in user control’.804
In May 2014, however, Facebook changed the default setting for new users back to
‘sharing with friends’.805
Facebook users’ names, gender, profile pictures, background (‘cover’) photos and
networks are always visible to everyone.806 On iWiW, name, nickname, country, town and
gender were always public.807 Pictures were visible to friends of friends.808 Also, users
were required to choose a location from a drop-down menu at registration, though this
was not verified and could easily be changed.809
Facebook, iWiW and Weibo allow users to choose whether search engines can index
their accounts; all public Twitter accounts are open to be indexed.810 Weibo users are not
given the option to make their account visible only to confirmed followers, but users can
disable comments and block specific users.811

5.4.2 Implementation in national context
The following section examines the outcomes produced by specific company policies
and practices relating to data collection, retention, and sharing with third parties, in the
context of particular regulatory and legal environments.
Data protection and privacy enforcement
Facebook has faced legal action over ‘deceptive’ privacy policies. In 2011, the US
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) fined Facebook for first telling users they could keep

804 Facebook Asks More Than 350 Million Users Around the World To Personalize Their Privacy.
Facebook Newsroom. 9 December 2009. http://newsroom.fb.com/news/2009/12/facebook-asksmore-than-350-million-users-around-the-world-to-personalize-their-privacy (Accessed 8 August
2014); Ryan Singel. 9 December 2009. Public Posting Now the Default on Facebook. Wired. www.
wired.com/2009/12/facebook-privacy-update (Accessed 8 August 2014.)
805 Making It Easier to Share With Who You Want. Facebook Newsroom. 22 May 2014.
http://newsroom.fb.com/news/2014/05/making-it-easier-to-share-with-who-you-want (Accessed
8 August 2014);
806 Facebook. Desktop Help. What’s considered public information? https://www.facebook.com/
help/167709519956542
807 Blase Ur and Yang Wang. Online social networks in a Post-Soviet state. op. cit.; iWiW Privacy Policy,
Adatkezelési szabályzat, available at http://iwiw.hu/i/adatkezelesi-szabalyzat, art. 7a, 7c, 7d.
808 iWiW Privacy Policy, Adatkezelési szabályzat, available at http://iwiw.hu/i/adatkezelesi-szabalyzat,
art. 7d; iWiW terms of service, Felhasználási Feltételek, available at http://iwiw.hu/i/felhasznalasifeltetelek.
809 Balázs Lengyel, Attila Varga, Bence Ságvári and Ákos Jakobi. 26 January 2013. Distance dead
or alive Online Social Networks from a geography perspective. SSRN. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/
ssrn.2207352
810 Facebook Desktop Help. Appearing in Search Engine Results. https://www.facebook.com/
help/392235220834308; Privacy policy of Origo Média és Kommunikációs Szolgáltató Zrt., operator
of iWiW.hu community website. iWiW, Adatkezelési szabályzat. http://iwiw.hu/i/adatkezelesiszabalyzat, art. 8G, 9G (cached copy at http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache
:PxnvWuqUMKkJ:iwiw.hu/pages/misc/privacy.jsp+&cd=2&hl=nl&ct=clnk accessed July 25, 2014);
Sina FAQ. Can Weibo Be Private? http://help.sina.com.cn/comquestiondetail/view/990/.
811 Weibo has introduced a ‘blacklist’ function. 2 December 2009. http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/
blog_61ecce970100gh66.html.
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information private but then changing privacy settings and causing information to be
made public inadvertently.812
The sheer amount of public content available on Facebook has given rise to companies
like Geo Listening, which monitors ‘public posts on social networks’ like Facebook and
Twitter to provide schools with information about their students in order to deter bullying,
depression, self-harm, substance abuse and truancy.813
In 2014, a Berlin court ruled that several clauses of Facebook’s privacy policy and terms
of service violate German law.814 The German data protection authority initiated an inquiry
into facial recognition technology and raised concerns about the fact that Facebook did
not notify users that facial recognition technology is being used. It also raised concerns
over the potential misuse of the company’s massive biometrics database. The German
Data Protection Authority also held that Facebook should delete all facial recognition data
already collected, and, at least, obtain consent.815 In mid-2014, Max Schrems, a 26-yearold Austrian law student, launched a class action suit against Facebook. As of August
2014, his action had attracted 25,000 users worldwide. Schrems claims that Graph
Search and data sharing by widgets on external websites violate EU privacy laws.816
Despite such concerns in Europe, users in countries such as Hungary are even less
happy with the local alternaties; interviews with Hungarians who have used both social
networks said that they generally trusted Facebook but perceived iWiW’s privacy policies
as deficient and ‘unprofessional’.817

Legal implications of real-name requirements
Facebook’s real-name policy has been the subject of government investigations. In
Germany, Schleswig-Holstein’s Data Protection Commissioner argued that Facebook
had violated the Telemedia Act, which allows internet users to be anonymous or

812 Facebook Settles FTC Charges That It Deceived Consumers By Failing To Keep Privacy Promises.
Federal Trade Commission. 29 November 2011. http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2011/11/facebook-settles-ftc-charges-it-deceived-consumers-failing-keep
813 Geo Listening Monitoring Service Privacy Policy. last updated 10 October 2013. http://geolistening.
com/privacy-policy (Accessed 8 August 2014); Stephen Ceasar. 14 September 2013. Glendale
district says social media monitoring is for student safety. Los Angeles Times. www.latimes.com/
local/la-me-glendale-social-media-20130915-story.html (Accessed 8 August 2014); Geo Listening.
FAQs, under ‘Can you explain privacy and social networks?’ https://geolistening.com/faq
814 Facebook subject to German data protection rules, says Berlin court. Out-law.com. 26 February
2014.
http://www.out-law.com/en/articles/2014/february/facebook-subject-to-german-dataprotection-rules-says-berlin-court (Accessed 25 July 2014.); Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband
[Federation of German Consumer Organizations]. Key Statements on the Judgment by the Court
of Appeal of 01/24/2014, Ref. No. 5 U 42/12. 24 January 2014. http://www.vzbv.de/cps/rde/xbcr/
vzbv/key-statements-vzbv-facebook-2014-01-24.pdf
815 Jakob Jung. 16 August 2012. Facebook must destroy facial recognition data – or get users’
approval, Germany decides. ZDNet. www.zdnet.com/facebook-must-destroy-facial-recognitiondata-or-get-users-approval-germany-decides-7000002720 (Accessed 4 August 2014.)
816 Facebook privacy challenge attracts 25,000 users. BBC News. 6 August 2014. www.bbc.com/
news/technology-28677667 (Accessed 11 August 2014.)
817 Blase Ur and Yang Wang. Online social networks in a Post-Soviet state. op cit.
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pseudonymous, though a higher court reversed the decision on procedural grounds.818
The Facebook policy led to the deactivation of activist accounts and pages during Egypt’s
Arab Spring protests in 2011.819
Weibo is now legally required to confirm the identities of its 500 million users, a challenging
task it has been unable to complete, which it acknowledges as a risk in its IPO prospectus:
‘our noncompliance exposes us to potentially severe penalty’.820

Contesting government requests for user data
There are no known cases of iWiW and Weibo contesting government demands for
user data. Facebook, on the other hand, has challenged some government requests.
According to data published by the company, between July-December 2013 it complied
with 29 per cent of user data requests from Hungary.821 The table below provides an
overview of government requests received as well as the company’s compliance rate for
all countries studied in this report.

Table 6: Facebook’s rate of compliance with government requests for user
data in jurisdictions studied in this report
Requests

Accounts specified

Compliance rate

Brazil

1,165

1,651

33.82%

Egypt

6

6

0%

Germany

1,687

1,950

37.88%

Hungary

38

51

28.95%

India

3,598

4,711

53.56%

Kenya

–

–

–

Russia

1

1

0%

UK

1,906

2,277

71.30%

USA

12,598

18,715

81.02%

818 Loek Essers. 23 April 2013. Facebook Can Keep its Real Name Policy, German Appellate Court
Decides. CIO Magazine. www.cio.com/article/2386497/facebook/facebook-can-keep-its-realname-policy--german-appellate-court-decides.html (Accessed 4 August 2014.)
819 Wessel van Rensburg. Wael Ghonim was admin of Khaled Said Facebook page. Kameraad Mhambi.
7 February 2011. http://mhambi.com/2011/02/ghonim-was-admin-of-khaledsaid-facebook-page
(Accessed 9 July 2014); Mike Giglio ElShaheed: The Mysterious ‘Anonymous’ Behind Egypt’s
Revolt. Newsweek. 30 January 2011. (updated 2 February 2011)
http://www.newsweek.com/elshaheed-mysterious-anonymous-behind-egypts-revolt-66697 (Accesssed
9 July 2014); Adrian Chen. 5 February 2011.Why Facebook Should Do More to Help Egypt’s
Protesters. Gawker. http://gawker.com/5752904/why-facebook-should-do-more-to-help-egyptsprotesters (Accesssed 9 July 2014.)
820 Form F-1 Registration Statement as filed with the Securities Exchange Commission
by Weibo Corporation. March 14, 2014. p. 37. http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/
data/1595761/000119312514100237/d652805df1.htm
821 Facebook. Government requests report. Hungary. July-December 2013. https://govtrequests.
facebook.com/country/Hungary/2013-H2
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On user data requests, the numbers in the table above demonstrate that Facebook did
not comply with all requests received.
Twitter describes itself as the ‘free speech wing of the free speech party’ and has cultivated
a reputation for challenging government requests.822 In 2011, it convinced a US judge to
lift a gag order, allowing it to notify three WikiLeaks affiliates that their account information
had been passed to US national security authorities following an official order.823 In 2012,
it failed in its efforts to challenge a law enforcement request to turn over the information
of an Occupy Wall Street protester.824 Twitter contested a subpoena in France but was
ordered by a French court to turn over information on anti-Semitic accounts.825
Companies more often make at least some data available upon receiving government
requests in the United States than in the other countries researched. This is primarily
because the companies are headquartered in the United States, and wherever possible
ask other governments to use the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) process to
channel user data requests through the US government.826

Official penalties against users
Users can be penalized for their online expression, and thus the potential for liability and
harassment can lead to self-censorship. Social networking platforms generally remain
silent when users’ publicly shared information results in penalties by governments, even
when the penalty is not in line with international standards for legitimate limitation of
expression. Companies may be required to take action as part of the penalty such as
removal of the user’s content, as discussed in the previous sections.
In China, individuals are liable for their posts on social media. In March 2012, the
government launched a ‘spring breeze’ campaign targeting trade in illicit goods, drugs,
822 Amir Efrati. Twitter CEO Costolo on Apple, Privacy, Free Speech and Google; Far From IPO. 18
October 2011.
http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2011/10/18/twitter-ceo-costolo-on-apple-privacy-free-speech-and-googlefar-from-ipo/ (Accessed 29 April 2014.)
823 Mathew Ingram. 18 October 2011. For Twitter, Free Speech Matters – Not Real Names. GigaOm.
http://gigaom.com/2011/10/18/for-twitter-free-speech-is-what-matters-not-real-names (Accessed
9 April 2014); Paul Sonne. 10 January 2011. U.S. Asks Twitter for WikiLeaks Data. Wall Street
Journal. http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527487044827045760720817882515
62 (Accessed 29 April 2014.)
824 Russ Buettner. 2 July 2012. Judge Orders Twitter to Release Protester’s Messages. New York
Times. http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/07/02/judge-orders-twitter-to-release-protestersmessages (Accessed 10 August 2014); Somini Sengupta. 3 September 2012. Twitter’s Free
Speech Defender. New York Times. www.nytimes.com/2012/09/03/technology/twitter-chieflawyer-alexander-macgillivray-defender-free-speech.html (Accessed 4 August 2014); Shira Ovide.
4 August 2013. For Twitter, Free Speech Is a High-Wire Act. Wall Street Journal. http://online.
wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323997004578643883120559180 (Accessed 8 April
2013).
825 Angelique Chrisafis. 12 July 2013. Twitter gives data to French authorities after spate of antisemitic
tweets. The Guardian. http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/jul/12/twitter-data-frenchantisemitic-tweets (Accessed 9 August 2014); Somini Sengupta. 13 July 2013. Twitter Yields to
Pressure in Hate Case in France. New York Times. www.nytimes.com/2013/07/13/technology/
twitter-yields-to-pressure-in-hate-case-in-france.html (Accessed 9 August 2014.)
826 For more about the MLAT process see Google’s MLAT page at https://www.google.com/
transparencyreport/userdatarequests/legalprocess/ and also a resource page published by Access
at https://www.accessnow.org/blog/2014/01/09/mlat-a-four-letter-word-in-need-of-reform
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human and organs, as well as privacy breaches. As a result, 1,065 suspects were arrested
and 200,000 messages were deleted.827
In India, numerous arrests have taken place under section 66A of the IT Act 2000, which
criminalizes a range of online content including offensive content.828 Yet a number of
these arrests have been criticized in the media as being a violation of rights in relation to
speech that was not illegal in many commentators’ view. For example, in 2012, two Air
India employees were arrested in Mumbai and jailed for 12 days after posting derogatory
comments on Facebook about city-wide commemorations of the death of the leader of
a religious political party.829
In the United States, a user of both Facebook and Twitter was arrested and charged for
posting information on the social networks that were perceived as terrorist threats.830 He
was an 18-year-old high school student and aspiring rapper who posted controversial
lyrics on Facebook that could – in the opinion of some, depending on the context – be
construed as announcing a plan for an attack on a city. He was released by a grand jury.831

5.5

Transparency

This section examines the policies and practices of companies related to transparency,
building on information about transparency reports and other practices already discussed
in previous sections.

5.5.1 Transparency about government and lawful requests
As mentioned earlier in this study, both Facebook and Twitter publish data sets that
have come to be known as ‘transparency reports’. Section 5.3.1 included a comparative
analysis of data published by Facebook and Twitter about government requests to restrict
user content.
Facebook’s ‘Government Request Report’ first disclosed information about content
restriction in April 2014 (its previous report only disclosed user data requests).832

827 “Beijing arrests 1,000 in Internet crime crackdown”, ChinaDaily, 31 March 2012, http://www.
chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012-03/31/content_14962187.htm.
828 Information Technology Act 2000 as amended in 2008. Section 66A.
829 Shipla Jamkhandikar. 19 November 2012. No criticism please, we are Indians. Reuters: India Insight.
http://blogs.reuters.com/india/2012/11/19/no-criticism-please-we-are-indians and Saurabh Gupta.
2 December 2012. Facebook row: Mumbai Police book man whose complaint led to Air India
employees’ arrests. NDTV. www.ndtv.com/article/india/facebook-row-mumbai-police-book-manwhose-complaint-led-to-air-india-employees-arrests-299898 (Accessed 4 August 2014.)
830 Craig Malisow. 12 February 2014. A Young Man’s Violent Threat on Facebook Lands Him in Jail,
and Limbo. Houston Press. www.houstonpress.com/2014-02-13/news/justin-carter-facebook/full/
(Accessed 11 April 2014.)
831 Eric Randall. The Methuen Teen Rapper Was Released from Jail. Boston. 7 June 2013. www.
bostonmagazine.com/news/blog/2013/06/07/the-methuen-teen-rapper-was-released-from-jail
(Accessed 11 April 2014.)
832 Facebook Government Requests Report. About the Reports. https://govtrequests.facebook.com/
about.

161
As described in section 5.3.1, Facebook only reports the number of government requests
that it complied with but does not report on the total number of government requests
received. It also does not include court orders or copyright takedown notices in its figures.
As reflected in section 5.4.2, Facebook’s transparency report provides much more detail
about government requests for user data – including information about compliance
rate and request types – than its very basic and incomplete information about content
restriction requests.
Twitter has disclosed content removal requests since its first transparency report in
2012. In addition to what Facebook discloses, Twitter’s report also includes compliance
rate, content withheld as well as copyright takedown notices.833 Twitter also distinguishes
itself from Facebook in transparency about content restriction by publishing copies of
the content restriction and takedown requests it receives to the Chilling Effects website
(see Study 2 for a discussion of Chilling Effects).834 For its reporting on government data
requests Twitter also provides details on types of requests and compliance rate, as well
as data about information disclosed to authorities during emergencies.835
The two US-based companies face constraints on what their home government
will permit them to report. The US government does not permit US companies to be
completely transparent about National Security Letters and FISA court orders.836 With the
NSA revelations, transparency mechanisms have become a point of debate. The issue is
to understand the scope of how users’ privacy is affected at a time when companies have
publicly expressed concern about how erosion of user trust in the internet diminishes its
commercial value.837 A number of US companies including Facebook have negotiated an
agreement with the US Government that allows them to report requests with a one-year
delay and in broad ranges, not exact numbers of requests received. Twitter was also a
part of that coalition but has signalled its dissatisfaction with the arrangement, arguing
that ‘these ranges do not provide meaningful or sufficient transparency’.838

833 For more information about the Digital Millennium Copyright Act see legal summaries in Chapter 2.
834 ‘Chilling Effects’ is a website that allows recipients of ‘cease and desist’ notices to submit the notice
to the site and receive information about their legal rights. For more information about Twitter’s
practice of sharing information with ‘Chilling Effects’ see: https://transparency.twitter.com/removalrequests/2013/jul-dec. For more information about ‘Chilling Effects’ see: http://www.chillingeffects.
org. Information about instances of Twitter being blocked is from Herdict.com and includes
information from China and Iran – two countries where Twitter is was blocked at the time of writing.
Twitter Transparency Report. Additional information. https://transparency.twitter.com/additionalinformation
835 Twitter clarifies that the company evaluates ‘emergency disclosure requests’ on a case by case
basis as per US law and if the company has good faith to believe that there is an emergency
involving the danger or death or serious physical injury to a person. For more information see:
https://support.twitter.com/articles/41949#12.
836 Karen Gullo. 7 October 2014.
Twitter Sues U.S. Over Transparency on National Security.
Bloomberg.
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-10-07/twitter-sues-u-s-over-transparencyon-national-security.html (Accessed 25 July 2014.)
837 Seth Rosenblatt. 8 October 2014. US spying scandal will ‘break the Internet,’ says Google’s
Schmidt. CNet.
http://www.cnet.com/news/us-spying-scandal-will-break-the-internet-says-googles-schmidt/ (Accessed
9 October 2014.)
838 Jeremy Kessel. 6 February 2014. Fighting for more #transparency. Twitter Blog. https://blog.twitter.
com/2014/fighting-for-more-transparency (Accessed 8 August 2014.)
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Weibo does not publish a transparency report because government requests fall under
China’s State Secrets Law. Due to legal constraints, it appears that the offline and online
media rarely mention state-level restrictions of content.839
iWiW did not publish any type of transparency report before its operations closed down.

5.5.2 Transparency about self-regulation
While Facebook and Twitter have taken efforts at increasing transparency about how
they handle government and lawful requests, they share much less information with
users or the public at large about how they enforce their own terms of service. None
of the companies studied provide information on content they have restricted based
on company policy, or any statistics about external reporting on violations of company
rules. As previously noted in earlier sections, government authorities in many countries
may avail themselves of mechanisms for reporting terms of service violations, but no
data about the number, source, or subject matter has been reported by either of these
companies. In fact, Facebook explicitly states in that it excludes from its government
requests report, ‘government requests to remove content that violates Facebook’s
Community Standards, such as child exploitation material’.840
While all social networks list content they prohibit, none of the companies studied
has provided much public information about procedures for evaluating content.
Industry sources have described internal rules and procedures for evaluating content
in conversations with concerned stakeholders, held on condition of non-attribution, but
such processes are generally not made public.841 It is usually through anecdotal evidence
via news reports that the public learns about specific examples.

5.5.3 User notification
Companies are inconsistent in informing users when they restrict their content or hand
over their user data. If content is removed due to a copyright violation, both Twitter and
Facebook are legally required under the DMCA to notify the user and provide information
on how to file a counter-notice.842 Furthermore, both companies commit to inform users

839 Mitchell A. Silk and Jillian S. Ashley. 1 January 2011. Understanding China’s State Secrets Laws.
China Business Review. www.chinabusinessreview.com/understanding-chinas-state-secrets-laws
(Accessed 10 August 2014); Beina Xu. 12 February 2014. Media Censorship in China. Council on
Foreign Relations. www.cfr.org/china/media-censorship-china/p11515. (Accessed 4 August 2014);
Shi Shan. 10 July 2014. China’s Media Ban on Reporting of State Secrets ‘Too Vague’. Radio Free
Asia. www.rfa.org/english/news/china/vague-07102014155503.html (Accessed 10 August 2014.)
840 Facebook. Government requests report. FAQ. https://govtrequests.facebook.com/faq
841 oDesk. Abuse Standards 6.2 - Operation Manual. http://www.scribd.com/gawker/d/81877124Abuse-Standards-6-2-Operation-Manual (Accessed 30 July 2014.)
842 Twitter. Transparency Report. Copyright notices. July-December 2013. https://transparency.twitter.
com/copyright-notices/2013/jul-dec; Facebook. Desktop Help. What happens when Facebook
acts on a claim that I have infringed someone’s copyright? Can I file a counter-notice? https://www.
facebook.com/help/365111110185763.
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about about requests for their data, unless the situation is an emergency or the company
is legally prohibited to do so.843
For content that Facebook removes to enforce its own Community Standards and
Statement of Rights and Responsibilities (SRR), the company commits to forewarn
people,844 but Twitter does not clarify if it does the same for content that violates its
terms.845 If it implements a foreign content restriction request, Twitter notifies the public
about the restriction through a ‘Tweet withheld’ notice, which it also uses for copyrightrelated takedowns:846

As mentioned previously, Twitter only restricts accounts in the jurisdiction whose
authorities made a valid request. In such cases it displays the following notification:

Facebook displays a more generic message such as the following from July 2014:

The text in the above message could mean many things and it is unknown which one
applies to a particular situation.
When content is restricted on Weibo, other users trying to access the post are notified:
‘I’m sorry, this post has been deleted. For more information, go to [link provided].’

843 Twitter. Help Center. Guidelines for Law Enforcement. https://support.twitter.com/entries/41949;
Facebook. Safety Center. Information for Law Enforcement Authorities. https://www.facebook.com/
safety/groups/law/guidelines.
844 Facebook. Desktop Help. About Facebook’s Security & Warning Systems. https://www.facebook.
com/help/365194763546571/.
845 Twitter. Help Center. Twitter media policy.https://support.twitter.com/articles/20169199-twittermedia-policy; Help Center. The Twitter Rules https://support.twitter.com/articles/18311-the-twitterrules ; terms of service. 25 June 2012. https://twitter.com/tos.
846 Twitter. Help Center. Country Witheld Content. https://support.twitter.com/articles/20169222country-withheld-content
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Weibo has been reported by users to ‘camouflage’ messages so they remain visible only
to the author, causing some authors to be unaware that their content was restricted.847
When Weibo deleted dissident artist Ai Weiwei’s account, it was replaced with a message
that read: ‘Error. Invalid Weibo user’.848

5.6 Remedy
None of the companies investigated offer a clear path to remedy for users who face image
or text removal or functional restrictions, such as the user’s inability to upload photos.
Facebook may remove pages (which tend to belong to businesses and organizations that
may buy advertisements) for alleged spam violations, but users have options to appeal.849
In one of the countries studied, the law does require some form of grievance mechanism:
India’s Intermediary Guidelines require intermediaries to have ‘grievance officers’ to
whom users may address privacy concerns and harassment claims.850
Facebook recommends using the help center’s web forms, but Indian users can contact a
grievance officer via email or postal mail (this information is not displayed to users outside
of India).851 Twitter has a grievance officer whose contact information is visible to users
outside India.852
For suspended accounts, both Twitter and Facebook do offer an appeal option. When
accounts are disabled for reasons of violating Facebook’s Statement of Rights and
Responsibilities, users can send an appeal through a specific form. There is no information
about how long it will take for a request to be processed, what the decision-making
procedure is, or the severity of violations that would trigger an account suspension.853
Twitter’s information page is also short on such information but explains more about how
to appeal.854 One exception is copyright, as US copyright law (the DMCA) requires Twitter

847 Oiwan Lam. 18 March 2013. China: Researchers Uncover Microblog Filtering Mechanisms. http://
advocacy.globalvoicesonline.org/2013/03/18/china-researchers-uncover-microblog-filteringmechanisms (Accessed 25 July 2014); Some behaviors of deleting Weibo message secretly have been
found and made public by users. http://weibo.com/1221117947/zdHIw7sCK?mod=weibotime.
848 Sui-lee Wee. 19 March 2012. Ai Weiwei says censors removed his microblog. Reuters. www.
reuters.com/article/2012/03/19/us-china-artist-microblog-idUSBRE82I09U20120319 (Accessed
10 August 2014.)
849 Facebook. Desktop Help: Managing a Page. Why are there limits on my Facebook Page? https://
www.facebook.com/help/348805468517220
850 Information Technology (Intermediaries guidelines) Rules, 2011, 11 April 2011. http://deity.gov.
in/sites/upload_files/dit/files/GSR314E_10511(1).pdf, §11; Display grievance officer’s name,
contact: HC to Google, FB. Hindustan Times. 23 August 2013. www.hindustantimes.com/indianews/newdelhi/display-grievance-officer-s-name-contact-hc-to-google-fb/article1-1111939.aspx
(Accessed 27 July 2014.)
851 Facebook. Desktop Help. Contact Your Grievance Officer. https://www.facebook.com/
help/253918971400132 .
852 Twitter. Help Center. Grievance Officer – India. https://support.twitter.com/groups/57-safetysecurity/topics/275-handle-issues-online/articles/20171602-grievance-officer-india.
853 Facebook Desktop Help. My Personal Account was Disabled. https://www.facebook.com/help/
contact/260749603972907.
854 Twitter. Help Center. My account is suspended. https://support.twitter.com/articles/15790-myaccount-is-suspended.
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and Facebook to notify the original content uploader and inform them about counternotices.855 It is unclear what sort of paths to remedy iWiW offered, if any.

Figure 11: Screen shot of form that users can use to appeal Facebook
account suspensions.856

855 Facebook. Desktop Help. What happens when Facebook acts on a claim that I have
infringed someone’s copyright? Can I file a counter-notice? https://www.facebook.com/
help/365111110185763; Twitter. Help Center. Copyright and DMCA policy. https://support.twitter.
com/articles/15795-copyright-and-dmca-policy.
856 Screen shot 27 July 2014. Facebook. Desktop Help. My Personal Account was Disabled. https://
www.facebook.com/help/contact/260749603972907.
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Weibo does not offer a direct appeal option or a web form; instead, users are encouraged
to email the company and to indicate if they 1) disagree about administrators’ operations;
2) are dissatisfied with administrators’ responses after communication; 3) have questions
relating to other administrative matters.857
On Weibo sparse information about remedies has meant largely having to rely on
anecdotal evidence. Content restriction seems to be inconsistent. For example, blogger
and free speech advocate Isaac Mao had his account closed in June 2012 after he
criticized China’s space program. Sina was reported to have told him he had no recourse
to appeal because the order had been given by ‘relevant authorities’, and was outside
the company’s control.858 Author Zhang Yaojie’s Weibo account was closed in September
2012. Following months of unsuccessfully navigating the online complaint system,
Zhang sued Sina in January 2013 for a refund of his monthly 10 yuan ($1.61) premium
membership fee and account reinstatement.859 Court delays lasted months, and at the
time of writing no action seemed to have been taken.860

5.7 Conclusions
In analyzing the interplay between intermediaries’ policy and practice and specific
national regulatory and legal contexts, the research shows that companies are better
able to maximize respect for internet users’ rights in jurisdictions where laws are relatively
compatible with international human rights norms regarding freedom of expression
and privacy. The legal context of the country in which a company is headquartered is
particularly important for the respect of user rights. Companies whose home governments
do not inhibit such efforts have made strides in transparency and accountability in terms
of how they handle government demands.
Yet the research also clearly shows that freedom of expression can be strongly influenced
in a positive or negative direction by companies’ own rules, processes and mechanisms
on matters including terms of service enforcement, user privacy and identity. Companies
are much less transparent and accountable with the public on these matters.
In general the research conducted for this study of Facebook, Twitter, Weibo and iWiW
points to the following conclusions:
Government actions against social network users may limit space for expression.
Facing fines or even arrests, users are sometimes penalized by some governments for
their online expression. A lack of clarity on what expression is and is not allowed, and

857 Sina Help. Complaints to a Weibo Manager. http://help.sina.com.cn/comquestiondetail/view/1077
858 Sophie Beach. 11 March 2013. Challenged in China. CPJ.org. http://cpj.org/reports/2013/03/
challenged-china-media-censorship-weibo-expression.php (Accessed 12 Sepbember 2014.)
859 Josh Ong. 24 January 2013. Chinese scholar sues Sina over Weibo microblog account closure.
http://thenextweb.com/asia/2013/01/24/chinese-scholar-sues-sina-over-weibo-microblogaccount-closure/
860 Zhang Yaojie. 1 May 2013. Please carry out the right to ‘hashly criticize’. My1510. http://www.
my1510.cn/article.php?id=96400; Phone interview with Mr. Zhang and e-mail interview with his
lawyer, Wang Zhenyu, 15 April 2014.
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restrictive policies can lead to self-censorship by users. Companies that operate social
networking platforms can help by being clear and transparent with users about their
content restriction practices, privacy settings, and data sharing policies. Companies can
also support individuals targeted in cases where penalties are not in line with international
human rights standards.
In some circumstances, companies can contest or decline removal requests.
Establishing guidelines and ‘best practice’ standards helps. As is evident in Twitter’s
transparency report, social networks do not necessarily comply with all requests for
content removals; in fact Twitter has only complied with 11 per cent of such requests.
This shows that social networks do have operating space to challenge content restriction
requests. It may be easier to resist pressures from countries other than the network’s
home jurisdiction, but even within the home country, some companies do not comply
with all requests. Of the four social networks profiled here, only two (Twitter, Facebook)
publish their criteria, if not the actual process, for dealing with content removal requests
from governments and/or third parties. Such published policies help users understand
in what circumstances their content may be removed by external request, and can
give companies a clearer framework to contest content removal demands that are not
consistent with due process or international human rights
Social networks are inconsistently transparent on government removal requests.
Only two of the four social networking platforms studied (Twitter and Facebook) provide
information about government requests, shedding an important light on how law
is enforced on their platforms. Twitter also shares the content removal request itself,
where possible, with the ‘Chilling Effects’ website and notifies the public via messages
on the platform when content is restricted based on request by a government. Across
jurisdictions studied in this research, governments are not fully transparent about the
nature and scope of content restriction and requests for user data on social media
platforms.
Some social networks do not always explain how they share user data with
authorities and others. Two of the four companies studied (Facebook, Twitter) have
published policy guidelines on how they respond to user data requests from both foreign
and domestic authorized bodies. Users of the other services are not informed how their
privacy will be protected in the face of requests by governments or others.
None of the companies in this case study publish data on self-regulatory restrictions
– e.g. how many accounts were disabled for impersonation, how many accounts of repeat
infringers were terminated, etc. With social networking platforms increasingly becoming a
central platform to individuals’ online expression, there is a strong interest among users
and stakeholders in having rules and enforcement processes that are clear, predictable
and to some degree, independently monitored. The absence of such accountability
detracts from intermediaries’ credibility and legitimacy as platforms for users’ freedom
of expression.
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Users’ vulnerability places special responsibility on social networks to protect
users’ privacy. With the significant amount of personal information available through
social network use, social networks carry a special responsibility to respect users’ right
to privacy. Lack of privacy protection may stifle individuals’ expression.
“Real name” policies require flexible implementation in order to avoid negative
impacts on users’ freedom of expression. Real-name requirements may have a serious
chilling effect on speech. China legally requires social networks to verify their users’
identities, but this is not the case in most jurisdictions. The authors recommend that
companies consider the privacy and free expression ramifications of implementing a realname policy (or enter the market of a country with such laws) by conducting a human
rights impact assessment.
There is a need for stronger global principles and guidelines for remedy and
transparency in self-regulation. The Global Network Initiative’s principles on freedom
of expression and privacy and accompanying implementation guidelines have provided
strong guidance, supported by a range of stakeholders, not only for GNI companies but
for internet intermediaries more broadly. GNI’s guidelines for companies on transparency
and process for handling government requests, grounded in international human rights
norms, have had an impact on company practices all three intermediary types studied
in this report. However this study highlights the glaring absence of similar principles,
guidelines and standards for companies’ self-regulatory practices, including terms of
service enforcement. Given the lack of transparency and consistency in how companies
enforce their terms of service and other private rules, and given the impact of such
enforcement of internet users’ freedom of expression, there is a clear need for the
development of guidelines and ‘best practice’ standards for intermediaries’ own rules on
user expression.
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6. GENDER
Among the 81 countries covered by the World Wide Web Foundation’s 2013 Web Index,
only half of had national policies addressing gender equality online. The authors of the
2013 Web Index report point out that a “Lack of political and policy focus is compounded
by failure to collect gender-disaggregated statistics.” As a result, ‘the ways in which
gender affects Web access and use are still poorly understood’.861 This chapter begins
with a brief overview of the issue of basic internet access for women in relation to men,
followed by an examination of how content restriction in some countries has affected
womens’ access to health information and gender-related discourse. The final section
discusses issues related to pernicious harassment targeting women and how it that
affects womens’ freedom of expression online by chilling their participation in the digital
information society more broadly.

6.1 Access to the internet
The extent to which internet empowers women cannot be underestimated and has been
highlighted by several reports that point to opportunities for empowerment, including,
gender equality, and economic benefits to women. Yet globally there is a significant
gender divide in broadband access between men and women. Factors affecting women’s
access to broadband include educational and income gaps, and that these factors are
more acute for women in developing countries versus women in developed countries.862
For example, in 2013 Google India found that though India houses over 200 million
internet users, only 60 million of these online users are women.863
Similarly, penetration of internet was 32 per cent for women in Egypt with 41 per cent of
the Egyptian women not being interested in the internet and another 23 per cent feeling
that they do not need access to the internet. Of this group, 22 per cent do not use the
internet due to fear that friends or family would disapprove or that it is not appropriate
to use the internet.864 In Brazil, 47 per cent of active internet users are women. In Kenya,
861 Anne Jellema and Karin Alexander. 22 November 2013. 2013 Web Index Report. Geneva, World
Wide Web Foundation, p. 20. http://thewebindex.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Web-IndexAnnual-Report-2013-FINAL.pdf
862 Broadband Commission Working Group on Broadband and Gender. September 2013. Doubling
Digital Opportunities: Enhancing the Inclusion of Women & Girls in the Information Society. Geneva,
International Telecommunications Union. www.broadbandcommission.org/Documents/workinggroups/bb-doubling-digital-2013.pdf ; Intel Corporation and Dalberg Global Development Advisors.
2012. Women and the Web: Bridging the Internet Gap and Creating New Global Opportunities in
Low and Middle-Income Countries. www.intel.com/content/dam/www/public/us/en/documents/
pdf/women-and-the-web.pdf
863 The Economic Times. 20 November 2013. Google India aims to bring 50 million women online.
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-11-20/news/44284934_1_google-indiainternet-new-campaign-aims (Accessed 28 July 2014.)
864 Intel’s ‘Women and the Web’ report highlights online habits in Egypt, Uganda. 13 January 2014.
oAfrica. www.oafrica.com/statistics/intels-women-and-the-web-report-highlights-online-habits-inegypt-uganda (Accessed 31 July 2014.)
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fewer than 28 per cent of citizens had internet access in 2013. The lack of access and
adequate internet infrastructure affects low-income rural areas the most, and women
most severely. Further, a study conducted in 2013 demonstrated that only 8 per cent of
respondents used the internet to access news.865 In contrast, in 2013 in the UK 84 per
cent of women over 16 years old had access to the internet.866 Also seen is a growing
trend of women increasingly accessing internet through smart phones. In Germany a
study found that the use of smartphones by German women increased by over 60 per
cent in 2013, while use by men increased only by 35 per cent.867 Policy interventions that
states can take to overcome the gender gap include expanding access to affordable
platforms, developing national plans to allow for increased broadband penetration, and
addressing market constraints that impact the affordability of internet platforms.868

6.2 Gender and content restriction
In some countries, women’s rights advocates are demanding broader restrictions on
pornographic and ‘obscene’ content online, arguing that there is a connection between
the online viewing of such materials and violence against women.869 In connection with
this, the ISP case study (Chapter 3) describes debates in India and the UK on whether
and how to institute ISP filtering.
In some countries, laws meant to curb pornography are also used to stamp out other
content. The Chinese Government, for example, periodically announces months-long
campaigns to rid the Chinese internet of pornography and ‘vulgarities’ that are ‘violating

865 Victoria Rocío Cunto, Moses Osani and Hannah Smothers. 2013. Empowerment Through Internet
Access: Promoting Women’s Rights with Social Media. Salzburg Academy on Media and Global
Change. www.salzburg.umd.edu/unesco/empowerment-through-internet-access (Accessed 28
July 2014.)
866 UK Government. 19 February 2014. Internet Access Quarterly Update, 2013 Q4. Office for National
Statistics. www.ons.gov.uk/ons/publications/re-reference-tables.html?edition=tcm%3A77300202#tab-all-tables
867 comScore. 14 March 2013. 2013 Future in Focus – Digitales Deutschland. www.comscore.com/
ger/Insights/Presentations_and_Whitepapers/2013/2013_Future_in_Focus_Digitales_Deutschland
(Accessed 30 May 2014.)
868 Broadband Commission Working Group on Broadband and Gender. September 2013. Doubling
Digital Opportunities: Enhancing the Inclusion of Women & Girls in the Information Society. Geneva,
International Telecommunications Union. www.broadbandcommission.org/Documents/workinggroups/bb-doubling-digital-2013.pdf; Intel Corporation and Dalberg Global Development Advisors.
2012. Women and the Web: Bridging the Internet Gap and Creating New Global Opportunities in
Low and Middle-Income Countries. www.intel.com/content/dam/www/public/us/en/documents/
pdf/women-and-the-web.pdf
869 Mary Eberstadt and Mary Anne Layden. 2010. The Social Costs of Pornography: A Statement
of Findings and Recommendations. Princeton, N.J., The Witherspoon Institute; Catharine A.
MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin. 1988. Pornography and Civil Rights: A New Day for Women’s
Equality. Minneapolis, Organizing Against Pornography; Milton Diamond. 1999. The Effects of
Pornography: an international perspective. James Elias, Veronica Diehl Elias, Vern L. Bullough,
Gwen Brewer, Jeffrey J. Douglas and Will Jarvis (eds). Porn 101: Eroticism, Pornography, and the
First Amendment. Amherst, N.Y., Prometheus Books.
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public morality and harming the physical and mental health of youth’.870 During one of
these campaigns in 2009, the Beijing Communications Administration shut down ‘Bullog’,
a popular blogging community due to ‘harmful comments on current affairs’.871 Baidu and
Google were also on a list of target websites required to clean up their content.872 Another
campaign launched in April 2014 targeted amateur online romance stories, many of which
were ‘slash fiction’, or male same-sex romances written for female audiences (a similar
crusade in 2012 landed approximately 20 women in jail for up to 18 months.)873 Although
some officials praised this as the coming of ‘rule of law in the virtual world’,874 some
experts have argued for an amendment to the definition of ‘online pornography’ in order
to avoid restricting freedom of expression.875
Our research team found that content related to women’s rights and medical information
is generally not restricted by Internet companies including search engines. However
companies continue to struggle for the right balance in relation to broad laws that can be
subject to a wide range of possible interpretation. For example, in November 2013 the
Gender Studies Group of Beijing Foreign Studies University (BFSU) posted 17 photos
on social network Renren.com. On each photo, there was a female student holding a
whiteboard and expressing her idea about sex with title starting with “My vagina says”.
Organizers and participants said their activity was inspired by Eve Ensler’s feminist play,
The Vagina Monologues.876 The BFSU students provoked hot debate on the Chinese

870 Chris Buckley. 5 January 2009. China targets big websites in Internet crackdown. Reuters. www.
reuters.com/article/2009/01/05/us-china-internet-idUSTRE5040F120090105 (Accessed 31 July
2014); China Internet Illegal Information Report Centre. 5 January 2009. State Council Information
Office and Other Six Ministries Carry Out Special Campaign against Internet Vulgarities. http://
net.china.com.cn/ywdt/txt/2009-01/05/content_2668979.htm (Accessed 28 July 2014); Michael
Wines. 12 March 2009. A Dirty Pun Tweaks China’s Online Censors. New York Times. www.nytimes.
com/2009/03/12/world/asia/12beast.html (Accessed 28 July 2014.)
871 Tania Branigan and Jemima Kiss. 13 January 2009. China closes 90 websites as internet crackdown
intensifies. The Guardian. www.theguardian.com/media/2009/jan/13/china-internet-censorship
(Accessed 28 July 2014); Anita Chang. 9 January 2009. Edgy China blog site shut amid Internet
porn sweep. Fox News. www.foxnews.com/printer_friendly_wires/2009Jan09/0,4675,ASChinaPor
nography,00.html (Accessed 31 July 2014); Wang Xiao. 28 February 2007. The Story Behind One
of China’s Largest Blogging Communities. The Blog Herald. www.blogherald.com/2007/02/28/thestory-behind-one-of-chinas-largest-blogging-communities (1 August 2014.)
872 People’s Daily Online: The First List Of Websites Under Exposure During the National Campaign
against Internet Vulgarities, January 5, 2009, http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1026/8622333.
html.
873 Alia. 16 April 2014. Slash fiction falls victim to China’s latest crackdown on online porn. Offbeat
China
Blog.
http://offbeatchina.com/slash-fiction-falls-victim-to-chinas-latest-crackdown-ononline-porn (Accessed 1 August 2014); Liu. 17 May 2012. ‘扫黄打非’办：耽美小说网负责人获
刑1年半. [‘Pornography’: slash fiction network executives jailed for a year and a half]. China Youth
Daily. (In Chinese.) http://news.china.com/focus/zhengzhidisu/11115954/20120517/17201391.
html (Accessed 1 August 2014); Kevin Tang. 22 April 2014. Inside China’s Insane Witch Hunt For
Slash Fiction Writers. BuzzFeed. www.buzzfeed.com/kevintang/inside-chinas-insane-witch-huntfor-slash-fiction-writers (Accessed 1 August 2014.)
874 Xinhua. 16 April 2014. Porn crackdown crucial to cyber development: experts. Global Times. www.
globaltimes.cn/content/854927.shtml (Accessed 31 July 2014.)
875 Abby Liu. 3 May 2014. China’s Anti-Pornography Crackdown Nets Much More Than Porn. Global
Voices.
http://globalvoicesonline.org/2014/05/03/chinas-anti-pornography-crackdown-netsmuch-more-than-porn (Accessed 28 July 2014.)
876 NetEase: Beijing Foreign Studies University Girls Posted Bold Photos to Express Bravely Their
Opinions about Sex, “The Vagina’s Way” Became a Hit, November 7, 2013, http://henan.163.
com/13/1107/23/9D4606BU022701R8.html.
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Internet not only about female sexuality but also about whether it should or should not be
publicly expressed by young women.
In this context it is interesting to note that a search for the word “vagina” on Baidu yields
a first page full of medical and encyclopedia web pages. However as of August 2014 on
Google.com.hk, the word “vagina” was blocked by the site’s SafeSearch feature.877 Users
from the rest of China outside Hong Kong are not allowed to shut down this feature.
Thus in this particular case, Baidu was found to be less restrictive than Google.
Social networks’ treatment of female nudity has also been a huge point of contention.
Facebook’s ban on breastfeeding drew user outcry.878 After a campaign by womens’
advocacy groups called #FreeTheNipple, Facebook clarified its nudity policy and decided
to allow breastfeeding photos on Facebook.879
The examples above illustrate how women’s ability to access and disseminate information
and ideas about sexuality can be stifled by restrictions, and how legislation whose
purpose includes protection of women can be appropriated for other purposes. However
as the following section will show, some women can also feel that their rights have been
violated when intermediaries fail to restrict content that has been posted on the Internet
with the express intention of harming them.

6.3 Gender-based harassment
Forms of harassment that can take place via social media platforms include stalking,
hate speech via graphics or text, cyber mobbing,880 revenge porn,881 unwanted sexual
attention and sexual coercion. Indeed, harassment has become so pervasive for ‘adults
who are active members of at least one social network’ that Zurich Insurance Group is
offering a yearly ‘Cybermobbing Insurance’ plan for CHF 149 (approximately $165) for
those who seek protection from being ‘defamed, harassed or even coerced by other
people via electronic channels’.882

877 Experiment conducted by the report’s China researcher, June 30, 2014.
878 Mariya Yefremova. 14 April 2013. In Support of an ‘Explicit Material’ Prompt on Facebook. Huffington
Post.
www.huffingtonpost.com/mariya-yefremova/in-support-of-an-explicit_b_3076354.html (Accessed
10 August 2014.)
879 Kashmira Gander. 12 June 2014. #FreeTheNipple: Facebook allows breast feeding photos in
change to nudity and pornography policy. The Independent. www.independent.co.uk/life-style/
health-and-families/health-news/freethenipple-facebook-allows-breast-feeding-photos-in-changeto-nudity-and-pornography-policy-9532695.html (Accessed 4 August 2014); Facebook. Desktop
Help. Does Facebook allow photos of mothers breastfeeding? https://www.facebook.com/
help/340974655932193.
880 Cyber mobbing includes defamation, harassment and coercion that takes place over the internet, in
chat rooms, instant messaging and mobile communications.
881 Revenge porn is sexually explicit material that is shared online without the consent of the individual.
882 Cybermobbing Insurance. Zurich Insurance Group. www.zurich.ch/en/private-customers/liabilityand-legal/cybermobbing-versicherung#im-detail (Accessed 30 July 2014.)
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6.3.1 Regulation
Because of the ease with which harassment and threats can take place via social media
platforms, debates have arisen around the responsibility of intermediares to help prevent
and address harassment. New regulations are also being drafted in many countries to
address the problem. Researchers for this report found that some countries do not have
legislation explicitly addressing online sexual harassment. Others have broad provisions
that could potentially encompass online sexual harassment, while others have developed
more specific laws.883
In the United States, the Violence Against Women Act penalizes someone who
‘utilizes a telecommunications device, whether or not conversation or communication
ensues, without disclosing his identity and with the intent to annoy, abuse, threaten or
harass any person at the called number or who receives communications’ with fines
or imprisonment.884 Germany is considering expanding penal sanctions against online
harrassment with a particular focus on incidents that take place on social networks, and
also to make it easier for victims to report incidents to the police.885 In Brazil, as a result
of online harassment, the Marco Civil da Internet includes Article 21 which holds content
providers liable if they do not remove, after being notified, videos and photos containing
nudity and sex posted without the individual’s consent. In this case there is no need for
judicial notification. It is an exception to the ‘judicial notice-and-takedown’ framework
established by the Marco Civil (as discussed in more detail in the intermediary liability
section in Chapter 2).886 In June 2014, the Egyptian Government criminalized sexual or

883 Examples: For Kenya see s. 29 of the Kenya Information and Communication Act. For India, a
number of sections of the Indian Penal Code can be used to address online sexual harassment,
including: IPC section 509: Addresses ‘insulting the modesty and intruding on the privacy’ of
women, IPC Section 507: Criminal intimidation via anonymous communication, IPC Section 354A:
Addresses online and offline sexual harassment, IPC Section 354C: Addresses voyeurism, IPC
Section 354D: Addresses stalking including cyber stalking, Information Technology Act section 66A:
can be used to address cyber-stalking and sexual harassment.
884 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a)(1)(C). At its passage, the statute stirred significant controversy given its
inclusion of the term ‘annoy’ because the term might capture a wide range of anonymous internet
banter that falls short of cyber-stalking. Naomi Harlin Goodno. 2007. Cyberstalking, a New Crime:
Evaluating the Effectiveness of Current State and Federal Laws. Missouri Law Review, Vol. 72, No. 1,
pp. 125–197. http://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3985&context=mlr;
Daniel J. Solove. 9 January 2006. Response to Kaimipono D. Wenger. 9 January 2006. Annoy
someone online (anonymously); go to jail. Concurring Opinions. www.concurringopinions.
com/archives/2006/01/annoy_someone_o.html/comment-page-1#comment-61010
(29
July
2014.) Courts have responded to this controversy, finding that although the statute might have
unconstitutional applications, it would not warrant facial invalidation on vagueness or overbreadth
grounds. United States v. Eckhardt, 466 F.3d 938, 943–44 (11th Cir. 2006). http://caselaw.findlaw.
com/us-11th-circuit/1467437.html (Accessed 28 July 2014.)
885 Bundesregierung. 13 December 2013. Deutschlands Zukunft gestalten: Koalitionsvertrag zwischen
CDU, CSU und SPD [Making Germany’s Future: Coalition Agreement between the CDU, CSU and
SPD]. Berlin, Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, p. 147. (In German.) www.
bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/_Anlagen/2013/2013-12-17-koalitionsvertrag.pdf;jsessionid=3B
84643BFC5B2B3D59DBDD25CFA31216.s4t1?__blob=publicationFile&v=2
886 Ronaldo Lemos, Director, Center for Technology and Society, Fundação Getúlio Vargas (FGV)
School of Law. Interview with Celina Beatriz Mendes de Almeida. Personal interview. Rio de Janeiro,
Brazil, 10 April 2014.
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pornographic suggestions or hints through words, signs, or acts as part of new legislation
addressing the problem of sexual harassment in society more broadly.887
A specific category of online harassment increasingly discussed by policymakers and
gender rights advocates is called ‘revenge porn’. Perpetrators are often bitter ex-spouses
or partners, or online ‘trolls’ who upload ‘nude or sexually explicit photographs or videos
of people online without their consent, even if the photograph itself was taken with
consent’.888 In an interview Brazilian Congressman Alessandro Molon, who served as the
rapporteur of the Marco Civil,889 observed that ‘revenge porn’ has become ‘increasingly
frequent’ in Brazil – hence the public support for special provisions in the Marco Civil.890
Israel was the first country to ban revenge porn, in January 2014.891 As of June 2014,
Japan892 and Canada893 were also working on measures to address revenge porn. The USbased Cyber Civil Rights Initiative’s ‘End Revenge Porn’ campaign seeks to criminalize
revenge porn – at the time of writing, US victims were only entitled to civil remedies.894
But in May 2014, Arizona became the first state to classify revenge porn as a felony.895
Revenge porn also afflicts emerging economies. In China, victims have turned to the
courts, invoking the Article 36 of China’s Tort Liability Law.896 Two different articles of
China’s Criminal Law have been applied in these cases and in 2009 a man who posted

887 Patrick Kingsley. 6 June 2014. Egypt criminalises sexual harassment for first time. The Guardian.
www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/06/egypt-criminalises-sexual-harassment (Accessed 28
July 2014.)
888 National Conference of State Legislatures, “State ‘Revenge Porn’ Legislation,” last updated April
30, 2014, www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/state-revengeporn-legislation.aspx (May 5, 2014).
889 Geoffrey King. 6 May 2014. The Marco Civil da Internet. Joel Simon (ed). Halftime for the Brazilian
press: Will justice prevail over censorship and violence? New York, Committee to Protect Journalists,
pp. 31–35. https://cpj.org/reports/brazil2014-english.pdf
890 Congressman Alessandro Molon, Rapporteur of the Marco Civil da Internet. Interview with Celina
Beatriz Mendes de Almeida. Personal interview. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 17 April 2014.
891 Sam Frizell. 7 January 2014. Israel Bans ‘Revenge Porn’. Time. http://world.time.com/2014/01/07/
israel-bans-revenge-porn (Accessed 25 April 2014.)
892 Julian Ryall. 23 January 2014. Japan Plans to Crack Down on ‘Revenge Porn’ with New Legislation.
South China Morning Post. www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/1411867/japan-plans-crack-downrevenge-porn-new-legislation (Accessed 3 May 2014.)
893 Daniel Proussalidis. 20 November 2013. Cyberbullies Face 5 Years in Jail Under New Law. The
Toronto Sun. www.torontosun.com/2013/11/20/cyberbullies-face-5-years-in-jail-under-new-law
(Accessed 4 May 2014.)
894 Cyber Civil Rights Initiative. About Us. www.cybercivilrights.org/about (Accessed 24 June 2014.)
895 David Schwartz. 1 May 2014. Arizona Governor Signs Legislation to Discourage ‘Revenge Porn’.
Reuters.
www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/01/us-usa-arizona-revengeporn-idUSBREA4000T20140501
(Accessed 5 May 2014.)
896 Article 36 ‘establishes the right of an injured party to proceed against an ISP that uses the Internet
to infringe upon the civil rights and interests of another person, or that is aware that users are
utilizing the ISP network to commit a tort and yet fails to take necessary measures (such as deletion,
screening or disconnection) or fails to take necessary measures after receiving notice from an injured
party and by this failure enlarges the damages.’ John V. Grobowski and Yiqiang Li. 1 February 2010.
Tort Liability Law of the People’s Republic of China. Faegre Baker Daniels LLP. www.faegrebd.
com/10911 (Accessed 30 July 2014); Peter Neumann and Calvin Ding. 1 March 2010. China’s New
Tort Law: Dawn of the Product Liability Era. China Business Review. www.chinabusinessreview.
com/chinas-new-tort-law-dawn-of-the-product-liability-era (Accessed 30 July 2014); Government
of China. 10 January 2010. English Translation of the Tort Law of the People’s Republic of China.
WIPO. www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=182630 (Accessed 30 July 2014.)
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nude photos of his ex-girlfriend online was sentenced to prison for two years.897 In July
2010, a Shanghai court ordered Baidu to display, for a period of three days, a public
apology to a woman whose ex-boyfriend had disseminated naked photos of her online.
Upon losing the case, Baidu assigned 200 employees to ‘manually filter and delete related
search results’. At a court hearing in October 2009, Baidu stated that it was merely a
search engine and that it bore no responsibility for publishing the images.898

6.3.2 Policies and practices of intermediaries
Negative media coverage and pressure from civil society groups have prompted some
intermediaries to proactively implement mechanisms to prevent and respond to sexual
harassment. For example, the social networking services Sina Weibo, Facebook and
Twitter prohibit harassment and allow users to report abuse.899 Responsiveness and
enforcement, however, vary depending on the degree of company commitment and
attention to the issue, public pressure, and legal enforcement. As elaborated later in
this study, in one example of how public pressure has prompted companies to change
policies, in the United States the hashtag #FBRape persuaded advertisers to withdraw
ads from Facebook, prompting it to take stricter enforcement.900
In a 2014 study examining how Facebook, Twitter and YouTube handle violence against
women, the Association for Progressive Communication concluded that while company
approaches to violence against women differ, and the companies “have made some effort
to respond to user concerns,” nonetheless “they do not do enough.”901 The study, titled
“Internet intermediaries and violence against women online” identified four over-arching
themes and trends emerging from their in-depth examination of the three companies.
First, the study found a ‘reluctance to engage directly with technology-related violence
against women, until it becomes a public relations issue.’ Specifically, neither Twitter
nor Facebook had taken what APC considered to be ‘genuine’ or ‘concrete’ steps to

897 Man Who Posted Ex-Girlfriend’s Nude Photos Online Was Sentenced To Prison For Two Years.
10 December 2009. New Express. http://news.sina.com.cn/s/2009-12-10/015019226383.
shtml (Accessed 29 July 2014); Man Who Disseminated Ex-Girlfriend’s Nude Photos Committed
the Crime to Insult. 14 October 2009. Yangcheng Evening News. www.ycwb.com/epaper/ycwb/
html/2009-10/14/content_620274.htm (Accessed 29 July 2014.)
898 Peng Pu. 2 July 2010. First sex photo case won in court. Global Times. www.globaltimes.cn/
content/547661.shtml (Accessed 31 July 2014); Qian Tao. 2011. Intermediary Liability of Website
Operators in Privacy Cases in China. Masaryk University Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 5,
No. 1, pp. 113–14. http://mujlt.law.muni.cz/storage/1327951355_sb_09-tao.pdf (Accessed 31 July
2014.)
899 Yuki Noguchi. 13 December 2013. Twitter Critics Say It’s Not Sensitive Enough To Cyberbullying.
NPR ‘All Tech Considered’. www.npr.org/blogs/alltechconsidered/2013/12/13/250802010/twittercritics-say-its-not-sensitive-enough-to-cyberbullying (Accessed 28 July 2014.)
900 Laura Stampler, “Facebook Will Block Photos Celebrating Rape Following Ad Boycott”, Business
Insider, 28 May 2013, accessed 28 July 2014, www.businessinsider.com/facebook-fbrape-adboycott-2013-5.
901 Carly Nyst. End violence: Women’s rights and safety online project – Internet intermediaries and
violence against women online. Executive summary and findings’. Association for Progressive
Communications (APC). July 2014. http://www.genderit.org/sites/default/upload/flow-cnystsummary-formatted.pdf
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‘promote women’s rights and specifically address violence against women until public
scandals and resulting high-profile campaigns emerged in respect of the intermediary.’902
Second, the study identified a “lack of transparency around reporting and redress
processes.” Specifically:
The primary challenge encountered by the researchers when conducting this
study was the lack of available information about the reporting and redress
processes available to victims of technology-related violence. Facebook
provides the most information online about its reporting processes, but there
remain serious gaps in information about the way complaints are dealt with,
and the tests/thresholds applied. Twitter provides very little information about
reporting processes but significant information about the circumstances under
which it will cooperate with law enforcement; this should be contrasted with
YouTube, which provides no information about law enforcement cooperation.903
Third, the study found a widespread failure by the three companies “to engage with
the perspectives of non-North American/European women.” The report points out that
“Facebook and Twitter both claim to interact with women’s rights groups, but do not
appear to have any formal relations with women’s rights groups outside of Europe and
North America.” APC researchers concluded it was impossible to tell ‘whether they have
an appreciation for international human rights and national legal framewoks regarding
violence against women.’904
Fourth, the study found that while the companies all make statements in support of free
speech, “none of the companies makes a public commitment to human rights standards
or to the promotion of rights” and “none of the available policies explicitly address
gender-related violence or harassment nor take a strong stance on respect for diversity
or for women’s rights.”905
Despite these problems the study did identify several positive developments. Both
Twitter and Facebook had ‘shown a willingness to opening a diologue with the women’s
rights community’. All three companies have ‘progressively simplified their reporting
mechanisms, ensuring that content can be reported at its source.’ APC also flagged
some proactive steps by Google’s YouTube:
YouTube has been trialling a new system called the YouTube Deputy Program,
in which certain users, with a history of accurate reporting of offensive or
otherwise inappropriate content, are invited to have more robust flagging
tools, allowing them to flag content in bulk. YouTube has started to invite
some organisations to trial the system, with the thinking that some groups may
have specialised knowledge or expertise that may help them flag. There is a
possibility that this system could be opened up to local women’s organisations
902
903
904
905

Nyst, op. cit. p.3.
Ibid.
Nyst, op. cit.p.4.
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or the like. This would allow stakeholder groups to take proactive steps to
eradicate technology-related violence against women.906
The APC report calls on internet intermediaries to balance their commitment to freedom
of expression with other human rights ‘such as that to be free from discrimination and
violence’.
Indeed, it can sometimes be difficult to pinpoint where free expression stops and
victimization begins. In June 2014, for example, YouTube drew criticism from the Egyptian
Government for refusing to take down a video recording the mass rape of a 19-year-old
woman at President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s inauguration. In response, YouTube said that it
‘always remove[s] videos entirely where there is a privacy complaint and an individual is
clearly identifiable’ (emphasis added), noting that in this case the attack’s ‘newsworthiness’
contributed to the company’s decision to allow blurred videos concealing the victim’s
identity. WITNESS, a nonprofit that seeks to use citizen videos documenting abuse to
effect change, applauded YouTube’s ‘nuanced stance’.907 YouTube also requires users
wishing to view the video to vouch they are 18 years old or older.908
As the APC report pointed out, sometimes companies come up with mechanisms
to report abuse only after being subject to strong public criticism. After stonewalling
women’s rights advocates when they reported misogynistic pages glorifying date rape and
domestic violence,909 Facebook finally took action. For example, a group called Women,
Action and the Media and the Everyday Sexism Project had to send thousands of emails
to companies that advertise on Facebook; after Nissan and several smaller companies
threatened to withdraw advertising, Facebook finally admitted that its ‘systems to identify
and remove hate speech have failed to work as effectively as we would like, particularly
around issues of gender-based hate’.910
At the same time, just as social media platforms are spaces where women or men face
sexual and gender-based harassment, social media platforms also enable activists to

906 Nyst, op. cit. p.5
907 Madeleine Bair. 25 June 2014. Consent, Privacy, and A Video of Sexual Assault. WITNESS Blog.
http://blog.witness.org/2014/06/consent-privacy-video-sexual-assault (Accessed 30 July 2014.)
908 David Clark Scott. 14 June 2014. Why YouTube won’t remove Egyptian sexual assault video.
Christian Science Monitor. www.csmonitor.com/World/Global-News/2014/0614/Why-YouTubewon-t-remove-Egyptian-sexual-assault-video (Accessed 28 July 2014); Lizzie Dearden. 14 June
2014. YouTube refuses Egypt’s request to remove footage of Tahrir Square sexual assault. The
Independent.
www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/youtube-refuses-egypts-request-to-remove-footageof-tahrir-square-sexual-assault-9537086.html (Accessed 28 July 2014); Madeleine Bair. 25 June
2014. Consent, Privacy, and A Video of Sexual Assault. WITNESS Blog. http://blog.witness.
org/2014/06/consent-privacy-video-sexual-assault (Accessed 28 July 2014.)
909 Women, Action and The Media. 27 May 2013. Examples of Gender-Based Hate Speech on
Facebook.
www.womenactionmedia.org/examples-of-gender-based-hate-speech-on-facebook (Accessed 31
July 2014.)
910 Marne Levine. 28 May 2013. Controversial, Harmful and Hateful Speech on Facebook. Facebook
Safety. www.facebook.com/notes/facebook-safety/controversial-harmful-and-hateful-speech-onfacebook/574430655911054 (Accessed 30 July 2014); Tanzina Vega. 29 May 2013. Facebook
Says It Failed to Bar Posts With Hate Speech. New York Times. www.nytimes.com/2013/05/29/
business/media/facebook-says-it-failed-to-stop-misogynous-pages.html (Accessed 30 July 2014.)

178
fight harassment and raise awareness. In some cases these campaigns have succeeded
in bringing national attention to the issues at hand and motivated political and policy-level
change. This includes the 2012 campaign in Germany that resulted in a national debate,
but which started on Twitter under the hashtag #aufschrei (German for ‘outcry’) through
which individuals would tweet about everyday sexism against women.911 Similarly, in
Kenya, the hashtag #SGBVJusticeKE on Twitter seeks to highlight the public interest case
where eight survivors of sexual violence during the post-election violence in 2007 have
brought a constitutional complaint against the Attorney General and five other senior
government officials.912

6.4 Conclusion
The previous chapter on social networking platforms found that global companies
like Twitter and Facebook are much less transparent and accountable about how
they enforce their terms of service than they are about how they handle government
requests. The APC study cited in this chapter reinforces the need for greater dialogue
and communication with all stakeholders about how social networking platforms develop
and enforce their rules. Companies need to work more closely with users, human rights
advocates of all kinds (including those advocating for gender rights as well as freedom of
expression rights) and governments if the problem of online gender-based violence is to
be addressed in a manner that also upholds and protects online freedom of expression.
Indeed, the problem of online gender-based violence underscores the urgent need for a
multistakeholder process to develop principles, standards, and ‘best practice’ guidelines
for how social networking platforms should communicate with and listen to users about
development and enforcement of their terms of service.

911 Axel Maireder and Stephan Schlögl. 17 February 2014. 24 Hours of an #outcry: The Networked
Publics of a Socio-Political Debate. European Journal of Communication, Vol. 29, forthcoming,
http://homepage.univie.ac.at/axel.maireder/php/wordpress/wp-content/MairederSchloeg
l_24HoursOfAnOutcry_PrePrint.pdf; Silke Wünsch. 26 January 2013. Anti-sexism Twitter
campaign gains momentum. Deutsche Welle. www.dw.de/anti-sexism-twitter-campaign-gainsmomentum/a-16552842 (Accessed 28 July 2014); Melissa Eddy and Chris Cottrell. 29 January
2013. German Politician’s Remark Stirs Outcry Over Sexism. New York Times. www.nytimes.
com/2013/01/29/world/europe/29iht-germany29.html (Accessed 28 July 2014.)
912 ICJ Kenya. 26 March 2013. Hearing of the PEV Sexual Gender Based Violence case begins in
Court. Kenyan Section of the International Commission of Jurists. www.icj-kenya.org/index.php/
media-centre/news/596-hearing-of-the-pev-sexual-gender-based-violence-case-begins-in-court
(Accessed 31 July 2014.)
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7. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
As an international intergovernmental organization that operates with a global remit and
promotes values that are universal, UNESCO has proposed a conceptual framework of
Internet “universality.”913 Respect for four core principles is a precondition for the Internet
to be universal: (i) human rights; (ii) openness; (iii) accessibility; and (iv) multistakeholder
participation. The four can be summarized by the mnemonic R – O – A – M (Rights-based,
Open, Accessible, Multistakeholder driven).914 This report’s research findings highlight
key challenges for realizing the first principle, human rights.
As discussed in the introductory chapter, this report builds on the UN Guiding Principles
for business and human rights, according to which states have a primary duty to protect
human rights, businesses have a responsibility to respect human rights, and both spheres
have a role in providing remedy to those whose rights are violated.
The case studies in this report highlight the difficulties that internet intermediaries face in
maximizing respect for users’ right to freedom of expression when states do not uphold
their own duty to protect. The cases above highlight ways in which all states have room for
improvement. However it is also clear from the case studies that Internet intermediaries
have considerable power to influence outcomes affecting internet users’ freedom of
expression even when the legal and regulatory environment is not fully supportive of that
aim.

7.1 State duty to protect
Part of the state’s duty to protect human rights includes facilitating and supporting
intermediaries’ respect for freedom of expression. This report’s findings illustrate how, to
varying degrees, policies, laws, and regulations are not well aligned with that particular
aspect of the state’s duty to protect human rights. Issues identified in the case studies
included:
1.

The characteristics of intermediary liability regimes or lack thereof, as well as the
regulatory objectives of the regimes (as elaborated in Chapter 2) affect intermediaries’
ability to respect freedom of expression. Limiting the liability of intermediaries for
content published or transmitted by third parties is essential to the flourishing of
internet services that facilitate expression.

913 UNESCO Universality. op. cit.
914 Feedback sought for UNESCO’s research on the Internet. UNESCO Communication and Information.
7 March 2014.
http://www.unesco.org/new/en/communication-and-information/resources/news-and-in-focusarticles/all-news/news/open_consultation_on_unesco_new_concept_internet_universality
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2.

Laws, policies, and regulations requiring intermediaries to carry out content
restriction, blocking, and filtering in many jurisdictions are not sufficiently
compatible with international human rights standards for freedom of expression.

3.

Laws, policies, and practices related to government surveillance and data collection
from intermediaries, when insufficiently compatible with human rights norms, impede
intermediaries’ ability to adequtely protect users’ privacy.

4.

Licensing agreements can affect intermediaries’ ability to respect freedom of
expression. This applies to ISPs in all countries studied and social networks and
search engines in some countries.

5.

Whereas due process generally requires that legal enforcement and decision-making
are transparent and publicly accessible, governments are frequently opaque about
requests to companies for content restriction, the handover of user data, and other
surveillance requirements. This makes it difficult for the public to hold governments
and companies appropriately accountable when users’ right to freedom of expression
is unduly restricted—either directly, or indirectly through the compromise of user
privacy.

7.2 Responsibility of business to respect
Companies’ own policies and practices affect Internet users’ freedom of expression
both positively and negatively. The case studies examined terms of service enforcement,
identity policies, transparency practices, the extent to which companies are willing or
able to contest government requests, and policies related to privacy, data retention and
data protection. Key findings are as follows:
1.

Transparency on content restrictions: (All three types of intermediaries) Companies
studied in this report can offer transparency about how they decide to filter, remove,
or otherwise restrict content either in response to requests from governments or third
parties, or in the course of enforcing and their own terms of service. Tranparency
includes giving notice where content is restricted to those trying to access it, as well
as notifying those publishing the content. Companies can offer comprehensive or
aggregated overviews of content restriction requests and the company’s compliance
with them. Despite the recent “transparency reporting” trend by some companies,
companies performed inconsistently in terms of what they choose to reveal and
how the information is communicated. There is a further lack of transparency by
companies about many aspects of their processes, particularly how they enforce
terms of service and respond to private requests.

2.

Ability to contest content restriction demands: Throughout the case studies it
became evident that companies may not follow through on all government or other
official demands to restrict content. Companies with clear policies and practices on
handling content restriction requests are able to contest and minimize the impact
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of local laws and regulations that fail to meet international standards for legitimate
limitations.
3.

Self-regulation and terms of service enforcement: Internal decisions agreements
among companies - particularly by social media companies - to restrict certain types
of content, to enforce of their own private rules, are often welcomed by governments
as a way to handle problems before they escalate into matters for the courts and law
enforcement. At the same time, these rulemaking and enforcement processes lack
transparency or independent oversight mechanisms that would help to ensure that
they are not subject to errors and abuses. In summary, the roles may be distinguished
as follows:

•

Internet Service Providers: terms of service for ISPs in all countries studied are
specific to each jurisdiction in which they operate and these generally ban illegal
activity on their services. Some ISPs in some countries work through self-regulatory
frameworks or take instructions from non-governmental bodies to identify illegal
content or activity.

•

Search engines: Of the three search engines studied, the terms of service of
Yandex (Russia) and Baidu (China) restrict what is required by law. Only Google
(U.S.) restricts substantial categories of content in its terms of service and internal
policies extending beyond what is required by law becaues its home jurisdiction has
relatively few legal restrictions on expression.

•

Social networking platforms: Weibo (China) forbids all content that is illegal under
Chinese law which itself is broad enough that wide categories of political and
religious speech have recently been identified as illegal by Chinese authorities.
iWiW (Hungary) forbade content that was also forbidden by the law as well as other
categories of content such “vulgar” or “obscene” speech and “overt” or “covert”
advertising. The terms of service of Twitter and Facebook (U.S.) both globally restrict
(to varying extents) a range of content categories not illegal in the U.S. In certain
other jurisdictions they sometimes carry out targeted restriction of content in those
jurisdictions where government requests identify the content as infringing.

Governments also use the terms of service abuse reporting mechanisms to flag content
which may or may not be illegal, but that violates the companies’ own rules. Also, users
in most countries studied reported incidents in which measures were taken against
content that did not appear to violate the terms, or in which the terms were enforced in
an excessively literal way (e.g., deletion of breastfeeding-promotion pages and pictures)
resulting in a negative impact on freedom of expression, and often without adequate
means for appeal (see also Access to remedy below).
4.

Privacy policies, data retention and data protection: (Applies to all three types of
intermediaries studied here, especially ISPs and social networks) Companies in all
three case studies collected similar types of data, although policies about retention
and third party sharing differed widely, as did the extent to which companies inform
users about whether policies exist and what they are. The majority of companies did
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not clearly explain how they handle government requests for user data, nor did they
offer information on actual requests for user data or compliance with those requests
(the researched social networks stood out more positively in this regard). While law
was a contributing factor to some of these differences, differences between the same
service type in the same jurisdiction indicate other company-specific factors at play.
5.

Identity policies: (All three types of intermediaries studied here, especially ISPs and
social networks). Whether users are allowed to use a service or create an account
without having their account linked to their government-issued identity, or without
having to use their real name, impacts users’ freedom of expression in many
jurisdictions studied.

7.3 Access to remedy
Remedy is the third central pillar of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human
Rights, placing an obligation on governments and companies to provide individuals
access to effective remedy. This area is where both governments and companies have
much room for improvement. Across intermediary types, across jurisdictions and across
the types of restriction, individuals whose content or publishing access is restricted as
well as individuals who wish to access such content had inconsistent, limited, or no
effective recourse to appeal restriction decisions, whether in response to government
orders, third party requests or in accordance with company policy. While some
companies have recently increased efforts to provide appeal and grievance mechanisms
and communicate their existence to users, researchers identified examples of rules being
inconsistently enforced and enforced in a manner also not consistent with the principles
of due process.

7.4 Issues of concern
Company policies and practices can combine with jurisdictional contexts to produce
outcomes that have a negative impact on freedom of expression. All three case studies
identified several common categories of issues:
•

Necessity and proportionality in content restriction: Over-broad law and heavy
liability regimes cause intermediaries to over-comply with government requests in
ways that compromise users’ right to freedom of expression, or broadly restrict
content in anticipation of government demands, even if demands are never received
and if the content could potentially be found legitimate even in a domestic court of
law.

•

The Internet’s transnational nature places particular limits on the operating
space for intermediaries: Intermediaries can be subject to different legal norms,
and are sometimes at risk of an all-out ban by authorities disagreeing with particular
content shared via the services. Internet services at times resist such pressures by
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closer cooperation with governments or sometimes by blocking content only in the
jurisdiction in question, or sometimes by wholescale deletion of said content.
•

Variety of actors involved creates uncertainty about permitted content:
Companies decide to allow or ban certain content based on their internal policies,
as well as being influenced by legal obligations following court rulings, governmental
orders, civil claims, instructions by third parties, monitoring groups with which the
intermediary cooperates, and others. This myriad of actors involved, compounded
by ambiguity of legal frameworks, often makes it unclear for individual users what
content is permitted, who decides on allowed content, and how, and the potential
consequences of their expression.

•

Gender Issues: The existence and nature of company policies dealing with
speech related to sexual harassment, gender-based violence and exploitation or
objectification of women are uneven, even across the same intermediary type and
jurisdiction. Companies in all three case studies had in place mechanisms allowing
users to report abuse. These mechanisms could be used for legitimate purposes,
including reporting sexual harassment, but at the same time some stakeholders
expressed concerns that the same mechanisms could also be used to abuse users’
legitimate freedom of expression rights.

7.5 Intermediaries and Internet Governance
In 2005, the UN Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG) defined “Internet
governance” as “the development and application by Governments, the private sector
and civil society, in their respective roles, of shared principles, norms, rules, decisionmaking procedures, and programs that shape the evolution and use of the Internet.”915
Thus while the term “Internet governance” is often used in the media and public debates
in a narrow sense to describe the technical policymaking and coordination functions of
organizations such as the International Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
(ICANN), the concept was originally conceived to encompass a broader set of processes
for determining policies and practices that shape the Internet’s functioning at all layers.
The policy role of internet intermediaries – and policies affecting their operations – is a
form of Internet governance broadly defined.916 It is therefore useful to situate this report’s
findings in the context of global debates over core principles for internet policymaking
that have a direct impact on intermediaries.
The annual Internet Governance forum (IGF), whose creation was mandated by the
2005 Tunis Agenda for the Information Society, provides a platform for stakeholders to
debate the full range of issues surrounding the Internet’s governance, albeit without a

915 Report of the Working Group on Internet Governance. Château de Bossey. June 2015. http://www.
wgig.org/docs/WGIGREPORT.pdf
916 Laura DeNardis. August 2013. Internet Points of Control as Global Governance. Internet Governance
Papers. No.2. Centre for International Governance Innovation. http://www.cigionline.org/sites/
default/files/no2_3.pdf
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mandate to set policy.917 A number “dynamic coalitions” were formed to support ongoing work related to a range of concerns related to the information society918 leading
to the emergence in 2008 of the multistakeholder Internet Rights and Principles (IRP)
Dynamic Coalition.919 The IRP developed a Charter of Human Rights and Principles for
the Internet,920 with a set of ten core principles launched in 2011 including principles
on freedom of expression and privacy.921 Notably, this development work preceded the
release of the first report by UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression Frank La
Rue in 2011 and the Human Rights Council’s first resolution on the Internet and human
rights in 2012, the content of which was discussed in greater detail at the beginning of
this report’s introductory chapter.
In February 2014 the European Commission submitted a report to the European Parliament
on Internet policy and governance, proposing an approach to developing principles
for global Internet policy and governance. This approach built on the Tunis agenda of
2005 and is represented by the acronym, COMPACT: “the Internet as a space of Civic
responsibilities, One unfragmented resource governed via a Multistakeholder approach
to Promote democracy and human rights, based on a sound technological Architecture
that engenders Confidence and facilitates a Transparent governance both of the
underlying Internet infrastructure and of the services which run on top of it”.922 Since Tunis,
the document states, “there has been a proliferation of Internet governance principles in
various fora but in most cases each one supported by a limited set of stakeholders,
or limited in geographical scope.” The COMPACT principles, the Commission argued,
have the potential to support “a process leading towards a more broadly supported
and coherent set of principles for Internet governance [that] would be helpful in finding
common ground.”923
In April 2014 the Brazilian government convened an international multistakeholder
conference called “NETmundial” to discuss “Internet governance principles” and a
“roadmap for the future evolution of the Internet Governance system.”924 Negotiations
among governments, industry, civil society and the technical community produced
a “multistakeholder statement” whose commitments on free expression and privacy
principles went beyond previous commitments agreed by UN member states at the World

917 APC Internet Rights Charter. last updated November 2006. http://www.apc.org/en/node/5677/.
918 Wolfgang Benedek, Veronika Bauer, and Matthias C. Ketteman eds., Internet Governance and the
Information Society: Global Perspectives and European Dimensions, (Utrecht: Eleven International
Publishing, 2008), p. 37.
919 The IRP coalition. Internet Rights & Principles Coalition website. http://internetrightsandprinciples.
org/site/about/.
920 Internet Rights & Principles Charter. http://internetrightsandprinciples.org/wpcharter/.
921 IRP campaigns: 10 Internet Rights & Principles.
http://internetrightsandprinciples.org/site/campaign/.
922 Internet Policy and Governance Europe’s role in shaping the future of Internet Governance. 12
February 2014. The European Commission. COM(2014) 72 final. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2014:0072:FIN:EN:PDF
923 Ibid. p.4
924 Dilma Rousseff. 23 April 2014. Opening Speech. NETmundial. http://netmundial.br/wp-content/
uploads/2014/04/NETMundial-23April2014-Dilma-Rousseff-Opening-Speech-en.pdf and
NETmundial Multistakeholder Statement. 24 April 2014.
http://netmundial.br/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/NETmundial-Multistakeholder-Document.pdf.
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Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) in Tunis in 2015.925 Notably, its clauses on
freedom of expression, association and access to information reinforced the emerging
international consensus – discussed in detail in this report’s introductory chapter – that
offline rights should be equally protected online. There was much less consensus around
sections relating to intermediary liability and online privacy. As the case study findings of
this report highlight, even if there appears to be stronger general consensus about the
principle of freedom of expression, governments and companies still have a long way to
go when it comes to translating such consensus into actual practice.
The September 2014 IGF in Istanbul saw the launch of a new Dynamic Coalition on
“Platform Responsibility” focusing on a specific category of intermediaries, “social
networks and other interactive online services,” to discuss “concrete and interoperable
solutions to protect platform-users’ human rights.”926 This new Dynamic Coalition has
similar potential to contribute to stronger norms for social networking services, search
engines and other types of intermediaries that can be defined as ‘platforms’ for expression.
There is a particular opportunity for this dynamic coalition to serve as a focal point for
developing stronger human rights-based principles and accountability mechanisms for
various emerging forms of self- and co- regulation.
The following recommendations are offered by this report’s authors in the spirit of
principles such as UNESCO’s ROAM formula, and the EC’s COMPACT and Netmundial,
in the hopes of fostering further discussion and eventually building greater international
consensus around best practices by all stakeholders.

925 Tunis Commitment. Second Phase of the WSIS (16-18 November 2005, Tunis) WSIS-05/TUNIS/
DOC/7. http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/doc_multi.asp?id=2266%7C0. Also see Milton Mueler.
27 April, 2014. Netmundial Moves Net Governance Beyond WSIS. Internet Governance Project
blog. http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/04/27/netmundial-moves-net-governance-beyondwsis/ (Accessed May 6, 2014.) and David Johnson. The Unanswered Questions of Netmundial.
Internet Governance Project Blog. 30 April 2014. http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/04/30/
the-unanswered-questions-of-netmundial/ (Accessed 6 May, 2014.)
926 Dynamic Coalition on Platform Responsibility. ‘About’ page. http://platformresponsibility.info/?page_
id=2
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8. RECOMMENDATIONS
The following recommendations apply in varying degrees to all stakeholders: governments,
companies, civil society and multinational organizations. If online freedom of expression
is to be adequately respected and protected, all of these actors must find ways to work
together across borders to improve legal and regulatory frameworks, establish and
implement corporate best practices, and increase awareness as well as participation
by internet users and citizens. Rulemaking and enforcement related to online speech
– whether carried out by governments or companies – must be compatible with and
held accountable to international human rights norms. The recommendations below are
offered as first steps in that direction.

1. Adequate legal frameworks and policies.
Policy, legal, and regulatory goals affecting intermediaries must be consistent with
universal human rights norms if states are to protect online freedom of expression and
if companies are to respect it to the maximum degree possible. Governments need to
ensure that legal frameworks and policies are in place to address issues arising out of
intermediary liability and absence of liability. Legal frameworks and policies affecting
freedom of expression and privacy should be contextually adapted without transgressing
universal standards, be consistent with human rights norms including the right to freedom
of expression, and contain a commitment to principles of due process and fairness. Legal
and regulatory frameworks should also be precise and grounded in a clear understanding
of the technology they are meant to address, removing legal uncertainty that would
otherwise provide opportunity for abuse or for intermediaries to operate in ways that
restrict freedom of expression for fear of liability.
In order to better inform public and private policymaking processes, there is a need
for much more qualitative and quantitative global research on the impact of company
policies, practices, business models, and design choices on freedom of expression.
Comprehensive surveys of internet users around the world on how intermediaries affect
individuals’ freedom of expression in different contexts are currently lacking. More research
is also needed on how legal, regulatory and policy frameworks affect intermediaries’ ability
to respect users’ rights, as well as their impact on Internet users more broadly. This study
only begins to scratch the surface in its examination of how specific companies’ policies
and practices affect freedom of expression in different jurisdictions. More detailed facts
about cause-and-effect between policies, practices and outcomes are needed. These
facts will better equip all stakeholders to refine and adjust their policies, practices, and
strategies to maximize the protection of and respect for freedom of expression rights of
Internet users everywhere in the world.
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2. Multistakeholder policy development.
Laws, regulations and governmental policies, as well as corporate policies, are more
likely to be compatible with freedom of expression if they are developed in consultation
with all affected stakeholders – particularly those whose rights are known to be at risk
– and take into account those interests. A genuine multistakeholder process involves all
stakeholders potentially affected by the policy from the start, rather than simply seeking
opinions after the basic parameters have been set and key directions already determined.

3. Transparency.
Transparency is important to demonstrate that governance and enforcement
actions are in compliance pre-specified principles, rules and conditions.
Greater transparency by governments about requests and requirements being placed
on companies that have the potential to affect Internet users’ freedom of expression and
privacy is a prerequisite for accountability in public governance of the Internet.
Transparency by companies is a prerequisite for accountability in how intermediaries
respond to government requests, as well as their own private “governance,” which in turn
is necessary not only for the protection of Internet users’ freedom of expression, but for
companies ability to earn and maintain public trust in their services.
In this context there are two kinds of transparency: qualitative and quantitative.
Qualitative transparency involves governments making publicly available, the laws, legal
interpretations, administrative procedures and other measures related to content restriction
and surveillance. For companies, qualitative transparency involves communicating with
users about processes for responding to government requests and for enforcing internal
company rules and processes. Quantitative transparency refers to the publication of
aggregate data about government requests and compliance rates, as well as other data
that helps internet users understand what types of content are being removed under what
auspices for what reason.
The GNI and Center for Democracy and Technology have developed the following
transparency recommendations for governments regarding content restriction:
•

Publicly post laws authorizing orders to remove or restrict content as well as official
legal interpretations of the law, including executive orders, legal opinions that are
relied on by executive officials, and court orders.

•

Disclose the information about:
{{

Which government agencies/bodies are legally permitted to order takedowns;

{{

The types of information by subject that can be ordered removed;

{{

The judicial, ministerial, or other oversight mechanisms required for the
authorization of each instance of content removal;
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•

{{

The judicial, ministerial, or independent oversight mechanisms that oversee the
implementation of content takedowns;

{{

The mechanisms for redress that victims of unlawful censorship may pursue;

{{

Public disclosure of the scope of unlawful censorship and remedial and
disciplinary actions taken.

Permit companies to disclose the number of takedowns requests that they receive
by number, subject matter, and specific legal authority, and how the company
responded to the request.927

Similar transparency measures are recommended for governments in reporting both
qualitatively and quantitatively on surveillance. Companies should disclose aggregated
information on the number of user data and real-time surveillance requests that they
receive, and how the company responds to them, on at least an annual basis. Governments
should enact legal reforms that clearly permits such transparency. Companies should
also be able to disclose the existence and basic details about any technical requirements
for surveillance that governments impose upon them.

4. Privacy.
Protecting users’ right to privacy is essential for freedom to expression to flourish.
Intermediaries should adopt best practices with respect to privacy. Intermediaries
must also have clear and comprehensible policies in place for what information about
users they collect and store, how they handle it, with whom they share it, and under
what circumstances authorities may obtain access to such data. Such policies must be
prominent and easy to access.
For governments, policies, regulations laws, and enforcement practices affecting
Internet users’ privacy, including data collection and surveillance for law enforcement
purposes, should be consistent with core human rights principles outlined in this report’s
first recommendation. The ‘International Principles on the Application of Human Rights
to Communications Surveillance’ developed by a global coalition of civil society groups
between late 2012 and May 2014, set forth 13 concrete principles that governments and
companies should follow to ensure that communications surveillance is carried out in a
manner consistent with international human rights standards.928

927 Susan Morgan and Emma Llansó. Letter to Members of the Freedom Online Coalition Working
Group on Privacy and Transparency Online. 29 August 2014.
928 https://en.necessaryandproportionate.org/text
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5. Human rights impact assessment.
Protection of online freedom of expression will be strengthened if governments carry
out human rights impact assessments to determine how proposed laws, regulations or
policies may affect Internet users’ freedom of expression and/or privacy domestically and
globally, and publish the results of those assessments.929
Companies should also carry out human rights impact assessments to determine
how their policies, practices, and business operations affect Internet users’ freedom
of expression and adapt their activities accordingly with strategies to mitigate potential
harms identified in the assessments.930 Such assessment processes should be anchored
in robust engagement with stakeholders whose freedom of expression rights are at
greatest risk online or those who are able to able to represent those interests, as well as
stakeholders who harbor concerns about other human rights affected by online speech.
Strategies to mitigate negative impact on freedom of expression can include, for example:
a.

the training of staff to enable informed decision-making on content restrictions
based on clear and consistent criteria and process;

b.

the development of a “rapid human rights impact assessment” process in
specific circumstances when time-sensitive business decisions are being made;

c.

creation of informed networks of knowledgeable stakeholders to engage with at
key moments.931

6. Self-regulation must follow principles of due process and
accountability, and be consistent with human rights norms.
National laws need to strengthen due process and the adherence to international human
rights norms to protect the rights of Internet users needs, but they are also essential
for intermediaries’ legitimacy as custodians of online content and should be a guiding
principle of private terms of service enforcement processes. This aligns with international
standards that require any limitations on free expression to be specified in rule, as distinct
from being arbitrary or retroactive. Self-regulation should further respect the principles
of necessity, proportionality, and internationally agreed legitimate purpose. Within the

929 See Eduardo Bertoni. Internet Regulation and the Need for “Human Rights Impact Assessments”
(HRIA) - a Proposal for Debate in Latin America. E-Bertoni. 27 July 2012.
http://ebertoni.blogspot.com/2012/07/internet-regulation-and-need-for-human.html (Accessed
September 17, 2014.)
930 For more information about human rights impact assessments see: Faris Natour and Jessica Davis
Pluess. Conducting an Effective Human Rights Impact Assessment. March 2013. http://www.bsr.
org/reports/BSR_Human_Rights_Impact_Assessments.pdf and Michael A. Samway. Business,
Human Rights and the Internet: A Framework for Implementation. in Human Dignity and the
Future of Global Institutions. (eds. Arend and Lagon, Georgetown University Press, 2014) pp.
309-312.
931 Legitimate and Meaningful Stakeholder Engagement in Human Rights Due Diligence: Challenges
and Solutions for ICT Companies. BSR, with CDT. September 2014. http://www.bsr.org/reports/
BSR_Rights_Holder_Engagement.pdf
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context of creating a safe user experience, content restrictions deployed by intermediaries
should not only be as minimal as possible, but should also avoid conflict with the key

human rights principle of non-discrimination.
In order to identify and mitigate potential adverse impacts on users’ freedom of
expression, intermediaries should carry out human rights impact assessments on their
terms of service and related enforcement policies and practices.
The Internet Society has proposed a set of principles and recommendations for selfregulatory processes and institutions. Key recommendations include specific ways
in which self-regulatory mechanisms should build accountantable and transparent
practices. Balanced and proportionate rules, due process, and judicial safeguards are all
essential. Periodic reviews should also be built into such systems: ‘All systems, including
public ones, should be periodically reviewed and evaluated as to their effectiveness. Such
reviews test the efficacy of policy mechanisms and their ability to provide answers to the
issues they were originally created to address.’932 This is sound advice for traditional
regulation as well as companies’ private rules and enforcement processes.

7. Remedy.
Internet users have the right to effective remedy when their rights are restricted or violated
by intermediaries, by states, or by a combination of the two. It should be possible for
people to report grievances and obtain remedy from private intermediaries as well as
from government authorities, including national-level human rights institutions. In seeking
remedy for restriction or violation of the right to online freedom of expression, Internet
users should not necessarily be required to pursue legal action through the courts.
Avenues for seeking remedies should be publicly available, known, accessible, affordable
and capable of providing appropriate redress.933
Depending on national context, grievance and remedy mechanisms provided by states
may include redress mechanisms such as those provided by data protection authorities,
national human rights institutions (such as ombudspersons), court procedures, and
hotlines.934
Depending on the jurisdictional and operational context, grievance and remedy
mechanisms provided by private intermediaries (and private regulatory schemes
that they may participate in) should provide mechanisms to receive and respond to
grievances from Internet users. These should be accessible, secure, and linguistically
and culturally-appropriate. The question of whether meaningful remedy is available
to users whose freedom of expression rights have been restricted or violated should
932 Voluntary Initiatives as a source of policy-making on the Internet. 29 July 2014. The Internet Society.
http://www.internetsociety.org/blog/2013/07/voluntary-initiatives-source-policy-making-internet
933 Recommendation CM/Rec(2014)6 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on a Guide
to human rights for Internet users. (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 16 April 2014
at the 1197th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies). Council of Europe. p.4 https://wcd.coe.int/
ViewDoc.jsp?id=2184807
934 Ibid. p.1
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be examined as part of a company’s human rights impact assessment process.
Depending on the grievance and the harm identified, remedy might could (but need
not necessarily) involve financial compensation. Meaningful remedy measures can also
include acknowledgment, apology, and commitment to address the problem in the future;
submitting to independent investigation or ongoing oversight; or participation in regional
or sector-wide multistakeholder entities to clarify and mitigate potential restriction or
violation of users’ rights.935

8. Public education and information, and media and information
literacy.
The composite concept of Media and Information Literacy covers the range of
competencies that citizens need for full participation in knowledge societies. In
their engagement with internet intermediaries, citizens require a range of of literacies
concerning free expression issues. Companies and governments have a role to play in
promoting these literacies formally and informally.
States have an obligation to provide accessible and clear information to the public so
that Internet users can not only understand and effectively exercise their rights, but also
recognize when their rights have been restricted, violated, or otherwise interfered with.
State restrictions on freedom of expression must not only pursue a legitimate aim and
comply with human rights law, but should also be made clearly known to the public.936
Public information should also include concrete instructions on official grievance and
remedy mechanisms.937
Respect of Internet users’ rights by private intermediaries also requires informing and
communicating with users about their rights as users of the service, how users’ expression
can be restricted according to the intermediary’s terms of service, the reasons for those
restrictions and why they are necessary, and other information necessary for a user to
make an informed decision about whether or not to use the service.938
Educational institutions should be encouraged and incentivized to include information
about the rights of Internet users in curricula related to human rights, civics and
government. Media should similarly be encouraged and incentivized to include reporting
and programming that helps to foster informed public discussion about the rights of
Internet users, and the obligations of states and businesses to protect and respect those
rights.

935
936
937
938

Telco Remedy Plan. Access. pp 8-10. https://www.accessnow.org/telco-remedy-plan
Council of Europe, op. cit. p.3
Ibid. p.1
Ibid. p.3
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9. Global accountability mechanisms
It is important that companies and governments alike make commitments to implement
core principles of freedom of expression and privacy. In today’s globally networked digital
environment, these principles must be implemented in a manner that is accountable
locally as well as globally.
Examples from the consumer privacy context include: the European Union’s Binding
Corporate Rules939 and the APEC Cross Border Privacy Rules system.940 Another
approach to accountability for companies is through assessment and certification
by independent multistakeholder organizations. The Global Network Initiative, a
multistakeholder coalition, requires its members to undergo periodic assessments as
part of an accountability mechanism for adherence to its principles and implementation
guidelines focused on how companies handle government requests. (As noted in this
report’s introduction, of the companies studied for this report, Google and Facebook are
GNI members. Vodafone and Telefonica, the parent company of Vivo, are members of
the Telecommunication Industry Dialogue, which works closely with GNI on developing
best practice for the telecommunications industry.) The GNI’s implementation guidelines
and assessment do not currently include consumer privacy issues or terms of service
enforcement, however. Other organizations and mechanisms may need to be developed
to improve accountability and transparency in these areas if GNI is unable to include them
in future.
As for states, a coalition of 23 governments have joined the Freedom Online Coalition, in
which member nations agree to work together to advance ‘free expression, association,
assembly, and privacy online – worldwide.’941 In April 2014 the coalition’s members issued
the ‘Tallinn Declaration’, a set of ‘Recommendations for Freedom Online.’ 942 Among
those recommendations three are particularly relevant to this report:
•

Dedicate ourselves, in conducting our own activities, to respect our human rights
obligations, as well as the principles of the rule of law, legitimate purpose, nonarbitrariness, effective oversight, and transparency, and call upon others to do the
same,

•

Reaffirm support for an open and interoperable internet, noting that strong cyber
security and secure and stable communication are critical to maintaining confidence
and trust in the internet, and key to safeguarding human rights and realising the
internet’s economic, social and cultural benefits,

•

Call upon governments worldwide to promote transparency and independent,
effective domestic oversight related to electronic surveillance, use of content take-

939 Overview on Binding Corporate Rules. Data Protection. European Commission. http://ec.europa.
eu/justice/data-protection/document/international-transfers/binding-corporate-rules/index_en.htm
940 APEC Cross-Border Privacy Rules System http://www.cbprs.org/
941 Freedom Online Coalition. https://www.freedomonlinecoalition.com/
942 Recommendations for Freedom Online. Adopted in Tallinn, Estonia on April 28, 2014 by
Ministers of the Freedom Online Coalition. https://www.freedomonlinecoalition.com/wp-content/
uploads/2014/04/FOC-recommendations-consensus.pdf
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down notices, limitations or restrictions on online content or user access and other
similar measures, while committing ourselves to do the same,
Three multi-stakeholder working groups have been set up. The coalition holds an annual
conference to which representatives from companies and civil society are invited. However
it remains to be seen whether any mechanisms will emerge through which governments
can be benchmarked and held accountable by gobal stakeholders on the extent to which
they have lived up to the above recommendations. Internet intermediaries will be hard
pressed to fully live up to their responsibility to respect human rights unless governments
fulfill their own duty to protect human rights including freedom of expression and privacy
online.
This study has been focused on three types of Internet intermediaries, assessing their role
in fostering freedom of expression. The research is not intended to be a representative or
static sample of actors, but rather to extrapolate more general insights. Its aim has been
to assist all stakeholders, and not least the intermediaries themselves, to identify how,
through the gatekeeping capacity inherent in mediating Internet content can be optimised
for freedom of expression and the right to privacy. In this way, internet intermediaries
and the companies that operate them can contribute to the evolution of what UNESCO
calls knowledge societies, which in turn are central to building democracy, sustainable
development and peace around the world.
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Glossary
Algorithm: ‘A set of ordered steps for solving a problem, such as a mathematical formula
or the instructions in a program.’943
Anonymity: The ability to ‘access and impart information, and to communicate securely,
without having to be identified.’944
Bandwidth: ‘The transmission capacity of an electronic pathway such as a communications
line, computer bus or computer channel. Digital bandwidth is the number of pulses per
second measured in bits per second (bps). For example, Ethernet transmits at different
speeds, including 10 Mbps [Megabits per second], 100 Mbps and 1000 Mbps’945
Blog: ‘A website, usually maintained by a person with regular entries of commentary,
descriptions of happenings, graphics or video. The ability of readers to leave comments
in an interactive format is an important part of many blogs.’946
Cloud computing: ‘[A] way of delivering applications, services or content remotely to
end users, rather than requiring them to hold data, software or applications on their own
devices.’947
Content: ‘On the Internet, content is any information that is available for retrieval by
the user, including Web pages, images, music, audio, white papers, driver and software
downloads as well as training, educational and reference materials.’948
Cookie: ‘A small text file (up to 4KB) created by a Web site you visit that is stored on
your computer either temporarily for that session only or permanently on the hard disk
(persistent cookie). Cookies provide a way for the Web site to recognize you and keep
track of your preferences.’949
Data Packet: “[A] unit of data made into a single package that travels along a given
network path. Data packets are used in Internet Protocol (IP) transmissions for data that
navigates the Web, and in other kinds of networks.’950

943 ‘Definition of: algorithm’. PC Magazine Encyclopedia.
http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term/37649/algorithm (Accessed 24 October 2014.)
944 Frank La Rue. 17 April 2013. (A/HRC/23/40) Op. Cit. p. 13.
945 ‘Definition of: bandwidth’. PC Magazine Encyclopedia,
http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term/38401/bandwidth (Accessed 25 October 2014.)
946 William H. Dutton, Anna Dopatka, Michael Hills, Ginette Law and Victoria Nash. 2011. Op Cit. p. 82.
947 UNCTAD. 2013. Information Economy Report 2013: The Cloud Economy and Developing Countries.
Switzerland, UN Publications, p. 4. http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/ier2013_en.pdf
948 ‘Definition of: content’. PC Magazine Encyclopedia. http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/
term/40264/content (Accessed 25 October 2014.)
949 ‘Definition of: cookie’. PC Magazine Encyclopedia. http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/
term/40334/cookie (Accessed 24 October 2014.)
950 ‘Data Packet’. Techopedia Dictionary. http://www.techopedia.com/definition/6751/data-packet
(Accessed 24 October 2014.)
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Data Protection: Standards that ‘place conditions on the collection, use and storage of
personal data (rules governing data controllers), give certain rights to the individuals to
whom the data relates (data subjects), and provide for a system of oversight to ensure
respect for the rules and to address breaches.’951
Deep Packet Inspection (DPI): ‘A technology which permits access providers to open
each “packet” of Internet data sent or received on its network in order to assess where it
is coming from, who it is going to and the nature of the file, if it is not encrypted.’952
Domain Name: ‘[A]n Internet resource name that is universally understood by Web
servers and online organizations and provides all pertinent destination information. To
access an organization’s Web-based services, website users must know the precise
domain name.’953
Email: A portmanteau of ‘electronic mail’ referring to the ‘transmission of text messages
from sender to recipient…Users can send a mail message to a single recipient or to
multiple users’ and can attach and transmit computer files in the message.954
Encryption: ‘A process that takes a message and makes it unreadable except to a person
who knows how to “decrypt” it back into a readable form.’955
Hashtag: ‘A means of providing a common topic identifier in text and chat messages so
they can be searched as a group. Commonly used in tweets, the hashtag uses a number
sign (#) prefix followed by text. Hashtags can be created and used to identify anything,
including people, businesses, organizations, sports teams, political parties, hobbies,
events, philosophies, moods, rants and raves.’956
Internet: ‘[A] large network made up of smaller networks…The global Internet comprises
nearly a billion Web, e-mail and related servers in more than 100 countries. Originally
developed for the U.S. military, it became widely used for academic and commercial
research, with access to unpublished data and journals on many subjects. Today, the
“Net” is the world’s largest source of information on every subject known to humankind.’957
Internet filtering: ‘A government, an ISP [Internet Service Provider], a company or a
parent can install software, either on a personal computer at home or on a server in an
organization, that restricts content to users. A filter can screen particular words, e-mail

951 Toby Mendel, Andrew Puddephatt, Ben Wagner, Dixie Hawtin, and Natalia Torres. 2012. Op. Cit.
p. 64.
952 Joe McNamee. January 2011. Op Cit. p. 3.
953 ‘Domain Name’. Techopedia Dictionary. http://www.techopedia.com/definition/1327/domain-name
(Accessed 25 October 2014.)
954 “Definition of: e-mail’. PC Magazine Encyclopedia. http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/
term/42233/e-mail (Accessed 25 October 2014.)
955 ‘Encryption’. Electronic Frontier Foundation, Surveillance Self-Defense project. https://ssd.eff.org/
en/glossary/encryption (Accessed 24 October 2014).
956 ‘Definition of: hashtag’. PC Magazine Encyclopedia. http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/
term/60984/hashtag (Accessed 25 October 2014.)
957 ‘Definition of: internet”. PC Magazine Encyclopedia. http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/
term/45184/internet (Accessed 25 October 2014.)
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addresses, Web sites or other addresses and be used for example, if a country wishes to
prevent users within its borders from seeing a particular news site online.’958
IP address: ‘Each device connected to the Internet has a unique number [called an IP
address] that allows it to communicate with other devices.’959 When a device connects
with a Web site or online server, its IP address is usually visible. It is possible to determine
information such as approximate location or ISP using an IP address.960
KB: Acronym for Kilobyte, a measurement of data. One KB equals 1,024 bytes. Textbased files, such as emails or documents, consist of thousands of bytes and are often
measured in KB. Audio, image, and video files are much larger and contain millions of
bytes. They are measured in MB (Megabytes, or about one million bytes).961
Keyword: ‘A word used in a text search.’ Also, a ‘word in a text document that is used in
an index to best describe the contents of the document.962 Filtering software often uses
keywords to determine what content or websites to block.
Malware: A combination of ‘malicious software’ referring to ‘[s]oftware ‘designed to
damage computers or computer systems, such as by installing a computer virus.’ 963
Metadata: (also known as “data about data”) and includes ‘everything about a piece of
information, apart from the information itself. So the content of a message is not metadata,
but who sent it, when, where from, and to whom, are all examples of metadata…[M]
etadata can often reveal a great deal, and will often need to be protected as carefully as
the data it describes.’964
MMS: An acronym for Multimedia Messaging Service, MMS is an ‘enhancement to the
SMS text messaging service that enables images, audio and video files to be transmitted
with the text message to a cellphone.’965
Net Neutrality: The principle that ISPs should treat all data equally and not prioritize data
or services for any reason – including commercial and political ones.966
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Network Level: When telecommunications access providers or ISPs perform a given
action, that action occurs at the network level. These actions may not change what
content is available on the World Wide Web, but they affect what users can access online.
Network-level actions that can restrict free expression include filtering, shutting down
service, or deliberately slowing service.
Portal: ‘[A]ny commonly used website serving as an entry point to the Internet, usually
with many links to a wide variety of information, data, resources and services.’967
Post: ‘To place an entry on a blog or social networking site or to place a new or revised
page on a Web site.’968 An entry on a blog or social networking site is also called a post.
Platform Level: When applications such as search engines, social network sites, or web
hosting providers perform a given action, that action occurs at the platform level. These
actions can affect what content is available online as well as what content users can
access. Platform-level actions that can restrict free expression include deleting content,
blocking content from view, or deactivating user accounts.
Pseudonym: ‘[A] name used in place of one’s given (or “real”) name. Examples of
pseudonyms in the computer world include usernames and handles, which are frequently
used when accessing websites or posting comments. A pseudonym may also be known
as a false name.’969
Search engine optimization: ‘Designing a Web site so that search engines find the
pages easily and index them. The goal is to have a page rank as high up on the results
list as possible...Search engine optimization (SEO) includes the choice of keywords used
in the text paragraphs and the placement of those words on the page, both visible and
hidden inside meta tags.’970
SMS: An acronym for Short Messaging Service, SMS is the ‘common text messaging
service available on cellphones and other handheld devices.’971
SIM Card: Short for subscriber identity module card, a SIM card ‘is a portable memory
chip used in GSM [Global Standard for Mobiles] phones. It is a crucial component in
mobile telecommunications as it identifies and stores the telephone number and connects
the cellphone to the mobile carrier’s network.”972
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Social media: ‘[A] catch-all term for a variety of Internet applications that allow users to
create content and interact with each other. This interaction can take many forms, but
some common types include:
•

Sharing links to interesting content produced by third parties

•

Public updates to a profile, including information on current activities and even
location data

•

Sharing photos, videos and posts

•

Commenting on the photos, posts, updates, videos and links shared by others’973

Spam: Unsolicited and bulk communications. Most spam is in the form of email, but
it can also be posted to online chat rooms, message boards, and comments sections.
Spam’s costs come from the cost to human attention and the large amount of network
bandwidth it consumes.
Spider: ‘Also known as a “crawler,” “robot” (bot) and “intelligent agent,” a spider is a
program that searches for information on the Web. Spiders are widely used by Web
search engines to index all the pages on a site by following the links from page to page.
The search engine summarizes the content and adds the links to [its index]. Spiders are
also used to locate Web pages that sell a particular product or to find blogs that have
opinions about a product.’974
Telecommunications: ‘[T]he exchange of information by electronic and electrical means
over a significant distance. A complete telecommunication arrangement is made up of two
or more stations equipped with transmitter and receiver devices…Telecommunications
devices include telephones, telegraph, radio, microwave communication arrangements,
fiber optics, satellites and the Internet.’975
URL: An acronym for Uniform Resource Locator, a URL is the ‘address that defines the
route to a file on an Internet server (Web server, mail server, etc.). URLs are typed into a
Web browser to access Web pages and files, and URLs are embedded within the pages
themselves as links.’976
Web hosting: Making a Web site available on the Internet. A Web site contains pages
of information stored in a Web server, which is a computer running Web server software
connected to the Internet…Small [organizations] typically use a third party to host their
site; however, sites with minimal traffic can share a single server with other low-traffic
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customers. In contrast, Web sites for large [organizations] may require dozens, hundreds
or even thousands of Web servers.977
World Wide Web: ‘An Internet-based system that enables an individual or a company
to publish itself to the entire world, except to countries or locations that prohibit the free
interchange of information.’978

977 ‘Definition of: Web hosting’. PC World Encyclopedia.
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